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ABSTRACT	
This	 is	 an	 integrative	 paper	 aiming	 to	 encapsulate	 the	 themes	 of	 my	 previously	
published	work	 upon	which	 this	 PhD	 is	 being	 assessed.	 This	work;	 encompassing	
several	 papers	 and	 various	 chapters	 of	my	 book	 are	 attached	 behind	 this	 essay.	
The	 research	 question,	 examines	 the	 effect	 of	 Western	 support	 to	 warlords	 on	
political	 legitimacy	 in	 the	 post	 9/11	 Afghan	 war.	 I	 contextualise	 the	 research	
question	 in	 terms	 of	my	 critical	 engagement	with	 the	 literature	 of	 strategists	 in	
Afghanistan	 during	 this	 time.	 Subsequently,	 I	 draw	out	 themes	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
available	 literature	 on	warlords,	 politics	 and	 security	 in	 Afghanistan.	 I	 highlight	
the	value	of	 thinking	about	 these	questions	conceptually	 in	 terms	of	 legitimacy.	 I	
then	 introduce	 the	published	work,	 summarising	 the	 focus	of	each	paper	or	book	
chapter.	Later,	a	‘findings’	section	addresses	how	the	policy	of	supporting	warlords	
has	 affected	 legitimacy	 through	 its	 impact	 on	 security	 and	 stability,	 the	 political	
settlement	and	ultimately	whether	Afghans	 choose	 to	accept	 the	Western-backed	
project	in	Afghanistan,	or	not.	I	argue	that	this	issue	is	important	as	it	has	security	
implications	 not	 just	 in	 the	 immediate	 region,	 but	 increasingly,	 throughout	 the	
Middle	East	and	possibly	further.		
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1. Introduction	
	Following	 the	 events	 of	 11	 September	 2001,	 the	 US	 and	 UK	 began	 a	 bombing	campaign	 on	 Afghanistan	 under	 the	 name	Operation	Enduring	Freedom	 (OEF).	The	 stated	 aim	 of	 the	 campaign	 was	 ‘to	 disrupt	 the	 use	 of	 Afghanistan	 as	 a	terrorist	base	of	operations	and	 to	attack	 the	military	 capability	of	 the	Taliban	regime’.1		Additional	aims,	elucidated	in	the	general	discourse,	were	for	a	‘liberal	humanitarian	intervention’	in	Afghanistan.	This	was	despite	the	contested	nature	of	the	terminology	with	Chomsky	(2001),	Ali	(2000)	and	Chesterman	(2001)	all	of	whom	 questioned	whether	 ‘humanitarian	 intervention’	was	 really	 a	 pretext	for	geopolitical	control	 in	strategically	important	regions	rather	than	importing	democracy	and	human	rights	to	conflict-affected	countries.					By	 2001,	 war	 had	 been	 ongoing	 in	 Afghanistan	 for	 over	 two	 decades	 and	 the	conflict	had	evolved	through	several	distinct	phases	(Maley,	2011).	A	central	part	of	 the	 US-led	 strategy	 after	 9/11	 was	 re-empowering	 un-indicted	 warlords.	2		Support	 was	 principally	 rendered	 by	 the	 US	 with	 the	 UK	 acting	 as	 a	 junior	partner.	Initially,	this	support	was	delivered	in	the	form	of	cash	and	weapons	to	strongmen	allies	brought	back	from	exile	abroad,	as	recalled	by	Dobbins	(2008),	Rubin	 (2004),	 Shroen	 (2003),	 Beardon	 (2005)	 and	 Grenier	 (2015).	 The	 CIA	initiated	the	strategy	and	later	US	military	chiefs	justified	it	as	an	alternative	to	putting	 Western	 military	 ‘boots	 on	 the	 ground.’	 	 	 Later,	 significant	 political	support	for	warlords	manifested	in	a	variety	of	ways,	3	which	ultimately	enabled	warlords	to	shape	and	constitute	the	state	itself.			A	 secondary	phase	of	 support	 started	 in	2003	when	 ISAF	 (later	NATO)	moved	outside	the	cities	in	the	guise	of	Provincial	Reconstruction	Teams	(PRTs),	whose	remit,	 in	 reality,	 was	 undefined	 (Stapleton,	 2008).	 The	 establishment	 of	 PRTs	had	further	implications	for	direct	and	indirect	support	to	regional	warlords;	in																																																									1	Statement	given	after	the	start	of	the	US	and	British	military	strikes	on	targets	in	Afghanistan	on	Sunday,	7th	October	2001	by	President	George	Bush.	2	I	have	used	the	generic	term	‘warlords’	throughout	this	paper	for	simplicity	even	though	in	some	places	the	term	‘strongmen’	may	be	more	appropriate.	Barfield	(2010,	p.	282)	describes	how	landowning	khans	(previous	allies	of	the	state)	were	replaced	during	the	jihad	by	“a	new	generation	of	younger,	self-made	military	commanders,	fighting	for	the	mujahideen	against	the	Kabul	government”.		Barfield	adds	that	‘militia	leaders	created	by	Najibullah	as	the	Soviets	withdrew’	were	added	to	this	group.		They	became	dominant	after	the	Soviet	withdrawal	and,	though	many	prominent	regional	commanders	were	killed	or	went	into	exile	during	the	Taliban	period,	the	associated	structure	of	‘local	commanders’	could	not	be	so	easily	displaced.	It	was	to	these	lower	level	commanders,	Barfield	says,	that	the	regional	leaders	(the	‘warlords’)	reconnected	following	the	collapse	of	the	Taliban	regime	in	2001	(ibid).			3	Political	legitimization	of	warlords	by	the	international	community	(IC)	was	initiated	at	the	Bonn	Conference	in	December	2001,	which	was	a	‘victors	peace’	rather	than	a	Peace	Agreement.		There	was	no	move	to	sideline	those	previously	accused	of	crimes	against	humanity	or	war	crimes	despite	the	fact	that	in	2004,	in	‘A	Call	for	Justice’	ordinary	Afghans	expressed	their	desire	for	accountability.		Further	political	legitimization	continued	with	the	ability	of	warlords	to	usurp	the	rules	of	Bonn	and	with	their	last	minute	inclusion	in	the	June	2002	‘Emergency	Loya	Jirga;’	a	development	that	UN	chief	Lakhdar	Brahimi	dubbed	‘Peace	versus	Justice’	(though	he	later	‘recanted’	).		Later	there	was	the	failure	by	the	IC	to	push	for	‘vetting’	of	parliamentary	candidates	for	previous	crimes	or	to	ensure	that	parliamentary	candidates	could	not	be	linked	to	armed	groups.		All	these	issues	are	developed	in	my	papers.	
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particular	 when	 warlords’	 militias	 were	 engaged	 with	 Western	 PRT	Commanders.	4	From	2006,	as	the	centre	struggled	to	consolidate	its	authority,	a	third	 wave	 of	 support	 was	 delivered	 to	 paramilitary	 groups	 in	 the	 regions,	funded	 by	 the	 CIA	 and	 the	 Pentagon	 as	 catalogued	 by,	 among	 others,	 Kipping	(2008)	and	Gopal	(2014).	This	was	in	spite	of	a	parallel	project	aiming	to	build	a	centralised	Afghan	national	army	and	police.			Today,	 despite	 the	 initial	 aims	 of	 the	war,	 the	 Taliban	 appears	 to	 be	 stronger	than	ever;	escalating	the	number	and	shock-value	of	terror	attacks	in	the	region,	strengthening	military	control	over	districts	in	Afghanistan	5	and	expanding	their	connections	with	other	radical	groups	across	the	Middle	East	(e.g.	Islamic	State).	A	 classified	December	 2013	US	National	 Intelligence	 Estimate	 (NIE)	 quoted	 in	the	Washington	Post	predicted	the	Taliban	to	return	to	power	by	2017	(see	LME,	2014	 pp.	 607	 f.n.	 59).	 In	 May	 2014,	 the	 International	 Crisis	 Group	 expressed	grave	 concern	 about	 Afghanistan	 consisting	 of	 a	 multitude	 of	 conflicts,	 where	insurgency	was	worsening	and	district	 centres	were	susceptible	 to	 falling	back	into	Taliban	hands	unless	the	West	stepped	up	its	efforts	to	support	ANSF.	The	long	disputed	April	2014	elections,	though	initially	deemed	relatively	successful,	were	 dominated	 by	warlords	 or	 their	 proxies	 (Nordland,	 2014).6	Although	 the	outcome	of	 the	war	may	not	be	 fully	known	 for	many	years	 to	come,	my	work	aims	to	show	how	processes	initiated	by	Western	states	in	2001	have	led	to	the	present	and	ongoing	situation.					Research	Rationale		My	 central	 question	 is	 how	 has	 Western	 support	 to	 warlords	 from	 2001-14	affected	political	legitimacy	in	Afghanistan?		Western	support	to	warlords	after	9/11	was	both	military	(encompassing	arms,	cash	 and	Western	military	 power)	 and	 political.7	The	 decision	 to	 give	military	support	 to	 the	Northern	Alliance	 (NA)	 brought	 about	 an	 array	 of	 security	 and	political	 implications.	An	early	example	was	how	the	US	bombing	of	 front	 lines	northeast	 of	 Kabul	 enabled	 the	 NA	 to	 take	 key	 ministries	 from	 the	 departing	Taliban.	This	established	‘facts	on	the	ground’	that	led	to	an	imbalanced	political	settlement;	 something	 my	 interlocutors	 and	 Abdul	 Haq	 (see	 below)	 had	attempted	to	warn	against.	To	further	situate	my	work,	 I	examine	the	available	literature	 surrounding	 these	 questions.	 For	 example	 how	 support	 was	constituted	 in	 Afghanistan,	 before	 and	 after	 2001.	 The	 1980s	 anti-Soviet	 jihad	drew	a	regional	and	Western	covert	response	and	I	found	the	effects	of	historic																																																									4	Also	the	refusal	by	NATO	Commanders	to	support	a	Programme	for	disarming	‘illegal	armed	groups’	(known	as	DIAG)	in	2004/5	because	of	the	implications	this	might	have	for	‘force	protection’	of	NATO	soldiers	at	the	PRTs.		The	corollary,	was	that	NATO	bases	and	PRTs	increasingly	worked	with	local	warlords	and	commanders,	to	the	bemusement	of	locals.		5	New	York	Times	30	July	2014	6	27	February	2014	Rod	Nordland	‘Warlords	with	dark	pasts	battle	in	Afghan	election’,	New	York	Times		7	see	note	3.		
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relationships	 built	 up	 during	 the	 jihad	were	 still	 in	 evidence	 in	 2001.	 I	 looked	broadly	at	state-building	and	state	 formation	theory	and	examined	how	far	the	post-2001	 Afghan	 intervention	 really	 was	 a	 ‘liberal	 peace.’	 There	 were	 many	assumptions	in	the	US	and	UK	about	the	war	which	do	not	reflect	the	realities	I	witnessed	on	the	ground.	My	publications	also	examine	how	the	initial	phase	of	support	 from	2001	 impacted	 upon	 the	 secondary	 phase	 (from	2003	 onwards)	and	 how	 the	 initial	 military	 strategy	 affected	 the	 political	 settlement,	 identity	politics,	legitimacy	and	the	national	narrative.			My	study	of	the	so-called	Haq	plan	is	an	analysis	of	the	counter-narrative.	While	the	Haq	plan	was	ultimately	undermined	by	Western	 intelligence,	 it	represents	an	Afghan-led	alternative	for	toppling	the	Taliban	already	exising	for	two	years	prior	 to	 9/11.	 Although	 Haq	 had	 international	 connections	 I	 found	 that	 these	were	not	through	the	official	channels	of	the	intelligence	agencies	that	warlords	enjoyed	after	9/11;	and	which	often	 reverted	 to	 relationships	established	with	Western	intelligence	agencies	during	the	1980s	(see	LME,	2011	Chapters	12,	13,	19	 and	 21).	 	 Numerous	 writers	 including	 Tomsen	 (2011),	 Kaplan	 (2002)	 and	Gutman	(2008)	describe	how	from	the	1980s	Pakistani	strategy,	financed	by	the	US	 and	 other	 Western	 states,	 factional	 warlords	 who	 supported	 Pakistan’s	perceived	 regional	 strategic	 interests	 were	 favoured. 8 	Hence,	 effective	nationalists	such	as	Abdul	Haq	were	neglected	while	leaders	such	as	Gulbuddin	Hikmatayar	were	given	preferential	treatment	(LME,	2011,	chapter	6).	Pakistan’s	use	of	certain	proxy	warlords	reflected	its	 leadership’s	concerns	about	Pashtun	nationalism,	the	threat	of	a	re-negotiation	of	the	Durand	border	with	Afghanistan	and	the	curtailment	of	Indian	influence	in	the	region	(LME,	2011,	Chapter	10).			Abdul	 Haq’s	 plan	 did	 not	 call	 for	 international	 support	 in	 2001.	 Instead	 he	preferred	that	the	West	hold	off	on	its	bombing	campaign	because	Haq	foresaw	its	deleterious	impact	on	security	and	power	politics	in	Afghanistan	(LME,	2011	chapters	 12,	 13,	 19,	 21,	 22	 and	 LME,	 2014).	 The	 Haq	 plan	 demonstrates	 how	power	is	purchased	locally	in	relation	to	relationships	based	not	solely	on	‘rent	seeking’,	as	is	often	assumed,	but	in	relation	to	historic	legitimacy.	I	believe	this	an	 important,	 yet	 overlooked,	 resource	 in	Western	 state-building	 and	 counter-insurgency	 strategy	 which	 has	 often	 placed	 too	 much	 weight	 on	 military	solutions	(LME,	2010,	pp	980-90).	The	Haq	plan	encompassed	agreements	made	in	 the	 two	 years	 prior	 to	 9/11	 with	 regional	 tribal	 leaders,	 including	 senior	Taliban	members	who	wanted	 to	 defect.	 	 As	 such	 the	Haq	 plan	was	 not	 just	 a	Pashtun	claim	for	legitimacy	but	rather	based	on	nationwide	consensus.				Evidence	 I	 accumulated	 as	 a	 result	 of	 a	 decade	 of	 research	 and	 experience	 in	Afghanistan	demonstrates	 that	 although	 the	 choice	made	by	 the	West	 to	work	with	warlords	in	2001	may	have	fulfilled	short-term	military	objectives,	it	failed	to	 suitably	 respond	 to	 the	aspirations	of	Afghans.9	In	addition,	 the	decision	did	not	appreciate	the	regional	context	of	a	war	that	had	been	ongoing	for	over	two																																																									8	There	was	also	significant	funding	and	support	from	Saudi	Arabia	but	that	was	delivered	directly	to	selected	mujahideen	leaders	-	eg.	Sayyaf.		9	Schmeidl,	2009,	p.	72,	says,	“one	of	the	questions	raised	most	frequently	during	nation-wide	civic	education	outreach	campaigns	by	the	Afghan	civil	society	Forum	and	its	partners	during	2003-2005	was	when	there	would	be	an	end	to	warlord	rule.	“	
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decades	 (comprising	an	 internal	 civil	war	and	a	 regional	 ‘power	play’).	Thus	 it	failed	 to	 anticipate	 longer	 term	 effects	 on	 security,	 stability,	 development	 and	consequently	 the	 legitimacy	 of,	 and	 support	 for,	 the	 project	 by	 Afghans	themselves.	Ultimately,	any	gains	made	are	liable	to	be	reversed	as	US	and	NATO	troops	pull	out.			My	research	therefore	challenges	the	generally	received	wisdom	that:	there	were	no	other	options	available	in	2001;	that	the	US-led	coalition	undertook	a	‘liberal	intervention’;	 that	 it	 was	 essentially	 a	 ‘legitimate’	 war;	 and	 that	 the	 fault	therefore	does	not	lie	with	the	West.10	These	published	works	contextualise	and	thus	 challenge	 myths	 which	 have	 been	 propagated	 by	 the	 US	 and	 UK	governments	 and	militaries.	 I	 feel	 this	 is	 crucial	 to	 understanding	 the	 broader	geopolitical	context	of	rising	instability	in	South	Asia	and	the	Middle	East.					
3.	Approaches	in	the	Literature		The	rationale	 for	my	research	 is	 therefore	based	on	a	critical	engagement	with	the	 mainstream	 strategic	 analysis	 which	 dominated	 Western	 perspectives	 on	Afghanistan	 in	 the	2000s.	This	 received	wisdom	which	was	pronounced	 in	 the	first	 decade	 after	 the	 intervention	 in	 2001	 constitutes	 one	 approach	 in	 the	academic	literature	on	the	subject.	It	is	composed	by	a	politicised	community	of	analysts	 which,	 as	 the	 approach	 has	 become	 demonstrably	 unsuccessful,	 have	sought	to	justify	their	original	recommendations.	I	critically	assess	this	literature	before	 going	 on	 to	 frame	my	 research	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 academic	 literature	 on	warlords	and	legitimacy,	and	state-building.				
Post-9/11	Security	Analysis	Initial	 proponents	 of	 Western	 support	 for	 warlords	 include	 authors	 closely	associated	 with	 the	 strategy	 itself,	 or	 former	 CIA	 personnel	 (Schroen,	 2003;	Beardon,	 2005;	 Berntsen	 et	 al,	 2005).	 These	 include	 the	 US	 Ambassador	 who	oversaw	 the	 December	 2001	 Bonn	 Agreement,	 former	 RAND	 official	 James	Dobbins	who	in	his	2008	book,	‘After	the	Taliban’	wrote	how	‘surprised’	he	was	by	the	failure	of	the	US’s	main	proxy,	the	NA,	to	share	power	with	the	majority	Pashtun	after	 the	 fall	of	Kabul	 (Dobbins,	2008	p	77-97).	However,	 I	 emphasise	that	Haq	had	anticipated	this	problem	and	this	was	the	crux	of	why	he	desired	an	‘Afghan	Solution’	to	toppling	the	Taliban	(see	LME,	2014	f.n.	83	p.	613).			An	important	feature	of	much	of	the	writings	about	security	in	Afghanistan	over	this	period	 is	 that	authors	are	deeply	 implicated	 in	 the	object	of	 their	analysis.	Though	I	have	drawn	on	Rubin	(1995),	Coll	(2004)	and	Rashid	(2000	and	2007),	my	work	differs	 in	 that	 I	 felt	Rubin	and	Rashid	were	both	very	 involved	 in	 the	initial	 strategy.11	Few	 authors	 have	made	 this	 point	 (see	 LME,	 2011,	 note	 2)12	and	 I	 did	 so	 because	 I	was	 concerned	 both	were	 very	 influential	 on	what	was																																																									10	Comments	by	Jose	Ramos	Jorta	in	Geneva,	May	2014	indicated	that	the	fault	lay	with	President	Karzai	who	‘failed	to	make	political	space’	for	democracy.	11	An	ICG	analyst	commented	to	me	in	2005	they	were	‘both	architect	and	critic’	of	the	initial	strategy.	12	though	Schmeidl	(2009	p.	69)	makes	a	similar	point	about	the	example	of	the	Constitution	making	process	in	Afghanistan.	
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being	published	on	the	post-2001	Afghan	conflict.	Interestingly,	in	the	preface	to	his	2008	book,	Dobbins	 attributes	 	 ‘many	 suggested	 corrections,	 additions	 and	interpretations’	to	Rubin	in	his	manuscript.13						Latterly	some	authors,	often	military	academics	or	former	CIA	officials,	indicate	that	 the	 strategy	 followed	 back	 in	 2001	was	 the	 only	 available	 option.	 Others,	such	 as	 Larson	 (2013)	 describe	 the	 war	 solely	 in	 military	 security	 terms.	Generally,	 the	 military	 narrative	 which	 ignores	 the	 more	 complex	 political	factors	underpinning	 the	war	has	also	been	coupled	with	 the	 received	wisdom	that	 Afghanistan	 ‘failed’	 because	Western	 resources	 switched	 in	 2003	 to	 Iraq.	Like	Rogers	(2010),	who	pleads	for	an	appreciation	of	local	factors	as	crucial	to	understanding	levers	of	conflict,	I	challenge	this	assumption	for	several	reasons.	First,	because	 it	 subscribes	 to	 the	notion	of	 the	Westphalian	order	as	 the	 ‘only	option’	 for	 global	 stability	 (Kissinger,	 2014)	 and	 assumes	 Afghanistan	 to	 be	 a	
tabular	 rasa;	 to	 be	 ‘cured’	 of	 its	 ‘failed	 statehood’	 through	 construction	 and	financial	resources.	For	example,	the	assumption	ignores	the	fact	that	the	USSR	had	also	undertaken	state-building	in	Afghanistan	only	a	decade	before.	I	argue	that	the	tabular	rasa	notion	indicates	collective	blindness	to	the	local	reality	and	obviates	the	need	to	understand	local	and	regional	political	factors	that	affect	the	situation;	 something	 I	 try	 to	 elucidate	 in	my	work.	 	 Secondly,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	failure	 occurred	 early	 on	 (October	 2001	 -	 July	 2002)	when	 significant	military	and	 political	 support	 was	 accorded	 to	 warlords.	 This	 affected	 power	 politics,	closing	 off	 opportunities	 to	 ameliorate	 the	 situation	 later.	 	 Abdul	Haq	 foresaw	this	 problem	 and	 argued	 that	 a	 window	 of	 opportunity	 would	 close.	 I	 show	iteratively	how	this	set	the	stage	for	what	has	occurred	since	with	regard	to	the	undermining	of	the	rule	of	law,	corruption,	instability,	insecurity,	the	resurgence	of	the	Taliban	and	the	overall	impact	this	has	all	had	on	global	security.					The	 accounts	 of	 former	 UN	 or	 State	 Department	 officials	 in	 Harrison	 and	Cordovez	 (1995),	 Gutman	 (2008),	 Kaplan	 (2001)	 and	 Tomsen,	 (2011)	 are	consistent	with	my	research	findings.	They	detail	the	Soviet	pull-out,	the	role	of	Pakistan,	 the	 close	 relationship	 between	 the	 CIA	 and	 ISI	 despite	 the	 differing	strategic	 interests	 of	 both	 countries	 in	 the	 region,	 while	 the	 ISI	 policy	 of	favouring	 warlords	 deemed	 compliant	 to	 Pakistani	 regional	 interests	 and	 the	rise	of	the	Taliban	and	al	Qaeda	was	also	documented.	Both	Tomsen	and	Gutman	describe	extensively	the	friction	between	the	US	Department	of	State	and	the	CIA	during	 the	 1980s	 and	 since	 2001.	 I	 reiterate	 with	 empirical	 observations	 the	effects	 of	 this	 friction	 post-9/11.	 At	 the	 outset	 of	 the	 war	 in	 2001,	 most	journalists	were	behind	Northern	Alliance	 front	 lines;	hence	 tending	 to	see	 the	warlord	 allies	 as	 ‘good	 guys’	 while	 the	 majority	 Pashtun,	 despite	 not	unanimously	 favouring	 the	 Taliban,	 were	 seen	 as	 ‘complicit’,	 ‘backward’	 and	‘conservative’.14		 My	 work	 redresses	 this	 balance	 with	 observations	 on	 the																																																									13	Dobbins	also	talks	about	how	the	Afghan	campaign	has	been	covered	“from	several	perspectives”	and	then	lists	the	books	of	senior	US	military	and	CIA	agents	as	informing	his	perspective.		These	were	those	of	Gen.	Tommy	Franks	and	CIA	agents	Schroen	and	Berntsen,	who	led	the	two	“para-military”	teams	into	Afghanistan	after	9/11.		My	work	is	an	attempt	to	find	a	counter	perspective.				14	For	example	the	notorious	propaganda	example	of	the	BBC’s	John	Simpson’s	‘arrival’	with	the	Northern	Alliance	in	Kabul	in	November	2001.			
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Pashtun	 reaction	 to	 the	post-9/11	 intervention	and	new	power	 structures	 and	attempts	 to	 disaggregate	 the	 Pashtun	 from	having	 the	 unwanted	 reputation	 of	‘Taliban	supporters’	(LME,	2011,	chapters	3,	7	and	8).					During	 the	 1980s	 war	 when	 Afghanistan	 was	 relatively	 inaccessible,	 Western	journalists	 travelled	 with	 mujahideen	 leaders	 to	 gain	 access	 to	 the	 country.	Several	admitted	bias	in	their	support	as	few	based	themselves	on	the	Soviet	side.	My	work	bridges	those	competing	viewpoints	by	relating	Afghan	perspectives	on	the	various	regimes	(eg.	Communist,	Mujahideen,	Taliban).	The	elections	in	2002	and	 2005	 exposed	 former	 Afghan	 mujahideen	 or	 communist	 sympathisers	whose	views	often	contradicted	Western	received	wisdom	about	the	1980s.		For	example,	 I	 found	the	most	dominant	Western	narrative	of	 the	anti-	communist,	‘freedom	 fighter’	 struggle	 to	 be	 somewhat	 distorted	 because	 many	 ordinary	Afghans	 saw	benefits	 in	 communism	as	 a	 vehicle	 for	modernisation	 and	 state-building.	 Some	 interlocutors	 were	 in	 favour	 of	 President	 Daoud,	 and	 later	President	Najibullah,	seeing	them	as	supporters	of	modernisation,	education	and	reconstruction.	 These	 diverse	 viewpoints	 enabled	 me	 to	 appreciate	 how	 the	Afghan	conundrum	was	not	the	simple	Manichean	struggle	presented	by	much	of	the	 media	 after	 9/11.	 It	 also	 demonstrated	 the	 value	 of	 an	 ethnographic	approach	 to	 understanding	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 situation	 and	 the	 need	 for	 a	historical	perspective.					
Legitimacy	and	warlords	An	 alternative	 perspective	 is	 found	 in	 the	 academic	 literature	 on	 warlords,		which	assesses	the	conditions	by	which	the	integration	of	military	factions	may	be	 considered	 legitimate.	 One	 of	 the	 foremost	 theorists	 of	 legitimacy,	 David	Beetham	(1991:	16),	sees	power	as	legitimate	if	it	meets	the	following	criteria:	(i) Conforms	to	established	‘rules.’	(ii) When	these	‘rules’	are	justified	in	terms	of	beliefs	shared	by	both	the	dominant	and	subordinate.		(i) When	 there	 is	 evidence	 of	 consent	 by	 subordinates	 to	 the	 power	relation;		I	 find	 Beetham’s	 notion	 of	 legitimacy	 useful	 because	 it	 is	 applicable	 both	 to	 a	modern	Weberian	style	nation	state	and	to	more	customary	systems.	This	is	the	case	even	where	tribal	structures	have	been	damaged	and	fragmented	during	the	past	 thirty	 years	 of	 war.	 Lister	 (2007)	 describes	 ‘micro-societies’	 created	 by	tribal	 and	 religious	 leaders	 before	 the	war	which	 related	 to	 central	 and	 other	powers	on	the	basis	of	negotiation	and	patronage.	Kuhn	(2010)	highlights	how	paradoxical	 claims	 of	 accountability	 have	 created	 tension	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	‘rentier	 state’	 situation	 in	 Afghanistan	 since	 2001.	 Hence,	 today	 the	 questions	include;		
• Who	provided	consent	for	the	rules	being	established?		
• Was	it	the	external	supporting	powers	or	the	Afghan	people?			
• Hence	the	question	of	whose	rules,	whose	beliefs	and	whose	consent	are	at	issue?		
• Is	it	those	of	Afghan	citizens	or	warlords	or	their	Western	paymasters?				
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There	are	opposing	positions	in	the	academic	literature	about	the	effects	on	state-building,	security	and	political	legitimacy	of	supporting,	rather	than	side-lining,	warlords.	For	example,	Stedman	(1997,	5-53)	argues	that	warlords	should	be	distinguished	according	to	whether	they	are	‘spoilers’	of	a	Weberian	inspired	state-building	project	or	not.	Ahram	and	King	(2012,	p.	170-173)	see	warlords	as	‘the	type	of	social	organization	that	the	state	was	meant	to	supplant.’	Lyons	and	Samatur	(1995)	and	Marten	(2006/7)	see	warlords	as	antithetical	to	the	state	in	that	they	exploit	systems	characterised	by	anarchy	and	insecurity	to	such	a	degree	that	their	empowerment	undermines	any	form	of	legitimate	governance.	I	aim	to	show	how	the	decision	made	in	2001	to	empower	warlords	to	displace	the	Taliban/al	Qaeda	goes	against	the	orthodoxy	of	liberal	peace	or	the	aim	to	eject	the	Taliban	for	it	undermined	the	rules-based	system	of	the	democratic	centralised	state.		I	am	one	of	few	authors	to	have	observed	directly	how	the	international	community	accorded	political	legitimacy	to	warlords	at	the	ELJ	in	2002	at	what	was	effectively	a	faustian	bargain	whose	corollary	was	a	hijacking	of	the	so-called	democratic	process	and	state-building	project	by	un-elected	warlords.1516		The	result	was	the	side-lining	and	intimidation	of	democratically-elected	Afghan	delegates	who	were	disbarred	from	dialogue,	empowerment	or	inclusivity	(essential	ingredients	of	peace-building).17	Where	Peceny	and	Bosin	(2011)	see	contradictions	in	a	policy	that	co-opted	warlords	yet	aimed	to	build	a	modern	and	democratic	state,	I	have	aimed	to	provide	concrete	examples	of	what	this	meant	to	Afghans	using	empirical	observation	of	events	as	they	unfolded.			While	Ledwidge	(2011),	Schetter	(2002)	and	Transparency	International	(2015)	argue	that	the	2001	decision	to	co-opt	warlords	rendered	the	state	unable	to	provide	public	goods	and	services	and	increased	inequality,	poverty,	criminality	and	instability,	I	have	again	given	examples	of	how	Afghans	felt	about	these	events.		Chayes	(2015)	portrays	the	corruption	engendered	as	a	result	of	the	policy	as	a	dangerously	destabilising	force	with	international	implications.	I	build	a	case	for	why	there	was	a	crucial	window	of	opportunity	early	on	in	the	intervention	that	was	missed	and	provide	examples	at	each	stage	of	the	intervention	regarding	how	the	situation	was	regressing.	Sharan	(2014)	presents	warlord	strongmen	as	vectors	in	a	networked	state	whose	tentacles	encompass	military,	economic	and	political	strength	and	whose	reach	today	includes	international	organised	crime.	Kuhn	(2008)	finds	that	the	state	was	hampered	by	both	external	demands	of	Western	powers	supporting	the	project	and	the	need	to	seek	political	accommodation	with	the	various	predatory	(and	rent	seeking)	warlords	and	their	proxies,	who	increasingly	came	to	constitute	the	state.	Where	Hodes	and	Sedra	(2005)	see	the	Bonn	meeting	as	a	lost	opportunity	to	re-balance	power	or	sideline	warlords,	I	argue	forcefully	that	the	opportunity	had	already	been	lost,	well	before	Bonn,	due	to	the	‘facts	on	the	ground’	established	weeks	earlier,	with	a	CIA/	military	strategy	that	had	armed	warlords	and	bombed	Taliban	front	lines,	leading	to	the	fall	of	Kabul	to	the	NA;	with	its	‘power’	ministries	(see	LME,	2011	chapters	12,	13	and	LME,	2014).																																																												15	Journalists	were	disbarred	from	entry	and	cordoned	into	the	Intercontinental	hotel,	which	was	over	1	km	away	from	the	site.		16	See	note	3.		17	As	former	UN	envoy	to	Guinea	Bissau	Jose	Ramos	Horta	said	in	a	lecture	titled	‘Preventing	conflicts,	ending	wars,	building	desirable	peace’	in	Geneva	on	15	May	2014.			
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	Mukhopadhyay	(2009	and	2014)	and	Leiven	and	Ottaway	(2003)	posit	that	warlords	are	a	useful	means	of	providing	governance	through	strength	and	bargaining	on	a	messy	continuum	towards	statehood.	However,	while	Mukhopadyay	promotes	the	concept	of	‘warlord	as	bureaucrat’	(2014,	p.	4),	much	of	her	theory	is	rooted	in	African	examples	such	as	those	covered	by	Reno.			Also	Mukhopadhyay’s	notion	of	‘informal’	is	orientated	towards	warlords	with	little	analysis	of	ILG	in	Afghanistan.18			The	inference	of	Mukhapadhyay	and	promoted	by	Boege	et	al	(2009)	is	that	‘warlord	systems	are	embedded	in	the	local	societal	structure	of	clans	and	tribes	as	witnessed	in	Afghanistan	or	Somalia.’		But	Schmeidl	says	(2009)	“this	is	an	extremely	tricky	issue	in	Afghanistan	as	I	have	met	no	Afghans	whose	preferred	choice	is	to	live	in	a	state	run	by	warlords.’		Mukhopadhyay	however	negates	the	impact	of	impunity,	banditry	and	lawlessness,	stating	that	‘predation	and	protection	often	go	hand	in	hand,	as	do	patronage	and	politics	and	the	provision	of	goods	and	services’	(Mukhopadhyay,	2004,	p.	11).	For	example,	banditry	was	a	salient	reason	for	Afghans	initially	welcoming	the	Taliban	as	I	discovered	when	I	lived	in	Kandahar	in	2000.		Their	memories	of	the	period	from	1992	to	1996,	when	‘warlord’	supremacy	led	to	anarchy,	was	one	they	did	not	wish	to	repeat.	Marten	(2014)	and	Ledwidge	(2011	and	2014)	among	others,	present	accounts	of	how	the	West	(in	this	case	the	UK)	misread	legitimacy	in	its	post-9/11	campaigns	in	southern	Afghanistan.			Rather	than	entirely	excluding	warlords	from	the	political	settlement	in	post-9/11	Afghanistan,	my	approach	to	legitimacy	is	not	to	simply	engage	more	with	customary	elements,	but	also	to	distinguish	paramilitary	leaders	who	had	committed	serious	crimes	against	humanity	or	war	crimes	from	those	who	had	not.	Abdul	Haq,	who	had	withdrawn	from	the	battlefield	in	1992	and	who	had	not	been	associated	with	the	worst	violations	of	the	1992-96	civil	war	or	with	war	crimes	in	the	preceding	era	recommended	in	2001	that	warlords	accused	of	crimes	be	sidelined,	made	accountable	before	an	international	body	and	not	included	in	any	new	political	settlement.19	This	fits	with	Beetham’s	notion	of	legitimacy	according	to	rules	and	forms	of	consent,	in	this	case	provided	by	the	legal	system.	Throughout	my	work	I	have	argued	that	if	such	a	system	had	been	supported	by	Western	powers	in	Afghanistan,	a	warlord	such	as	Rashid	Dostum,	who	is	currently	Deputy	President,	would	have	been	held	accountable	for	the	numerous	massacres	he	coordinated	at	different	phases	of	the	last	three	decades	of	conflict	in	Afghanistan.	There	is	also	the	need	to	distinguish	warlords	from	leaders	whose	‘primary	allegiance	is	to	local	solidarity	groups	based	on	kinship	or	locality’	as	described	by	Barfield	and	Nojumi	(2010).	My	major	criticism	of																																																									18	For	example	Mukhopadhyay	(2014,	p.4)	when	talking	about		‘the	absence	of	a	preexisting	institutional	architecture	linking	Kabul	to	the	countryside’	she	fails	to	qualify	the	fact	that	historically	a	balance	between	the	Monarch	and	tribal	leaders	in	the	regions	provided	this	link.		For	Afghanistan	has	never	been	a	modern	state.					19	My	research	established	that	wider	Afghan	opinion	saw	Abdul	Haq	as	legitimate	and	not	a	personality	who	had	engaged	in	war	crimes.	For	example	even	this	month	(February	2015)	a	former	member	of	the	Afghan	National	Security	Council	contacted	me	to	request	that	I	do	an	online	rebuttal	of	a	speech	at	the	New	America	Foundation	in	Washington	DC	held	in	January	2015	by	ex	CIA	Robert	Grenier,	who	had	just	published	his	account	of	events	surrounding	9/11.			
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much	of	the	narrative	around	the	intervention	was	that	senior	British	military	and	DFID/UK	Stabilisation	Unit	figures	seemed	to	have	little	idea	of	what	went	on	in	relation	to	ILG	at	the	periphery.20	Hence,	British	military	and	DFID	staff	dismissed	ILG	and	traditional	elements	as	‘invisible’;	while	continueing	to	believe	warlords	were	the	sole	reference	points	for	engagement	in	Afghanistan.				Other	authors	who	catalogue	serious	examples	of	state	capture	associated	with	the	policy	of	supporting	warlords	include	Maley	(2011),	Filkins	(2009),	Forster	(2010),	Chayes	(2007)	and	Wilder	and	Lister	(2008).	Giustozzi	(2009)	sees	the	prerogative	of	warlords	as	holding	military	power	rather	than	gleaning	benefits.21	Both	Macginty	(2010)	and	Mukhopadhyay	(2014)	appear	to	conflate	the	‘local’	and	‘informal’	with	‘warlord’,	which	I	found	problematic	because	the	narrative	after	9/11	ignored	forms	of	governance	not	visible	to	outsiders	in	favour	of	military	‘might’.	22,23		Like	me,	Schmeidl	and	Karokhail	(2009,	p.	72)	emphasise	the	problem	of	academics	‘endorsing	hybrid	political	orders	that	most	ordinary	Afghans	would	have	opposed’	and	call	for	more	research	to	‘identify	actors	within	hybrid	political	orders	that	should	be….sidelined.’		Unlike	Mukhopadhyay	(2014),	I	do	not	see	warlord	power	as	a	means	to	an	end	on	a	hopeful	continuum	towards	state	stability.	Rather,	‘handing	out	ministries	as	war	bounty	to	different	factions’	at	the	2002	ELJ	(Maley,	2006	in	Schmeidl,	2009,	p.	72)	undermined	the	stability	and	legitimacy	of	the	intervention	in	the	longer	term	to	such	an	extent	that	by	late	February	2015	the	US	was	forced	to	delay	its	planned	departure	from	Afghanistan.24	I	chart	iteratively	how	decisions	made	in	2001-02	led	to	the	present	instability.	LME	et	al	(2013),	argues	that	the	policy	of	supporting	warlords	further	undermined	the	traditional	system	of	governance	which	historically	enabled	a	periphery/centre	balance	and	enabled	locals	to	feel	represented.	The	failure	of	security	analysts	and	practitioners	in	2001-02	to	appreciate	this	context	is	generally	reflected	in	the	literature.	I	disagree	with	the	received	wisdom	that	Afghanistan	failed	due	to	the	Bush	administration’s	decision	to	go	to	Iraq	and	the	resultant	lost	resources,	rather	than	altered	power	structures	and	impunity	(e.g.	see	Rashid,	2012	p.	69).	The	failure	to	debrief																																																									20	For	example	at	meetings	I	attended	on	‘International	Intervention’	at	Ditchley	Park,	May	2012	and	at	Merton	College,	Oxford,	in	December	2013	I	heard	respectively	a	DFID	representative	say	‘we	don’t	want	to	go	back	to	the	13th	Century’	in	response	to	a	comment	on	ILG	in	Afghanistan	and	senior	British	military	figures	dismiss	the	idea	of	there	being	any	elements	other	than	warlords	to	engage	with	in	Helmand.		21		Giustozzi’s	book	came	out	in	advance	of	the	Kabul	bank	scandal	and	some	of	the	worst	stories	of	NATO	cooption	of	warlords	and	the	racketeering	associated	with	those	contracts	eg.	to	guard	roads	or	to	warlord	militias.		For	example	the	case	of	Mattiullah	Khan	in	Orozghan	as	reported	by	Maley	(2011)	or	by	Filkins,	and	Rosenberg,	2010	on	the	Kabul	bank	scandal.		Or	on	Kandahar	governance	and	the	Karzai	family	(Forster,	2010	and	Chayes,	2007).				22	The	US	military	did	recognize	the	importance	of	understanding	informal	local	governance	at	the	periphery.		Hence	the	Human	Terrain	system,	introduced	alongside	the	‘surge’	in	2008,	attempted	to	map	and	engage	with	what	was	‘local’		on	the	ground.			23	The	Human	Terrain	system	was	a	genuine	attempt	by	the	US	military	to	engage	with	less	formalized	governance	at	the	periphery.		Unfortunately	it	came	too	late	(2008)	by	which	time	security	had	broken	down	and	there	had	been	further	fissuring	of	consensus	building	structures,	making	work	very	difficult	for	the	human	terrain	specialists.				24	Ashton	Carter:	US	‘re-thinking	Afghan	Policy’	Foreign	Policy	South	Asia	Channel,	23	February	2015	
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enough	regional	experts		resulted	in	a	dismissal	of	the	role	of	traditional	leadership	and	the	empowerment	of	un-indicted	warlord	strongmen	that	the	CIA	and	Mi6	had	engaged	with	since	the	1980s.	The	corollary	has	been	growing	instability,	complexity,	disenchantment	and	a	trend	of	increasing	sympathy	for	the	Taliban	(see	LME,	2011	p.	260).			
Approaches	to	State-building	A	 third	 approach	 in	 the	 literature	 on	 warlords,	 politics	 and	 security	 in	Afghanistan	 is	 that	 of	 state-building.	 Generally,	 the	 recent	 state-building	approach	 has	 been	 characterised	 by	 the	 externally-led	 process	 whereby	 a	predominantly	Westphalian	 model	 is	 imposed	 even	 on	 to	 occidental,	 complex	tribal	 societies.	 Like	 Schmeidl	 (2007),	 I	 found	 that	 civil	 society	 was	 not	meaningfully	engaged	in	the	state-building	exercise,	but	rather	seen	as	a	threat,	by	 both	 the	 international	 community	 and	 the	 Afghan	 government	 (See	 LME,	Chapter	14,	18	and	note	16).			I	explore	authors	who	critique	the	Westphalian	model	such	as	Paris	(2004)	and	Chesterman	et	al	(LME,	2010,	p	969)	and	emphasise	the	need	to	look	beyond	the	state-centric	 Westphalian	 approach	 to	 governance	 and	 statehood.	 	 Hence,	 I	assess	the	 literature	of	writers	 looking	beyond	orthodox	concepts	of	 legitimacy	and	towards	understanding	the	role	of	legitimacy	and	customary	governance	as	more	effective	responses	to	state	fragility	(see	LME,	2010	pp	980-981,	986-7	and	pp	988-989	and	LME,	2014).	My	work	shows	how	theoretical	approaches	can	be	transposed	to	ground	examples;	for	example,	in	relation	to	the	Haq	plan.	Thus,	I	explore	 and	 summarise	 ideas	 being	 developed	 in	 the	 academic	 sphere	 and	demonstrate	 how	 the	 international	 community	 missed	 opportunities	 in	Afghanistan	to	bring	about	more	 inclusivity	and	accountability	(see	LME,	2010,	2011	 chapters	 12,	 13,	 18	 and	 2013	 pp.	 10-11,	 2014).	 I	 show	 that	 there	 was	potential	for	a	more	stable	political	approach	than	that	delivered	by	the	security-led	focus	of	2001-14.				One	track	of	the	literature	on	state-building	has	focused	on	informality.	Barfield	and	Nojumi	 (2010),	Tariq	 (2008)	and	Schmeidl	and	Karokhail	 (2007)	 find	 that	informal	local	governance	(ILG)	has	remained	an	important	but	neglected	aspect	of	power	dynamics	in	Afghanistan	since	2001.	Barfield	and	Nojumi	(2010)	talk	of	‘gradually	invisible’	informal	local	mechanisms	of	governance	and	show	how	the	focus	on	 engaging	 strongmen	after	9/11	meant	 such	nuances	were	 ignored	by	the	IC.	In	addition,	there	was	a	failure	to	appreciate	that	historical	relationships	between	the	ISI	and	CIA	were	ultimately	problematic	when	it	came	to	selecting	which	warlords	 to	work	with	 after	 9/11.	Hence,	 some	 of	 the	West’s	 supposed	allies,	handpicked	by	Pakistan,	worked	against	Western	strategic	interests	in	the	region.	 An	 example	 of	 the	 corollary	 of	 this	 lack	 of	 focus	 was	 the	 somewhat	scandalous	discovery	of	Osama	bin	Laden	in	2011	in	the	Abbottabad,	where	the	Pakistani	army	is	based.				In	my	work,	I	argue	for	greater	accountability	and	an	approach	to	state-building,	recognising	 positive	 aspects	 in	 both	 Westphalian	 and	 traditional	 models.	Karokhail	and	Schmeidl	(2008)	give	examples	of	how	such	a	bridging	approach	could	 work	 in	 their	 useful	 case	 study	 on	 Loya	 Paktia,	 eastern	 Afghanistan.	 In	
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doing	 so,	 they	 engaged	 tribal	 and	 traditional	 elements	 and	built	 trust	 between	them.	 With	 an	 emphasis	 on	 a	 rules-based	 system	 acceptable	 to	 traditional	elements,	 I	 try	 to	 show	 how	 similar	 bridging	 approaches	 could	 have	 been	employed;	 for	 example,	 with	 a	 local	 consultative	 shura	 in	 Jalalabad	 that	 was	replicable	at	other	governance	levels.				
4.	 Political	Ethnography	as	a	basis	for	research	design		By	drawing	and	reflecting	on	my	practical	experience,	my	research	is	consistent	with	 the	 principles	 outlined	 in	 Schatz’s	 (2009)	 book	 on	 political	 ethnography.	Schatz	 states	 that	 in	 order	 to	 gain	 knowledge	 and	 understanding	 of	 a	 context,	complete	immersion	in	a	community	is	required.	This	enables	the	researcher	to	observe	 participants	whether	 they	 be	 in	 a	 cohort,	 a	 community	 or	 a	 locale	 or	indeed	a	variety	of	 locations	and	contexts.	Furthermore,	Schatz	emphasises	the	importance	 of	 the	 researcher	 understanding	 the	 political	 reality	 of	 those	observed,	 and	 stresses	 that	 this	 goes	 beyond	 face-to-face	 contact.	 I	 tried	 to	 do	this	 and	 also	 to	 triangulate	 my	 questioning	 because,	 having	 lived	 with	 three	decades	 of	 war,	 and	 shifting	 alliances,	 Afghans	 sometimes	 give	 incorrect	responses	 to	questions	 as	 a	 coping	 strategy.	 	This	 type	of	 engagement	 is	more	meaningful	 than	 data	 collection	 and	 allows	 for	 a	 multi-dimensional	 means	 of	inquiry.				Rather	 than	designing	 an	 academic	 research	design	 in	 advance	 of	 going	 to	 the	field,	 I	 reflect	 methodologically	 on	 my	 practices	 of	 questioning	 and	 evidence	gathering	that	led	to	my	findings.	My	experience	was	from	1999	to	2006	in	the	field.	Only	later	did	I	attempt	to	make	sense	of	this	and	relate	it	to	the	literature.	I	published	 ‘the	 Afghan	 Solution’	 in	 2011	 and	 other	 papers	 between	 2008	 and	2014.	 During	 2013,	while	writing	 up	 this	 PhD,	 I	 returned	 twice	 to	 the	 field	 in	Afghanistan.		I	have	worked	as	a	scholar-practitioner	and	have	influenced	policy	with	my	writing	and	talks	at	academic	institutions,	think	tanks	in	Europe	and	the	US	and	the	House	of	Lords	Select	Committee	on	Defence.			I	was	able	 to	witness	 trends,	experience	 for	myself	 the	situation	and	 formulate	empirical	research	through	interviews,	through	participation	in	events,	meetings	and	 conversations	 of,	 and	 between,	 the	 international	 community,	 the	military,	the	Afghan	government	 and	among	normal	Afghans.	What	 I	witnessed	 in	 rural	areas	was	 in	 stark	 contrast	 to	my	 experiences	 of	 the	 assumptions	made	 about	those	 rural	 contexts	 by	 the	 international	 community	 in	 Kabul	 and	 later	 the	military	structures	in	those	regions.			These	 experiences	 enabled	 me	 to	 make	 links	 between	 Western	 support	 for	warlords	 and	 further	 fragmentation	 of	 consensus	 building	 and	 informal	 local	governance	 structures.	 On	 a	 trip	 to	 Afghanistan	 in	 June	 2013,	 an	 Afghan	interlocutor	commented:		 ‘We	had	a	system	and	they	have	destroyed	that;	even	the	Soviets,	Pakistan	and	 the	 Taliban	 never	 quite	 managed	 to	 destroy	 what	 they	 have	 done	since	2001.’	
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	I	 witnessed	 the	 trade-off	 between	 the	 policy	 of	 appeasing	 strongmen	 and	 the	effect	on	stability	and	ultimately	legitimacy.	I	chart	this,	beginning	with	my	own	experience	at	 the	Emergency	Loya	 Jirga	 (ELJ)	 in	2002,	by	referring	back	at	 the	Bonn	 Agreement	 (LME,	 2011,	 chapters	 1,	 2,	 12).	 The	 faustian	 bargain	 made	between	the	UN	/	USA	and	the	warlords	on	the	eve	of	the	ELJ	was	a	shock	to	me	after	monitoring	 elections	 in	 Spring	 2002,	 when	 Afghans	 expressed	 hope	 that	their	 country	 was	 being	 ‘re-born’	 after	 23	 years	 of	 war.	 My	 research	 on	transitional	 justice	 issues	 in	 2002	 for	 the	 International	 Crisis	 Group	 meant	 I	interviewed	 people	 who	 described	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 deal	 made	 between	 the	US/UN	and	the	warlords	at	both	Bonn	in	November	2001	and	the	summer	2002	ELJ	 ,	 which	 included	 senior	 international	 diplomats,	 members	 of	 the	 Afghan	diaspora,	women,	opposition	figures.			My	 fieldwork	also	applied	a	 triangulation	research	method.	This	meant	 I	asked	several	sources	the	same	question	several	times.	I	also	triangulated	several	local	interlocutors	 I	 used.	 For	 example,	 in	 relation	 to	 Pakistani	 policy	 across	 the	Durand	 line,	 I	 interviewed	 both	 Pakistani	 and	 Indian	 representatives	 in	 Kabul	and	Jalalabad,	the	UN	representative	in	Jalalabad,	the	US	military	in	the	area,	the	leader	of	the	Mohmand	tribe	in	Jalalabad	and	local	people	 in	villages	affected.	 I	also	visited	the	Commander	of	the	Afghan	Border	Guard	at	the	Durand	frontline	where	the	Afghans	were	fighting	Pakistani	incursions.					Within	 Appendix	 I	 on	 sources,	 I	 explain	 my	 biography	 and	 positionality	 in	relation	 to	 the	 politics	 of	 writing	 about	 Afghanistan.	 I	 also	 gathered	 empirical	information	and	informed	myself,	through	literature,	on	the	background	to	what	I	was	learning	in	Afghanistan	(on	a	political,	social,	regional	and	historic	basis).			A	list	of	my	interviews	is	included	in	Appendix	I.					
		
5.	 Introduction	to	the	published	works	utilised		Work	 selected	 for	 this	 PhD	 aims	 to	 show	 how	Western	 support	 for	 warlords	since	 2001	 materialised	 and	 what	 it	 says	 about	 the	 broader	 issues	 of	 state-building	 and	 legitimacy.	 The	 objective	 is	 also	 to	 understand	 the	 effects	 on	 the	legitimacy	of	this	support.	I	have	therefore	selected	the	following	papers:			
1) Lucy Morgan Edwards; How the ‘Entry’ defines the ‘Exit’: Contradictions 
between the Political and Military Strategies adopted in Afghanistan and 
how they have undermined longer-term possibilities for stabilisation -	
Conflict,	Security	and	Development,	 Volume	 14,	 Issue	 5,	 2014	 	 	 (LME,	2014)	The	paper	discusses	paradoxes	inherent	to	the	intervention	and	charts	how	the	military	strategy	of	supporting	warlords	affected	power	politics	in	2001,	leading	to	 the	 present	 crisis	 of	 impunity,	 the	 difficulty	 for	 the	 centre	 to	 retain	 a	monopoly	 over	 the	 use	 of	 violence	 and	 the	 resultant	 chaotic	 situation	 in	Afghanistan.	The	paper	makes	linkages	between	the	Haq	strategy	and	the	idea	of	informal	 local	governance	and	traditional/historic	 legitimacy	(Clements,	2009),	
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showing	how	 this	 could	have	 achieved	a	better	 outcome.	 It	 argues	 that,	 rather	than	 seeing	 stabilisation	 solely	 through	 the	 centralised	Westphalian	 state	 and	security	 lens	 (partly	 manifested	 by	 the	 short-term	 strategy	 of	 supporting	warlords),	 practitioners	 have	 neglected	 political	 legitimacy	 as	 an	 essential	ingredient	in	stabilisation.	The	paper	examines	the	Haq	strategy	as	an	alternative.		It	also	examines	literature	on	more	hybridised	approaches	to	governance.		
	2) Lucy	Morgan	Edwards,	International	Review	of	the	Red	Cross	(Vol	92,	No.	 880,	 December	 2010)	 'State-building	 in	 Afghanistan;	 a	 case	showing	the	limits?'		(LME,	2010)	This	paper	was	commissioned	for	a	special	two	volume	edition	entitled	‘Conflict	in	Afghanistan.’	The	title	had	been	chosen	by	the	editors	and	I	had	to	work	within	those	 parameters.	 I	 decided	 the	 question	 could	 only	 be	 answered	 by	 looking	generally	 at	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 current	 state-building	 paradigm	 as	 well	 as	recent	 approaches	 to	 state-building	 and	 so-called	 liberal	 humanitarian	interventions.	 I	 examined	 whether	 the	 fault	 was	 the	 template	 chosen	 for	Afghanistan	 or	 the	 country	 itself.	 So	 I	 assessed	 historical	 approaches	 to	 state-building	in	Afghanistan	and	looked	in	detail	at	the	model	chosen	following	9/11.	This	included	examining	the	various	stages	of	the	Bonn	Agreement,	the	Western	military	strategy,	the		comprehensive	military-led	approach	to	state-building	and	the	outcomes	of	each	of	those	stages;	both	positive	and	negative.	I	also	looked	at	the	literature	on	fragility,	questioning	whether	a	Weberian	model	(emphasising	rule	 of	 law	 rather	 than	 support	 to	 unindicted	 warlords)	 would	 have	 been	appropriate	 for	a	 traditional	society	where	modes	of	governance	and	authority	are	 informal,	 complex	 and	 for	 which	 historic	 and	 charismatic	 sources	 of	legitimacy	are	implicit.	I	looked	at	work	which	challenges	the	orthodox	Weberian	notions	of	state-building,	showing	in	particular	how	informal	local	governance	as	well	 as	 traditional	 and	historic	 legitimacy	mechanisms	 can	be	 a	more	 valuable	means	 to	 affect	 state	 effectiveness.	 I	 found	 that,	 as	 a	 means	 of	 tackling	 state	fragility,	 the	 Weberian	 nation	 state	 model	 has	 resulted	 in	 a	 more	 limited,	predominantly	security-focused	lens	as	a	prescription	for	fragile	conflict	zones.	I	found	that	other	writers	err	on	the	side	of	supporting	a	more	nuanced	approach	in	 complex	 situations,	 seeking	 to	 engage	 with	 informal	 governance	 and	 to	understand	what	constitutes	legitimacy	locally.					3) Guest,	K,	Morgan	Edwards,	L.	and	Seeger,	R.		A Better Path to Peace; a 
more optimistic Solution for Afghanistan, Written Evidence Published by 
the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence Session 2012-13. 
‘Securing the Future of Afghanistan.’ HC 413.		(LME	et	al,	2013)	This	 paper	 builds	 upon	 an	 earlier	 one	 co-written	 with	 the	 same	 authors	 and	published	in	the	Small	War’s	Journal	in	2010	that	emphasised	the	need	to	work	through	 traditional	 elements	 in	 the	 Pashtun	 belt,	 the	 border	 area	 between	Afghanistan	 and	 Pakistan,	 which	 is	 also	 the	 heartland	 of	 the	 insurgency.	 This	paper	 develops	 the	 argument,	 saying	 that	 there	 is	 a	 need	 to	 focus	 on	 the	periphery	 (and	 traditional	 structures),	 rather	 than	 building	 up	 security	 forces	and	militias	from	the	centre.	By	localising	the	response	to	security	problems,	you	are	able	to	build	accountability	(e.g.	accountability	of	the	security	forces	to	those	they	 are	 meant	 to	 be	 protecting)	 into	 the	 system.	 Secondly,	 ‘The	 Better	 Path’	
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warns	against	an	eleventh	hour	political	settlement	that	would	leave	Pakistan	as	the	real	beneficiary	of	the	Western	pull-out	in	2014.				4) Lucy	Morgan	Edwards	‘The	Afghan	Solution:	the	inside	story	of	Abdul	Haq,	the	CIA	and	how	western	hubris	lost	Afghanistan’,	(Pluto	Press	/	Palgrave	Macmillan)	London,	2011	(LME,	2011).		The	 book	 arose	 from	my	 experiences	 in	 the	 region	 from	 1999	 to	 2006	 and	 is	aimed	 at	 a	wide	 readership	 and	 contains	 important	 practitioner	 contributions	that	 others	may	 wish	 to	 draw	 upon	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 background	 research	material	 in	 order	 to	develop	 their	 own	arguments	 in	 the	 field	 of	 humanitarian	intervention,	 liberal	 peace	 building	 and	 to	 develop	 arguments	 about	 how	perception	 management	 arguments	 around	 a	 war	 (e.g.	 of	 supposed	 liberal	intervention)	can	contradict	the	realities	on	the	ground.				I	 have	 chosen	chapters	of	 the	book	which	underpin	 the	 issues	 I	 address	 in	my	research	 question.	 For	 example,	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 intervention	 being	 benign	 and	aimed	 at	 democracy	 is	 called	 into	 question	 with	 chapter	 1	 on	 the	 Emergency	Loya	 Jirga,	 a	major	 event	 in	 the	 state-building	 project.	 Further	 chapters	 show	how	the	policy	of	 re-empowering	warlords	was	disdained	by	ordinary	Afghans	and	knowledgeable	 foreign	 interlocutors	while	 also	highlighting	 the	 cascade	of	effects	arising	from	that	policy.	Later	chapters	look	at	the	Haq	strategy,	why	this	was	more	appropriate	to	the	context	in	2001	and	Afghan	political	legitimacy,	and	why	it	was	rejected	by	the	West.					 a) Chapter	1	-	The	Peace	versus	Justice	Strategy	b) Chapter	2	-	Re-Igniting	Fundamentalism	c) Chapter	9	-	First	you	call	us	Freedom	fighters,	now	warlords		d) Chapter	10	-	Playing	the	al	Qaeda	card		e) Chapter	12-	A	Perspective	on	British	post	9/11	strategy	and	intelligence	(UK	Haq	effort)	f) Chapter	13	 -	He	would	have	begun	 a	Revolution	 (that’s	why	 they	killed	him	so	fast)		g) Chapter	18	-	Governance	and	traditional	structures		h) Chapter	19	-	UK	Haq	effort	Part	2	i) Chapter	21	-	Abdul	Haq	and	CIA	Strategy	in	Afghanistan	
	
	
	
	
6.	Findings		
	My	key	 findings	are	 two-fold.	 In	 the	 first	 sub-section,	 I	 summarise	my	 findings	regarding	 how	 the	 initial	 military	 strategy	 of	 empowering	 warlords	 had	 an	immediate	 effect	 on	power	politics.	 In	 the	 second	 sub-section,	 I	 abbreviate	my	findings	with	respect	 to	how	this	 impacted	upon	the	political	settlement	 in	 the	longer	term	and	ultimately	eroded	Afghan	popular	confidence	in	the	regime	and	the	intervention.			
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a) Post	9/11	Military	Balance	and	Questions	of	Security	The	new	military	facts	on	the	ground	were	already	obvious	at	the	Bonn	Meeting	in	November	2001.	 Further	 evidence	of	 how	warlords	were	 shaping	 the	 state-building	project	came	with	the	ELJ.	I	provide	rare	empirical	observations	of	what	happened	at	the	meeting	and	how	effects	cascading	from	it	ultimately	impacted	upon	 the	political	 legitimacy	of	 the	 regime	and	 its	Western	backers	 from	2002	onwards.	 I	 show	 iteratively	 how	 the	 Taliban	 have	 been	 able	 to	 exploit	 these	weaknesses	 in	 political	 legitimacy	 and	 how	 this	 has	 given	 them	 a	 military	advantage.	 I	 also	 provide	 examples	 of	 alternatives,	 including	 the	 Haq	 plan	 in	order	to	strengthen	the	reasoning	behind	my	argument	with	respect	to	political	legitimacy	in	the	Afghan	context.						
The	Haq	Peace	Plan	The	 Abdul	 Haq	 strategy	 is	 the	 lens	 through	 which	 problems	 inherent	 to	 the	Western	2001	military	strategy	are	shown	(LME,	2011,	chapters	12,	13,	19,	21,	22	 and	 LME,	 2014).	 As	 Haq	 foresaw,	 the	 2001	 Western	 military	 strategy	immediately	altered	the	power	balance	between	competing	ethnic	and	factional	groups.	The	strategy	also	failed	to	take	account	of	historic	parallels	such	as		the	1992	entry	into	Kabul	by	the	mujahideen	which	presaged	the	civil	war	of	1992-1996	when	warlords	carved	up	the	country,	enabling	the	Taliban	to	take	power	easily,	 partly	 because	 locals	 preferred	 security	 to	 anarchy.	 A	 1993	 letter	 from	Abdul	Haq	 to	 the	US	State	Department	describes	 ‘the	 foreign	supporters	of	 the	mujahideen	 choosing	 whom	 to	 give	 weapons	 created	 several	 monsters’	 (LME,	2011	 Annex	 V	 p.	 334).	 Haq’s	 October	 2001	 entry	 into	 Afghanistan	 from	 the	southeast,	attempted	to	hedge	against	an	outcome	similar	to	that	of	1992	when	Massoud’s	 troops	had	 taken	 the	 city	alone,	ultimately	 leading	 to	 inter-factional	conflict	 over	 sharing	 power.	 Interestingly,	 there	 were	 definable	 windows	 of	opportunity	in	2001	that	diminished	with	each	military	victory	by	warlords	over	the	Taliban.	However,	Western	commentators	struggled	to	grasp	the	underlying	dynamics	 behind	 the	 arc	 of	 cities	 that	 were	 held	 by	 Haq’s	 associates	 and	 fell	without	 fighting.	 By	 2001,	 Haq’s	 jihad-era	 commanders	 held	 positions	 in	 the	military	axis	of	 the	Taliban	regime	and	were	ready	for	a	new	order	around	the	former	king.	My	 investigation	 into	 the	Haq	 strategy	 revealed	dynamics	 around	legitimacy	 that	 remain	 inexplicably	 invisible	 to	 the	CIA.	 For	 example,	 the	CIA’s	regional	station	chief	in	2001,	Robert	Grenier,	(2015,	p.	160)	writes	about	Haq:	‘We	just	didn’t	see	any	military	capability	there,	whatever	Haq’s	political	appeal.’	The	 CIA	 was	 assessing	 allies	 based	 purely	 on	 perceived	 military	 capability,	regardless	 of	 political	 acceptability	 or	 legitimacy.	 Pakistan	 also	 continued	 to	enjoy	 disproportionate	 influence	 over	 many	 agents’	 the	 West	 supported	 in	Afghanistan	while	the	CIA	seemed	ambivalent	to	this	(see	LME	2011;	p	197,	201-4,	284	and	287	and	LME	et	al,	2013,	pp	4-6).	The	effects	of	 this	policy,	and	the	beliefs	 underpinning	 it,	 remained	prevalent	 in	 the	 co-constitution	of	 particular	factions	post-9/11.			
Loss	of	state	control	over	security	There	was	also	a	reduction	in	the	monopoly	of	power	over	security	as	a	result	of	the	 policy	 of	 empowering	 regional	 warlords.	 As	 time	 passed,	 and	 warlords	consolidated	 their	 regional	 power	 bases,	 security	 grew	 worse.	 There	 were	
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contradictions	between,	for	example,	the	stated	objectives	and	the	reality	on	the	ground	-	in	Disarmament	Demobilisation	and	Re-integration	(DDR)	programmes,.	So	 even	 as	 the	 UN	 dis-armed	 factions	 of	 the	 ANA,	 the	 US	 continued	 arming	strongmen	 allies	 in	 the	 north	 (LME,	 2011,	 Chapter	 9,	 p.	 140).	 Although	 DDR	initially	 focused	 on	 the	 ANA,	 in	 reality	 it	 was	 a	 subsidy	 to	 the	 faction	 of	Mohammad	Fahim	who	was	Northern	Alliance	chief	and,	 immediately	after	 the	capture	of	Kabul,	Defence	Minister.	Fahim	took	over	 the	military	 infrastructure	of	 the	 departing	 Taliban	 ‘national	 army’	 of	 Afghanistan	 in	 November	 2001,	immediately	 transporting	 its	equipment	 to	 the	Northern	Alliance	stronghold	of	Panjshir	(See	LME,	2011,	p.	259).	 	Disarmament	programmes	also	failed	to	deal	with	the	other	militia	associated	with	the	West’s	new	allies	in	Afghanistan	(LME,	2011	p	258-9).	By	2005,	 the	EUSR	office,	where	I	worked,	estimated	that	there	were	 around	1700illegal	militias	 (see	LME,	 2011	p	220	 -	 221)	 associated	with	regional	 warlords	 in	 the	 countryside.	 Though	 there	 was	 a	 proposal	 for	 a	Disarming	 Illegal	 Armed	 Groups	 (DIAG)	 programme,	 by	 2005	 the	 Western	military	leaders	of	the	PRTs	were	not	keen	to	disarm	strongmen	on	whom	they	relied	for	force	protection,	provision	of	militias,	guarding	of	routes	and	provision	of	land	in	their	quest	to	fight	the	Taliban	(See	LME,	2011,	p.	258-9).			From	2003,	the	enrichment	of	strongmen	continued	under	NATO	with	lucrative	contracts	 awarded	 for	 guarding	 routes,	 providing	 militias,	 renting	 land	 (often	illegally)	and	transporting	oil.	Some	warlords	played	both	sides	(e.g.	NATO	and	Taliban)	 for	 financial	 gain.	 Partly	 as	 a	 result	 of	 these	 contradictions,	 the	 initial	policy	of	building	a	central	ANSF	had	not	achieved	its	objectives	by	2006.	Hence,	from	2006	 the	West	began	 a	project	 to	 support	 the	 centre	by	 creating	militias	(paramilitary	 groups)	 in	 the	 regions.	 By	 2012,	 ICRC	 remarked	 that	 the	multiplicity	of	armed	groups	now	roaming	the	countryside	was	contributing	 to	decreasing	 levels	 of	 security.25	The	 line	 between	militia	 and	 non-state	 actor	 is	fluid,	 especially	where	militias	 engage	 in	 illicit	 or	 random	 criminal	 activity,	 as	part	of	local	or	international	networks	(See	LME	2011,	2015).	In	re-constituting	militias	with	Western	 influence	and	rents,	and	making	 them	answerable	 to	 the	Ministry	 of	 Interior	 (MOI)	 in	 Kabul,	 there	 have	 been	 problems	 with	accountability	 at	 the	 periphery	 (LME,	 2010,	 p.	 968).	 In	 LME,	 2010	 (p.	 968)	 I	detail	the	multiplicity	of	militia	set	up	by	the	US.Hence,	in	LME	et	al	(2013,	pp	10	-	13),	we	argue	for	devolution	of	security	in	order	to	build	accountability	locally	so	as	to	resolve	problems	in	the	security	sector.		By	2013,	 the	general	discourse	acknowledged	that	the	ANSF,	despite	a	massive	financial	 outlay,	 would	 not	 provide	 adequate	 security;	 a	 view	 reinforced	 by	Sharan	 (2014)	 who	 posits	 that	 the	 security	 of	 an	 individual	 in	 post-2014	Afghanistan	 is	 related	 more	 to	 their	 engagement	 in	 a	 network	 than	 security	afforded	by	the	state.	The	view	among	Afghans	during	both	of	my	visits	in	2013	was	 that	 inequality	and	crime	continued	 to	decline.	 	An	Engineer	 told	me	 	 that	life	 was	 better,	 with	 less	 inequality,	 under	 the	 last	 communist	 leader,	 Dr.	Najibullah	in	the	late	1980’s.		This	underlines	the	general	preference	for	a	rules-
																																																								25	September	2012	ICRC	Press	conference	to	mark	departure	of	Mission	head	Reto	Stocker	from	Kabul	after	six	years	in	post.		
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based	 system,	 whether	 it	 is	 Western	 or	 grounded	 in	 traditional	 forms	 of	legitimacy.				
b) How	Security	Politics	Impacted	upon	the	Political	Settlement		Political	 legitimacy	 in	Afghanistan	post-2001	was	progressively	 impacted	upon	by	 the	policy	of	 supporting	warlords.	This	affected	political	 legitimacy	because	steps	were	 taken	without	 conditions	being	met	 early	on	 to	 support	 the	 rule	of	law,	 accountability	 or	 side-lining	 those	 involved	 in	 previous	 rights	 abuses	 and	compensating	victims.	Instead,	external	support	for	warlords,	 in	altering	power	politics,	 impacted	upon	political	stability,	security	and	ungoverned	space	at	the	periphery.	Meierhenrich,	(2004,	p.	156)	speaks	of	legality	and	bureaucracy	as	the	“most	important	tasks	in	state	formation	after	state	failure”	for	“both	can	“lock	in”	stakes	for	those	who	stand	to	lose	from	the	reformation	of	a	state.”			My	work	goes	beyond	assessing	whether	the	 intervention	was,	 in	 fact,	a	 liberal	peace.	 I	 aim	 to	 show	 the	 consequent	 effects	 on	 legitimacy,	 stability	 and	 the	workings	of	power	arising	from	warlords’	renewed	strength	from	2001	onwards.	This	 warlord	 strength	 was	 generally	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 ordinary	 Afghans	 and	flowed	from	the	initial	military	strategy,	the	Bonn	Agreement	and	later	the	ELJ.	The	late	Sebhagatullah	Sangar,	former	leader	of	the	Republican	Party	(who	I	call	‘Musa’	in	my	2011	book	to	protect	him),	infers	the	hypocrisy	of	the	then	Special	Representative	 of	 the	 Secretary	 General	 in	 Afghanistan,	 Lakhdar	 Brahimi,	 in	brokering	a	 faustian	deal	at	 the	ELJ	with	 the	warlords	but	 then	complaining	 in	UNAMA	reports	to	the	Security	Council	of	a		breakdown	in	security	beyond	Kabul	(see	 LME	 2011,	 p.	 144,	 146.).	 I	 describe	 how	 ordinary	 elected	 delegates	 felt	betrayed	 by	 the	 international	 community	 (LME,	 2011	 p	 34,	 37,	 48,	 49).	 By	empowering	warlords,	results	were	felt	immediately	with	detrimental	effects	on	women’s	 rights,	 the	 media	 and	 justice	 (see	 LME,	 2011	 p.	 47-52,	 chapter	 2).	Impact	was	also	felt	by	fledgling	political	parties	who	(e.g.	those	with	no	‘Political	Parties’	 law	 and	 little	 military	 power)	 were	 at	 a	 disadvantage	 to	 the	 politico-military	 factions	 of	 the	warlords	 (see	 LME,	 2011	 p.	 50	 and	 148-9).	 I	 note	 the	close	 relationship	 between,	 for	 example,	 MI6	 and	 their	 chosen	 warlord	 in	Jalalabad	(LME,	2011	Chapters	3	and	8),	and	how	this	relationship	distorted	the	UK’s	response	to	the	poppy	scheme	and	how	locals	perceived	the	UK	as	a	result.			
The	effect	of	‘Peace	versus	Justice’	on	a	rules-based	system	Political	empowerment	of	warlords,	which	began	at	Bonn,	continued	at	the	ELJ,	the	first	stage	of	the	state-building	process.	CIA	staff,	 through	an	affiliate	called	The	Asia	Foundation	were	involved	in	running	the	ELJ.26	The	strategy	of	allowing	warlords	immunity	was	dubbed	‘Peace	versus	Justice’	by	Mr	Brahimi	(LME,	2011,	p.	36).				Little	was	reported	in	the	press	about	the	violent	arrival	of	the	warlords	to	the	ELJ	(LME,	2011,	p.	22)	or	how	the	democratic	process	was	subverted	by	the	US	decision	 to	 allow	 them	 into	 the	 meeting	 (LME	 2011,	 p	 19-24,	 26,	 30-32).	Consequently,	delegates	were	side-lined	and	 threatened	 into	supporting	Karzai																																																									26	I	worked	for	the	Asia	Foundation	from	April	to	July	2002	as	an	election	‘monitor’.		
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over	 the	 former	 king,	 a	 process	 overseen	 and	 backed	 up	 by	 the	NA-controlled	NSD	 (LME,	 2011	 p.	 26,	 27,	 32–34,	 36,	 54).	 This	 process	 allowed	 warlords	 to	shape	the	outcome	of	the	ELJ,	effectively	seizing	the	state	(LME,	2011,	28-29,	30,	32)	from	meetings	conducted	in	a	‘VIP’	side-tent,	while	candidates	who	had	been	democratically	 elected	 were	 ignored.	 	 Dissenters	 were	 later	 harassed,	disappeared	or	 forced	into	hiding	(LME,	2011,	p.	37).	 I	describe	the	reaction	of	elected	candidates	and	women	to	the	arrival	of	the	strongmen	(LME,	2011	p.	20-4,	&	p	48).	With	the	press	effectively	corralled	off	–the	ELJ	site,	I	am	one	of	few	writers	able	to	describe	this	event	in	detail.	Later	in	2002,	I	conducted	research	on	transitional	justice	for	ICG	which	enabled	me	to	describe	reactions	to	 ‘peace	versus	 justice’	 by	 Afghan	 civil	 society	 (e.g.	 AIHRC,	 by	 RAWA),	 Afghan	 and	Western	technical	specialists,	Afghan	ministries	and	foreign	diplomats	(see	2011,	LME,	 47-	 52).	 The	 overall	 view	 was	 that	 ‘Peace	 versus	 Justice’	 was	 simply	 a	means	 to	rent	peace,	which	enabled	newly-empowered	strongmen	to	return	 to	their	 fiefdoms	 and	 subdue	democratically-elected	Afghans	who	had	 challenged	them	at	the	ELJ	(LME,	2011,	p.	35-36).	This	set	the	stage	for	a	feeling	by	ordinary	Afghans	of	betrayal	by	the	IC	and	alienation	from	their	own	state.	Both	Brahimi	and	the	warlords	accused	of	crimes	claimed	rather	disingenuously	to	journalists	that	 they	 could	not	be	 considered	war	 criminals	 for	 they	had	never	been	 tried	before	a	court	of	law	(LME,	2011,	pp.	30-31,	36).	The	‘Peace	versus	Justice’	policy	and	its	effect	is	analysed	(see	LME,	29-36	and	47-55,	specifically	p.	36	and	p.	49.		Also	p.	305-9	and	p.	260).	In	sum,	the	policy	took	up	political	space	and	greatly	reduced	any	hope	of	a	rules-based,	inclusive	and	ultimately	legitimate	settlement.	27		Other	ways	that	the	legitimacy	of	the	entire	project	was	undermined	include	the	fact	 that	 in	 2003	 fledgling	 democratic	 parties	 complained	 that	 they	 were	 dis-advantaged	compared	to	the	politico-military	factions	which	had	operated	from	the	 outset.	 This	 was	 due	 not	 only	 to	 military	 power	 but	 because	 the	 IC	 was	seemingly	 unable	 to	 stop	 the	 ‘Political	 Parties	 Law’	 from	 being	 delayed	 (LME,	2011	p.	145).	Interestingly,	Brahimi,	when	interviewed	by	The	Nation	magazine	in	2009,	admitted	that	there	were	some	mistakes	in	the	initial	policy.	28																																																									27	The	need	for	inclusivity	as	a	crucial	element	underpinning	legitimacy	in	Peace	Settlements	is	analysed	by	Tim	Murithi	and	Paula	Murphy	Ives	in	‘Under	the	Acacia;	Mediation	and	the	dilemma	of	Inclusion’	pp.	77-86	Africa	Mediators’	Retreat.	http://www.hdcentre.org/uploads/tx_news/108UndertheAcacia_Mediationandthedilemmaofinclusion.pdf.		The	fact	the	2001	‘Bonn	Agreement’	was	not	an	inclusive	settlement	but	a	‘victors	peace’	failing	to	include	either	the	Taliban	or	many	Pashtun	tribal	leaders,	undermined	its	legitimacy	with	Afghans.			28	Responding	to	questions	put	by	Barbara	Crossette	of	The	Nation	magazine	on	9	March	2009,	Mr	Brahimi	admitted	“We	are	now	paying	the	price	for	what	we	did	wrong	from	day	one.	First,	the	
people	who	were	in	Bonn	were	not	fully	representative	of	the	rich	variety	of	the	Afghan	people.	I	
underlined	this	fact	to	the	thirty-five	delegates	we	brought	together	in	Bonn	again	and	again.	I	
made	the	point	once	more	when	an	agreement	was	reached	and	we	all	prepared	to	return	to	Kabul:	
the	popular	base	of	the	interim	administration	put	together	in	Bonn	under	President	Karzai	was	far	
too	narrow.	We	all	vowed	to	work	hard	to	widen	that	base	once	we	returned	to	Kabul.	
Unfortunately,	very	little	was	done.	On	the	contrary,	the	Northern	Alliance	[the	remnants	of	the	old	
mujahedeen],	which	had	been	thoroughly	defeated	by	the	Taliban	and	had	been	literally	
resuscitated	from	certain	death	by	the	US,	was	actively	engaged	in	consolidating	its	grip	over	the	
country.		We	now	have	a	very,	very	serious	situation.	To	be	sure,	the	Taliban	are	not	universally	
liked	in	Afghanistan.	But	when	they	first	erupted	on	the	Afghan	scene	in	1994,	their	success	was	due	
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	The	2005	parliamentary	elections	enabled	warlords	or	their	associates	to	further	consolidate	 their	 control	 over	 the	machinery	 of	 the	 state	 and	won	 seats,	 often	through	bribery	and	intimidation.	The	new	parliament	quickly	pushed	through	a	law	 granting	 warlords	 amnesty	 from	 prosecution	 for	 previous	 crimes.	 Niland	(2010)	described	how	the	failure	of	the	IC	to	value	the	rule	of	law	sent	a	signal	to	power	 holders	 that	 they	 would	 not	 be	 accountable.	 	 The	 corollary	 was	 more	serious	 crime,	 which	 further	 eroded	 the	 trust	 or	 ordingary	 Afghans	 in	 the	Western-backed	 intervention.	 The	 failure	 of	 the	 IC	 to	 ensure	 proper	 vetting	 of	candidates	 to	 ensure	 the	 removal	 of	 links	 between	 armed	 groups	 and	 those	seeking	political	office,	both	undermined	 the	moral	 authority	of	 the	 IC	and	 the	possibility	to	sustain	a	‘rules-based’	system.	Thus,	power	structures	and	stability	continued	to	be	altered	(LME,	2010,	p.	979	and	LME,	2011,	p.	258-9).	The	effects	on	political	legitimacy,	security,	regional	government	appointments	and	how	this	undermined	the	centre	and	the	state-building	project	are	analysed	(LME,	2010,	p.	977-	9).	As	warlord	 governors	 failed	 to	deliver	basic	 services,	 local	 people	 felt	unrepresented	 (see	 LME,	 2011	 p.260,	 306-7).	 The	 result	 has	 been	 local	accommodations	with	 the	Taliban,	 especially	 in	 the	 south,	 the	heartland	of	 the	insurgency,	 and	where	 a	 system	of	 ‘shadow	Taliban	 governors’	was	 able,	 from	2005	 onwards,	 to	 gain	 traction	 by	 providing,	 for	 example,	 quick	 recourse	 to	justice	(LME	et	al,	2013	p.	11	and	LME,	2014,	pp.	611-612	).29						The	policy	of	CIA	and	Special	Forces	backed	militia	 (expanded	since	2006)	has	led	to	 further	conflict	and	violence	with	a	proliferation	of	armed	groups	across	the	 countryside.	 I	 analyse	 the	 comprehensive	 approach’	 military-led	 model	 of	state-building	 because,	 from	 2003,	 this	 became	 the	 principle	 means	 through	which	the	West	(through	both	NATO	and	OEF)	delivered	support	to	Afghanistan	(LME,	2010,	pp.	975-9).			Unfortunately	 the	 military	 approach	 dominated	 coordination	 and	 its	 focus	 on	force	took	precedence	over	governance	and	the	need	to	understand	the	complex	issues	 underpinning	 the	 conflict	 (LME,	 2011	 p	 309-311).	 From	 2003,	 when	NATO	 expanded	 into	 the	 countryside,	 the	 PRT	 leaders’	 often	 had	 little	appreciation	 of	 the	 wider	 political	 context	 in	 which	 they	 were	 operating.	 	 I	discuss	this	situation	and	its	impact	in	(LME,	2011,	216-8).			Peripheral	 areas	 are	 not	 simply	 ungoverned	 space	 or	 a	 tabular	 rasa	 but	 are	where	 informal	 local	governance	 takes	place.	 Informal	mechanisms,	 if	properly	understood,	can	be	used	to	help	bring	about	stability	(LME	2014,	LME	et	al,	2013,	pp.	10-14,	and	LME,	2011,	pp.	248-255,	309-11).	Although	the	tribal	system	was	altered	 from	 the	 1980s	 onwards	 by	 a	 jihad-era	 policy	 of	 arming	 proxies	 and	moving	 from	 a	 system	 of	 consensus-building	 to	 one	 of	 rent-seeking	 and	 from	‘jirga’	as	the	main	vehicle	of	representation	to	‘shura’	which	was	associated	with																																																																																																																																																															
to	the	fact	that	those	who	were	in	charge	[the	mujahedeen]	were	much	worse.	I	am	afraid	today's	
government	is	not	much	better	than	that	of	the	mujahedeen	after	the	withdrawal	of	the	Soviet	
Union	and	the	fall	of	the	man	they	left	in	charge,	Najibullah.	
29	Reasons	for	the	growing	preference	for	Taliban	courts	is	described	well	by	Azam	Ahmed,	
Taliban	courts	gain	favor	in	Afghanistan,	New	York	Times,	2	February	2015.		
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jihadi	leaders,	traditional	elements	do	still	exist	and	encompass	their	own	set	of	rules,	beliefs	and	forms	of	consent.	Sadly,	the	policy	of	supporting	warlords	has	further	 fissured	 these	 customary	 mechanisms.	 For	 example,	 I	 describe	 how	 a	model	consultative	shura	in	Jalalabad	(LME,	2011,	chapter	18)	was	undermined	by	the	militarisation	of	Western	funds.			The	effect	was	to	attract	local	strongmen	into	 governance	 issues	 which	 meant	 locals	 felt	 alienated	 from	 the	 benefits..	President	Karzai,	wanting	 to	 exert	 control,	 also	 undermined	 the	 possibility	 for	the	development	of	 the	consultative	shura	system	which	had	been	successfully	developed	 in	Eastern	Afghanistan.	This	accords	with	David	 (1997	p.	561),	who	posits	 that	 often	 the	 strengthening	 of	 central	 authority	 as	 opposed	 to	 its	weakening/collapse	is	a	permissive	cause	of	internal	war.				Though	the	choice	to	work	with	warlords	fulfilled	short-term	military	objectives,	it	failed	to	appreciate	the	regional	context	of	a	war	which	had	been	ongoing	for	23	years	by	2001.	As	warlords	were	progressively	 incorporated	 into	 the	 state,	abuses	against	normal	Afghans	worsened	(LME,	2011,	chapters	1	and	2	and	pp.	144	and	146)	and	people	felt	 increasingly	alienated	from	their	political	system.	The	situation	was	paradoxical	as	strongmen	were	empowered	at	the	cost	of	the	local	population	who	 suffered	 the	burdens	of	warlord	 impunity	and	predation.	Examples	 include	 expropriation	 of	 their	 children	 or	 property	 through	 growing	criminality	 (see	 LME,	 2011	 pp.	 257-261)	 or	 the	 inability	 to	 find	 recourse	 to	justice	 and	 services.	 Meanwhile,	 the	 West,	 blinded	 by	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 Taliban	being	 the	 sole,	 monotheistic	 enemy,	 failed	 to	 understand	 the	 more	 complex	nature	of	the	insurgency.	This	cognitive	dissonance	was	reinforced	when	NATO	moved	from	Kabul	to	the	regions	in	2003	to	establish	PRTs,	awarding	lucrative	contracts	to	 local	strongmen	who	were	supposed	to	have	been	disarmed	(LME,	2011,	p.	259).30	Therefore,	to	locals,	the	Western	presence	seemed	mostly	about	the	protection	of	NATO	soldiers	rather	than	their	own	security.31	Ultimately,	the	Western	 project	 since	 2001	 in	 Afghanistan	 cannot	 be	 described	 as	 one	 that	created	a	regime	or	a	state	conforming	to	Beetham’s	notion	of	acceptable	rules	(in	 the	 normal	 sense),	 beliefs	 or	 consent.	 There	 seemed	 to	 be	 a	 collective	blindness	from	NATO	about	the	fact	that	locals	loathed	the	arbitrary	criminality	of	warlord	rule.				
Legitimacy	and	National	Identity	Ironically,	had	 the	West	 retained	certain	aspects	of	a	 liberal	peace	 instead	of	a	militarised	 version	 of	 realpolitik,	 some	objectives	 of	 state	 legitimacy	may	have																																																									30	I	attended	meetings	on	disarmament	between	GoA	and	the	international	community	(2005/5)	and	witnessed	the	refusal	by	NATO	Commanders	to	support		a	Programme	for	disarming	‘illegal	armed	groups’	(known	as	DIAG)	in	2005.		This	was	due	to	the	implications	this	might	have	for	‘force	protection’	of	NATO	soldiers	at	the	PRTs.		The	corollary,	was	that	NATO	bases	and	PRTs	increasingly	worked	with	local	warlords	and	commanders	and	further	empowered	them	financially	with	contracts.	This	had	the	effect	of	awarding	them	further	political	legitimacy,	to	the	bemusement	of	locals	who	expressed	the	desire	for	‘protection’	by	the	west	from	the	warlords,	but	were	ignored.				31	‘Force	Protection’	was	another	reason	NATO	chiefs	were	unwilling	to	challenge	newly	empowered	strongmen	in	the	regions	when	there	was	discussion	in	2005	about	‘disarming	illegal	armed	groups’	associated	with	regional	strongmen.		NATO	preferred	to	make	them	its	allies	(in	spite	of	local	perceptions).	
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been	 realised	 for	 the	 Afghans.	 In	 contrast	 to	 Afghanistan,	 other	 liberal	interventions	 such	 as	 in	 the	 Balkans32	and	 Sierra	 Leone	 during	 the	 1990s	featured	a	policy	of	accountability	 for	 those	who	had	committed	rights	abuses.	Yet,	 in	 Afghanistan,	 similar	 figures	 were	 allowed	 to	 take	 military	 and	 then	political	 power	 even	 though	 Afghans	 had	 expressed	 their	 desire	 for	accountability	in	a	nationwide	survey	undertaken	by	the	AIHRC	and	published	as	‘A	call	for	Justice’,	2003.	 	Haq	also	emphasised	the	need	to	support	this	process	from	 the	 outset.	 Others	 said	 Afghan	 society	 must	 confront	 its	 past	 and	 bring	about	 a	 real	 degree	 of	 reconciliation.	 Such	 principles	 were	 outlined	 by	 Louis	Joinet	in	a	paper	endorsed	by	the	UN	in	1997.33			Afghans	remembered	former	King	Zahir	Shah’s	reign	as	forty	years	of	peace	and	for	 this	 reason	 Haq	 desired	 to	 use	 the	 former	 king	 as	 the	 centre	 of	 his	 own	‘Afghan	Solution’	 for	 toppling	 the	Taliban	 in	2001	 (see	LME,	2011	p.	194,	LME	2010	pp.	974-5,	982-3	and	2014	p.	612).	The	King	would	be	the	unifying	figure	to	reinforce	an	idea	of	legitimacy	and	national	identity.	For	example,	Rustaw	(1970,	pp.	337-363)	emphasises	 that	 the	 idea	of	nationhood	 (possibly	within	Migdal’s	schema	 of	 the	 collective	 conscience	 or	 Beetham’s	 set	 of	 beliefs	 underpinning	consent)	is	’a	vital	pre-requisite	for	democracy	in	any	transition’	(LME,	2014,	p.	612).	 This	 lost	 opportunity	 could	 have	 underpinned	 a	more	 egalitarian	 power	share	 between	 the	 ethnic	 groups.	 Sadly,	 in	 acquiescing	 to	 the	 demands	 of	 the	warlords	in	late	2001,	an	opportunity	for	working	with	shared	beliefs	based	on	consent	 to	bring	about	national	unity,	stability	and	building	political	 legitimacy	in	Afghanistan,	was	missed.	Haq	had	recognised	this	and,	for	that	reason,	despite	originating	 from	the	Ghilzai	 tribe,	 traditionally	 in	competition	with	the	Durrani	tribe	of	the	king’s	family,	as	Barfied	notes,	(2010)	he	understood	the	importance	of	the	former	king	as	a	central	figure	around	which	disparate	groups	could	unify.			Conversely,	the	warlords	were	adamant	that	Zahir	Shah	should	be	excluded	from	the	 political	 settlement	 following	 the	 capture	 of	 Kabul	 (LME,	 2011,	 chapters	 1	and	2	and	conclusions,	LME,	2014).	As	Haq	had	forewarned,	the	possibility	for	a	balanced,	inclusive	and	legitimate	political	settlement	was	lost	once	the	warlords	took	Kabul	in	November	2001.	The	result	was	an	immediate	loss	for	the	West	of	the	military	leverage	required	to	enforce	a	more	balanced,	and	hence	acceptable,	political	settlement.			Conclusions	and	implications	My	work	 challenges	 the	 assumptions	 about	 the	policy	of	 arming	warlords	 as	 a	successful	factor	in	the	post-9/11	Afghan	war.	I	show	that	success	defined	solely	on	short-term	military	factors	was	an	illusion	and	for		longer	term	stabilisation,	more	 complex	 political	 issues,	 legitimacy	 and	 the	 concerns	 of	 locals	 must	 be	referenced	 from	 the	 outset.	 This	 is	 because	 military	 action	 has	 immediate	consequences	 for	 power	 structures,	 accountability	 and	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 all	 of																																																									32	Already	at	the	time	of	the	Dayton	Agreement	a	comprehensive	process	of	accountability	for	those	who	had	committed	rights	abuses	was	agreed.		33	Principles	Against	Impunity	developed	by	Louis	Joinet	and	approved	by	the	UN	Commission	on	Human	Rights,	1997.		http://www.dealingwiththepast.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/2013_Course/Readings_2013/1_Joinet-Question_of_the_impunity_of_perpetrators_of_HR_Violations.pdf	
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which	 are	 issues	 valued	 greatly	 by	 people	 within	 countries	 where	 Western	interventions	 have	 occurred.	 Today,	 the	 mistakes	 made	 in	 Afghanistan	 since	2001	 have	 repercussions	 throughout	 the	whole	Middle	 East,	 for	 example	with	the	development	of	 ISIS.	 	Hence	 it	 is	 important	 those	mistakes	are	understood	and	not	repeated	in	other	situations.																																														
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Methodological	Appendix	and	List	of	Sources			The	 purpose	 of	 this	 appendix	 is	 to	 provide	 further	 background	 information	about	the	sources	I	used	for	my	work,	how	this	related	to	the	positions	I	held	in	Afghanistan	and	my	 life	 there	over	a	 six-year	period.	During	 this	 time	spent	 in	the	country,	I	had	many	conversations	with	Afghans	and	foreigners	that	are	un-recorded	 here	 but	 nevertheless	 contributed	 to	 my	 understanding.	 The	 major	sources	 for	 my	 published	 materials	 are	 described	 within	 sub-sections	 below	which	give	context	to	the	situations	in	which	I	found	myself.	The	opening	section	addresses	my	career	and	positionality	during	the	time	I	spent	in	Afghanistan.			
1.	BIOGRAPHY,	POSITIONALITY	AND	THE	POLITICS	OF	WRITING	ABOUT	
AFGHANISTAN	 		The	various	posts	I	worked	in	gave	me	extensive	access	to	various	different	figures	(both	Afghan	and	international).	Moreover,	because	the	jobs	were	relatively	short-term,	I	was	able	to	compare	and	contrast	a	large	variety	of	Western	and	Afghan	institutional	contexts	within	the	country	without	being	tied	to	a	particular	institutional	agenda.	Unlike	those	on	a	set	career	path,	where	organisational	loyalty	can	impede	objective	interpretation	of	empirical	information,	I	have	always	maintained	my	independence	as	a	freelancer.		However,	I	also	benefitted	from	these	positions	and	the	privileged	vantage	points	which	they	offered.	Specifically,	I	had	access	to	meetings	between	various	opposition	figures,	Taliban,	commanders,	strongmen,	tribal	chiefs	and	the	international	community	in	the	context	of	my	jobs.	My	experience	in	Afghanistan	was	not	one	of	short	rotations,	but	included	residence	with	Afghans	in	remote	rural	areas.	For	example,	I	bolstered	my	understanding	of	the	Arsala	family	(of	Abdul	Haq)	through	reading	a	lot	of	the	literature	about	their	role	during	the	1980s	jihad	and	by	conducting	interviews	with	journalists	and	peace	makers	who	had	known	the	family	during	various	times	from	the	1980s	until	the	present	day.			Some	accounts	of	Afghanistan	appear	partisan.	This	may	be	due	to	certain	authors	or	experts	having	a	limited	possibility	to	travel	in	or	around	the	country	and	see	for	themselves	the	situation.		It	could	also	be	due	to	the	culture	of	an	organisation	to	which	the	writer	feels	loyalty.	There	is	also	the	question	of	how	organisational	loyalty	or	culture	can	create	bias,	hence,	former	CIA	agents	who	wrote	accounts	of	their	years	in	the	region	(mostly	Pakistan)	during	the	1980s,	were	limited	with	regards	to	the	extent	to	which	they	could	actually	travel	in	the	country.	This	was	not	only	attributable	to	their	security	arrangements	but	also	the	result	of	political	deals	made	between	the	CIA	and	the	Pakistani	ISI	such	that	CIA	agents	during	the	jihad	years	of	the	1980s	had	to	be	contained	mostly	in	Islamabad.	Interestingly,	other	US	accounts	(e.g.	by	Tomsen,	2011,	Gutman,	2008,	Kaplan,	2002	and	conversations	e.g.	with	Guest	and	Jouvenal)	dispute	the	version	presented	by	the	CIA.	These	independent	journalists	and	researchers	also	sometimes	comment	on	the	‘consistency	of	disinformation’	presented	by	the	CIA.			
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In	the	UK	there	has	been	a	particular	publishing	focus	on	books	about	Afghanistan	since	9/11	(and	more	recently	since	the	UK’s	deeper	engagement	in	Helmand)	by,	for	example,	male	writers,		such	as	soldiers	or	officers	writing	their	memoirs	of	the	war.	These	books	also	have	a	particular	view,	or	are	marketed	in	a	specific	way,	which	legitimises	and	promotes	the	notion	of	the	Afghan	war	as	something	benign.	When	I	submitted	my	book	manuscript	to	publishers,	most	of	their	agents	were	more	interested	in	my	personal	life	than	the	important	story	I	wanted	to	tell.	I	believe	this	reflects	a	culture	in	the	UK	publishing	and	media	industry	that	negates	or	distrusts	the	contribution	of	women	in	warzones,	which	are	deemed	to	be	‘a	man’s	world’,	and	also	tends	to	give	more	credence	and	legitimacy	to	members	of	‘the	old	school	tie	network.’	I	was	accused	by	young	men	in	the	UK	publishing	industry	of	‘having	an	agenda.’	I	was	also	asked	by	many	publishers	or	agents	whether	I	was	a	friend	of	Old	Etonian	Conservative	MP,	Rory	Stewart,	as	though	confessing	such	a	friendship	would	confer	on	me	the	legitimacy	they	sought.			While	in	the	UK	my	gender	seemed	to	be	an	impediment	to	securing	a	good	publishing	deal,	on	the	contrary	in	Afghanistan	I	felt	that	my	gender	was	actually	an	advantage.		I	was	often	perceived	by	the	people	among	whom	I	lived,	or	by	my	interlocutors	(both	male	and	female),	to	be	a	sort	of	‘third	sex.’		This	meant	I	felt	that	people	opened	up	to	me	and	invited	me	into	their	homes	and	afforded	me	their	trust	in	a	way	that	they	may	not	have	done	if	I	had	been	a	man.	I	was	able	to	speak	to	women,	an	opportunity	which	is	difficult	for	both	Afghan	and	Western	males.	I	felt	that	although	the	war	was	‘sold’	to	the	West	as	a	‘liberal	peace’	on	the	grounds	of	Afghan	female	liberation,	little	has	been	heard	about	the	actual	fate	of	women	since	the	war	began.	In	fact,	women	have	been	disproportionately	affected	(along	with	children)	but	their	stories	are	often	not	covered	by	the	literature.					
2.	SOURCES	–	Background		
	During	 my	 work	 in	 Afghanistan	 I	 undertook	 thousands	 of	 both	 formal	 and	informal	 interviews	 in	 Afghanistan	 from	 2000	 to	 2006	 and	 in	 2013	 with	members	of	all	levels	of	Afghan	society	and	the	international	community.	There	were	 also	 specific	 interviews	 in	 relation	 to	 the	Abdul	Haq	 investigation	within	my	book	(mostly	2002-2010).				
i)	 Posts	Held	I	first	travelled	to	the	region	in	1999	when	I	visited	Pakistan,	travelling	to	Islamabad,	Peshawar,	NWFP	(now	known	as	Khyber	Pakhtunwa),	Swat	and	the	Karakorum	Highway	and	staying	several	nights	in	each	of	these	places.	In	2000	and	2002,	I	also	visited	Chitral,	Gilgit,	Lahore	and	Karachi.	While	staying	in	Swat	in	1999,	the	nervousness	of	our	hosts	indicated	the	first	stirrings	of	Salafist-inspired	extremism	beginning	to	take	root	in	Pakistan.				a)	 Programme	Manager	for	UN	Centre	for	Human	Settlements	(UN	Habitat)	in	Kandahar	and	Herat	with	travel	to	Pakistan	(July	-	December	2000)	
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In	the	summer	of	2000,	I	took	up	a	post	with	the	UNDP	Afghanistan	office,	based	in	Kandahar	and	Herat.	I	worked	for	UNCHS	on	an	ECHO-funded	urban	relief	project	targeting	vulnerable	people	such	as	widows	and	the	disabled.	Afghanistan	was	already	three	years	into	a	severe	drought	and	many	IDPs	and	returnees	needed	aid	and	shelter	delivered	through	community	development	fora.34	Our	communications	were	limited	to	CODAN	radio,	or	handheld	‘walkie	talkie’	and	there	was	no	mobile	phone	network.	Al	Qaeda	were	prevalent	in	Kandahar;	Osama	bin	Laden	and	his	aides	were	present,	as	was	Mullah	Omar	who	lived	a	few	hundred	yards	from	our	compound.	At	this	stage,	bin	Laden	had	issued	a	fatwa	against	British	and	Americans	located	in	Afghanistan.	For	this	reason,	the	UN	had	hired	me,	rather	controversially,	by	sub-contracting	me	to	a	French	NGO.	This	meant	I	had	no	security	umbrella	in	Afghanistan	and	lived	independently	from	the	UN	staff,	with	an	NGO	who	were	nervous	about	my	presence	in	case	I	needed	to	evacuate.		My	Belgian	housemate	at	the	time	said	‘something	happens	at	least	once	every	three	months	and	we	need	to	leave	fast.’	His	assessment	of	the	situation	was	proved	accurate	when	in		October	2000,	Al	Qaeda	attacked	the	USS	Cole	in	Aden.	I	had	to	leave	Kandahar	by	road	for	Quetta	and	then	Islamabad,	where	I	worked	for	several	months	while	uncertainty	prevailed	about	US	retaliation	in	Afghanistan	as	the	US	presidential	elections	results	remained	inconclusive.	At	this	stage,	sanctions	on	the	Taliban	were	tightened,	and	this	prefaced	the	destruction	of	the	centuries-old	Buddha’s	of	Bamyan	in	February	2001.					During	 this	 time,	 I	 conducted	 informal	 interviews	 with	 UNCHS	 staff,	 mostly	engineers	and	women,	local	NGO	staff,	UNICEF	local	staff	and	doctors	as	well	as	NGO	 staff	 from	 ICRC,	Handicap	 International,	MSF,	 and	 IRC.	 Formal	 interviews	were	conducted	with	Taliban	representatives	in	Herat	and	Kandahar.			b)	 Reports	Officer	for	World	Food	Program	–	(October	2001	–	March	2002)		I	 returned	 to	 the	 region	 after	 9/11,	 first	 to	 visit	 refugee	 camps	 in	 Quetta	 in	October	2001	and	then	to	Islamabad	(and	later	Kabul)	to	take	up	a	post	with	the	World	 Food	 Program	 (WFP),	 as	 reporting	 officer	 for	 the	 Regional	 Emergency	Operation.	 	At	 the	 time,	 this	was	 the	main	 reporting	 forum	 for	most	of	 the	UN	(particularly	with	regards	to	the	security	situation)	since	WFP	had	the	greatest	access	to	the	country.	I	took	Irish	donors	around	several	new	Afghan	ministries	and	the	US	and	UK	embassies	in	January	2002	on	behalf	of	WFP.						c)	 Election	Monitor	for	The	Asia	Foundation	(April	to	June	2002)	From	April	to	July	2002,	I	was	an	election	monitor	for	The	Asia	Foundation,	travelling	extensively	around	the	country	monitoring	district	level	elections	in	the	run	up	to	the	keenly	anticipated	Grand	Council	of	Elders	known	as	the	
Emergency	Loya	Jirga	(ELJ).	At	this	stage,	I	witnessed	Northern	Alliance	soldiers	or	NDS	intimidating	democratically-elected	candidates	in	elections	in	Kabul.	I	also	had	to	cancel	one	local	election	in	Panjshir	(after	consultation	with	colleagues)	after	one	warlord	failed	to	inform	the	whole	community	of	the																																																									34	After	9/11	these	‘community	forae’	became	the	basis	of	the	new	National	Solidarity	
Programme	(NSP)	funded	by	the	IBRD.	
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election	and	transported	in	only	his	supporters	on	the	morning	of	the	election	to	vote	for	him.	I	also	witnessed	severe	fear	and	intimidation	tactics	deployed	by	the	strongmen	who	had	come	to	power	during	the	previous	generation	of	war.	I	witnessed	fighting	between	different	ethnic	groups	(who	shared	the	same	villages)	and	tribes	in	Logar,	the	Shamali	Plains	and	Ghorband.				Despite	these	difficulties,	in	the	spring	of	2002,	Afghans	I	met	believed	the	international	community	had	come	to	‘save’	Afghanistan,	and	that	this	was	a	‘liberal	peace’	intervention	whereby	democracy	and	women’s	rights	and	economic	development	would	prevail	and	that	the	world	had	not	forgotten	Afghanistan.	However,	difficulties	with	the	elections	and	tensions	between	the	people	and	the	strongmen	who	were	returning	from	exile,	supported	by	Western	intelligence	agencies,	were	evident.	The	ELJ	was	supposed	to	be	a	significant	turning	point	for	Afghanistan.	Sadly,	it	was	a	turning	point	in	my	understanding	about	whether	this	project	really	was	a	liberal	peace.	From	September	to	December	2002,	I	undertook	research	on	transitional	justice	for	the	International	Crisis	Group.	I	interviewed	a	wide	range	of	international	diplomats,	Afghan	intellectuals	(including	those	who	had	been	on	the	Constitutional	Drafting	Commission),	the	leaders	of	fledgling	political	parties,	women’s	groups,	the	AIHRC	and	the	Afghan	Justice	Project	among	others.		The	intention	was	to	gather	an	idea	of	the	prospects	for	peace	and	to	learn	their	view	of	‘Peace	versus	Justice’	and	its	effect	on	the	Afghan	state.	This	is	further	analysed	as	the	book	develops.	Interestingly,	Abdul	Haq	had	himself	called	for	a	process	of	accountability,	saying	that	without	it,	there	could	never	be	elections,	stability	or	democracy.	His	view	was	that	this	would	need	to	be	sanctioned	by	the	ICC	so	that	some	of	Afghanistan’s	more	notorious	rights	abusers	could	be	side-lined.				d)	 Observer	at	Emergency	Loya	Jirga	(June	-	July	2002)	During	 this	 time,	 I	 conducted	 informal	 meetings/observations	 with	 elected	Afghan	 representatives,	 other	 ELJ	monitors,	 UN	 staff,	 journalists	 and	women’s	representatives	(eg	Massouda	Jalal).				e)	 Freelance	Journalist	(July	2002	–	September	2003)	From	the	summer	of	2002,	I	became	a	freelance	journalist	and	travelled	the	country	extensively.	I	first	visited	Jalalabad	in	September	2002,	while	researching	the	narcotics	situation	and	was	introduced	to	the	family	of	Abdul	Haq.	At	this	stage,	I	began	to	appreciate	the	importance	of	face	value	politics	and	the	relevance	of	a	patriarchal	system,	and	historic	and	traditional	legitimacy	rather	than	the	rational-legal	style	system	that	was	then	being	constructed	in	Kabul,	with	its	putatively	‘secret	ballot’	voting	system.			f)	 Work	 on	 ‘Transitional	 Justice’	 issues	 for	 the	 International	 Crisis	 Group	(ICG)	(September	–	November	2002)	I	worked	as	a	researcher	on	justice	issues,	gender	issues	and	the	state-building	project.		g)	 Monitor	 in	 currency	 exchange	project	 -	 Louis	Berger	 (November	2002	 -	March	2003)		I	 met	 with	 local	 Afghan	 government	 representatives,	 including	 Afghan	 central	
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bank	staff	and	ministers	and	governors	of	provinces	in	regions	where	I	observed	the	 counting	 and	 burning	 of	 the	 old	 currency	 notes	 in	 preparation	 for	 the	exchange	 with	 the	 new	 Afghani	 notes.	 	Regions	 visited	 included	 Loya	 Paktia,	Loya	Paktika,	Khost,	Herat,	Nuristan,	Gardez	and	Wardak.	I	also	worked	in	Kabul	at	the	Central	bank	where	I	interacted	with	its	chiefs,	and	with	finance	ministers.			
 h)	 Co-Producer	 of	 Channel	 4	 Documentary	 titled	 ‘Here’s	 one	 we	 invaded	Earlier’	(April	-	May	2003)	This	encompassed	setting	up	travel	and	interviews	for	recording	in	Herat,	Kabul	and	Jalalabad	with	a	broad	range	of	interlocutors.				i)	 Political	Advisor	to	the	EUSR,	Kabul	(November	2004	-	June	2005)		As	Political	Advisor	to	the	EUSR	(November	2005	to	July	2006)	my	remit	was	narcotics,	security,	civil	military	relations	(including	disarmament)	and	occasionally	donor	meetings.	I	thus	regularly	attended	meetings	between	the	Afghan	government,	the	international	military	and	diplomatic	corps	and	civil	society	on	the	following	issues:			 - Narcotics	- Civil	Military	Relations(the	Provincial	Reconstruction	Team	Steering	Committee,	the	PRT		Working	Group)	- Demobilisation,	Disbandment	and	Re-Integration	(DDR)	- Donor	Round	Table			j)	 Country	 Expert	 to	 the	 EU	 Chief	 Election	 Observer	 for	 the	 2005	 Afghan	parliamentary	elections	(June	-	November	2005)		As	Political	Advisor	to	the	EUSR	and	then	Country	Expert	to	the	Chief	of	the	2005	Afghan	parliamentary	elections	I	travelled	(either	alone	or	later	with	the	Chief	Observer	and	her	assistant)	to	most	provinces	of	the	country	and	met	with	local	governors,	warlords,	opposition	figures,	commanders,	leaders	of	political	parties	or	politico-military	factions,	local	administrations,	police	chiefs	and	the	international	military	and	civilian	heads	of	PRTs.	We	also	met	with	Afghan	civil	society	groups	such	as	women’s	groups	and	their	leaders	(e.g.	in	Kandahar	and	Kabul	and	most	provincial	capitals	which	we	visited),	the	Afghan	Independent	Human	Rights	Commission	(AIHRC),	other	INGOs,	local	NGOs,	farmers	and	local	people.	I	also	met	with	many	electoral	candidates	and	many	members	of	the	National	Coalition	for	Dialogue	with	the	Tribes,	through	its	Head,	Prince	Ali	Seraj.	In	addition,	the	civil	and	military	leaders	of	the	NATO-led	PRTs	in	Jalalabad	(December	2004),	Faizabad,	(February	2005),	Mazar-e-Sharif	(July	2005),	Kundoz	(August	2005),	Kandahar	(August	2005)	and	Herat	(August	2005).	As	a	representative	of	the	EU	I	had	to	arrange	meetings	with	most	national	political	figures,	international	diplomats	and	senior	international	military	for	the	Chief	Observer	and	myself	to	ascertain	their	views	on	the	elections.		I	myself	also	met	many,	many	elders	who	were	sent	to	my	office	by	the	National	Coalition	for	dialogue	with	the	Tribes.		Ultimately,	many	were	very	disappointed	in	the	2005	elections.				………………………		
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I	left	Afghanistan	in	December	2005	to	move	to	Geneva	with	my	husband.		Meanwhile,	I	undertook	several	consultancies	including	for	the	Geneva	Centre	for	Security	Policy	(writing	on	integration	on	defence,	development	and	diplomacy	issues),	for	the	Aga	Khan	Foundation	on	participatory	governance	and	for	the	Womanity	Foundation	(2013).	I	also	wrote	several	academic	papers	before	and	after	the	publication	of	the	book	in	2011.	I	returned	to	Afghanistan	twice	during	2013	to	meet	with	interlocutors	in	January	and	to	undertake	a	consultancy	on	women’s	empowerment	and	education	for	the	NGO	‘Womanity’	in	June.			
iii)	 List	of	Interviews	held		
a. Elite	interviews	1. Minister	of	Women’s	Affairs,	Sima	Samar,	Jan	02	–	Kabul	–	English		2. WFP	bakery	local	female	staff,	Jan	02	–	Kabul	-	Dari	3. Local	 office	 WFP	 staff	 (e.g.	 Massouda	 Jalal	 who	 would	 be	 first	 female	Afghan	presidential	candidate),	Jan	02	–	English		4. US	 Embassy	 staff	 (including	 USAID,	 the	 US	 Ambassador,	Military	 chief),	Jan	02	–	Kabul	–	English		5. UK	Embassy	staff,	Jan	02	–	English		6. With	Ministry	for	Public	Works,	Jan	02	–	Dari		7. President	Karzai,	April	2003	-	Kabul	-	English		8. UN	Security	Chief,	April	2003	-	Kabul	-	English	9. UN	Heads	of	Mission	in	Herat	and	Jalalabad,	April	2003	10. Pashtu	traders	in	Herat,	April	2003		11. Pashtu	traders	in	Jalalabad	-	September	2002	12. Opium	farmers	Nangarhar	-	September	2002	13. Chief	 of	 Republican	 Party	 (a	 fledgling	 opposition	 party),	 Sangar	Sebagatullah,	September	2002	and	April	2003	14. Chief	Justice	Shinwari,	September	2002	–	Kabul	-	Dari		15. Attorney	General,	Dr.	Rahimi,	September	2002	-	Kabul	-	Dari		16. Head	of	Constitutional	Drafting	Committee,	Dr.	Fasili,	September	2002	17. Afghan	Independent	Rights	Commission,	Simar	Samar	and	Nader	Naderi	18. Representative	of	RAWA,	September	2002	19. Head	of	Women	Judges	Association,	September	2002	20. Head	of	Afghan	Red	Crescent	Society,	Mohammad	Qar-a-bec	21. Head	of	ICRCa,	September	2002	22. UK	Ambassador,	August	2002	23. UN	Deputy	SRSG	(Jean	Arnault),	September	2002		24. UN	SRSG	(Lakhdar	Brahimi),	September	2002	25. UN	Political	Officers	-	various	(informal	interviews	mostly)	26. UN	Human	Rights	officer,	September	2002		27. EU	Ambassador	Francesc	Vendrell,	September	2002	28. Italian	Ambassador	Domenico	Georgy,	September	2002a	29. Head	of	UNHCR,	Mr	Lubbers,	September	2002	30. USAID	representative,	September	2002	–	Kabul	-	English		31. Demining	representatives,	September	2002				
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b. Group	interviews	with	International	NGOs	1. IWPR	2. Medica	Mondiale	3. ICRC		4. MSF	5. ACF		6. Oxfam	7. IRC	8. CARE	9. CIVIC	10. IFHope	11. ICG		 1. Interviews	with		governmental	and	quasi-governmental	institutions,	
business	persons,	local	NGOs,	Commanders,	Taliban	figures,	tribal	
leaders	and	members	of	political	parties	or	civil	society	2. AINA	-	October	2002		3. RAWA	-	September	2002	4. Female	inmates	and	the	female	‘guards’,	Marastoon,	asylum	for	Afghan	women	run	by	the	ARCS,	September	-	October	2002.	I	interviewed	several		5. AREU	-	September	2002		6. TLO	-	February	2005	7. AIHRC	Head	Office	in	Kabul	-	September	2002	(Nader	Nadery),	January	2002	(Dr.	Sima	Samar),	January	2005,	(Dr.	Samar),	July	2005,	(Dr.	Samar),	January	2013	(Nader	Nadery),	June	2013	(Dr.	Samar)	8. AIHRC	local	counterparts	offices	in	Kandahar	(June	05	and	August	05)	and	in	Faizabad	(February	05	and	July	05)		9. Opium	farmers,	Jalalabad	(September	2002),	Pashtu	(April	2003)		10. Governor	Haji	 din	Mohammad,	 September	2002,	April	 2003	and	August	2003	–	Pashtu	11. Deputy	Governor	of	Jalalabad,	August	2003	-	Pashtu	12. Head	of	Border	Guard,	Haji	Zahir,	September	2002,	October	2002,	January	2003	13. Corps	Commander	Hazerat	Ali,	September	2002	–	Pashtu		14. Local	government	officials	and	farmers,	May	2003	-	Shinwar,	Pashtu		15. Local	officials,	August	2003	-	Dur	Baba,	tribal	areas	–	Pashtu		16. Villagers,	summer	2003	–	Anar	Gai,	Lal	Pura,	Mohmand	17. Indian	and	Pakistani	Consulate	representatives	-	Jalalabad	(August	2003),	Kabul	(Aug	2003)	18. UN	officials,	April	2003	and	August	2003	-	Jalalabad	–	English		19. Local	government	officials,	May	2003	–	Shinwar	-	Pashtu		20. Head	of	Nangarhar	Daily	News,	Autumn	2002	and	2003	–	English			21. Head	of	Mohmand	Tribe,	Faraydoon	Mohmand,	Autumn	2002	–	Pashtu		22. First	Secretary,	Indian	Consulate	in	Jalalabad,	August	2003	-	English	23. First	 Secretary,	 Pakistan	 Consulate,	 Jalalabad	 and	 Kabul,	 August	 2003	 -	English		24. Head	of	Tribal	Affairs	Office,	August	2003	–	Jalalabad	-	Pashtu	25. CIA	representatives,	August	2003	–	Jalalabad	-	English	26. Head	of	PRT,	Jalalabad,	December	2005	-	English		
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27. Head	of	PRTs	in	Faizabad	(civil	and	military	leaders),	February	&	August	2005	-	English		28. Head	of	PRT	in	Kandahar,	May	and	July	2005	-	English		29. Head	of	PRT	in	Bamyan,	August	2005	-	English		30. Head	of	PRT	in	Mazar,	September	2005	-	English		31. Head	of	PRT	in	Herat,	September	2005	-	English		32. Civilian	Advisor	to	PRT,	Jalalabad,	January	2005	33. Commander	of	Afghan	Border	Guard	for	Nangarhar,	Lal	Pura,	Mohmand	-	Pashtu	34. Various	farmers,	August	2003	-	Lal	Pura,	Goste,	in	Mohmand	35. Mullah	Malang,	September	2002,	December	2004	-	Jalalabad	and	Kabul	-	English	36. Khan	Mir,	August	2003	-	Jalalabad	-	Pashtu	37. Mullah	Rocketti,	December	2004	-	Kabul	-	Pashtu	38. Hazerat	Ali,	September,	2002	–	Jalalabad	-	Pashtu		39. Faraydoon	Mohmand,	May	2003	and	August	2005	-	Jalalabad	-	Pashtu	40. Aga	Jan,	January	2005	-	Sarobi	-	Pashtu	41. Amin	Wardak,	July	2005	-	Kabul	-	English		42. Ali	Wardak,	summer	2003	43. Khairullah	(Haq’s	secretary),	July	2003	-	Jalalabad	-	Pashtu		44. Haji	Baryalai	(brother	of	Haq),	various	interviews	(informal),	2002	–2005		45. Haji	Daoud	(brother	of	Haq),	August	2003	-	Jalalabad	-	English		46. Haji	din	Mohammad,	Governor	of	Nangarhar	and	then	Governor	of	Kabul,	September	2002,	December	2004,	June	2005	-	Jalalabad	-	Pashtu	47. Haji	Zahir	(nephew	and	son	of	VP	Haji	Qadir),	September	2002,	April	2003,	July	2003,	January	2004,	December	2005	-	Jalalabad	and	Kabul	-	English	48. Majeed	Arsala	(Haq’s	oldest	son),	August	2004	49. Abdullah	Arsala	(Haq’s	aide	during	time	in	Peshawar	after	9/11),	August	2003		50. Farid	Zikria,	Afghan	Ambassador	to	UAE,	January	2004		51. Taliban	Deputy	Interior	Minister,	Mullah	Khaksar,	January	2004		52. Mullah	Zaeef,	June	2005	53. Naeem	Kochai,	June	2005		54. James	Ritchie,	October	2002	and	summer	2003		55. Sir	John	Gunston,	September	2003	56. ‘RAM’	Seeger	(former	Head	of	UK	SBS),	Autumn	2003	and	2007-2012	57. Ken	Guest	–	October	2002	and	2007-2012		58. Peregrine	Hodson,	2002	59. William	Reeve	(BBC),	2004	60. Peter	Jouvenal	–	BBC	–	2002	–	9		61. Jon	Swain		–	April	2002		62. Antony	Lloyd	–	April	2002		63. Steve	Masty	–	September	2005	64. Barnet	Rubin	–	April	2005		65. Peter	Tomsen,	US	Ambassador	to	the	Afghan	Mujahideen	(1989–92)	(by	email)		66. Helena	Malikyar,	January	2004	–	Kabul	–	English		67. Hedayat	Arsala,	January	2005	–	Jalalabad	–	English		
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68. A	former	aide	to	the	King,	February	2005	-	Kabul	-	English		69. Prince	Mustafa	(a	brother	of	Mustafa),	February	2005	-	Kabul	-	English		70. Ismael	Khan,	April	2003,	December	2004	and	July	2005	–	Herat	and	Kabul	-	Dari		71. Abdullah	Abdullah,	July	2005	-	Kabul	–	Dari		72. Prof.	Burhannuddin	Rabbani,	July	2005	–	Kabul	-	Dari	73. Abdur	Rashid	Sayyaf,	April	2002	–	Kabul	–	Pashtu		74. Ustad	Atta	Mohammad,	July	2005	–	Mazar-e-sharif	and	Balkh	-	Dari		75. Mohaqek	–	July	2005	–	Kabul	-	Dari		76. Rashid	Dostum,	July	2005	-	Kabul	-	Uzbek	77. Pir	Gailani,	Head	of	NIFA	party,	August	2005	-	Kabul	-	Pashtu		78. Mohammad	Gailani	(Pir’s	cousin),	July	2005	-	Kabul		79. Former	Communist	Governor	of	Kandahar,	September	2005	80. Governor	of	Kandahar,	Wali	Karzai,	June	2005	and	September	2005	-	Pashtu		81. Governor	Shirzai,	September	2005	–	Jalalabad	-	Pashtu		82. Mohammad	Daoud,	Minister	of	Narcotics,	December	2004	-	Kabul	-	Dari		83. Mullah	Izat,	summer	2003	and	summer	2005	-	Qarga	region,	Kabul	-	Pashtu	84. Asadullah	Khaled,	March	2005	–	Ghazni	-	Pashtu	85. Rahim	Wardak,	Ministry	of	Defence,	December	2004	–	Kabul	-	English			86. Fatima	Gailani,	Head	of	ARCS,	February	2005	and	July	2005	-	Kabul	-		English		87. Massouda	Jalal,	Women’s	Minister,	November	2004	-	English		88. Mrs	Kakar,	Women’s	Minister,	September	2002	-	English		89. Mahbouba	Seraja,	Women’s	NGO	chief	and	advocate,	January	2013	and	June	2013	90. Hassina	Sherjan,	Women’s	education	NGO,	January	2013	and	June	2013		
	
iv)	Informal	observations	and	conversations	 	
	
a. Conferences	and	Meetings	attended			Ditchley	Park	–	on	international	intervention	–	May	2012		Wilton	Park	–	on	transitional	justice,	development	and	security	(for	which	I	was	the	rapporteur)	–	January	2013		Oxford	University	Changing	Character	of	War	Programme	conference	on	‘Transitions’	–	December	2012		
	
b. Informal	Conversations	
		Because	my	home	base	was	Afghanistan	during	much	of	the	period	2000–2006,	I	had	countless	informal	conversations	with	Afghans,	foreigners,	military	and	civilian	personnel.	I	do	not	have	the	space	here	to	list	all	of	these.	Some	are	recorded	though	in	my	extensive	personal	diaries.				
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Abstract
Focusing on the period 2001–2003, the paper discusses how the Western military
intervention in Afghanistan changed power structures early on, undermining the
political settlement in the long term and culminating in the present electoral crisis.
Key concepts, a theoretical framework and the initial military approach (including
how the initial military strategy undermined an indigenous solution for toppling the
Taliban) are outlined and literature focused on hybrid governance and ‘legitimacy’
as an important but overlooked facet of peace-building is presented. Examples of
‘lessons learned’ in relation to the failure to engage with traditional forms of
governance–early on in the Afghan conﬂict—are set out. The objective is to show
that the military strategy adopted in 2001–2002 had adverse long-term
consequences that were hard to reverse later on (e.g. by shifting the goalposts of
military activity to, for example, a counter-insurgency strategy from 2005 onwards).
This paper does not aim to resolve these paradoxes in the Afghan context going
forward but oﬀers implicit recommendations based on ‘lessons learned’.
+
+
State-building in
Afghanistan: a case
showing the limits?
Lucy Morgan Edwards
Lucy Morgan Edwards is a former Political Advisor to the EU Special
Representative in Kabul and has completed a book on the alternative to war offered
by Commander Abdul Haq for Afghanistan in 2001. It is to be published in 2011.
Abstract
Since the 1990s, the concept of ‘state-building’ has become the means by which
intervenors have attempted to tackle ‘state failure/fragility’. The ‘ideal’ referred to
when attempting to do this – both theoretically and in practice – has been that of
the classic ‘nation-state’ as developed by Max Weber. To answer the question posed
by the title above, the article first looks generally at the evolution of the current
state-building paradigm and global governance discourse. Second, a background of
historical attempts at state-building in Afghanistan is given. Third, an assessment is
made of the international community’s approach to Afghanistan since 2001. Finally,
the appropriateness of replicating a Weberian state-building model onto more
traditional societies such as Afghanistan – where modes of governance and authority
are often informal, complex, and characterized by historical and charismatic sources of
legitimacy – is addressed. Until now, such contexts have barely been acknowledged,
still less understood, by intervenors. Today, however, some academics are beginning to
outline an alternative response to state fragility, recognizing more traditional sources
of legitimacy and a hybridity of political order.
By 2010, nine years after the events of 11 September 2001 (9/11), the Afghan state
appears to be characterized by a centralization of power. The situation is similar
to that faced by the Soviets in 1987, in that the state is fiscally unsustainable
and the government is only able to function in cities.1 Moreover, the state is run
by a political elite whose objectives seem diametrically opposed to those of the
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international community – a dynamic similar to one identified in Somalia.2 Like
the Soviets halfway through their ten-year engagement in the 1980s, the inter-
national community, struggling to extricate itself from its nearly decade-long
engagement in Afghanistan and faced with a steady deterioration in security since
2005–2006, is starting to focus on expensive militaristic ‘stopgap’ measures. These
have been characterized by Kipping as ‘somewhat similar to the 1980s’.3 They are
also a desperate attempt to shore up the state security apparatus, and include the
establishment of militias whose loyalty is questionable.4 For example, the Afghan
National Auxiliary Police were deemed a ‘quick fix effort’5 to stabilize the south
but were in reality led by their former militia commanders, often in pursuit of
somewhat criminal agendas. In 2008 there followed the Afghan Public Protection
Force, which US Special Forces, encouraged by the Sunni militia ‘Sons of Iraq’6
experience, hoped would replicate that development in Afghanistan. But, like
other irregular security forces, this too was criticized as potentially fuelling ethnic
problems owing to the arming of communities in conflict with others. There was
also the issue of a further weakening of the state’s claim to a monopoly on the use
of force.7 In 2009 further initiatives to set up militias were taken, including the
Ministry of the Interior’s Civil Defence Initiative.
With the ongoing justification for the war being to ‘dismantle, disrupt
and defeat’ the Al Qaeda terror network, efforts to strengthen and sustain the
Afghan government have been a secondary priority ranking far behind military
operations.8 Relatively late in the day, much of the rhetoric now relates to the issue
of ‘ungoverned space’ and ‘governance’. Nine years into the war, however, there
remains huge uncertainty in that regard. The Center for American Progress states
that:
building legitimate, responsive and self-sustaining Afghan government in-
stitutions is essential if the United States and its NATO International Security
1 Martin Kipping, Two Interventions: Comparing Soviet and US-led State-building in Afghanistan, The
Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN), Thematic Report, January 2010, available at: http://aan-
afghanistan.com/uploads/AAN_Two_Interventions.pdf (last visited 8 February 2011).
2 In Somalia, continued instability ensures the government an ongoing revenue stream and allows it to
maintain a fac¸ade of ‘importance’, as discussed in Ken Menkhaus, ‘Governance without government in
Somalia: spoilers, state building, and the politics of coping’, in International Security, Vol. 31, No. 3,
pp. 74–106.
3 M. Kipping, above note 1, p. 13.
4 Ibid.
5 Robert M. Perito, Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link in Security Sector Reform, United States Institute
of Peace (USIP), Special Report No. 227, August 2009, p. 9, available at: http://www.usip.org/files/
afghanistan_police.pdf (last visited 8 February 2011).
6 Fred W. Baker III, ‘Petraeus parallels Iraq, Afghanistan strategies’, in American Forces Press
Service, 28 April 2009, available at: http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=54107 (last visited
8 February 2011).
7 Waheedullah Mohammad, ‘Can Afghanistan’s new “Guardian” militia restore security in the pro-
vinces?’, in Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 7, No. 20, p. 5.
8 Colin Cookman and Caroline Wadhams, Governance in Afghanistan: Looking Ahead to What We Leave
Behind, Center for American Progress, May 2010, p. 1, available at: http://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/2010/05/pdf/afghangovernance.pdf (last visited 8 February 2011).
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Assistance Force allies are to withdraw their military forces from Afghanistan
and keep them out over the long term without the country descending
into civil war and regional proxy fighting. To accomplish this, Congress, the
Obama administration, and the American public need a clearer understanding
of the full dimensions of Afghan governance and the many international actors
and programs whose activities affect the issue.9
The outlook is not good: some studies demonstrate a low success rate
in externally led state-building projects over recent decades. For example, Doyle
and Sambanis surveyed 121 processes of post-conflict peace-building from 1945
to 1999, and found that less than half had achieved an end to war and violence.
More difficult goals, such as a basic level of political openness, were even
more problematic. Significantly, the activities of external peace-keeping forces had
negligible effect on the likelihood of success, although a sustainable peace was a
little likelier in those countries with a UN-mandated intervention force.10
Meanwhile, Paris compared eleven UN peace-building missions from 1989 to 1999.
He found that only two had been successfully concluded (Namibia and Croatia),
two had failed (Angola and Rwanda), and the remaining seven presented a mixed
outcome.11
To assess whether Afghanistan constitutes ‘a case showing the limits’ to
state-building it is first necessary to define the concepts of state-building aimed for,
and also to determine the historical role of state-building in Afghanistan.
Concepts
Differing theoretical traditions of the ‘state’ and state ‘functions’
Historically, philosophers ranging from Machiavelli to Thomas Hobbes, John
Locke, Max Weber, John Stuart Mill, and John Dewey (among others) have held a
variety of views about the state and its functions. However, the model that has
emerged as the basis of today’s world order is that of the ‘nation-state’ as espoused
by Max Weber during the 1918 Bavarian Revolution and the First World War. He
defined the state as a human community that claims a monopoly on the legitimate
use of force within a given territory, and noted the intimate relationship between
the state and violence.12 Lockhart and Ghani (former World Bank employees who
wrote much of the 2001 Bonn Agreement that prescribed the state-building project
for Afghanistan) assert that Weber articulates a ‘clear, functional view of the state,
9 Ibid., pp. 1–2.
10 Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace
Operations, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2006.
11 Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
2004.
12 See e.g. Max Weber, Economy and Society, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, Bedminster Press,
New York, 1968.
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and describe its “basic functions” as the legislature, the police, the judiciary,
and the various branches of civil and military administration’.13 In such a
model, however, state institutions are distinct from civil society, having their ‘own
interests, preferences and capacities’.14
Evolution of the state-building paradigm
State-building strategies
Over the past decade, the issue of state fragility – and state-building as a response
to it – has become a major area of interest for the donor, peace-building,
and security communities, marking a shift from the 1980s belief that the ‘market’
(the rhetorical term then was ‘structural adjustment’) could solve these problems.
Various interventions by the international community have taken place in
Afghanistan, Bosnia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Haiti, and Iraq, with ‘state-building’
perceived as the dominant ‘solution’ for places deemed to have ‘failed’.15 A variety
of definitions exist, which encompass ‘failure’, ‘weak’, or ‘fragile’,16 but there re-
mains a vagueness and sometimes a blurring of distinctions between these.17
Boege et al. assert that the focus of the security and development
environment is on the ‘lack of willingness or capacity [of state institutions] to
perform core state functions in the fields of security, representation and welfare’.18
The authors recognize the existence of a consensus that different degrees of state
fragility or different stages of state failure can be identified, that the phenomenon is
increasing, and that the solution generally recommended is ‘state-building’.19 This
encompasses: ‘sustainably strengthening state institutions in addition to enhancing
the capacities of state actors for control, regulation and implementation, particu-
larly in the core fields of state-hood, namely internal security, basic social services,
the rule of law and legitimacy of government’.20
13 Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp. 116–117.
14 Achim Wennmann, Grasping the Strengths of Fragile States: Aid Effectiveness between ‘Top-down’ and
‘Bottom-up’ Statebuilding, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the Centre on
Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP) at the Graduate Institute, Geneva, CCDP Working
Paper No. 6, 2010, p. 16, available at: http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/site/ccdp/shared/6305/
Working%20paper_6_BD.pdf (last visited 8 February 2011).
15 Ibid., p. 2.
16 Tobias Debiel, and Axel Klein (eds), Fragile Peace: State Failure, Violence and Development in Crisis
Regions, Zed Books, London, 2002.
17 See Tobias Debiel and Daniel Lambach, Global Governance Meets Local Politics: On Western State-
building and the Resilience of Hybrid Political Orders, paper presented at the Global Conference of the
International Peace Research Association (IPRA) 2010, Sydney, Australia, 6–10 July 2010.
18 Volker Boege, Anne Brown, Kevin Clements, and Anna Nolan, On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging
States: State Formation in the Context of ‘Fragility’, Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict
Management, Berlin, 2008, p. 3.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
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Bøa˚s and Jennings21 contend that ‘fragile states are seen through the
dominant lens of Western security interests’ and that in this context they appear as
little more than fertile breeding grounds for the export of terrorism or safe havens
for terrorists.22 As such they become a threat to ‘the national security of the USA’
and to ‘international security’. Hence, ‘rebuilding states’ is seen as a challenge that
US policy must take on. As such:
The focus of state-building generally is very much on the security dimension,
with building the capacity of security agencies (police, military, customs and
border protection) as a priority field of external assistance. This becomes an
avenue for security agencies to address development issues, to ‘securitise’ these
issues and thus add to the legitimacy of the military and other security agencies
which are expanding their areas of activity.23
In Afghanistan, the result since 2001 has not necessarily been an effective
means of ensuring security in ‘ungoverned space’.
The 1990s ‘global governance’ discourse
The current state-building paradigm emerged largely from the ‘global governance’
discourse of the mid-1990s, according to which rapid de-borderization, globali-
zation, and turbulence formed the basis for a new concept. Rosenau referred to
a ‘bifurcation’ in world politics, whereby the sphere of non-state actors gained
relative influence ‘acting according to its own goals, instruments, modes of
cooperation and patterns of legitimacy’.24 Based on these assumptions, global
governance was defined as ‘systems of rule at all levels of human activity – from
the family to the international organization – in which the pursuit of goals through
the exercise of control has transnational repercussions’.25
Concepts of ‘global governance’, including the ‘right to protect’ and
the ‘right to rebuild’
Debiel and Lambach describe how the global governance ideas were soon embo-
died within the prescriptive frameworks of the UN system (Commission on Global
Governance, 1995), resulting in new debates on ideas of national sovereignty and
ultimately the ideal of the ‘responsibility to protect’ formulated by the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001,
which ‘juxtaposed the view that state sovereignty was not only a right to prevent
interference from outside with one that considered [the said responsibility] also to
21 Morton Bøa˚s and Kathleen M. Jennings, ‘Insecurity and development: the rhetoric of the “failed state” ’,
in European Journal of Development Research, Vol. 17, No. 3, p. 388.
22 V. Boege et al., above note 18, p. 3.
23 Ibid., p. 4.
24 James N. Rosenau, The United Nations in a Turbulent World, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, 1992, p. 20.
25 James N. Rosenau, ‘Governance in the twenty-first century’, in Global Governance, 1995, No. 1, p. 13.
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be an obligation of the state towards its citizens’.26 The authors suggested that the
‘responsibility to protect’ might shift from national to global level if gross human
rights violations occurred and were not stopped.
An implication of this concept was that ‘spaces in which the state is either
not willing or able (or both) to secure the safety of its citizens, should and can
be globally governed’;27 the corollary was that the concept of ‘responsibility to
rebuild’ became an aspect of the ICISS report.28 In other words, the international
community gave itself the responsibility/right to tackle the problem of ‘ungoverned
space’. But, ten years on in Afghanistan, it has yet to achieve success in this domain.
Wennmann, referring to the security, donor and development ‘com-
munities’, adds: ‘Despite different institutional perspectives, the debate over fragile
states has reflected an implicit consensus in these communities that a strong
and functioning state is the instrument to solve the challenges of poverty, armed
violence, and sustainable developmen’.29 As such, the Weberian/Westphalian
nation-state model came to be perceived as a solution to state failure, and the
interventions of the late 1990s were characterized by a top-down, centralized focus
with emphasis on controlling the use of force. Usual tasks included providing
infrastructure, training civil servants, and initiating organizational reforms.30
However, although the approaches produced quick results, ‘the role that informal
actors and institutions, culture and identity play’31 was downplayed. Meanwhile
‘the political dimensions of seemingly apolitical reforms were grossly under-
estimated’.32
Historical overview of the state in Afghanistan
Rule of the monarchy
Before 1747, when Ahmad Shah Durrani established a confederacy at Kandahar
under the unifying name of Afghanistan (the ‘Land of the Afghan’), Afghanistan
was known as ‘Sarzameen-e-Bay’, the lawless land. Autocratic rule continued under
Durrani, who managed to unify the tribes. At the end of the nineteenth century,
unification was more pronounced under the forceful ‘Iron Amir’, Abdur Rahman
Khan, who used a mix of force and guile to cement the tribes together. The first
Afghan constitution was enacted in 1923 under King Habibullah.
Divisions between modernizers and traditionalists (a tension that con-
tinues to exist in Afghanistan) became more evident in the summer of 1928, when
26 T. Debiel and D. Lambach, above note 17, p. 2.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 A. Wennmann, above note 14, p. 2.
30 Ulrich Schneckener, Fragile Staatlichkeit: ‘States at Risk’ zwischen Stabilitat und Scheitern, Nomos,
Baden-Baden, 2006.
31 T. Debiel and D. Lambach, above note 17, p. 3.
32 Ibid.
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Habibullah’s son, King Amanullah – looking towards what Kemal Attaturk was
doing in Turkey – tried to introduce modernizing reforms. These included the
establishment of a Western-style constitutional monarchy and the abolition of
the veil. However, the Loya Jirga – which itself is a version of direct democracy
similar to the traditional Landesgemeinde or cantonal assembly of the older Swiss
cantons – rejected most of the proposals. An insurrection followed, begun by
Shinwari tribesmen who burnt down the king’s palace (and the British Consulate)
in Jalalabad. This led to Amanullah’s eventual exile, opening the way for General
Nadir Shah, who had defeated the bandit forces, to occupy Kabul.33
Nadir Shah became king in 1930, after his legitimization by a Loya Jirga.
His 1931 constitution was essentially a promulgation of an ‘autocratic monarchy
allied to religious conservatism’34 in an attempt to consolidate power by appeasing
the mullahs who had brought about the downfall of his predecessor. Accordingly,
the first article of the new constitution officially decreed that the religious law
of the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam was to be the basis of law in Afghanistan. Nadir
Shah’s reign ended with his assassination in 1933 by a high-school student in
Kabul.35
His son, Mohammad Zahir Shah (1933–1973) succeeded him and his rule
lasted for forty, relatively peaceful, years. In 1964, the third Afghan Constitution
created a constitutional monarchy with a legislature. Although Sharia (Islamic law)
was referred to, the basis of law became that of a secular legal system because
the constitution introduced an independent judiciary. Most power, however,
remained with the king.36 In 1965, elections were held and resulted in a lower house
of parliament, the Wolesi Jirga, which was broadly representative and included
anti-royalists. The king had allowed the establishment of the People’s Democratic
Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which had two wings, Khalq and Parcham, com-
prising rural Pashtuns and left-leaning urbanites (who were often dari speakers)
respectively.
The Soviet era
Soviet influence had continued to gain traction throughout the 1970s and,
in December 1979, resulted in the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. An
interim constitution followed in 1980, even as various resistance groups began to
organize themselves from their base in Peshawar. They ranged from traditionalist
groups interested in restoring the former king to minority Shi’a groups and the
more fundamentalist Islamist groups of strongmen such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
and Abdur Rab Sayyaf. The aim of most of these groups was not democratic rule
but a redefinition of Islam in Afghan society.
33 Angelo Rasanayagam, Afghanistan: A Modern History, IB Tauris, London, 2004.
34 Ibid, p. 23.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
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The Mujahideen and Taliban era
The West provided aid and ordinance to the resistance groups and, by the time the
Soviets were defeated in 1989, Afghanistan faced a new crisis: the economy was
now based on drugs, the country was flooded with weapons, and Afghan civil
society had been decimated. This situation enabled the Taliban, since they set about
restoring order, to gain the support of the populace in much of the country.
Though seen as ‘occupiers’ in the cities of Kabul, Mazar, and Herat, they thus easily
gained control over most of Afghanistan and – despite UN sanctions – refused to
give up Osama bin Laden and believed that they could win the remaining territory
in the north-east still occupied by the Northern Alliance.
Attempts to broaden loyalty from traditional structures to a concept
of ‘nationhood’
As early as 1973, the US anthropologist Louis Dupree identified a tension within
Afghan society between those desiring to promote the concept of ‘nation-state’ and
those who preferred a more traditional society based on ‘kinship’. Dupree defined
the ‘nation-state’ as: ‘in the western sense, more a set of attitudes, a reciprocal,
functioning set of rights and obligations between the government and the
governed – with emphasis on the individual rather than the group’.37 In contrast,
he wrote that ‘tribalism’ occurs ‘in non-literate societies … when kinship replaces
government and guarantees men and women born into a specific unit a
functioning set of social, economic and political rights and obligations’.38
This tension still exists in Afghanistan today and encompasses differences
between rural and urban traditions, between youth and older people, between
modernizers and traditionalists, between diaspora Afghans and those who remain
within Afghanistan. Interestingly, Dupree identified diaspora Afghans as those
pushing for the nation-state ideal.
Shahrani repeats Dupree somewhat when he says that previous attempts
at political reform in Afghanistan during the twentieth century had not enjoyed
success in broadening loyalty from clan-based or tribal networks to a concept of
nationhood.39 Although he adds that much of the difficulty has been historically
related to limited literacy and problems in communication and transport
networks, a lack of revenue also curtailed the state’s attempt to legitimize power, so
that successive leaders had to play one group off against another (with political
and financial incentives). His view is that, over time, the central power was forced
to turn more and more to regional leaders for financial and military assistance,
thereby enabling tribal and traditional structures of authority to become
entrenched. Some commentators argue that this phenomenon has succeeded only
37 Louis Dupree, Afghanistan, 1980 edition, Rama Press, New Delhi, 1980, p. 659.
38 Ibid.
39 M. Nazif Shahrani, ‘Afghanistan: state and society in retrospect’, in Ewan W. Anderson and Nancy Hatch
Dupree (eds), The Cultural Basis of Afghan Nationalism, Pinter Publishers, London, 1990, pp. 41–49.
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in accelerating the tendency of religious and ethnic pluralism to develop into social
fragmentation.40 Others would contend that this has always been so in Afghanistan,
and is echoed today because Hamid Karzai’s ability to hold onto power is largely
determined by patronage (in this case, the spoils of foreign aid and lucrative
sinecures, i.e. ‘police chief’ positions).
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the British were
Afghanistan’s main source of revenue during nation-building exercises. From the
1950s, both the USA and the USSR provided support, and in the 1980s the USSR
provided massive financial investment while occupying Afghanistan. Latterly, there
have been contributions (during the Mujahideen era) from the US and other
Western nations, and since 9/11 the West has been providing most of the revenue
to shore up the state.
The post-9/11 intervention
The post-9/11 intervention comprised three elements: military, political, and se-
curity sector reform.
The military response: Operation Enduring Freedom and NATO
The military effort in Afghanistan has been under the remit of both Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and – since it moved beyond Kabul in 2003 – the
UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) under NATO
command.
The attacks of 11 September 2001 led to the unprecedented invoking by
NATO of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, according to which an armed
attack on one member state is deemed an attack on all. NATO thus committed
itself – for the first time – to an operation beyond its immediate borders. Though
there was political will by NATO to contribute troops, US General Tommy Franks,
then leading Operation Enduring Freedom, made clear that he wanted exclusive
control over the theatre of operations beyond Kabul.41 As such, ISAF was confined
to Kabul. On 11 August 2003, NATO assumed leadership of the ISAF operation,
ending the six-month national rotations.
A key part of the OEF strategy – the use of Northern Alliance militiamen
as ground forces to oust the Taliban – was perceived as a means of averting
the need for the US to commit ground troops in significant numbers. Instead,
the strategy was to support a disparate group of mostly Tajik warlords
based in the north and east with over one billion US dollars’ worth of cash and
40 Barnett Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International
System, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1995.
41 Lucy Morgan Edwards and Shambhu Simkhada, Defence, Diplomacy and Development (3Ds): A New
Approach to International Relations?, report commissioned by and written for the Swiss Agency for
International Development and Cooperation (SDC), 2008.
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weapons.42 The fact that the Northern Alliance had been involved in an ongoing
civil war with the mostly Pashtun Taliban was overlooked, even though other
Afghans criticized their use as inevitably leading to a lopsided political settlement.
This development was accelerated when the US bombed Taliban front lines in
October 2001, as the Northern Alliance were thereby enabled to take Kabul, and
with it the key ‘power’ ministries of Defence, Interior, and Foreign Affairs.
The Bonn Framework 2001–2005
The political response was mapped out by the international community, the
UN, and certain Afghan groups in December 2001 in Bonn. Afghan representatives
from different exile groups – but crucially not the Taliban, and with few
significant Pashtun tribal leaders present – signed the Agreement on Provisional
Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent
Government Institutions.
The Bonn Agreement was intended to ‘initiate a state-building process’.43
It envisaged the initial establishment of an Interim Authority followed by an
Emergency Loya Jirga, to be held in 2002, at which a Transitional Administration
would be established and legitimized until presidential and parliamentary elections
elected a government in 2004.44
Under the Interim Administration a constitutional drafting committee
was set up to prepare for a Constitutional Loya Jirga. The Constitution was in-
tended to establish Afghanistan as a state with executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of government. A Judicial Commission was to rebuild the justice system
in accordance with Islamic principles, international standards, the rule of law, and
Afghan legal traditions. A Supreme Court was also to be established.
Security Sector Reform (SSR)
Alongside the Bonn process and Operation Enduring Freedom, G8 donor coun-
tries decided on a ‘lead nation’ approach to SSR in 2002. The Security Sector was
divided into five pillars: Germany would lead on police reform, the US on military
reform, Italy on judicial reform, the UK on counter-narcotics, and Japan on the
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants.45
That approach marked the beginning of what would become the main plank of the
West’s perceived ‘exit strategy’ from Afghanistan, namely by building up Afghan
security forces.
42 Gary C. Schroen, First In: An Insider’s Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in
Afghanistan, Ballantine Books, New York, 2004.
43 Joint Electoral Management Body Secretariat (JEMBS) background document, 2005.
44 Ibid.
45 Cyrus Hodes and Mark Sedra, The Search for Security in Post-Taliban Afghanistan, International Institute
for Strategic Studies (IISS), London, August 2007.
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Outcomes of the approach adopted
The military response
Although the Taliban regime was soon toppled, the movement was not so easily
destroyed but merely retreated to remote parts of Afghanistan and safe havens
in Pakistan, from where it has – since 2004 – mounted an increasingly successful
insurgency campaign.
Afghanistan was a ‘quickly won’ war, but a failed peace. The US decision
to use the Northern Alliance as a proxy to rout the Taliban was widely criticized
because:
The more this [i.e. payoffs by the Coalition] … happened in the name of
hunting down their prized catch, Osama bin Laden, the more the Americans
undermined the interim administration and destroyed hopes of building a
viable central administration for Afghanistan.46
Moreover, the return of strongmen (often after several years of exile
abroad) to the fiefdoms that they had occupied prior to the arrival of the Taliban
enabled commanders ‘to use the money and arms they received to invest in drug
production and engage in land grabs, predation, political intimidation, and ethnic
cleansing – a major source of insecurity for Afghans’.47
This set the stage for anarchy in the provinces and led to a feeling by many
Afghans of alienation from the state, which was not perceived to be serving their
interests. By 2005 insecurity had spread beyond the Pashtun belt and the south to
many areas of the north and east, enabling the Taliban to make their presence
increasingly felt.
The Bonn Process
The feeling that many significant Pashtun leaders (as well as the Taliban, of course)
had been sidelined from the meeting in Bonn and the political settlement that
followed amplified the feeling (for Pashtuns) of alienation from the central
government.
The last-minute participation of fifty unelected governors (in reality
‘warlord strongmen’) in the 2002 Emergency Loya Jirga was dubbed the ‘big tent’
approach by the presiding US Ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad. Meanwhile, the UN
chief, Lakhdar-i-Brahimi, told journalists that it had been necessary in order for
‘peace’ to be able to take precedence over ‘justice’. Others disagreed with the
approach, believing that this was only a temporary solution akin to ‘renting peace’,
46 John Kampfner, Blair’s Wars, Free Press, London, 2003, p. 146.
47 Barnett R. Rubin, Afghanistan’s Uncertain Transition from Turmoil to Normalcy, Council Special Report
No. 12, Council on Foreign Relations Press, March 2006, pp. 5–6.
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which would soon give way to anarchy.48 As Debiel and Lambach assert, such an
approach to state-building was characterized by a top-down focus promising quick
results but downplaying the role of informal actors and grossly underestimating
‘the political dimensions of seemingly apolitical reform’.49
The ability of the warlords to shape the outcome of the 2002 Emergency
Loya Jirga has had a long-term deleterious effect on the state-building process,
not simply because it enabled them to claim the political legitimization of
the international community (whereby, instead of being called to account for
their often dubious history of alleged rights abuses, they were now sharing
out ministerial positions with the approval of international diplomats). It also
enabled strongmen to influence key appointments both regionally and at central
government level50 and to affect the composition and outcome of the constitutional
drafting committee and ultimately, therefore, the Constitution. The corollary is an
extreme form of centralized government that protects the interests of an elite group
of strongmen with whom Karzai maintains allegiances. It has also put a brake on
judicial reform51 and hampered the reform of security institutions both locally and
centrally.52
Despite the enthusiasm by the international community for the com-
pletion of presidential and parliamentary elections in swift succession (arguably
driven by US/UK domestic politics whose imperative was to demonstrate
the ‘success’ of democracy in Afghanistan), law, order, and security have continued
to break down in the countryside. Narco-trafficking and corruption are now
known to reach the highest levels of the Afghan government, as shown by the
recent corruption scandal at the Kabul Bank, the interference in the Anti-
Corruption Commission by President Karzai himself, and the fact that the Afghan
Deputy President, Zia Massoud, was alleged to have been found in Dubai with US$
52 million on his person.53
Security Sector Reform
In 2005, one of the ‘flagship’ programmes of SSR – that aiming to disarm, demo-
bilize, and reintegrate (DDR) tens of thousands of combatants and called the
Afghan New Beginnings Programme (ANBP) – was trumpeted a success by the
48 The author was present at the Emergency Loya Jirga in June 2002 and has written about what happened
in her forthcoming book, The Afghan Solution: The Untold Story of Abdul Haq, the CIA and how Western
Hubris Lost Afghanistan, to be published in 2011.
49 T. Debiel and D. Lambach, above note 17, p. 3.
50 Sarah Lister, Understanding State-building and Local Government in Afghanistan, Crisis States Research
Centre, LSE, Working Paper No. 14, London, 2007, available at: http://www2.lse.ac.uk/
internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/Publications/phase2papers.aspx (last visited 8 February
2011).
51 C. Hodes and M. Sedra, above note 45.
52 S. Lister, above note 50.
53 Various articles published by the New York Times, including that on the Kabul Bank by Dexter Filkins,
and leaked cables published by WikiLeaks in November 2010.
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international community.54 Though its prospective target was originally 140,000
combatants, the numbers were reduced first to 40,000, then to 10,000.55 Crucially,
ANBP also only tackled the demobilization of so-called ‘official’ Afghan army
units, that is, those militias of the Northern Alliance leader Mohammad Fahim,
who, in late 2001, had taken over the army units left by departing Taliban.56 As
such, ANBP did nothing to tackle the more serious problem of the ‘unofficial’
militias belonging to the strongmen controlling the countryside. These were known
as ‘illegal armed groups’ and there were estimated to be some 1,800 such groups
throughout the country in 2005.57 Although a Disbandment of Illegal Armed
Groups (DIAG) programme was mooted by the UN in 2005, in reality neither
NATO nor the Coalition had the political will to undertake such a programme
because the militias had links with the strongmen, who – since 2001 – had been
allied with the Coalition. Indeed, many of these strongmen were now in govern-
ment or, in 2005, about to be elected as members of parliament.58 There has also
been widespread criticism of the ethnic imbalance of the Afghan National Army,
which remains largely Tajik and dominated by Northern Alliance generals.59
Meanwhile reform of the justice sector has been very weak. Besides lagging
behind schedule, it has been hampered by some of the leaders, who themselves have
known fundamentalist leanings and extremely chequered histories. For example,
Abdur Rashid Sayyaf is thought to have had undue backroom influence, including
the appointment in 2002 of Mullah Shahrani as Chief Justice (who promptly
reintroduced the hated religious police). Overall then, the decision by the West to
sponsor strongmen who many believe ought instead to have been indicted for their
previous rights abuses60 has had extremely negative consequences for the post-9/11
state-building project in Afghanistan.
In her assessment of state-building at the local level in Afghanistan, Sarah
Lister concludes:
Disarmament, the reform of the police, and the judicial sector and close at-
tention to the quality of senior appointments are all measures that would have
contributed to shifting ‘the rules of the game’ in Afghanistan from informal
patronage based systems, and towards a more depersonalized, formalized and
rationalized exercise of power through the state. Instead their neglect at a
54 S. Lister, above note 50.
55 Ibid., p. 13.
56 Ibid.
57 C. Hodes and M. Sedra, above note 45.
58 Author’s experience of meetings between the international community and Afghan government on
DIAG in Kabul, 2005. See also Andrew Wilder, A House Divided? Analysing the 2005 Afghan Elections,
Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), 2005, available at: http://www.areu.org.af/
index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=&task=doc_download&gid=254 (last visited 7 January 2011).
59 ‘Afghanistan’s troubled National Army: fixing the unfixable’, in The Economist, 19 August 2010,
pp. 39–40.
60 Patricia Gossman, Casting Shadows: War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: 1978–2001,
Afghan Justice Project, 2005, available at: http://www.afghanistanjusticeproject.org/
warcrimesandcrimesagainsthumanity19782001.pdf (last visited 8 February 2011).
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critical period has enabled local powerholders to continue to use the state as
a means to exercise power, resisting or co-opting attempts to create new
structures and impose bureaucratic rules.61
Constraints on the West’s ability to conduct a successful
post-9/11 state-building exercise in Afghanistan
A historical perspective of state-building
Boege et al. remind us that, although processes of state formation in the Western
world were undertaken over a period of centuries and often involved much viol-
ence, since the era of decolonization Western state forms have been ‘delivered’
relatively fast to many parts of the Global South. This ‘delivery’ has tended to
be guided by ‘the replication of European political models’.62 At the time of inde-
pendence, these newly formed ‘states’ therefore:
lacked roots in the recipient societies, particularly where there was no unitary
form of rule pre-existing colonial government. The global delivery of Weberian
systems was not accompanied by the development of the economic, political,
social and cultural structures and capacities that had provided the basis and
framework for an efficiently functioning political order in the course of
the evolution of the state in European history. … An identity as ‘citizens’ and
the ‘idea of the state’ does not meet with much cultural resonance within these
societies, as people are relatively disconnected from the state, neither expecting
much from state institutions nor willing to fulfill obligations towards the state
(and often with little knowledge about what they can rightfully expect from
state bodies, and what the state can rightfully expect from them).63
Hence interveners have often failed to understand what really constitutes
‘political order’ in regions of fragility. This is also reflected in the experience of
recent attempts to transpose the ‘ideal’ of the European nation-state to the South.
To understand true ‘political order’ in such regions, therefore, Boege et al. rec-
ommend moving beyond the narrow ‘state-centric’ discourse to understand the
importance of ‘legitimacy’ and hybrid political order.64
Just as Dupree noted in 1973, Kevin Clements in 2009 recognized the
essential elements of indigenous or tribal society whereby:
Most of the customary sources of legitimacy are based on norms of trust and
reciprocity. The core constitutive values that lie at the heart of traditional
legitimacy are the values that enable kin groups, tribes and communities to
61 S. Lister, above note 50, pp. 15–16.
62 V. Boege et al., above note 18, p. 6.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid., pp. 6–13.
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exist, satisfy basic human needs and survive through time. Traditional legit-
imacy rests on complex patterns of power, responsibility and obligation, which
enable social groups to exist and co-exist.65
The link between ‘legitimacy’ and ‘capacity’
A reason for the West’s failure in assisting former colonial states since indepen-
dence lies in an underestimation of the inextricable link between capacity and
legitimacy. Since independence, many such states have had difficulty in establish-
ing their legitimacy and effectiveness.66 Clements says that the same problem exists
with fragile states, and defines legitimacy as ‘a complex set of beliefs, values and
institutions (endogenous and exogenous) about the social compact governing
state–society relations’.67 He asserts that legitimacy:
helps generate social and political trust and predictability; public acceptance
of dominant power relations and an awareness of reciprocated rights and
responsibilities. If these are not present the possibility of state systems being
able to act effectively, or claim legitimacy, is very slight indeed.68
Clements cites as a possible explanation for the underestimation of the
link between capacity and legitimacy the fact that concepts of legitimacy most often
invoked by donors are ‘almost exclusively seen in Western enlightenment terms
and as some variant of the Weberian ideal type of rational-legal legitimacy’.69
Consequently, such analyses focus solely on ‘process and performance’ legitimacy
or that of institutional sources of ‘rational-legal types of legitimacy (e.g. security of
the state, rule of law, provision of public goods etc.)’. Very little attention is paid to
traditional community and social institutions, nor to the ‘interactions’ between the
‘two different sources of legitimacy, namely those located within the state realm
and those located within the social and community realms’.70
Clements stresses that ‘rational-legal legitimacy … as found in western
OECD states is only one type of legitimacy in fragile states’. Donors, he says, ‘will
have to engage with other types of legitimacy if they want to help build effective,
resilient and legitimate states in fragile situations’.71
65 Kevin P. Clements, ‘Note on building effective, legitimate and resilient state institutions’, Headline
Seminar on Deteriorating Governance, presented at the World Bank, Washington DC, April 2009, p. 4,
available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTLICUS/Resources/511777-1224016350914/5474500-
1257529177557/Notes_Clements_Institution_Building_HS_Apr8_09.pdf (last visited 25 January 2011).
66 Paul Collier analyses these factors in The Bottom Billion, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008.
67 K. P. Clements, above note 65, p. 1.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid., p. 2.
70 Ibid., p. 3.
71 Ibid. Clements indicates that the argument in his paper is based on the three ‘ideal types of legitimacy’ as
espoused by Max Weber, i.e. ‘legitimacy based on (1) Rational grounds – “resting on a belief in the
“legality” of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to
issue commands (legal authority). (2) Traditional grounds – resting on an established belief in the
sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under
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The failure by intervenors to distinguish ‘limited access’ from
‘open access’ orders
North et al. suggest that different dynamics within states (as regards political
and economic opportunities) can be characterized as either ‘limited access orders’
or ‘open access orders’.72 In the latter, governments structure access to political
and economic opportunities competitively via markets, merit, and elections. In
the former, access to political and economic opportunities is limited to elites
who are apparently dissuaded from fighting one another because they are better
off ‘participating in a patrimonial network than by challenging the authorities
violently’.73
The mistake of the international community (in Afghanistan) has been a
failure to distinguish between ‘limited’ and ‘open access’ orders. This, according to
North et al., has led to a failure of development policies:
because they try to transplant elements of the open access order – such
as competition, markets, and democracy – directly into limited access
orders. These reforms threaten the rent-creation that holds the society
together and in many cases challenge the very logic on which the
society is organized. Not surprisingly, the elite and many non-elite resist,
sabotage, or subvert such reforms in limited access societies that are not ready
for them.74
In other words, Afghanistan continues to embody a system based more on
kinship and patronage, such as a tribal people relate to, than on a rational-legal
system, which is found in a Weberian state. The problem is that intervenors have
proceeded to intervene on the basis that a rational-legal type of political order
system can exist in a tribal society that has hitherto functioned on the basis of
patronage and ‘traditional’ authority.
Sometimes there is an assumption by intervenors/donors ‘that there is
some natural trajectory whereby local “traditional” sources of legitimacy evolve in
the direction of a rational-legal political order’.75 There is also the danger of relying
them (traditional authority); or finally (3) Charismatic grounds – resting on devotion to the specific and
exceptional sanctity, heroism and exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative
patterns or order revealed or ordained by him (charismatic authority)” ’. Ibid., p. 3, note 5, quoting
M. Weber, above note 12, p. 46. Clements explains how Weber has thus ‘firmly linked the question of
legitimacy to specific modes of production, particular types of decision-making and law-making pro-
cesses and wider theories of social change’ (ibid.).
72 Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, Steven B. Webb, and Barry R. Weingast, ‘Limited access orders
in the developing world: a new approach to the problem of development’, The World Bank, Policy
Research Working Paper No. 4359, Washington DC, 2007, available at: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/
servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/09/19/000158349_20070919115851/Rendered/PDF/WPS4359.
pdf (last visited 8 February 2011).
73 A. Wennmann, above note 14, p. 26.
74 D. C. North et al. above note 72, p. 5.
75 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), The State’s Legitimacy in Fragile
Situations: Unpacking Complexity, Conflict and Fragility Series, OECD, Paris, 2010, p. 54.
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on ‘local “champions” of a rational-legal approach to reform’ in advancing a
Western state model, whereas engaging with a wider range of stakeholders might be
more realistic.76
Since 2001 the West has engaged in Afghanistan mostly with a
‘patrimonial network’ limited to the elites of the Northern Alliance
strongmen (with Karzai as the Pashtun figurehead). However, this key elite
has failed to build a relationship with a broader constituency – particularly
the majority Pashtun population – by providing protection, welfare, jobs,
and justice systems. The Taliban has therefore filled the vacuum, providing
jobs and justice, especially in the south, where the Pashtun majority have felt
alienated.
The above encapsulates the problem described by Dr Ken Menkhaus,
whereby the objectives of the international community – in building a strong
state – can often be at odds with that of the local governing elite, whom the
international community is essentially ‘propping up’ (in the fragile states con-
cerned).77 For this elite, continuing instability equates to continued funding (in the
case of Afghanistan, for so-called ‘Taliban reconciliation schemes’, building up the
Afghan National Army, aid money, and so forth).
The weakness of global actors in local situations
Much of the problem for intervenors (or ‘global actors’) is that, despite often
having advantages in terms of resources, they still find themselves outmanoeuvred
by local counterparts. Often this has to do with the fact that policy is decided
far away in the intervenors’ capital city, and by the time it reaches the personnel
representing them in base camp (or ‘the bush’) that policy bears little resemblance
to realities on the ground: ‘The personnel in the metropolitan headquarters or
in the base camp do not possess knowledge of local power structures and as
a result perceive the space of the intervention as being void of any power struc-
tures’.78
Kipping has compared the 1980s intervention in Afghanistan by the USSR
with that of the present day. He concludes that – like the USSR then – the West is
now further ‘militarizing’ its intervention in response to a failure that is char-
acterized by an inability to project the state beyond major urban centres into rural
areas.79
76 Ibid.
77 K. Menkhaus, above note 2.
78 Klaus Schlichte and Alex Veit, Coupled Arenas: Why State-building is so Difficult, Junior Research Group
‘Micropolitics for Armed Groups’, Humboldt University, Berlin, Working Papers Micropolitics No. 3,
2007, p. 26.
79 M. Kipping, above note 1.
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The link between a ‘legitimacy deficit’ and deteriorating governance
A major problem with externally imposed state-building projects is a failure to
understand the local context and hence what constitutes legitimacy locally.
Accordingly:
Unless there is a close connection to deep sources of individual and collective
(kin, clan, community) identities and belonging; externally imposed or
supported systems will never generate that ‘taken for granted’ trust and
legitimacy that exists between state and people in the West.80
The result is a breakdown in relationships and – in fragile societies –
deteriorating governance. The salient indicators of deteriorating governance
include abuse of power, declining security, corruption, exclusion, and failure to
serve the public. Clements has identified further indicators of deteriorating
governance as including:
a) polarization between endogenous customary/traditional institutions and
actors and exogenous imposed/introduced institutions/actors with regard to
the reach and significance of the state;
b) reliance by political leaders on external sources of legitimacy (aid, develop-
ment organizations, neighbouring states, etc.) rather than indigenous sources
of legitimacy;
c) disagreement (along customary/non-customary lines) about accepted rules
for decision-making, e.g. when community actors rather than state actors
deliver welfare and education services more effectively than the state, or when
customary leaders invoke traditional beliefs to invoke concepts of public/
community good versus state predation;
d) when external actors withdraw their legitimization of states or regimes;
e) when religious leaders stand in opposition to states and mobilize the faithful
to oppose the state;
f) when there is open competition over which ‘legal system’ should take pre-
cedence, e.g. in relation to endogenous/exogenous settlement of ‘land dis-
putes’;
g) when state power is challenged and lacks the legitimacy to govern by peaceful
means;
h) when taxes are low or non-existent and states rely on ‘unearned income’ such
as oil, diamonds, aid, logging, customs duties.81
Many of the above characteristics (or indicators) of deteriorating governance are
currently found in Afghanistan.
Some academics, referring to Somalia, argue in favour of a ‘third way’ of
‘ordered anarchy’ beyond the centre. Their view is that external actors should focus
80 K. P. Clements, above note 65, p. 3.
81 Ibid., pp. 4–5.
984
L. Morgan Edwards – State-building in Afghanistan: a case showing the limits?
only on basic functions – for example, minimum security and protection
of trade routes – while aid should be sent directly to the regions on the basis of
institutionalized relations with warlords and of central government acting as
mediator.82 However, such an approach possibly overlooks the complexity of
patterns of legitimacy at the local level. For, in Afghanistan, warlords are often not
necessarily historically legitimate – particularly in the south and east – even though
external proxies have changed power patterns over the past decades, endowing such
strongmen with ‘force’.
There is a challenge for intervenors in understanding what constitutes
traditional/customary legitimacy in fragile situations, because these elements
are in constant flux and must be continuously reinterpreted to suit local con-
ditions: ‘sources of traditional legitimacy matter a lot in fragile situations and
external actors have to work with their advocates to the widest possible extent
in order to promote progressive state formation, stable peace and develop-
ment’.83 Given this difficulty, the design of intervention strategies ‘capable of
generating higher levels of political legitimacy in such circumstances’ can be
extremely challenging. Additionally there is often confusion about differing
types of legitimacy, including which types reside with the state as legislative,
executive, and judicial institutions, which lie with governments or regimes, and
which lie with communities and social institutions. A particular problem is
knowing the internal dynamics of these various arenas. Hence, more research is
needed.
Clements focuses on the interaction between state and non-state actors
who enjoy ‘grounded legitimacy’, that is, the interaction that is rooted in ‘frame-
works of customary tradition and values, from which people derive their social
meaning’.84 One could even call this ‘customary governance’. This, he says, would
surprise Weber today because, although the introduction of Western values
changed ‘popular understandings of culture and custom’, it did not manage to
destroy most of the central ‘integrative elements’. As such,
people living in societies that have strong indigenous cultures have a choice
of utilizing customary provisions and/or relying on state provisions. If
the state is unwilling or unable to provide any meaningful security or
other public goods, there is a strong willingness to resort to customary
sources.85
The Taliban have – since 2001 – recognized this and filled the vacuum
left by the international community and the Karzai government with a parallel
82 Marina Ottaway and Anatol Lieven, Rebuilding Afghanistan: Fantasy versus Reality, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Policy Brief No. 12, 2002, available at: http://carnegieendowment.
org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=883 (last visited 8 February 2011).
83 K. P. Clements, above note 65, p. 3.
84 Ibid., p. 4.
85 Ibid.
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administration system in many provinces, including shadow governors and justice
systems.86
Ways forward
The need to reconceptualize thinking and accept alternative (or
‘customary’) governance mechanisms
Over recent decades the discourse on state fragility and the state-building policies
allied to it have tended towards a replication of the Western-style Weberian/
Westphalian state, despite the fact that this form of statehood barely exists outside
the world of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD). In recognition of this problem some thinkers are advocating reflection on
the concept of a ‘post-modern nation-state’ order.
In Afghanistan, for example, intervenors would need to take greater
account of traditional legitimacy:
It is clear however, that legitimacy needs much more systemic attention in
its own right and should be placed at the heart of the discourse on state
effectiveness. States can only govern authoritatively and with minimal coercion
if their citizens/peoples accord them legitimacy.87
The corollary of traditional legitimacy is the need to recognize and
work with ‘hybridized governance mechanisms’, also sometimes referred to as
‘customary governance’ or ‘mediated states’. For example, in writing about
Somalia, Menkhaus says:
The government relies on partnership (or at least co-existence) with a diverse
range of local intermediaries and rival sources of authority to provide core
functions of public security, justice, and conflict management … Mediated
states are intrinsically messy, contradictory, illiberal,and [involve] constantly
re-negotiated deals – not ideal choices for governments but often the best of
bad options for weak states.88
The concept of ‘hybrid political order’ is gaining traction, with advocates
saying that this opens up new options for conflict prevention and development,
as well as for new types of state-building. It also offers an alternative interpretation
of governance in fragile states, case examples of the limitations of externally
led state-building, and ultimately a reinterpretation of whether ‘state fragility’
86 Ken Guest, RAM Seeger, and Lucy Morgan Edwards, ‘The tribal path: commanding the prime battle
space: a more hopeful strategy for Afghanistan’, in Small Wars Journal, March 2010, available at: http://
www.the-beacon.info/images/Tribal%20path%20May%2027.pdf (last visited 11 January 2011).
87 K. P. Clements, above note 65, p. 1.
88 K. Menkhaus, above note 2, pp. 74–106.
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and ‘patronage’ systems (as opposed to rational-legal systems) are such a bad
thing.89
The idea of understanding and working with a ‘hybrid political order’ is
discussed further in the following sections, in particular its potential as a means of
improving ‘state effectiveness’.
The need to understand the ‘context’ of ‘customary governance’
in fragile states in order to improve state effectiveness
Donors and intervenors need to understand better the ‘context’ of fragile societies/
states before engaging with them. A first step is to recognize that such places often
exhibit features whereby:
diverse and competing claims to power and logics of order co-exist, overlap
and intertwine, namely the logic of the ‘formal’ state, of traditional ‘informal’
societal order, and of globalisation and associated social fragmentation … In
such an environment, the ‘state’ does not have a privileged position as the
political framework that provides security, welfare and representation; it has to
share authority, legitimacy and capacity with other structures.90
When such customary arrangements work well (be they economic, social,
or political), they can be an effective means of delivering consensus, security,
representation, and welfare to people. In many of the more remote regions of
Afghanistan, for example, these customary governance arrangements are the only
source of such benefits.
Because such arrangements (or customary governance) can play a positive
role in expanding the reach, power, and effectiveness of the state, it makes sense for
intervenors not to dismiss them as ‘too complex’ to work with, or as remnants of
an outmoded system of governance to be ignored. Unfortunately, this has tended
to be the case in Afghanistan since 2001. Thus elements of these customary
‘systems’ have sometimes stood in opposition to the post-9/11 state-building
project, while the Taliban – who have understood their relevance – have made
more use of them, ultimately to their strategic advantage.91
Bridging formal and informal institutions
In other words, rather than simply being ordered along the Weberian model, we
need to recognize the hybridity of political order that often exists in fragile societies
and post-colonial states. Wennmann, in advocating a bottom-up approach to
state-building, says that ‘hybrid political orders’, ‘mediated states’, and ‘pockets of
89 V. Boege et al., above note 18.
90 Ibid., p. 10.
91 K. Guest, RAM Seeger and L. Morgan Edwards, above note 86.
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authority’ in fragile states should be leveraged by development assistance agencies
because:
They are forms of authority that often go unrecognised but show that some-
thing can work in fragile states, and that they follow a particular political or
economic logic or order that, alas, does not always coincide with Western
perceptions of the way a state or society should work. There may be much to
gain for development policy from reaching out to these existing governance
arrangements and recognising them as a policy opportunity. Rather than
building parallel state structures that marginalise functioning structures al-
ready delivering protection, welfare and justice to local populations, donors
should explore the implications of integrating them into a long-term transition
process. The starting-point for statebuilding should, therefore, revolve around
what is there rather than what should be or is not there; hence emphasising the
need for assessments of strengths rather than weaknesses.92
There is also a need to see the legitimacy accorded to traditional
authorities and charismatic leaders as a resource underpinning contributions to
governance and law and order at local level, and ‘as a potential resource to be
drawn upon by the state system through greater interaction and engagement
with local communities and their leaders’.93 There is a need for intervenors to
use ‘bridging institutions’ in order to open up use of this potential resource for
purposes of state formation. In Afghanistan, the Tribal Liaison Office has tried to
propose ways in which informal and formal systems of governance and justice
can be bridged so that the concepts (and benefits) of statehood can be leveraged
by local actors (and vice versa).94 This work has only lately begun to be appreciated
by donors (and intervenors).
The OECD95 makes useful recommendations for external actors on how to
improve the way they intervene, and in particular on the need not to intervene
without a very comprehensive actor/issue analysis. Clements, who is also one of the
key OECD working group contributors, adds that there is a need to understand
that:
The main problem is not the fragility of state institutions as such, but the
lack of constructive linkages between the institutions of the state and
society … Focusing on states alone often results in the external legitimization
of internal legitimacy.96
92 A. Wennmann, above note 14, p. 27, emphasis in original.
93 See K. P. Clements, above note 65, p. 5.
94 Masood Karokhail and Susanne Schmeidl, ‘Integration of traditional structures into the state-building
process: lessons from the Tribal Liaison Office in Loya Paktia’, in Heinrich Bo¨ll Foundation (ed.), Issue 1:
Afghanistan, Publication Series on Promoting Democracy in Fragile States under Conditions of State
Fragility, Berlin, 2006, pp. 59–78, available at: http://www.tlo-afghanistan.org/sites/default/files/About-
TLO/Boell-Afghanistan-en-Integration-of-Traditional-Structures-into-the-State-building-Process.pdf
(last visited 10 January 2011).
95 OECD, above note 75.
96 K. P. Clements, above note 65, p. 5.
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Intervenors must also understand how traditional governance and char-
ismatic movements assert themselves (for example, in the face of social and econ-
omic change) and how customary institutions interact with state institutions (and
other social agencies) to generate or hinder positive change that includes and reaps
benefits for marginalized societal groups.
Multilateral development agencies, too, must change their attitude to face-
to-face relations and value them as much as they have previously valued bureau-
cratic forms of organization. Alongside this they must change their attitude to
‘time-frames’ because ‘[d]eveloping knowledge and understanding of the local
everyday life of the people on the ground requires a long-term presence. Trust,
built on personal relationships, might be more important than bureaucratic ac-
countability procedures’.97 There is a need to take into account
traditional forms of accountability that reach beyond conventional donor
understandings of accountability. Notions of moral obligation and inter-
personal accountability in the context of kin and other customary relations can
be drawn upon; they are not merely sources of clientelism and corruption
(which is the conventional donor perspective), but they can also be sources of
social welfare and security.98
Suggestions for further research
The OECD has recognized these issues and is trying to push donors to do the same.
Its International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) has a remit to im-
prove understanding of state-building processes. A recent report by this group
explains why the promotion of ‘rational-legal’ political institutions as a means of
strengthening state capacity and legitimacy in fragile environments has largely
failed. The report makes a variety of recommendations, including the importance
of understanding ‘country context’ rather than ‘the promotion of a particular
donor-led agenda’ as a starting point for intervenors.99
However, the OECD report sometimes fails to distinguish between legit-
imate sources of local governance and governance ‘imposed’ by strongmen
who have asserted themselves as a result of external patronage over the past three
decades and – since 2001 – through the international community’s failure to ex-
clude known rights abusers from political office. In this sense, the international
community has been complicit in allowing a crisis of impunity to develop
in Afghanistan that will be hard to reverse, given the increasingly ‘globalized’
relationships (such as mafia linked with illegal activities) and sources of income
enjoyed by the strongmen.100
97 Ibid., p. 6.
98 Ibid., p. 7.
99 OECD, above note 75.
100 Alex de Waal, ‘Dollarised’, in London Review of Books, Vol. 32, No. 12, 24 June 2010.
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Further research would be useful to clarify, for example, how traditional
systems of integrity, transparency, and accountability work; how hybrid political
orders function at various levels (e.g. province, district); how legitimacy at this level
is generated; and where the limits of traditional and charismatic legitimacy lie with
respect to youth, urbanization, shadow economies, and organized crime. It would
also be useful to find out whether traditional legitimacy can meet the aspirations of
young people; how communities arrive at consensus over who is a legitimate or
charismatic leader; and how they ensure that such leaders play a positive role in
development, governance, community problem-solving, disputes, and so forth.
Furthermore, there is the question of how electoral processes impact on the legit-
imacy of leaders and how such processes relate to the legitimacy of such charis-
matic and traditional leaders.101
The overall conclusion of the OECD report is that intervenors must focus
on ‘legitimacy’ instead of on capacity development and institution-building – as
they have done in Afghanistan since 2001. Its individual conclusions reflect ways of
limiting the ‘indicators of deteriorating governance’ identified earlier:
Legitimacy matters because it transforms power into authority, allowing rule
by non-coercive means. In fragile situations, a lack of legitimacy undermines
constructive engagement between state and society, which weakens state ca-
pacity and thus contributes to fragility. Multiple sources of legitimacy often
compete and conflict. Conflicts between external sources of legitimacy and
internal sources contribute to fragility. Large variations in perceptions of
legitimacy between different areas and among different communities confront
governments (and donors) with different judgements about when to negotiate
with and accommodate competing, non-state actors and when to ignore or
attempt to suppress them. Conflicts between pre-existing customary practice,
and ‘introduced’ laws and institutions can also undermine the legitimacy of
public institutions. Challenges from leaders with authority that derives from
charismatic legitimacy pose a threat to those whose authority is based on both
rational-legal and ‘traditional’ sources of legitimacy.
All of this contributes to fragility because it impedes constructive relations
between state and society, and leaves the state unable to impose the ultimate
rules of the game, and to provide a shared social and cultural framework
within which people think and act.102
Ultimately the OECD recommends that: ‘Donors working in fragile
situations need to invest far more effort in gaining a detailed, empirical under-
standing of local sources of legitimacy – of both state and non-state actors and
institutions – and in monitoring the impact of their own interventions’.103
101 K. P. Clements, above note 65.
102 OECD, above note 75, p. 59.
103 Ibid.
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Conclusion
Since 2001, the Afghan example has taught intervenors the limits of the Weberian
state model in stabilizing a fragile, tribal society that never had a strong centre.
Even within that context, however, Western intervenors failed to address salient
issues that have ultimately affected the legitimacy (as seen by Afghans) of their
state. These included what many Afghans perceived to be the unjust political
settlement in Bonn, the failure of the ‘peace versus justice’ strategy (and the con-
comitant inclusion within the government of an ‘elite’ cadre of strongmen whom
many Afghans associated with rights abuses), a failure to deliver services and justice
locally, and a military strategy that has appeared to operate in complete detach-
ment from the political situation.
There has also been widespread resistance by intervenors to the need for a
longer-term perspective and for a greater attempt to understand and to work with
the Afghan context. One example thereof is continued (and sometimes deliberate)
conflation of the term ‘warlord’ with ‘tribal’ or ‘tribal legitimacy’ and general dis-
missal of the idea of engaging with tribal contexts as ‘too complex’. There may be
political reasons for this – for example, the desire for ‘quick-fix’ solutions to
demonstrate ‘success’ to the domestic electoral audience of the intervening state.
Yet, as the work by several authors and the OECD shows, there is clearly a
need for intervenors (whether military, development, or donors) to reconfigure
their objectives for – and their approach to – state-building in fragile contexts such
as Afghanistan. A longer time-frame and greater understanding of complex local
contexts will be needed. Only then might it be possible to say whether Afghanistan
is indeed ‘a case showing the limits’ or not. For, as Chesterman et al. say:
States cannot be made to work from the outside. International assistance may
be necessary but it is never sufficient to establish institutions that are legitimate
and sustainable … international action should be seen first and foremost as
facilitating local processes, providing resources and creating the space for local
actors to start a conversation that will define and consolidate their polity
by mediating their vision of a good life into responsive, robust and resilient
institutions.104
104 Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff, and Ramesh Thakur (eds), Making States Work: State Failure and
the Crisis of Governance, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, p. 384.
991
Volume 92 Number 880 December 2010
A BETTER PATH TO PEACE 
 
A more optimistic solution for Afghanistan 
 
 
 
Compiled and written by Ken Guest, ‘RAM’ Seeger and Lucy Morgan Edwards 
 
17 November 2012 
 2 
Cover photo – Mujahedin at prayer, Paktia 1981 by Ken Guest © 	  
 
ABOUT THE AUTHORS 
 
Ken Guest is a former Royal Marine and photo-journalist. He has recently been working in 
Kabul and has now been closely involved with Afghanistan for 32 years.  During its struggle 
against the Soviets he probably spent more time inside Afghanistan, living and working with the 
Mujahedin, than any other Western witness to that conflict.   As a result of that past, he has a 
first hand knowledge of not just how the ordinary Afghan thinks, but how the Taliban and Al 
Qaeda think and act. Ken has written, contributed to and illustrated several books and feature 
articles, eg Flashpoint ! (Brassy’s) and British Battles (Harper Collins) and most recently at the 
request of the ICRC ‘The dynamic interplay between Islam and Conflict in Afghanistan’ 
(International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 82, No. 880, Dec 2010). 
‘RAM’ Seeger is a former Royal Marine who left the Corps in 1976 after commanding the 
Special Boat Service.  He won a Military Cross with 40 Commando during the Borneo 
confrontation, was an instructor at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, and attended the 
Army staff college at Camberley.  After leaving the Corps he set up a Special Force for the 
Sultan of Oman and then became a security consultant. During the early 1980s he made a 
number of trips into occupied Afghanistan to give training and help to the Mujahedin.  Most of 
these were to the Panshir valley for Ahmad Shah Massoud. After this he did an MA degree in 
War Studies at King’s College London.  In 2001 he lobbied for Western support of Abdul Haq, 
along with Ken Guest and another friend and colleague – Sir John Gunston.  
Lucy Morgan Edwards is a researcher in politics and regional studies at the University of 
Exeter.  She first worked in Afghanistan during the Taliban period running urban development 
projects for UNCHS in Kandahar and Heart.  The ‘community forum’ aspect of these 
programmes later became known as the National Solidarity Programme.   After spending five 
years in Afghanistan as an election monitor, researcher on transitional justice for the 
International Crisis Group and correspondent for the Economist, she was Political Advisor to the 
EU Ambassador (with responsibility for security sector reform, narcotics and civil military 
relations).  She was then 'country expert' to the EU Chief Election Observer on the 2005 
Parliamentary elections.  She has written a book on her experiences of the current intervention 
whose central theme is an investigation of the internal plan for toppling the Taliban 
advocated by famed resistance Commander, Abdul Haq, using the ex King Zahir Shah as a 
rallying point.    
THE WRITING OF THIS PAPER 
 
The authors of this paper have been watching the unfolding tragedy of these last eleven years 
with consternation and huge sadness. We have all had practical outside the compound 
experience of Afghanistan ie we have walked, talked, worked and in Ken Guest’s case, fought 
with ordinary Afghans over prolonged periods of time and as a consequence have much 
affection and great respect for the Afghan people.  We also have profound admiration for the 
courage and fighting skills of the ISAF soldiers and deplore what is likely to become a waste of 
young men’s lives.  Ken and RAM as former soldiers feel this especially. 
 
Ken did 34 trips into occupied Afghanistan during the Afghan-Soviet war, saw ISI agents at 
work in the ‘Jihad theme park’ at Ja Wa, Paktia, watched their grooming of Jalaluddin Haqqani 
and Haqqani’s development from a resistance fighter to Jihadist leader, and most unusually 
perhaps, met and discussed religion with Osama bin Laden and witnessed his panicky 
reactions in a combat situation. None of us, however, have had the time or secretarial back up 
to produce a fully researched and argued academic study.  We have therefore deliberately 
kept our paper short and to the point.  We have added some notes at the end by way of 
elaboration, and can add to these if required. 
 3 
 
A BETTER PATH TO PEACE 
 
A more optimistic solution for Afghanistan 
 
(17 November 2012) 
 
 
 “We have bought into a policy which will fail.  If we are honest, everyone is simply 
crossing fingers and hoping for the best.  In so doing we have continued a pattern of 
allowing ourselves to be pushed about by events, rather than being active and creative 
in seeking a solution that would and will be acceptable to all Afghans save the few who 
have a stake in the continuation of a corrupt and discredited government.   The 
consequences of continuing down this path will be severe, damaging and immediately 
apparent.  As matters stand we are simply, through ennuie fatigue or laziness, 
consciously allowing Afghanistan to drift.” 
 
Frank Ledwidge – author of ‘Losing Small Wars – British Military Failure in Iraq and 
Afghanistan’(1)  
  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this paper is to stress the dangers and consequences of negotiating with the 
Taliban, and to present an alternative way forward.   
 
Negotiation with the Taliban will not work – at least not in the way we want or expect – 
and the consequences – to quote Frank Ledwidge above – will be severe, damaging 
and immediately apparent. Negotiation with the Taliban will be orchestrated by the ISI, 
will result in a Jihadist controlled government and is not the right path to follow.  We are 
wrong to pin our hopes to it. 
 
An equally bad course of action is to continue on the present path.  After eleven years 
of war, heavy costs and failure this is unlikely to suddenly succeed.  It too will end with a 
Jihadist controlled government.  Our only hope is that the government we supported 
and funded, and its large ethnically unbalanced army, will last long enough after our 
departure for us to claim that this was not our fault.  
 
Given these two very unsatisfactory options we should instead adopt a very different 
path.  Rather than negotiating with the Taliban, we should be thinking in terms of 
negotiating with the ordinary people of Afghanistan and giving them the space to run 
their affairs in the way that best suits them. This could be done through devolved 
government and empowerment of the tribes – a course of action that believers in the 
centralised Western template will, no doubt, regard as a retrograde and ill-starred step, 
and one requiring far too much time and effort to implement at this late stage. 
 
However, as we hope to show, given the track record and likely outcomes of the other 
two alternatives, our third option, although radical, is not as inapt or as impractical as it 
might at first appear. 
 
 4 
WHERE WE WENT WRONG 
 
To fully appreciate the dangers we are warning against and our proposals for devolved 
government, we need to understand and accept where we went wrong in the past. In 
summary only, as the intention of this paper is not to conduct a post-mortem on past 
failures, our main mistakes were as follows. 
 
• We declined the opportunity for a quick and acceptable solution by not backing 
Abdul Haq and instead selecting Hamid Karzai.  Haq was an honest, 
independent and much respected Pushtun war leader.  He bridged the ethnic 
divides, had reached agreement with Ahmad Shah Massoud and could have 
overthrown the Taliban with only modest help from the West. (2) 
 
• We fought the wrong war – Kinetic instead of Perceptional. (3) 
• We misjudged the role and influence of Al Qaeda and spent too much time and 
effort on reducing this. (4) 
• We tied our credibility to a Government widely perceived to be corrupt and 
illegitimate – a major handicap and early mistake.  
• We failed to play the Tribal card – see comments later in this paper. 
• We failed to play the Islamic card.  The Taliban should have been challenged on 
Islam.  They should have been shown to have violated Islamic principles and 
Pushtunwali. (5)(6) 
• We tried to impose a Western template (big government, big army etc) on a 
mainly rural, conservative, poor and primitive society.  We failed to realise that ‘it 
was all about local’ and failed to give the people what they wanted.  Instead we 
tried to give them what we thought they ought to have, 
• Finally we allowed Pakistan to support and control the Taliban - which not only 
helped the Taliban to conduct an insurgency, but is one of the main reasons why 
negotiating with the Taliban is not a good option. 
THE DANGERS OF NEGOTIATING WITH THE TALIBAN 
In our desire for an early exit, we are convincing ourselves that there is a hawk/dove 
divide within the Taliban leadership and that we can negotiate an acceptable solution 
with the more reasonable and practical of the Taliban leaders (See Michael Semple 
interview and RUSI paper)(7) 
 
We do not think this is possible for three reasons. 
 
Firstly, because if there is any divide within the Taliban, it is between the local Afghan 
Taliban (who don’t like foreign soldiers on their land, have lots of relatives to avenge, 
want law, order and justice, and see the Government as illegal and corrupt) and the 
Pakistani influenced Jihadist Taliban who form the bulk of the leadership and are 
fighting for mainly ideological reasons, and it is this latter group that we will be forced to 
deal with. 
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Secondly, because as far as this Jihadist element is concerned, they are winning or 
have won the war, so any negotiation is simply a discussion of surrender terms and 
their path to power.  
 
And thirdly, because the ISI (Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence), who support and 
control them, will try indirectly to orchestrate the negotiations and ensure that any 
agreed post conflict Government is firmly under the control of the Jihadist element.  
 
The ISI want (and need) control of Afghanistan and see the Jihadist Taliban as the best 
means of achieving this. They see the Jihadist Taliban as their proxies (they have, after 
all, supported and controlled them from the outset) and if the Jihadist Taliban are in a 
position to control an Afghan Government, so too will be the ISI. 
 
The ISI see control as necessary for a growing number of reasons - strategic depth, 
fear of Indian encirclement and to make trouble against her, to restrain Baluchi and 
Pakistani Pushtun aspirations for independence in the Tribal Areas, to preserve the 
Durand line, to gain regional influence and last but not least for financial gain – from 
Afghan natural resources (copper, rare earth etc), trade (and traffic into and through 
Afghanistan), oil and gas from the Central Asian Republics and the flow of copper out of 
Afghanistan into China.   
 
A strong, stable and independent Afghanistan is not perceived by Pakistan to be in 
Pakistan’s interest, so the ISI are unlikely to waste the opportunity of ensuring that this 
does not happen. To this end they will try to ensure that the ‘reasonable and practical’ 
negotiators that the West appear to be choosing are in fact chosen by the ISI, that any 
‘negotiated settlement’ is framed by the ISI, that the West are excluded from the real 
horse trading, and that the West can believe they have achieved ‘exit with honour’ – 
military spin speak for lose without loss of face.  
The ISI will be aiming for three things –  
 
• Recognition of those they want to be recognised. 
 
• Collusion by the West in achieving this (so it will become near impossible for 
them to back out of).  
 
• The morphing from a pariah Jihadist organisation (mistakenly seen in the West 
as Islamic) into a UN recognised Government. 
 
On past and present showing they are likely to achieve all three of these aims.  While 
they know what they are doing, have clear objectives and will field their best team, we 
have flexible objectives, uncertain hopes, and if the present Afghan government has 
any input, are liable to field a failed cabal of former warlords and gangsters propped up 
by our funding. 
 
The Jihadist Taliban, for their part, are likely to accept their proxy role, because, 
contrary to popular thinking, they have no supreme leader or master plan of their own 
(Mullah Omar is a Pakistani installed figurehead) and because they have always done 
what Pakistan directed (he who pays the fiddler, calls the tune).  Many of them are also 
Pakistanis, live in the Tribal Areas and/or were brought up in Pakistan. (8) 
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To achieve their ends both groups – the ISI and the Jihadists, will be prepared to accept 
any government dressed up to be acceptable to the West providing they can directly or 
indirectly control it. 
 
Both see control as their main aim and they will happily cede short term tactical gains 
for this ultimate power. Thy will be quite happy not to be seen to be in control but will of 
course want international recognition of the Government that they are in. 
 
Although this will be against their interests and wishes, it is unlikely that the Northern 
Alliance, or any other non-Pushtun or anti-Pakistani groups, will be able to do anything 
about it. With a Jihadist controlled but UN/Western recognized government in power 
(and all the financial and military backing that this will entail) it will be very difficult for 
them to protest without finding themselves suddenly cast in the role of the bad guys.  
This apart, as soon as they see the way the wind is blowing, actors like Abdul Rashid 
Dostum will change sides and all opposition will fade away.  
 
THE LIKELY CONSEQUENCES 
 
Assuming our aim is not just to get out as quickly as we can, but to achieve the best 
possible settlement under the circumstances, all of the above is not good news. 
 
Apart from the fact that it will not be in the best interests of the Afghan people, a Jihadist 
controlled Government will be widely propagated and perceived as defeat for the West.  
We will lose much face and the worldwide spread of Jihadism will be much encouraged.  
This is particularly likely in Pakistan, where their growing Jihadist movement may 
additionally (and ironically) be able to gain strategic depth from the use of safe havens 
and bases inside Afghanistan. (9)  
 
The ISI, in their vanity, think this will not happen and believe they can control Jihadism 
and use it for their own purposes as a ‘smart’ weapon – to further Pakistan’s frontier 
and regional policies (as already explained) and as a threat to others to leave Pakistan 
alone.  There is a real danger however that they cannot.  Once the genie is out of the 
bottle, it is very hard to force it back in again. (10)(11) 
 
If the ISI are proved wrong, this growing and out of control force of Jihadism will 
threaten the Pakistan state, spread to other countries, destabilise the region, force 
interference from China, India and Iran and have long term implications for the security 
of the West.  If Pakistan’s nuclear assets come under Jihadist control, there is the 
danger of nuclear leakage or misuse. (12)(13)(14) 
 
The end result therefore will be that we will have fought and paid for an Afghan 
war, only to have recognised and allowed the very things that we went to war to 
prevent. (15)  
 
MORE OF THE SAME 
 
Given our past mistakes and need soon to withdraw from Afghanistan, the continuation 
of current policies is not a serious option.  If we, the West, like the Russians before us 
(with similar aims and policies) are unable to defeat an Afghan insurgency, it is highly 
unlikely that Karzai’s government and army (modelled on ours) will be any more 
successful.  Nor are they likely to last any longer after our departure than Najibullah’s 
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did after the Russians ended their funding.  The increasing number of green on blue 
killings – an attempt to make amends and protect families against reprisals - is a sure 
sign of declining confidence.  As stated earlier the end result will be the same as 
negotiating with the Taliban – a Jihadist controlled government. 
 
A BETTER PATH 
 
Contrary to common perceptions, the choice is not between more of the same - ie 
continuing war and corrupt government, and negotiation with the Jihadist Taliban.  It 
should still be possible, by engaging with the Afghan majority, to give it what it has 
always wanted – no war and no return of the Jihadist Taliban.  Jihadist Taliban, it must 
never be forgotten, is an imported concept that was designed and launched by the ISI in 
1993.  It is not an Afghan concept and runs against the Afghan nature. The 2001 
collapse of Taliban authority was widely welcomed by the vast majority of the population 
who were fed up with its interference in their daily and very traditional lives. 
 
We maintain that the best way of getting in contact with the ordinary Afghan and 
marginalising the Taliban is by reducing the power and scope of the central 
government, establishing semi-autonomous regions and following what we have 
come to call the Tribal Path. (See our paper ‘The Tribal Path’ dated 9 June 
2010)(16) 
 
Regional Government would be more in keeping with Afghanistan’s historical past. It 
would allow us, without loss of face, to correct past mistakes and be harder for the ISI 
and Jihadist Taliban to control.  Instead of having to infiltrate a single central 
government, they would have to infiltrate multiple governments many of which would be 
ethnically different and jealous of their independence.  By following the prescriptions 
advocated in the Tribal Path it should be possible to reduce most of the difficulties and 
dangers, win over the moderate Afghan Taliban, and bring new hope to the Afghan 
people. (17) 
 
DIFFICULTIES AND DANGERS OF REGIONAL GOVERNMENT 
 
The difficulties and dangers of Regional Government could be considerable.   
 
For a start the concept is unlikely to be well received by the current Afghan Government 
who will see it as an unwelcome dilution of power and loss of control.  
 
It might also mean multiplying the central government corruption problems by the 
number of regions to which power is devolved and lead to inter-factional feuding, civil 
war and Balkanisation. 
 
These dangers can be minimised, providing:-  
 
• The devolution process is carefully and securely planned. 
  
• The regional division is correctly balanced – this is the essential first step.   Get 
this wrong (as we did with the Durand line) and the concept is under a 
permanent handicap.   
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• Regional governments do not mimic the strong central government we are trying 
to get away from.  They too must have a light footprint.  
 
• Suitable regional governors are democratically elected and all decision making 
and ownership is as transparent and as close to the people as possible.  This 
means devolving power to tribes and local communities and following the 
principles of the Tribal Path. 
 
• The Afghan Security Forces are restructured, reformed and reduced in size with 
the use of traditional Tribal Forces as the front line first responders.  
 
HOPE AND OPPORTUNITY 
 
Whilst the difficulties and dangers should not be underestimated, we would argue that 
they are, at least, no less than those attached to negotiating with the Jihadist Taliban or 
continuing on our present course, and at best, offer far more hope of achieving a 
peaceful outcome. 
 
If we can accept them, make a start on devolving power to regions and local 
communities and reduce the Army to a more manageable and effective size, we will be 
giving Afghan morale what it badly needs – a highly visible indication of beneficial 
change.   
 
The need for this is paramount, as it is the only way of capturing the enthusiasm, hope 
and backing of the Afghan people and ensuring that the expenditure of blood and 
treasure since 2001 has not been entirely in vain. 
 
PROPOSED REGIONS 
 
The obvious solution of forming regions round the country’s main towns leaves much to 
be desired.  Space is as important as population, and Afghanistan is still predominantly 
rural. Other critical factors are trade routes, security, ethnicity, easy access to the 
regional capital, and speedy Quick Reaction Force (QRF) access to all corners of the 
region. 
 
Taking all these factors into account, we feel that the country could be divided into 
seventeen regions.  (See map at end of paper after ‘NOTES’. 
 
The population based regions would be Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat and 
Mazar, while other possibilities subject to further and more detailed consideration could 
be:-  
 
Meaymaneh (Faryab).  This area offers alternative routes to Turkmenistan and splits 
the distance between Mazar and Herat.  It will act as a trip wire aiding northern border 
security. Whilst the northern reach of the Afghanistan ring road is being developed, 
Taliban activity develops at a faster pace. Significant effort and resources need to be 
focussed on its completion.  
 
Kunduz.  This is Hekmatyar’s home ground and the Taliban have been expanding their 
activity in this region.  It therefore needs special attention if it is to be kept under control, 
not least because the Taliban are beginning to expand their circle of recruitment. This 
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development represents a serious risk, which, if it becomes wide spread, changes the 
dynamics of the operational environment in the north. 
 
Badakhshan with its capital in Faizabad.  This is a large area with a low population, 
so is often seen as less important. But it is part of the access route to the north, and 
includes the Wakhan corridor to China.  It also borders with Pakistan and Tajikistan. 
Poor security here has allowed the Taliban to use the area as a rat run and supply route 
to Kunduz and other northern regions (18). Although the ground is physically 
challenging, the Taliban have been able to move through it relatively easily. As they are 
channelled through high passes, a focused effort by suitably trained and supported 
forces could cause significant disruption. 
 
Panjshir. As the Tajik heartland, this is a secure area and the purpose of placing a 
regional centre here would be to reward success and consolidate security. It would 
serve as a base against Taliban infiltration routes through southern Badakhshan and 
Northern Nuristan and give support to their regional centres. 
  
Nuristan.  This is one of the Gateway provinces, and used by the Taliban as a passage 
north to Badakhshan and west to Laghman and Kapsia. Nuristan would act as a central 
buttress mutually supported by Panjshir to the north and Jalalabad to the south. 
 
Khost. This has to be a separate region as border crossing points are cut off from 
Nangarhar (Jalalabad) and Logar (Ghazni) by high mountains.  The area is also the 
stamping ground of the Haqqani Network, so for this alone merits special attention.  
 
Paktika. This area plugs the gap between Khost and Kandahar. Development of the 
road from Gardez to Paktika and on to Kalat would enable an outer trip wire route, 
offering additional protection to the main Kabul-Ghazni-Kandahar highway. 
 
Ghazni. This is an important staging point and security hub, on the highway between 
Kabul and Kandahar. 
 
Lashkar Gah.  A region here would protect part of the main Kandahar-Herat highway 
and act as a point from which to connect with the Afghan Baluch community. The 
Baluch are ethnically different from the Pushtun.  Baluchistan is also a sensitive issue 
for the Pakistanis, and more effective Western connection to the Baluch could be used 
as a pressure point to encourage co-operation by Pakistan.   
 
Farah. A regional hub in Farah would help protect the Kandahar-Herat highway. 
Subject to regional political needs, it might become the hub for a new border trade and 
supply route serviced via Iran and their deepwater port of Chah Bahar. In addition to 
increasing trade benefit, the potential use of Chah Bahar might prove a useful tool for 
leveraging more effective Pakistani support, as it competes with the new Pakistani 
deepwater port in Gwadar. It could also impede the transport of drugs across to Iran. 
 
Chaghcharan. This would give a region to the Aimaq people.  It would help to secure 
the central highway trade route and impede Taliban supplies and personnel heading 
north towards Badghis and Faryab. It also represents a suitable staging post, as it is 
presently about a one day drive from Herat. 
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Bamian. By including Bamian, the Hazaras would have their own region.  The central 
highway trade route security would be better serviced as Bamian is about a days drive 
from Chagcharan. Having both Bamian and Chagcharan would mean the Herat-Kabul 
drive was broken down into manageable legs, with sizable staging posts and security 
hubs at the end of each days drive.  
 
Increased use and security of the central highway would provide competition for the 
Kabul/Kandahar/Herat road ie trade and revenue would follow the most secure route.  
Local communities would then not only gain from improved security, but lose if they 
failed to provide it. 
 
THE TRIBAL PATH 
 
The Tribal Path paper we wrote in 2010, advocated four things, all of which are relevant 
to regional devolution and, if devolution is to be successful, should be incorporated into 
regional institutions:- 
 
• Bottom up community governance.  
 
• Tribally raised and tribally controlled Tribal Forces. 
 
• The importance of building up trust and allowing the Tribes to lead the way. 
 
• A properly sponsored and authoritative study to find out more about the Tribes 
and local communities than is currently the case. 
 
Tribal based Community Governance 
 
Local governance should be based on the tribal system because:- 
 
• Tribes and local community structures still matter in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is 
still a traditional, kinship-based and mainly rural society.  If its people are not 
always as tribal as each other, they are likely at least to be clannish by nature 
and conservative in outlook. They are likely to have more in common with each 
other than divides them. They share a common experience and respond in 
similar ways. Tribes are used by the people (who can expect more certain and 
reliable support from them than from other organisations), the Central 
Government (to an extent), and the Taliban (see below). 
 
• For the Afghan, the traditional Jirga, with its open forum assembly, transparency 
and accountability, is much fairer and more democratic than a Western electoral 
system which can be misunderstood, difficult for rural Afghans to participate in, 
and easily manipulated.  The system has always worked well in the past, and 
has shown itself to be trustworthy and sustainable.  It was collective and 
transparent and well suited to the people it managed. There were Jirgas at 
different levels of society, with every member of the tribe and community being 
allowed to attend their meetings.  Tribesmen received information through their 
representatives in the Jirga, and everyone was fully aware of decisions made, 
and allowed to ask their leaders and representatives to justify these.  Jirga 
members were voted in on grounds of capability and included women, often from 
non-prominent households. (19) 
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A common criticism is that tribal structures have been weakened by the pre-9/11 
Communist, Mujahedin and Taliban regimes, and since then by the assassination of 
uncooperative leaders by Taliban insurgents.  These have certainly damaged the 
structure but not fatally. 
 
Perhaps the strongest argument for following the tribal path, is the use made of it by the 
Taliban.  Unlike the West or the Afghan Government, the Taliban have taken active 
(and successful) steps to utilise the tribal dynamic – at first using its support and then 
replacing it with its own direct influence and control.  A policy of tribal empowerment 
and cooperation would not only give the government a very effective asset, it would 
deny the same to the Taliban.  This is important because if the Taliban lose the 
support (20) of the tribes - they will ultimately fail, while if they retain their 
dominance over this resource, it will be almost impossible to defeat them. 
 
Tribal Forces 
 
Our Tribal Path proposal for Tribal Forces was more controversial, but only because, 
quite wrongly, it evoked memories of warlord militias (paid retainers of mafia thugs) or 
central government militias, which were more of a source of enrichment and prestige to 
government ministers than a threat to the Taliban. (21) 
 
Properly structured however, Tribal Forces are a cost effective way of securing tribal 
lands, although they must be controlled by their own tribes-people and tribal leaders, 
operate in their own areas, and work for the readily perceived benefit of the tribe 
providing them - eg community defence and the ejection of unwelcome intruders.  Local 
security and stability is now becoming a major issue for ordinary Afghans as they face 
an increasingly uncertain and turbulent future.  Responsible and accountable Tribal 
Forces who can safeguard tribal space will do much to reduce this concern. (22) 
Although regional and central governments should resist the direct control of tribal 
forces, they must still support them, and provide escalating layers of follow up forces for 
situations they cannot control or deal with.   Working together in this way should allow 
both sets of forces to develop a sense of interdependence and mutual respect. 
 
We would see the Tribal Forces being structured on traditional tribal lines. These 
involved three kinds of force – the Kishakee who gathered intelligence, the Lashkar who 
were a large grouping called together for defence against a common enemy (usually 
also an enemy of the country), and best known and most used, the Arbakai.   
 
The Arbakai were volunteers and respected members of the community.  They were 
embedded in the community, engaged on community tasks, and were answerable to 
the community. Their main duties were to implement their Jirga’s decisions, maintain 
law and order, and protect the borders and boundaries of the tribe or the community. 
Unlike militias they were unpaid and not used for the political or financial 
interests of individuals. Moreover, whilst being an Arbakai member was considered 
an honour, belonging to a militia was considered shameful. (23) 
 
Tribal Police 
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Working alongside the traditional Tribal Forces should be a specially recruited and 
formally recognised tribal police force. This would function in a way not dissimilar to how 
tribal police are used in the USA on Native American reservations. 
 
Scouts 
 
Based on the old North West Frontier Scouts, should be a para-military regional 
organisation recruited from the Tribes, but not tribally owned or part of the Police or 
Army. They would be controlled by a Political Officer, and would be used to back up 
local forces, keep quarrelling tribes apart, or punish misdemeanours of tribe against 
tribe.  
 
Quick Reaction Forces (QRFs) 
 
Efficient, effective and highly mobile QRFs are essential to the concept of escalating 
layers of Government support for Tribal Forces.  Whenever possible these should be 
heliborne.  
 
Where the QRFs are located is important, as this will affect how quickly they can reach 
likely trouble spots.  Any area they are unable to reach easily will soon be realised by 
the insurgents and used by them to advantage.  
 
The concept of relentless pursuit is essential and to this end combat tracker teams must 
be developed with expert human trackers.  
 
Building up Trust and Allowing the Tribes to Lead the Way 
 
Having decided that the Tribal Path is worth following, it is important to understand that 
even after finding the right people to deal with, it will take time to build up bonds of trust.   
 
And having won the trust and cooperation of the Tribes, the next step is to realise that in 
order to keep this and use it productively, the Tribes must lead the way in the use of 
Tribal Forces.  
 
Tribal Forces will work if they are raised and controlled by the Tribes and seen by 
the tribes as working on their behalf.  They will not work if they are merely an 
extension of government power in tribal disguise.  
 
Need for a Tribal and Local Community Study 
 
An independent and authoritive study is necessary as the tribal situation in Afghanistan 
is a complicated one. The study would involve not just tribal mapping (which to a large 
extent has already been done), but establishing the social, economic and historical 
inter-relationships between the tribes.   
 
RESTRUCTURED  STATE SECURITY FORCES 
 
Paralleling the devolvement of power to Regions and local communities, should be a 
restructuring and reforming of the Afghan State Security Forces.  Neither the Army nor 
the Police are functioning properly and despite optimistic Western forecasts are unlikely 
to. This should take place at the same time as changes in governance. 
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A More Sustainable and Acceptable Army 
 
The Army should be renamed as the Afghan Defence Force, reduced in size, and be 
reorganised into regionally recruited regional regiments. The Army should be of a 
limited size so that it can be more sustainable, better trained, better paid and more 
effective.  It should wear local style uniforms with the traditional salwar. Basing it on the 
failing model of a large US/ISAF army was a mistake. (24)(25)(26) 
 
Western Officers 
 
Initially at least, the Army could also be partially officered by Westerners – some of 
whom might be seconded, others of whom might be contracted.  A model for this might 
be the highly competent and successful Sultan of Oman’s Armed Forces (SOAF) during 
the Dhofar war.   
 
Loyalty of Afghan troops to Western officers need not be a problem.  In a properly run 
regiment, with Western officers speaking the language of their men and committed for a 
period of several or more years and where the troops are well equipped, well looked 
after and confident about the future, the situation could be very different from the 
present one.  In the Indian army, there was no problem in recruiting and holding 
the loyalty of Pushtun soldiers even when they were used on the frontier against 
other Pushtuns. 
 
Restructured, Renamed and Better Paid Police 
 
A better structured and more effective police force is essential. As a first step in 
countering this, the pay for the Police should be increased. Rural police should be 
recruited on a regional basis from the areas they are to police. City police should have a 
wider regional and ethnic mix and more women. The force should also be renamed as 
the Afghan Nation Police instead of the Afghan National Police.  They too should be 
given new uniforms with a specially coloured salwar. 
 
REGIONAL ISSUES 
 
We see regions breaking down into provinces and districts under Regional and 
Provincial Governors and District Officers. As with the new regional boundaries, 
provincial and district boundaries will need to be the subject of a careful and detailed 
study.  This should take full note of the tribal and local community study we are also 
proposing. 
 
The new governments should try to follow the principles and practices of the tribal path 
as completely as possible.  Some examples of where this can be applied are the 
selection of Governors and District Officers, governance by committee, selection and 
use of Political Officers, control of budgets and allocation of funds. 
 
Governors and District Officers should be elected, governance committees should 
replicate the jirga system and include tribal representation from local jirgas.  Political 
Officers should be specially qualified and appointed. Their prime duty would be to liaise 
with the Tribes and be responsible for tribal affairs.  The Regional Government should 
control its own budget. 
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Priority issues for the regions are likely to be Aid, Justice, Reconciliation and Revenue 
collection. 
 
Properly administered Aid will be the most visible gain for local communities so must be 
the top priority if their support is to be won.  Next in line is Law and Order and Justice 
(27).  This is a prime concern for the ordinary Afghan, and must run in tandem with Aid 
or we run the risk of Aid fuelling corruption and injustice, as is the case now. With visible 
local benefits and improved Law and Order, the space for local Reconciliation is 
created. Last in line is Revenue collection as it can only come from a stable 
environment, and if given priority would undermine the scope for creating the stability it 
needs. Note Law and Order is a rallying cry for Taliban. We need to own that banner. 
 
WIDER CONSULTATION 
 
Our final plea, whatever the course of action, is to widen the consultation process to 
include those with practical experience of living and working with ordinary Afghans and 
travelling throughout the country.  This is not to knock academic study or the efforts of 
MOD and FCO officials, it is simply to point out that because of the security situation 
getting this experience nowadays is very difficult, so those who have been lucky enough 
to have obtained it are a valuable and dwindling resource, which should be used more 
than has been the case hitherto. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We are at the eleventh hour.  For the past eleven years we have failed to make 
sustainable progress in Afghanistan.  This is mainly because we’ve used the wrong 
models for the development of the Government, Army and Police.  If we can resist the 
siren call of negotiation with the Taliban, it is possible to recover from this faulty start, 
but only by radically changing our approach and building these institutions on different 
lines. If we cannot embrace such change we will, most certainly, embrace failure.  
 
 
NOTES 
 
(1).  ‘Losing Small Wars – British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan’ by Frank Ledwidge. 
ISBN 978-0-300-16671-2. 
(2).  See Lucy Morgan Edwards’ book - ‘The Afghan Solution – the inside story of Abdul Haq, 
the CIA and how Western hubris lost Afghanistan’ published by Pluto Press/Palgrave Macmillan 
(USA).  ISBN 978-0-9568449-0-3. 
(3). Instead of imagining the opposition as a physical mass with a weakness at the centre, we 
should have seen it as a formless gas affected by all kinds of indirect factors.  We should have 
made more of an effort to target how the enemy thinks and so perceives and structures for the 
contest.  For example, while we might see drones as a calculated and effective way of striking 
at the enemy leadership, the Taliban perceive them as a sign that the West is too weak and 
frightened to fight man to man. 
 
(4). Al Qaeda never existed in large numbers, was never a major participant and never had a 
chance as a non-Afghan enterprise of functioning inside Afghanistan in the way the Americans 
imagined.  More dangerous than the organisation is the idea that drives it.  This is a general 
 15 
dissatisfaction with the Muslim lot, which is blamed on the West.  Al Qaeda is the smoke, not 
the fire. 
 
(5). We should have created debate and seeded doubt.  We should have attacked their pillar of 
presentation, that they are engaged in a war against non-Islamic occupying forces, by stressing 
that the only real invaders are those infiltrating from Pakistan, intent on destabilising and 
destroying Afghanistan. 
(6).  Clearly the UK government has no credibility as a commentator on Islam.  However, 
friendly Islamic authorities (ulema) could have been approached either directly or through 
friendly governments.  Such authorities include Al Azhar University in Cairo, the centre of 
mainstream Sunni theology, the many sound Pakistani authorities or Islamic scholars at our 
own universities (there are some fine ones at Oxford for example); or all of the above.  All have 
expressed a willingness to name Al Qaeda’s approach as heretical. 
(7).  See the Emma Alberici/Michael Semple interview on ABC News Australia, 4 September 
2012 and the RUSI Briefing paper September 2012.  
(8). Within ISI arsenal are firm allies, such as Jalaluddin Haqqani, but even Haqqani is not a 
Pakistan puppet, although he will accommodate them as long as it suits him. The proof of that is 
what happened immediately after 9/11. Pervez Musharraf rushed to offer Haqqani an 
opportunity to become the acceptable face of Taliban, replacing Mullah Omar, but Haqqani 
turned Musharraf down. Mullah Omar is Pakistan’s puppet, Haqqani is not. Haqqani has the 
capacity to become the prime focus of Jihadisim along the Pakistani N.W. Frontier, easily 
outpacing Mullah Omar.  Mullah Omar is and always was, merely window dressing. 
(9). Jihadism in Pakistan developed in the 1980s out of a controlled ISI experiment.  Its purpose 
was to use Islamic credentials to legitimise the holding onto power by the military.  However as 
this aggressive use of Islaminisation gathered popular support – it was a powerful rallying cry 
among the deprived rural population for whom the government had done little – it began to 
gather its own momentum. This was accelerated by an unrealistic evaluation of the role played 
by the Islamic resistance in the ‘defeat’ of the Soviets in Afghanistan, seen by some as proof 
that Allah was on their side. That perception increased the pace from Islaminisation to Jihadism. 
(10). Jihadism in Pakistan has now become a serious threat, as its expansion has left the ISI 
with a fragmented web of factions it finds hard to control. Some will be loyal cohorts, some will 
be allies of expediency, and some will be opposed, resenting attempts to impose controls or 
frustrated by any one of a number of issues which vex them. 
 
(11). Pakistan believes it won the Soviet-Afghan War by ‘controlling’ Jihad like a ‘smart 
weapon’. It thinks it is winning now in Afghanistan in the same way. In reality it is achieving its 
ambition far more on the back of Western failures than its own brilliance. The ‘smart weapon’, 
overall, is not obedient and has the capacity to bite the hand that feeds it. 
(12). Although the ISI/Jihadist movement in Pakistan is more interested in controlling 
Afghanistan and influencing near neighbours than it is in exporting Jihadism world wide, its use 
of Jihadism as a threat to others to leave Pakistan alone is likely to increase. Meanwhile the 
Jihadist elements within Pakistan are likely to expand to a point where the ISI can no longer 
contain their threat to the state.  
(13). The Jihadists who morph out of ISI patronage will have a much more far reaching view of 
‘Jihad’, not least because they are infused with Wahhabi ambitions. They will see it as their duty 
to overthrow the West, making penetration of Western Islamic enclaves a key part of their 
strategy. 	  Interestingly, they will attempt to do what the West should have done in Afghanistan. 
They know they cannot hope to occupy the battle space physically, so will make their ‘frontline’ 
a battle for perception among the resident Islamic community in the West. They will do this by 
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exploiting grievances, pushing for favourable political reforms, uniting and mobilising the 
disaffected, agitating to seed chaos, in fact using all the essential ingredients for war by other 
means.  Added to this will be a certain amount of kinetic activity to force heavy handed counter 
measures which can then be used for propaganda purposes. Their aim will be to establish cells 
that are self-motivating rather than operating in a conventional command and control 
organization. 
(14). The danger is that the ‘secure cordon’ that the ISI describe as protecting their nuclear 
systems faces the wrong way. In theory it protects by preventing entry, in practice, the most 
likely source of danger is not Jihadists climbing over the wire but facility staff already inside the 
compound. 
(15). One can admire the skill of the ISI without being blind to the weak link in their armour - 
ego. This infuses them with an absolute conviction of their own invulnerability. Admittedly the 
West has given them ample reason to bond with that perception. However, in our opinion, in 
doing so they credit their own performance more than it deserves. It does deserve a lot but it 
should be balanced against the degree to which the West has defeated itself. In effect, the ISI 
on its own could not win.  It needed the West to fail, making significant mistakes. This the West 
did, and it was these mistakes, more than ISI perfect planning, which is delivering victory to the 
ISI.  
(16).  ‘The Tribal Path – Commanding the prime battle space’ dated 9 June 2010 by Ken Guest, 
RAM Seeger and Lucy Morgan Edwards.  Published earlier in March 2010 in the Small Wars 
Journal.  See also http://thetribalpath.weebly.com/the-tribal-path-9-june-2010-pdf.html (click on 
view in full screen) 
(17). For a supporting perspective on the Tribal path and ISI manipulation see the Pushtun 
Awakening brief by the NWSC (New World Strategies Coalition) which describes the Taliban as 
“a religious mafia concocted on white boards in Rawalpindi”  
(http://www.eurasiareview.com/15092012-pashtun-awakening-defeat-the-taliban-by-changing-
the-narrative-analysis/#comment-435357) 
(18). August 2010 saw the murder of 8 expatriate aid workers in one attack in Badakhshan, 
when it was reported the local police chief had an agreement with Taliban to allow safe passage 
through his space in exchange for allowing illegal smuggling of semi precious stones from 
mining activity he had a share in. 
(19). Tribal Security System (Arbakai) in Southeast Afghanistan – Occasional Paper no 7 – 
dated December 2008 by Mohammed Osman Tariq from the Crisis States Research Centre. 
http://www.crisisstates.com/download/op/OP7.pdf 
 
(20). This tribal support has never equalled approval or a willingness to see the instalment of a 
Jihadist Taliban regime. 
 
(21).  An example of what the Tribal path is not about, is the Warlord force allegedly recruited by 
Ahmed Wali Karzai and his associates and known as the Kandahar Strike Force.   Such militias 
have been accused of murder, rape and extortion, while this particular one was investigated for 
shooting dead Matiullah Qateh, the Kandahar chief of Police (see article by Stephen Grey 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/16/afghan-prosecutor-arrest-warrant-us-officer). As 
mercenary forces, Warlord militias are notoriously unreliable, with loyalty, at best, questionable 
(as shown by the number of times people like Abdul Rashid Dostum have swapped sides) and 
their performance, as part of legitimate government, extremely counter-productive. 
 
(22).  Recent reports recount that the going rate for an AK47 have increased to $1,000 from 
$300 a year ago. 
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(23). As for Note 19. 
 
(24).  Even some of its own commanders acknowledge that it is far too large and highly likely to 
fragment after NATO’s withdrawal.  
 
(25). It naturally follows, if the power is decentralised to natural regional locations then the 
military force at its disposal must also be decentralized and operate in a more local manner 
whilst reflecting the ethnic balance of their home regions. This removes the need for the mass 
mini-me preference of the US, reduces cost and permits a custom made structure for the 
environment in which it must function. 
 
(26).  Frank Ledwidge author ‘Losing Small Wars’ recounts a telling story of how a group of 
Pushtun Taliban prisoners being guarded by British and ANA soldiers watched with surprise 
when the ANA soldiers (Tajiks in Western style uniforms) went off to pray.  They asked the 
British soldiers what the ANA soldiers were doing.  “Praying” replied the Brits.  “But why” said 
the Taliban,  “They’re Russians aren’t they?” 
 
(27). A major justice problem is deciding how to deal with those personalities that the West 
empowered after 2001, who instead of being indicted (as they should have been), have 
remained in power and are continuing to orchestrate mafia heists of resources in Afghanistan. 
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This book is dedicated to my husband,  
Philip
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An American businessman who has been assisting and lobbying for 
Haq around US Gov called this morning and believes that following an 
initial interest with Haq – which still exists – the hawks have won with 
their plan to attack and remove the Taliban with coalition forces.
Though there is no other source for this alarmist scenario it could 
explain the latency with which Haq has been treated.
I need hardly add that the Pashtun response will be one to unite and 
“all will be against the foreigner”. The Haq option will be dead in 
the water and the US could well be in for a Soviet experience. In the 
Islamic world it would be a disaster.
‘Words from Washington’, sitreP, October 2001
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IAUTHOR’S NOTE 
Since 2001, I have interviewed hundreds of Afghans and others 
about the events described in this book. There are many others to 
whom I am indebted, but who prefer not to be named. Some names 
have been changed.
Much of the dialogue is from those interviews. Sometimes my 
interlocutors or I referred back to contemporary notes or letters or 
had a strong recollection of what was said. I have rendered such 
dialogue in quotation marks. 
Quotations and information taken from other books, articles 
and other published materials are listed in the endnotes and 
bibliography. Permissions have been sought for the longer 
quotations made in the text.
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DRAMATIS PERSONAE: 
Principal characters of the narrative  
and their positions in 2001 - 2002
THE ARSALA FAMILY
An Eastern Pashtun family of eight brothers who fought the Soviets 
and the Taliban. They belong to the Ghilzai branch of the Pashtun:4 
their tribe are the Ahmadzai; their sub-tribe is Jabbarkhel. The most 
famous were:
Commander Abdul Haq – Famed Pashtun Commander of the Jihad 
and the only Commander to take the fight to the centre of the 
Soviet regime in Kabul. He is the principal character of this book. 
Assassinated in October 2001 by the Taliban. 
Haji Abdul Qadir – Former Governor of Jalalabad, until the Taliban 
drove the family out in 1996. Governor again after their rout in 2001. 
During the early 1990s, Qadir was nominally head of the ‘Eastern 
Shura’ which comprised representatives from Nangarhar, Nuristan, 
Laghman and Kunar. He rose to fame as one of the most effective 
commanders in the East during the 1980s war against the Soviets. 
Awarded position of Vice President in the ‘Interim Administration’ 
(June 2002) but was assassinated within weeks.
Haji Din Mohammad – Governor of Jalalabad following Haji 
Qadir’s assassination in 2002. The most pious of the eight brothers, 
he is the one that the rest of the family look up to. Governor of 
Kabul 2005-9. 
Haji Nasrullah (known to me as Baryalai) – One of the younger 
brothers. After returning from Germany in 2001, he set up ‘The 
Abdul Haq Foundation’ and later a shura, both aiming to continue 
the community based work advocated by Abdul Haq. 
Haji Zahir – Son of Haji Qadir and now Head of the Border Guard. 
Though only twenty-seven years old, he has already escaped a 
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Taliban jail with Ismael Khan and led a force at the battle of Tora 
Bora, where he captured twenty-two al Qaeda prisoners (and 
famously had them filmed by CNN). 
Abdul Majeed Arsala – Haq’s oldest son.
Hedayat Amin Arsala – A cousin who worked for the World Bank 
in Washington DC for twenty years and became Vice President 
after the death of Haji Qadir. Currently a senior minister in Karzai’s 
government. 
FORMER COMMANDERS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED 
WITH ABDUL HAQ
Jalaluddin Haqqani – Ex Khalis Commander (see below under 
section titled the ‘Armed Opposition’).
Aga Jan – based in Sarobi, a strategically important ‘crossroads’ 
between the east, the north east and Kabul. Famed for conducting 
important operations against the Soviets. Ex Khalis Commander.
Mullah Malang – well known for the brilliant operations he 
conducted against the Soviets in Kandahar during the jihad. Also 
has influence in areas as diverse as Badghis, Ghor, Daikundi, Ghazni, 
Wardak and Gardez. His men constituted the bodyguard of Mullah 
Omar. Ex Khalis Commander.
Abdul Salam Rocketti – Received his name as a result of his 
prowess in launching rockets against Soviet tanks during the jihad. 
Served under the Taliban regime as ‘Corps Commander’ firstly in 
Zabul Province and later in Jalalabad, where he was at the time of 
September 11. Ex Sayyaf / Khalis Commander.
Khan Mir – with influence around Paghman, north east of Kabul, 
from where he conducted operations during the jihad. Taliban 
Division Commander with 800 men. Ex Khalis Commander. 
Arif Shah Jehan – Leader of Hazaras in Ghazni Province.
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PRINCIPAL POLITICAL PARTIES
In reality, these ‘parties’ were polico-military factions associated 
with mujahideen leaders. 
The Northern Alliance was a group of loosely-allied former 
mujahideen groups brought together by Commander Massoud. 
Its principal cabal, the Shura-e-Nazar (Council of the North), is 
associated with strongmen from the north-east, mostly from the 
Panjshir valley. 
The original jihadi parties of the ‘Peshawar Seven’:
The three main (generally more hard-line) parties:
Jamiat-i-Islami (led by Commander Massoud and the • 
Shura-e-Nazar faction but whose Political leader was 
Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani) 
Hizb-i-Islami (led by Hekmatyar; NB when ‘Hizb’ split, • 
Hikmatyar’s more radical faction separated from that of 
Younus Khalis)
Ittehad-i-Islami (led by Abdurrab Rasul Sayyaf; now • 
leader of Dawat-i-Islami)
The four minor parties:
Hizb Islami (led by Mullah Younus Khalis, associated • 
with the Ghilzai Eastern Pashtun, with the Arsala 
family as its figurehead)
Mahaz Milli Islami (led by the Gailani Family and • 
associated with the former King, and the National 
Islamic Front for Afghanistan, NIFA, in Pashtun)
Jabha-yi-Nejat Milli (Sebhagatullah Mojadedi, Pashtun)• 
Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami (Mohammad Nabi • 
Mohammadi, Pashtun)
Xdramatis personae
The two main Iran-based parties and alliances:
Hizb Wahdat (Abdul Ali Mazari & Karim Khalili, • 
Hazara)
Harakat Islami (Asif Mohseni, Shia Pashtun)• 
The final significant party is Jombesh Mille, the Uzbek faction led 
by General Abdul Rashid Dostum)
PRINCIPAL MUJAHIDEEN LEADERS (‘WARLORDS’) 
OF THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE
General Abdul Rashid Dostum – Uzbek warlord based in Mazar, he 
recently returned from exile in Turkey. 
Mohammad Qasem Fahim – Defence Minister and de facto Head 
of Shura-e-Nazar since the assassination of Commander Massoud 
on 9 September 2001. Associated with much extra-judicial killing 
when Head of Security for Massoud during the Mujahideen assault 
on Kabul (1992−96). 
Ismael Khan – Tajik warlord and Governor of Herat. 
Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani – Political leader of Massoud’s 
party and Islamist scholar trained in Cairo. 
Abdurrab Rasul Sayyaf – Ittehad-i-Islami – Islamist scholar trained 
in Cairo. Fundamentalist Wahhabist who set up training camps 
along the border with Pakistan in the early 1990s and, through his 
links with Saudi Arabia, brought many Arabs and funding to the 
region following the jihad. 
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‘WARLORDS’ IN NANGARHAR PROVINCE
Hazerat Ali – Police Chief and member of the Pashai, a minor ethnic 
group at Dar-yi-Noor (50 km north of Jalalabad). Although originally 
a commander of Haji Qadir, he has now become allied with General 
Fahim of the Northern Alliance and, despite his unpopularity in 
the East, is the principal ally of the Americans in Jalalabad. He led a 
band of soldiers at the battle of Tora Bora. 
Haji Zaman Ghamsharik – Member of the Khogiani tribe in 
Chaprahar. Recently returned from exile in Paris to lead some 
soldiers at the battle of Tora Bora. Principal ally of the British in 
Jalalabad. Accused by locals of having orchestrated a massacre and 
pocketing money from the British poppy compensation scheme. 
THE ARMED OPPOSITION 
The Taliban – A stratified Pashtun group, believed to be supported 
by Pakistan, whose regime ruled Afghanistan prior to 9/11.
Jalaluddin Haqqani – Once a Commander of Hizb Islami (the same 
party of Younus Khalis and Abdul Haq), Haqqani became more 
radicalized and joined the Taliban where he led a front based in 
Miramshah, Pakistan, controlling the Loya Paktia and the Khost 
region of Afghanistan. Close to bin Laden whom he is thought to 
have invited back to Eastern Afghanistan in 1996, upon his expulsion 
from Sudan. Veteran Afghan journalist Kathy Gannon noted in 
2005, “had he wanted to, Haqqani could have handed the US the 
entire al Qaeda network”. Yet after 9/11 Haqqani, who had links 
with the CIA and Saudi’s during the 1980s and maintains strong 
links with the Pakistani ISI, chose to continue fighting the US and 
NATO forces in ‘Af-Pak’ long after the toppling of the Taliban. 
Sirajuddin Haqqani - Son of the elderly Jalaluddin, who will 
later lead the south eastern opposition ‘front’ against the Karzai 
government and US forces in Afghanistan.
Gulbuddin Hikmatyar – Radical Islamist ISI supported guerrilla, 
rival of Massoud. Recently returned from exile in Iran. Leading an 
insurgency from the areas bordering Pakistan’s NWFP. 
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FORMER TALIBAN
Mullah Abdul Razzaq – Taliban Interior Minister who apparently 
ordered the killing of Haq after he entered Afghanistan, October 
2001.
Mullah Abdul Samad Khaksar – Deputy Interior Minister who had 
switched his support covertly to Abdul Haq.
Mullah Ahmad Wakil Mutawakil – Taliban Foreign Minister. 
Abdul Salam Rocketti – see section entitled ‘Haq’s former 
Commanders’ (above)
WOMEN
Massouda Jalal – Female Presidential candidate in 2002 Emergency 
Loya Jirga
Dr Sima Samar – Erstwhile Chair of Loya Jirga in 2002, sacked by 
warlords. Since then, Head of Afghan Independent Human Rights 
Commission
Fatima Gailani – Head of Afghan Red Crescent after Qar-a-bec was 
finally ousted
Malalai Joya – Woman from Farah Province who challenged 
warlords at the Constitutional Loya Jirga in 2004. They threw her 
out. Elected to Parliament in 2005. Expelled by warlords after she 
criticised them for their human rights abuses. 
INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATS 
Francesc Vendrell – EU Chief
Lakhdar Brahimi – UN Chief 
Zalmay Khalilzad – US Ambassador
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US SOLDIERS 
Lt. General Dan McNeil – commander of the US led Coalition forces 
in Afghanistan in 2002 
General Tommy Franks – head of CENTCOM during the U.S. 
invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq
THE CIA 
Milton Beardon – Chief of Station, Islamabad, 1986−89
Gary Schroen – Case Officer, Islamabad, 1978–80; Chief of Station 
designate, Kabul, 1988−1990; Chief of Station, Islamabad, 1996−1999; 
Deputy Chief, Near- East Division, Directorate of Operations, 
1999−2001
US DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Peter Tomsen – Special Envoy to the Afghan Resistance, 1989−92
ABDUL HAQ’S US BACKER’S
James and Joe Ritchie – American brothers who were brought 
up in Afghanistan. After making money as Chicago options 
traders, they initiated and funded a series of Loya Jirga meetings 
outside Afghanistan during the Taliban years. They attempted, 
through working with Haq and the ex-King, to support the 
process of providing an alternative to the Taliban for the people of 
Afghanistan. 
Robert ‘Bud’ McFarlane – Former US National Security Advisor 
under President Reagan. Worked alongside the Ritchie brothers in 
attempting to find support for Haq in Washington DC both before 
and after September 11. 
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HAQ’S BRITISH SUPPORTERS:
Ken Guest – Former marine and cameraman who travelled extensively 
with the mujahideen from 1980-89 during which time he met bin 
Laden, Jalaluddin Haqqani and most mujahideen leaders. 
Sir John Wellesley Gunston – A photographer during the jihad, who 
travelled extensively with the mujahideen during the jihad, went to 
support Abdul Haq in Rome after September 11, and then Peshawar 
before he left on his last mission, attended the Bonn Conference 
with Haji Qadir (as ‘advisor’) and the battle of Tora Bora. He also 
attended installation in December 2001 of Hamid Karzai. 
‘RAM’ Seeger – Former Head of the Special Boat Service (SBS) who 
worked alongside Guest and Gunston in attempting to find support 
for Haq in Whitehall and amongst the British defence and intelligence 
establishment. 
BRITISH SOLDIERS AND OFFICIALS 
General Sir John McColl – Commander of ISAF troops in Kabul 
2002. Former Head of MI6 (1989-94) 
General Lord Guthrie – Chief of the Defence Staff (1997–2001) 
Sir Richard Dearlove – Head of MI6 (1999–2004)
Lord (Paddy) Ashdown – former leader of the Liberal Democrat Party 
and International High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(2002–2006)
Ian Duncan Smith – then leader of the Conservative Party
MISCELLANEOUS PEOPLE
Fazl Akbar – later Governor of Kunar 
Dr Abdullah Abdullah – Panjshiri who became Foreign Minister 
in 2001
XV
the afghan solution 
Ayoub Afridi – alledged drug dealer who lives on the Khyber Pass. 
Friend of Haji Qadir
Sher Mohammad Akhundzada –  Governor of Lashkargah, Karzai ally
Engineer Arif – Massoud’s Intelligence Chief. Became head of the 
National Directorate of Security (NDS), the Afghan intelligence 
service, after Kabul fell to the Northern Alliance
Mohammad Daoud – Northern Alliance Commander and ally of 
Fahim from Konduz, would become ‘Drug’s Tzar’ of Interior Ministry 
in late 2004
Hamid Gul – former ISI chief
Mullah Izat – Northern Alliance Commander
Assadullah Khaled – Governor of Ghazni until 2005 when he was 
moved to Kandahar. Ally of Karzai family
Mustafa Khan – Commander of Haji Zahir
Jan Mohammad – Governor of Uruzghan, Karzai ally
Najibullah – last Afghan Communist President 
Nader Nadery – Deputy Chair of Afghan Independent Human Rights 
Commission
Arif Noorzai – Karzai ally in Kandahar
Shah Shujah – Puppet King installed by the British in the nineteenth 
century
Amin Wardak – ally of Abdul Haq 
Rahim Wardak – Defense Minister of Afghanistan, 2004– 
Qari Mohammad Yousef – Commander of Haji Zahir responsible for 
capturing arabs at battle of Tora Bora. Later arrested by Americans 
and taken to Bagram.
Qar-a-beg – Panjshiri strongman who refused to budge from the 
sinecure he had taken as Head of the Afghan Red Crescent, following 
the capture of Kabul. 
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dramatis personae
Dr Asef Qazizada – Deputy Governor of Jalalabad – 2002-5
Haji Rohullah – Salafi leader from Kunar, arrested by US and taken 
to Guananamo in 2002
Wuliullah – cousin of salafi leader from Kunar, Haji Rohullah. British 
allowed him to run 2002 poppy compensation scheme in Jalalabad 
THE TRIBES OF EASTERN AFGHANISTAN
Ghilzai Pashtun 
Ahmadzai  
Khoghiani 
Shinwari 
Safi
In Nuristan:
Pashai (on the edge of Nuristan, and Kunar at a place called Dar-yi-Noor) 
Parachi 
Aroki 
Gawarbati
Along the border:
Mohmand 
Afridi 
Utman Khel 
Daoudzai 
Mahmund 
Bajouri
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CHRONOLOGY
Year  Afghanistan   
1973    July: King Zahir Shah overthrown by his ‘modern-
ising’ cousin Daoud in a military coup. 
1978    April: People’s Democractic Party of Afghanistan 
takes power with a military coup (this becomes 
known as the ‘Saur Revolution’ and marks the end of 
two hundred years of Durrani dominance).
1979  December: Soviet troops invade Afghanistan. 
1989  February: Soviet troops withdraw from Afghanistan.
1992   February: Abdul Haq convenes the ‘Shura of the 
Commanders’ in Chitral where mujahideen leaders 
agree to work together to secure the capital city. 
Massoud attends but neither Hikmatyar nor Sayyaf.
   April: The mujahideen commanders’ accord is 
broken as General Massoud enters Kabul early and 
is made Minister of Defence on 5 May. Massoud and 
Hikmatyar’s forces begin their assault on the city 
and the mujahideen government takes power amid 
continued fighting in Kabul. Disappointed with the 
inter-factional fighting now the Soviets have left, 
Abdul Haq quits Afghanistan. 
1993   February: The Afshar massacre (of around seven 
hundred mostly civilian Shiites) is prosecuted in the 
Kabul district of Afshar alledgedly by the troops of 
Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and General Massoud.5
1994  November: Taliban capture Kandahar.
1995  September: Taliban capture Herat.
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1996   May: Osama bin Laden, expelled from Sudan, returns 
to Afghanistan (where he had participated in the jihad 
between 1986– 89). He is apparently invited back by 
Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and is based at Chiparhar, in 
Nangarhar, which remains under Northern Alliance 
control until September. 
  September: Taliban capture Jalalabad and Herat.
2001   September 11 attacks take place in the USA.
   7 October: US-led bombing campaign of Afghanistan 
starts.
    21 October: Abdul Haq leaves Peshawar and makes 
for Afghanistan. 
    24 October: Abdul Haq meets with Hisarak Talib 
commander
   25 October: Arab Taliban forces converge on Tera 
Mangal and capture Abdul Haq.
  26 October: Abdul Haq is executed by the Taliban.
  13 November: Kabul falls to the Northern Alliance. 
   14 November: The UN Security Council agrees 
Resolution 1378 which mandates a ‘transitional 
administration’ for Kabul.
   2–6 December: Offensive takes place at Tora Bora, 
from where Osama bin Laden ‘disappears’. 
   5 December: The Bonn Conference takes place in 
Germany, after which it is announced that the Pashtun, 
Hamid Karzai, will head an ‘Interim Authority’ which 
will last until voting at an ‘Emergency Loya Jirga’. 
  6 December: Kandahar falls.
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2001   20 December: The UN authorizes the deployment of 
an ‘International Security Assistance Force’ (ISAF) 
to Kabul and its environs. Initially, ISAF comprises 
around 5000 soldiers. 
2002    April: District and regional-level elections begin to 
select delegates who will attend the ‘Emergency Loya 
Jirga’.
   June: ‘Emergency Loya Jirga’ held in Kabul. It is set 
up to select the President of Afghanistan’s ‘Interim 
Authority’,6 election of the Cabinet, selection of the 
constitutional drafting committee, and decisions on 
the type of state Afghanistan will be. Its mandate will 
shape the state-building project for years to come. 
2003	 	 	December	 2002−January	 2004: Constitutional Loya 
Jirga held in Kabul. It opts for a strong presidential 
system and a weaker parliament.
2004   September: Afghan presidential elections held in 
Kabul. 
2005   September: Afghan parliamentary elections (This 
marks the end of the Bonn Process). 
2009   US President Barack Obama commits an extra 34,000 
US service personnel (including troops, engineers 
intelligence officers) to Afghanistan, bringing the 
total for coalition and NATO troops in Afghanistan to 
around 140,000 (and of US troops to around 113,000 
troops; more than the USSR committed at the height 
of its engagement).
 
1INTRODUCTION
Tera Mangal, Afghanistan, 25 October 2001 
‘Al humdullilah, we’ve caught the American and British agents!’ they 
heard the man say in a thick, Arabic accent, and knew the Taliban 
were upon them. It was around ten pm and they were in the place 
named Tera Mangal, crouching on scree slopes dwarfed between 
slabs of vertical rock face which reached thousands of metres high.
Their Taliban captors moved out of the darkness and faced 
Abdul Haq.
Some minutes earlier, when the group first realised the Taliban 
were close, Haq had instructed his men to sit apart from one another 
so they would not all be seen. They had left their weapons back in 
Hezarac village after lunch with the elders and now had nothing 
with which to defend themselves. As early as that afternoon, when 
the Taliban were in each of the four narrow Passes that met high in 
the Hezarac valley, it had been obvious to them there was no way 
out of the narrow incline.
The steepness of the slope meant Haq had been forced to 
dismount the pony. He leant against the animal, breathing hard. 
Despite being known as the ‘Lion of Kabul’ for orchestrating 
tactically brilliant operations against the Soviet regime during the 
1980s, tonight Abdul Haq seemed spent. The situation was clearly 
hopeless. He couldn’t move fast and decided to give himself up 
before they saw the others. 
The Arab cocked his Kalashnikov as the three other Talibs 
moved forward, their dark turbans momentarily silhouetted 
against the moon. They were nervous, undecided as to what they 
were about to do. Three had their arms held high, intending to 
stop the Arab firing. 
‘Move, go!’ the Arab screamed as Abdul Haq stepped forward 
from the shadow, still holding the pony by its bridle. 
‘I need the pony, I can’t walk without my prosthetic’, Haq said 
and his voice, normally steady, wavered. 
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When I heard this story over three years later, in January 2005, I was 
told that the reason Haq could not walk was because his prosthetic 
was actually broken. He had lost his foot to a landmine during his 
quest to eject the Soviets from Afghanistan during the 1980s. 
But that night in October 2001 the Talibs weren’t listening. The 
pony was called for. He was helped onto the beast and led away, 
along with two of his commanders. Minutes later, thirteen shots 
were fired.
This was the capture of Abdul Haq as recounted to me, in Sarobi, 
by Aga Jan: the man who had been with him on this last mission, 
as well as countless others during the anti-Soviet jihad. There were 
varying accounts of what happened next. One was that Haq was 
tortured and shot in Rishicoor barracks in Kabul; the other, more 
credible, version was that a day later, the car carrying Haq from 
Hezarac reached Logar, on the outskirts of Kabul. A second vehicle 
– this one carrying the Taliban Interior Minister, Mullah Razzaq – 
sped towards it, from the city centre. And there, on a piece of tarmac 
in the open air, Razzaq grabbed a Kalashnikov from his bodyguard. 
Seconds later, the man Afghans knew as the ‘Lion of Kabul’ was 
shot dead. 
***
On 5 October 2001, the London Evening Standard (see Appendix I) 
reported a veteran commander of the 1980s Soviet jihad calling for 
George Bush’s imminent bombing campaign of Afghanistan to be 
delayed. The commander, whose name was Abdul Haq, needed 
time, he said, to implement his plan for an internal, peaceful 
toppling of the Taliban. 
‘Every time I meet commanders who cross the mountains in darkness 
to brief me’, he said, ‘they are part of the Taliban forces, but they no 
longer support them. These men will join us and there are many of 
them. When the time is right they and others will rise up and this 
Taliban Government will be swept aside’.7 
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Haq went on to add: ‘The people are starving, they are already 
against them’.
But his voice, so authoritative when visiting Reagan and Thatcher 
to call for more support to the mujahideen during the Soviet war, was 
barely heard in the aftermath of September 11. The bombing started 
and Abdul Haq began his perilous mission. Two weeks later, on 25 
October 2001, he was dead. 
In November 2001, after his death, Abdul Haq’s obituaries were 
dismissive, even overtly condemning. Not only was the manner of 
his death questioned but so too was his life and, implicit to that, his 
‘value’. When the New York Times described him demeaningly as ‘a 
middle aged man on a mule’8 or a ‘privately financed freelancer trying 
to overthrow the Taliban’9 the implication was that there should be 
nothing to regret about his loss. In London, an unattributed piece 
in Private Eye added snidely, ‘Like so many erstwhile terrorists, Haq 
managed to reinvent himself as a “moderate” and a “peacemaker” 
– so successfully that his murderous exploits were entirely omitted 
from every single obituary’.10
Other pieces begged to differ and one, written by a cultural 
anthropologist and former US Diplomat to Afghanistan,11 had a 
different take on the story:
To hear them talk in Washington and Islamabad, you’d think 
there was some doubt. In fact, you’d think his death no great 
loss. Listen carefully. It’s scared talk, the kind of stuff you hear 
from bureaucrats whose backsides are exposed.12 
Abdul Haq, they rush to insist, was on a mission of his own. 
Maybe he was, maybe he wasn’t. Either way, it’s shameful to 
demean him.
He added: 
There is some doubt about how the man died and where and when. We 
know he was ‘questioned’ and then executed. But was it by hanging 
with his body then used for swaying small-arms target practice, or 
was he shot in cold blood in a prison courtyard? It was in eastern 
Afghanistan – but Jalalabad or Kabul? It was two weeks ago – but late 
Thursday or early Friday? There’s some doubt about who sent him 
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and who betrayed him. There could even be confusion about his name 
were it not so well known: 
‘Born Hamayoun Arsala 44 years ago, he became “Abdul Haq” – 
Servant of Justice – in the crucible of our Cold War’s most decisive 
battleground’.13
***
As I finish writing this book, the Taliban has extended its control over 
large parts of both Pakistan and Afghanistan, both governments are 
weak and failing, and it looks as though the US and NATO will be 
facing strategic failure in the region.
President Obama’s ‘troop surge’ and the strategy followed by 
the West in Afghanistan in 2010 remains broadly similar to that 
adopted at the outset in 2001. 
Then, the US-led coalition provided financial and military support 
to the Taliban’s traditional foe, the predominantly Tajik Northern 
Alliance which – since the killing by al Qaeda on 9 September 2001 
of Commander Massoud – has been led by Mohammad Fahim. 
Prior to September 11, the Northern Alliance was an almost spent 
force, the Taliban having taken some ninety-five percent of the 
country.14 I remember how in Kandahar during September 2000, the 
Taliban celebrated their capture of Taloqan – a city in the North East 
and deemed vital for the Northern Alliance supply pipeline – by 
removing the concrete barricades which had closed the road in front 
of the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar’s, compound. Yet only a year 
later, in November 2001, when the US led coalition bombed the front 
line between the two sides, the Northern Alliance was able to take 
Kabul, the key ‘power’ ministries and, for a short time, the country.
Following the Bonn Agreement in December 2001 and the 
Emergency Loya Jirga in June 2002, the ethnic Pashtun Hamid 
Karzai became President. Karzai was essentially a figurehead to 
Northern Alliance warlords who were enabled to further consolidate 
their control over the machinery of state. For a while, there was 
peace of sorts but this quickly gave way to extreme corruption, a 
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resurgence in opium production and eventually a breakdown in 
security. Seemingly defeated in late 2001, the Taliban only appeared 
to have ‘melted away’ and since 2003 their ‘resurgence’ has grown 
exponentially. Ironically they have exploited conditions similar to 
those which existed during their initial rise to power in 1995-6: popular 
discontent with the government’s failure to provide jobs, security or 
justice, as well as a culture of impunity whose corollary has been 
widespread human rights violations. By 2009, the Taliban provided 
shadow governors and a parallel justice system in thirty-three out 
of Afghanistan’s thirty-four provinces. Meanwhile the coalition has, 
in response, ramped up its military-based strategy with a ‘surge’ 
of 30,000 extra troops, bringing the overall number to over 200,000. 
There are also some 100,000 military contractors in Afghanistan.15 
Meanwhile the number of western troops killed in Afghanistan has 
increased relative to Iraq. And despite the $236 billion USD spent on 
Afghanistan by the US government by October 2009,16 a successful 
endgame for the West looks increasingly unlikely. 
The chief of US and NATO forces, General McKiernan, noted 
upon his departure from Afghanistan in spring 2009 that, ‘ultimately, 
the solution in Afghanistan is going to be a political, not a military 
solution’.17 And US General Michael Flyn said, ‘Eight years into 
the war in Afghanistan, the vast intelligence apparatus is unable to 
answer fundamental questions about the environment in which US 
and Allied forces operate and the people they seek to persuade’.18 
The West is floundering in Afghanistan and the prospect of 
strategic failure there by the coalition and NATO is today a very real 
proposition. The goalposts for withdrawal will be altered, leaving 
Afghanistan to its own fate. This will only empower those jihadists 
whom, in September 2001, we sought to overcome. 
There is also now a tentative realisation that for a political 
solution to be durable it must also be ‘internal’: that is, arrived at 
and sustained by Afghans. Although the focus for the West’s ‘exit 
strategy’ remains – in the absence of an effective political strategy 
– overly focused on building up the Afghan security forces, there 
is also talk of ‘bottom up’ governance at regional level. However, 
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there is little real commitment to this, nor understanding of how 
to achieve it. Increasingly too, there is chatter about the need for a 
‘strong leader’ who is able to work with all tribes, someone who has 
‘no blood on his hands’. 
The idea that the ‘war’ to topple the Taliban in 2001 was a ‘success’ 
has only been challenged relatively recently. Many commentators 
often added that it was ‘brilliantly executed’.19 Afghanistan only 
failed, so the prevailing mantra went, because we went to Iraq. 
Sadly, this twin fallacy has obscured the root causes of why we have 
so comprehensively failed in Afghanistan.20 And how the crucial 
mistakes were made at the outset, then compounded in 2002. 
As I finished writing this book I attended a talk entitled 
‘Afghanistan–Pakistan: Mission Impossible?’ in Geneva.21 There, 
the Pakistani Ambassador to the UN stressed the need for the 
international community to utilise tribal structures to tackle 
instability in the region. But curiously, when I asked him whether 
today the Afghan situation might have been different had Abdul 
Haq not been ignored and subsequently killed soon after September 
11, his reply indicated so much about what is at the heart of the 
problem. ‘It was’, so he said, ‘the greatest tragedy that he [Abdul 
Haq] was sent on a mission by the CIA to Afghanistan to whip up 
support for a Pashtun government’.
This book is also an attempt to tackle some of the false ‘narratives’ 
which certain groups, countries, individuals or organisations have 
attempted to sustain – through conflation, misrepresentation or 
under-reporting of more complex nuances – about events, histories 
or individual stories. Often such narratives have sewn confusion in 
what is an extremely complex political situation. Sadly though, it is 
people and society, both in the West and where the conflict continues 
to take place, who continue to pay the price for this. Global security 
at large that will be undermined when the West eventually exits a 
far less stable and infinitely more complex Afghanistan than that 
they found in 2001.
This book is not really about Abdul Haq so much as about the 
strategy that the West should have followed in Afghanistan, the one 
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we failed to take account of. For, as the Taliban Interior Minister 
told me, the Taliban killed him because ‘everyone supported his 
plan in Khost, Paktia, Paktika’. 
Thus, this book is also a first-hand witness account of some of the 
crucial facets of the West’s post-September 11 Afghan intervention, 
intended for those who have an interest in why certain decisions are 
made and what the outcomes of those decisions can be. The book 
is written in narrative form because I take the reader to key events 
at which I was present. Many of these events became key turning 
points towards the outcome we see today. 
The book’s central thesis is the ‘peace plan’ which Commander 
Abdul Haq was working on when he was killed by the Taliban in 
October 2001. The book explores the reasons why Haq had warned 
repeatedly (in the aftermath of September 11) that the West should 
delay its imperative of bombing Afghanistan. And why Haq was 
thwarted in his attempt to put in place an ‘internal’ means of 
stabilising Afghanistan. I believe this is relevant both because of 
the enormous cost in both lives and treasure of the West’s post-
September 11 Afghan ‘adventure’ in Afghanistan. Also because of 
the failure to capture bin Laden at Tora Bora and now the likelihood 
of strategic failure by both NATO and the US-led coalition in 
Afghanistan. When one takes these costs into consideration, I 
believe that the story I have to tell is one that those groups who 
have recast the narrative to fit their own interests would rather you 
did not know about. 
The book also tackles other related lines of enquiry: justice, 
impunity, Pakistan and the Pashtunistan issue, and the relevance 
of working with ‘traditional’ (i.e. tribal or quam based) structures 
to achieve lasting stability. On the issue of justice, I argue how the 
West’s failure to indict former human rights abusers, instead making 
them its partners, has made Afghanistan a vastly complex theatre 
of operations characterised by a massive ‘crisis of impunity’. It is 
now very difficult for Western forces operating within the country 
to know the difference between an insurgent, a Talib and a criminal 
drug dealer. 
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Other controversial issues dealt with in this account include: the 
fallacy of ‘democracy’ in a country where there is no rule of law; how 
the West essentially sold out Afghan women with its decision to use 
Northern Alliance warlords to conduct its war; how our intelligence 
agencies (principally the CIA and MI6) have failed to understand 
the most basic dynamics of this country, this region and the people 
who live there, thus pulling the West into a potentially interminable, 
unwinnable war whose ‘objectives’ change by the month. 
Many of these problems had been written about by Abdul Haq 
in letters to Western leaders, sometimes as far back as the 1990s. 
These letters, most of which have never before been quoted, 
provide new insights into his thinking in the early 1990s, and are 
compelling particularly when one considers that he even warned of 
‘a cataclysmic event for the West’ back in 1992. 
This book is aimed at those with an interest in policymaking, 
whether that be military, diplomatic, humanitarian or peace 
negotiation. As far back as 2003, I remember an Afghan al Jazeera 
journalist commenting that, ‘This is just a short interlude of peace 
in an otherwise ongoing civil war’. His words were prescient and 
today it appears that the West’s 2001 military ‘success’ masked a 
military strategy that was more about emotion, fireworks, vengeance 
and Faustian alliances than about stabilising Afghanistan and 
building a viable state. A similar, apparently ‘political’ strategy was 
conceived at the Bonn Conference in December 2001. Some rather 
optimistically dubbed this a ‘Peace Agreement’. It was not, for it did 
not include all parties to the conflict. 
Despite the enormity of the West’s costs in Afghanistan, and the 
increasing likelihood of failure, there has been a strange absence of 
interest in Abdul Haq and the ‘solution’ that he had conceived prior 
to September 11 for ejecting the Taliban and stabilising Afghanistan. 
Other Afghan commentators who have written about this ‘solution’ 
since 2001 have done so only fleetingly. Or worse, they have glossed 
over his role in working for an alternative to the Taliban in the years 
prior to September 11 (for which he paid with the murder of his 
wife and son in Peshawar in 1999).22 Or they have mischaracterised 
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his objectives; implying that Haq’s objection to the US bombing of 
Afghanistan was limited to averting the bloodshed of civilians.23 
Or that he was simply trying to raise a force among the Ghilzai 
Pashtun, with the objective of avoiding a power vacuum in the east, 
where his family had been based.24 
This book is about Abdul Haq’s ‘solution’ in relation to: the 
history of the CIA and Pakistani ISI in the region; US and British 
intelligence weaknesses in ‘Af-Pak’ policy prior to and since 
September 11; the strategy and policies that were chosen ‘instead’ 
(many of which I participated in during the six years I spent in 
Afghanistan); the alternative ‘Pashtun rebellion’ option apparently 
provided by Hamid Karzai in the South; the consequences of 
ignoring the Haq ‘solution’ which include the West committing 
itself to an unwinnable war in Afghanistan and assisting the wider 
region to become a crucible of fundamentalist chaos. 
Some may say that the relevance of Abdul Haq’s story ended 
with his premature death at the hands of the Taliban in October 
2001. I would not agree, firstly because I believe that history is 
important and also because it is only through knowing the past 
that we can understand the present. I also believe that if more of 
our strategists had understood the reasons why Abdul Haq was 
prepared to sacrifice his life to achieve this plan, then we might 
not have found ourselves in such an insoluble mess in Afghanistan 
today. With military strategists and Western politicians keen to find 
an internal solution for resolving the Afghan impasse, such that our 
troops can begin the drawdown, there will be renewed interest in 
the reasons why Abdul Haq was prepared to lose his life on the 
mission he attempted in 2001. And indeed, why he lost his life. 
In Afghanistan, the storytellers’ bazaar is notorious for its 
conspiracy theories and webs of inaccuracy. To wade through that, 
any serious researcher must ‘triangulate’ sources to obtain the most 
accurate picture possible. 
I have felt it important to tell this story because Afghanistan 
is an enigma to so many Westerners who now have a stake in it: 
foreign civilians working there, military forces and their families, 
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aid workers, diplomats and politicians. Today in Afghanistan, we 
are in a situation where, after eight years, we are still nowhere near 
what Winston Churchill defined during WWII as ‘the end of the 
beginning’. This is a salutary lesson for those who as early as 2001 
declared victory so prematurely. For, as the Duke of Wellington once 
remarked, ‘The difficulties will begin where the military successes 
ended’. There are few who would argue this has not been the case 
in Afghanistan since the 2001 invasion to rout the Taliban. 
But it did not have to be like that. 
***
As the West was wondering how to be rid of the Taliban, the mantras 
chanted in unison by those charged with making policy after the 
September 11 attacks were that Abdul Haq – or ‘Hollywood Haq’ 
as he was dubbed by the Pakistani ISI, and ultimately the CIA and 
Britain’s MI6) – ‘does not have the wherewithal’ and ‘Abdul Haq has 
baggage’. Yet when the attacks of September 11 happened, Abdul 
Haq had for years been working with a group of commanders and 
tribal leaders around the former King. Their aim was for a peaceful 
toppling of the Taliban and a stabilisation of Afghanistan. By January 
2001, Abdul Haq, who had been described as ‘the legendary Pashtun 
commander’,25 felt the time was ripe.26 By August 2001, he had 
pledges from his former jihadi commanders, many of whom were 
now strategically well placed within the Taliban, to move onto his 
side. He also had pledges from the King’s group, the promise of 
defections by senior Taliban Ministers and Talib commanders in 
key strategic cities of the South and – at a historic meeting in Khoja 
Bauddin, Dushanbe, in July 2001 – this ‘Pashtun hero of the war’ met 
with Commander Massoud, otherwise known as ‘the Tadjik hero 
of the war’27 and they came to a ‘mutually acceptable agreement’. 
Above all else, Haq desired a united Afghanistan and ‘he was willing, 
if necessary, to be Massoud’s deputy if that’s what it took’.28 29 
He planned to implement his objective through consensus, 
through grass roots tribal unity and through tribal cohesion. His goal 
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was, like Tzun Su over two thousand years ago, to avoid achieving his 
objectives through military force, with its unpredictable outcomes, if 
at all possible. Guile was a far superior weapon. And as a guerrilla 
leader in Kabul during the 1980s, he had used this plentifully, 
developing an underground network that had penetrated the 
Communist Army and civil service, targeting his attacks on power 
stations, munitions stores and key strategic outposts.
In the tribute piece written after his death, Whitney Azoy, 
an American anthropologist, outlined some of Haq’s Olympian 
achievements:
When the Soviets invaded in December 1979, he raided their convoys 
with, as one admirer puts it, ‘little more than shotguns, deer rifles 
and dynamite’. He opened the first Resistance front on the immediate 
south and west of Kabul. Other brave commanders operated 
elsewhere; Abdul Haq would always concentrate on the capital city 
itself. He blew the Naghlu power station outside Kabul after months 
of meticulous preparation. He blew a seven level underground Soviet 
ammunition dump in nearby Paghman. The subsequent five-hour 
firestorm was famously videotaped 10 miles away from the roof of 
the British Embassy. 
Azoy also indicated who his detractors were: 
In the holy war’s aftermath, he helped organise a multi-party shura 
(committee of Resistance Commanders) in an attempt to avoid civil 
war. It wasn’t because of Abdul Haq that such efforts failed. Look 
elsewhere for the culprits: among ambitious and self aggrandizing 
Afghan ‘leaders’ but even more among the Islamist cadres of 
Pakistan’s ISI. While you’re looking, ask yourself where the Americans 
were (ungratefully gone from the scene) and to whom America had 
entrusted Afghanistan’s future (Pakistan’s ISI).30 
British cameraman Peter Jouvenal, who had covered Afghanistan 
from the early days of the Soviet intervention in the early 1980s, 
told me about the type of warfare conducted by Haq: 
His was a very different type of warfare, much more cunning and 
harder. Like the kidnap of a Russian advisor, not the firing of rockets. 
That’s what made Abdul Haq special.31 
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This book looks at Haq’s skills during the anti-Soviet jihad, 
particularly in Kabul where he conducted several operations 
believed ultimately to have shaped that war’s outcome. It also 
revisits his candid criticism of the CIA’s conduct of the jihad and 
how this led to his being vilified by both the CIA and ISI, and how 
that contributed to their assessment of his plan in the run up to and 
after September 11. 
A key question under consideration in Afghan policymaking 
remains that of balancing power between the ‘state’, or centre, 
and the more traditional forms of governance provided locally. 
In Afghanistan during the 1970s, ‘the centre was strong enough 
to maintain law and order, but it was never strong enough to 
undermine the autonomy of the tribes’.32 It was in recognition of 
this state of affairs that Haq – who was from a leading tribal family 
or khan khel) – hoped to achieve his plan. 
Although there has been some replacement of traditional village 
elders with jihadi ones, essentially not much has changed since 
the late nineteenth- century when the British General Sir Henry 
Rawlinson observed:
The nation consists of a mere collection of tribes, of unequal power 
and divergent habits, which are held together, more or less loosely, 
according to the personal character of the chief who rules them. 
The feeling of patriotism, as known in Europe, cannot exist among 
Afghans, for there is no common country.33 
This book aims to show what remains an enigma to most foreigners 
involved with Afghanistan. It takes the reader directly to the tribes 
and to the people who would have implemented Haq’s plan. The 
same people the West must learn to work with if there is to be any 
hope of stabilising Afghanistan.
An underlying theme of this book then is the importance of 
finding Afghan solutions to the conflict. Afghanistan is a far more 
complex arena than Iraq, predominantly because it remains a largely 
traditional, tribal society which has never had properly functioning 
state institutions. Although much of the tribal means of governance 
has been fragmented by thirty years of war, it is still to the tribes 
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that rural Afghans, particularly those in the south, continue to look 
for direction. Networks in the north, if not so tribal, remain largely 
‘clannish’ in nature. Abdul Haq understood the importance of 
using the tribes – particularly the Pashtun tribes in the border areas 
and the south, which is the main hotbed of the insurgency – as a 
bulwark against the re-emergence of the Taliban from across the 
border in Pakistan. 
Unfortunately, since September 11, Western policy in Afghanistan 
has been predominantly kinetic. Where alliances have been forged, 
they have tended towards the paying off strongmen willing to do 
the West’s (or CIA’s) bidding. The idea of building relationships 
through ‘traditional’ power structures (as opposed to ‘tribal 
militias’) has been an anathaema. The tribute piece by the American 
anthropologist continued:
We don’t know for sure what happened when Abdul Haq left 
Peshawar two weeks ago and crossed into Afghanistan. There are too 
many unknown details, many doubts about the official story. Just who 
was with him? Just what promises had been made and by whom? Just 
who betrayed him to the Taliban and why? We don’t know – just yet. 
Inshallah (the Muslim for ‘God Willing’), we’ll get to that.34
Within weeks of Haq’s death the war moved on, Kabul was taken 
and – in the tribulation and back-patting following that occasion – 
Abdul Haq and his warnings were soon forgotten. 
***
I spent the greater part of six years living in Afghanistan. At 
the height of the Taliban regime, I ran community and urban 
reconstruction projects, the precursor to what is now known as the 
National Solidarity Programme (NSP),35 in Kandahar and Herat. I 
lived, somewhat foolishly, under the threat of a fatwa against British 
and Americans issued by bin Laden. So when al Qaeda bombed 
the USS Cole, at Aden in October 2000, I left Kandahar for Quetta, 
crossing the Registan desert by taxi. 
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I returned to the region in the aftermath of September 11, eagerly 
naive to assist in the country’s planned transition to democracy, 
working in a number of capacities: for the World Food Programme; 
as an election monitor for the initial ‘democracy building phase’ 
with the 2002 Loya Jirga; as a researcher on transitional justice 
for the International Crisis Group; as a monitor on the currency 
exchange project and as a freelance journalist. By late 2004, I was 
Political Advisor to the EU Special Representative and then to the 
Chief Observer on the 2005 parliamentary elections. 
This book records what I saw in Afghanistan between 2000 
and 2006, from the regime of the Taliban to the end of the formal 
implementation of the Bonn Process, a critical period. As the West’s 
immediate post-September 11 ‘success’ quickly unfurled, so I 
became more interested in the reasons why Haq had risked his life 
on this apparently doomed mission.
Abdul Haq was one of eight brothers who during the jihad 
were dubbed ‘Resistance Royalty’ by journalists. Mostly, the 
sobriquet arose from their charisma and individual effectiveness as 
commanders in fighting the anti-Soviet guerrilla war of the 1980s. 
But as khan khel (chief clan) of the Ghilzai Pashtun, the family also 
had a long history and relationship with the tribes of Afghanistan’s 
four eastern provinces.
I was led to Haq’s family, the Arsalas, by another journalist in 
September 2002 when researching a story on poppy production. 
Their base, Jalalabad, is on the trade route between Peshawar 
and Kabul, considered one of the foremost poppy-growing areas 
of Afghanistan. By 2002, Western diplomats dubbed the Arsalas 
‘warlords’, considered them lynchpins in the drugs trade and 
failed to work with them in hunting down bin Laden at the battle 
of Tora Bora. The Tora Bora were the caves from which bin Laden 
had escaped in November 2001 and which the Arsala family knew 
intimately, having built them two decades before, as a base from 
which to fight the Soviets. Within fifteen years, the family’s status 
had evolved from ‘Resistance Royalty’ to pariah. 
For some reason, however, they trusted me. Between September 
2002 and the end of 2005, I was invited in, taken into their confidence 
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and allowed to stay in their houses for weeks at a time. I travelled to 
Kunar and Nuristan, to the drug smuggling bazaars of the Shinwar 
and the smuggling depots of the tribal areas. My friendship with 
them took me deep into the politics of the Pashtun belt, giving me 
an understanding of Afghanistan far removed from the Powerpoint 
presentations of the soldiers and diplomats among whom I later 
worked in Kabul. I witnessed the inter-warlord rivalries and Western 
intelligence mistakes that had led directly to Osama bin Laden’s 
escape from Tora Bora. I also learnt the intricacies of rebuilding 
traditional structures of local governance, of smuggling, poppy and 
how the issue of ‘Durand’ – the historic difficulties over the border 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan – lay at the root of Pashtun 
nationalism and Pakistani politicking over Afghanistan. I was 
granted access to this family and to the tribal people of the Eastern 
Provinces that bore no relation to the lives of most foreigners living 
in the international compounds in Kabul. Possibly they trusted me 
because they knew I was there with an interest in their family, their 
history, in Abdul Haq and his role in the anti-Soviet jihad and in 
the Pashtun people. But also in how this tribal society worked and 
how it would react to the ‘democracy’ that the West was, nominally, 
delivering to Afghanistan. On the family’s side, when I met them 
they were still reeling from the killings of both Haq and Qadir and 
had been sidelined by the West. I still wonder if it was for all these 
reasons that they allowed me access to their side of the story. 
This book is both a temporal journey and an awakening about 
what is really shaping Afghanistan. In relation to this, I have explored 
the parallel ‘private’ US and UK efforts to find support for Haq in 
2001, and have uncovered information about what was happening 
– primarily in the intelligence community but also among Afghan 
players – in the run up to and the months following September 11. 
This information is in the book but not yet in the public domain. 
On the US side were two American brothers, James and Joe 
Ritchie, who had made their money as Chicago options traders 
but who remained impassioned by the country in which they had 
spent much of their childhood. For years they had financed a series 
of Loya Jirga outside Afghanistan, in an attempt to formulate an 
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alternative to the Taliban. Ultimately they decided that Abdul Haq 
and the banner of the King provided the best means of toppling the 
Taliban regime. 
Meanwhile, on the UK side, an independent effort to find 
support for Haq was being made by three former military men who 
had experience in 1980s Afghanistan. One had been a renowned 
Head of the British Special Boat Service (reforming it in the run up 
to the Falklands War), another was an ex-Marine who had covered 
Afghanistan extensively as a cameraman during the jihad and the 
third was an ex-Rhodesian army officer and Guardsman, a British 
Baronet who had also covered the Afghan War. They hoped – in 
vain as it turned out – to get British intelligence agencies to take 
Abdul Haq seriously. 
Their stories mesh with those of Haq’s former mujahideen 
commanders (many of whom had become ‘Taliban’), members of 
the ‘Rome’ group (representing those Afghans and tribal leaders 
willing to unite beneath the banner of the former King), UN political 
staff, ambassadors, senior Taliban ministers, and tribal leaders. 
The book draws upon previously unpublished letters, plans, 
sitreps36 and faxes relating to Haq’s plan and both US and UK 
efforts to find support for him within the CIA and MI6. There are 
also letters written by Haq to Western leaders during the early 1990s 
when Haq was attempting to warn – among other things - of the 
unchecked radicalisation taking place amongst ‘foreign fighters’ in 
the tribal areas. 
As far back as 2001, I recognised that Abdul Haq provided 
answers to questions that – nine years into the current intervention 
in Afghanistan – are only beginning to be posed. Hence it is through 
Abdul Haq’s story that I aim to explain the present by exploring the 
past, indicating where the mistakes were made and which route 
those with an interest in stabilisation for Afghanistan should be 
heading towards. 
The book also raises related questions. For example, when did 
the US ‘select’ Hamid Karzai and why? Was there ever an intention 
to deliver democracy and rights for women to Afghanistan? Why 
did the West opt to subvert justice and accountability for a ‘peace’ 
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with Afghan warlords that could never be sustained? The question is 
of prime importance, as twice now in their spectacular rise to power 
the Taliban have shown their version of Shariat to be a preferable 
alternative to the anarchy of the warlords. The re-ascendance of the 
warlords has probably done most to alienate ordinary Afghans from 
the West’s intervention and impede the formation of a viable state. 
Yet Abdul Haq foresaw the problems associated with the 
warlords taking power as far back as 1991 when – in a letter to the 
Saudi Ambassador in Islamabad – he prophecied: 
If these radical Mujahidin elements take power in Afghanistan, there 
will be war forever. There will be no peace and security, and we 
Afghan people will have to beg for food and support for the rest of 
our lives. From the other side, people will come to hate the names of 
Mujahidin and Jihad throughout the world, and think that the word 
means only killing, destruction, disunity and terrorism. It will destroy 
the image of Mujahidin and Jihad. Moreover, the students and guests 
of these radical elements will find many supporters in your country 
and, if not take full power, still engage in atrocities and chaos. This is 
neither good for you, nor for us, nor for Islam.37
In the aftermath of the 2009 presidential elections, this scenario 
looks to have taken hold. The opportunity of bringing these men to 
justice was ignored in 2001, when instead the West made them its 
allies in removing the Taliban. The result is what we see today. 
After beginning this book I found myself talking to a former 
SIS man in Lamu, Kenya. His view of Abdul Haq seemed to typify 
that of the British (and indeed US) intelligence establishments 
when he said: ‘He was dead within a couple of weeks so what 
did it matter?’ With both Afghanistan and Pakistan now failing, 
causing attendant problems for the entire world, this book is about 
why it did indeed matter.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE ‘PEACE VERSUS JUSTICE’ STRATEGY
The Tigers of Wrath are wiser than their Horses of Instruction
William Blake
Kabul, June 2002
The evening was still and the dust had settled, now replaced by 
a light of such crystalline luminescence that the Mausoleum of 
King Amanullah stood like a cutout on its ridge above the city. 
On the other side of town, last-minute preparations for the Grand 
Assembly of Elders, known here as a Loya Jirga, were coming to 
an end. The buildings of Kabul’s 1970s-style polytechnic had been 
steadily refurbished: glass puttied into shattered windows, fountains 
reconnected to water, coats of paint brushed over the strafe marks 
of machine-gun fire, landmines cleared from the long grass between 
dorms, piles of mouldering excrement swept from lecture theatres 
whose last residents had been Arab Talibs. 
The delegates who would participate in the Loya Jirga had been 
elected in their districts and regions, and their thoughts were now 
pregnant with the responsibility of selecting Afghanistan’s new 
President and the Cabinet of the country’s transitional government. 
There was a distinct feeling that a new era of peace was about to 
dawn over Afghanistan, after twenty-three miserable war years. 
Despite some of the problems with bribery and intimidation in 
the first phase of the elections, the process overall had been fairly 
democratic and UN workers had expressed pride in achieving the 
election of over a thousand people38 across Afghanistan.39 
This Loya Jirga – the first Grand Assembly of Elders to be held 
here in twenty years – was the first step in the Bonn Process. The 
Bonn Process was the roadmap, agreed in November 2001, between 
the international community and a select group of Afghans (some 
now say too select) for the state-building and democratisation of 
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Afghanistan. It was not strictly a ‘peace plan’ because it failed to 
include all parties to the conflict, namely the Taliban.40 
The tent where the Assembly would be held sat white and huge 
on the highest level of the site, dazzling in the sun against the ochres 
of the mountainside. The Germans had brought it from Munich, 
where it had been the principal beer tent at the Ocktoberfest, 
something the more conservative Afghan leaders coming here 
tomorrow would probably not be happy to know. 
The screams cut through the still evening. A fellow election 
worker, an American, scurried up the steps shrieking that there 
were ‘gunmen’ on the site-level beneath us.
A UN political colleague walked towards us. When he heard 
gunmen had entered the site, his brow furrowed and he shook 
his head, storming away uttering expletives. His anger, so out of 
character for a man who was one of the ‘elders’ of the monitors – 
he had spent some twenty-five years in Afghanistan running aid 
projects for a Nordic organisation – was unexpected. Despite his 
seniority, it was obvious there was an undercurrent or an agenda of 
which even he was unaware. 
Below us, ordinary Afghans – men and women, old and young 
– streamed quietly towards a large open-sided Indian chamiana 
tent with a carpeted floor. All seemed innately proud to have been 
elected; serious about the task they had come here to undertake: the 
‘re-birth of their nation’ in selecting its new government, and also 
serious about reconstructing Afghanistan after years of bloodshed 
and war. 
However, something they had not foreseen was unfolding. Three 
shining black Landcruisers, codan masts still swinging after a high-
velocity arrival, were parked on the level below us, surrounded by 
armed men. Through their open doors it was possible to see a stash 
of RPGs and Kalashnikovs; all strictly banned on the site. The Loya 
Jirga’s atmosphere, so hopeful even within the past hour, was now 
bloating with latent violence, like a balloon filling with water until 
reaching bursting point, unleashing its force without being checked.
These Landcruisers had just borne some of Afghanistan’s most 
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ignominious characters into the heart of the site and – though we 
did not yet know it then – into the heart of the state-building project. 
Now milling at the edge of the shamiana was Prof (Ustad) Rabbani, 
a thin man who, though no shia, wore an Iranian-style turban. He 
had been Afghanistan’s President during Kabul’s 1992−94 ‘terror’. 
Behind was Fahim, who looked to me almost gangster-like and was 
scowling. A former Afghan female colleague who had taken me to 
visit the World Food Programme’s widows’ bakery programme 
in January 2002 had explained the significance of the Northern 
Alliance to the people of Kabul when I had commented naively that 
with Massoud’s poster plastered around Kabul, people must feel 
a sense of relief in this new, post-Taliban era. She had reacted with 
passionate fury. 
‘These are not our people, they are from the Panjshir, not here. 
The people of Kabul hate Massoud because of what he did to us ten 
years ago! And of all Afghan factions, Massoud’s soldiers were the 
worst!’ But surely, I asked, these men were better than the Taliban? 
‘No’, she replied, ‘at least with the Taliban, we knew what the rules 
were!’ She wanted to know why the West had made Fahim Defence 
Minister. Didn’t we realise he was a terrorist’ who had executed 
thousands of people when he was head of the KHAD? Taken them 
out to the airfield where they were killed? Her reaction unsettled 
me, particularly as she herself had been imprisoned by the Taliban 
just weeks before September 11, for contravening some rule. 
Kabul’s airport had desolate, open land around it. You could kill 
a lot of people there with no one watching. This evening though, 
the warlords continued filing into the shamiana to take their seats. 
Behind Fahim came Sayyaf. Then there was the thickset, bullish 
General Dostum. 
A couple of women, no doubt emboldened by the atmosphere of 
intense international interest now in Afghanistan and believing that 
the rules precluded those with a history of human rights abuses 
from participating in the Loya Jirga itself,41 unfurled questions at 
the strongmen like small arms fire. In short, why were the warlords, 
those responsible for destroying the country, here? The men stared 
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back unflinchingly. Another woman challenged Rabbani to explain 
what had happened in Badakhshan for he had apparently bribed 
his way into a seat by buying votes with fake money printed by the 
Russians ten years before. As he attempted some explanation, there 
were peels of laughter from the women. A fellow election monitor, 
Amy, the daughter of an eye doctor brought up in Afghanistan 
during the Afghan civil war, was incredulous, having never 
witnessed Afghan women challenge those who had terrorised 
them. But at this stage the women – and I – still believed that the 
international community had come to Afghanistan in the wake of 
September 11 not just to rout al Qaeda, but to protect these women 
from the abuses to which they had been subjected for so long. 
Perhaps that is why they believed they had the ability to hold these 
men publicly to account. It was a defining moment for them. But it 
stopped right here. The warlords sat and faced the crowd defiantly 
and the uncharacteristic reaction of my colleague Nils was my first 
indication that all was not okay.
I decided to leave. But at the gate, British ISAF soldiers, virtually 
incoherent with tension, said the warlords had forced their way 
in. ‘Put a fucking gun to the head of one of our lads’, one of them 
spewed, his voice tingling with nerves. ‘He was tellin’ ‘em they 
couldn’t come in ‘ere with them guns or cars, but the driver slammed 
down his accelerator and burst through the cordon. Fuck, this is 
fucking crazy’, he screeched. 
Outside in the car park scores of Hilux jeeps, laden with armed 
men, surged back and forth, like wild horses in a coral throwing 
up a miasma of dust. I dodged to avoid them, feeling intensely 
visible and alienated from this display of undiluted, aggressive 
testosterone. My elderly driver, Jan Mohammad, sat quietly at the 
far end of the car park, hunched over the wheel. He looked worried 
and, putting the car into first gear, commented that this perplexing, 
superfluous display of strength by the bodyguard militias of the 
warlords who had come to Kabul from the provinces was bistiar 
gharrab or ‘very bad’. 
We drove to the Intercontinental where I had arranged to meet 
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a friend, a Newsweek journalist. The press corps were gathered there 
in a gloomy interior awaiting a press conference and my friend 
was re-capping with his interpreter the events of that afternoon. 
‘Khalilzad42 must be out of his mind’ he stormed, ‘Why the hell 
make such a public display of US interference? He could at least 
have let the King say it himself?’ 
He was talking about a last-minute press conference which 
journalists had been called to attend. There, the US Ambassador, 
the Afghan-born Zulmay Khalilzad, had strutted menacingly up 
and down. Looking on were the UN chief, Lakhdar Brahimi and 
Hamid Karzai (who was nominally titled ‘President’ of the Afghan 
Interim Authority). But most surprisingly, in a quiet corner cowered 
Afghanistan’s former King, Zahir Shah. The press corps were 
unaware why they had been called here until Khalilzad, raven-dark 
eyes scanning the crowd, exhorted, ‘The King will not be running 
against Karzai as Head of State’. 
He had apparently spun on his heels to face the press corps. 
An impregnable silence had fallen over the room. A protegée of 
Condoleeza Rice and Member of the Rand Corporation, Khalilzad 
had worked for UNOCAL, an American petroleum company that 
for years had courted the Taliban in an attempt to build a pipeline 
across Afghanistan.
The former King, now eighty-three years old, had seemed 
defenceless to the journalists. When he had returned to Afghanistan 
the previous week, ending twenty-nine years of exile, Afghans had 
gathered around ancient television screens in anticipation of his 
words. The older generation remembered his peaceable forty-year 
rule with fondness, and so it had been a momentous occasion to see 
him reach the bottom of the airplane steps on his walking stick. A 
microphone had been put in front of him, he had opened his mouth 
to speak and … the sound system cut out. King Zahir Shah had 
mouthed words into nothingness and Afghans heard nothing of his 
sentiments about returning to the country of his birth after twenty-
nine long years. 
The relevance of the ex-King had become obvious to me days 
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earlier on Chicken Street where Afghans sold knickknacks and 
carpets. An elderly man stepped forward from a doorway to greet 
me and another election monitor. We were invited into his shop 
where Uzbek saddle bags, small rugs and old Gardener teapots were 
stacked. The frail old man offered tea, which my colleague accepted 
as we continued the discourse. The mood turned wistful: the man 
had tears in his eyes. Perry conversed with him in dari and explained 
that the man was happy to see foreigners again and that the last 
thirty years had been a time of pain for Afghanistan. Everything was 
okay until King Zahir Shah left, then things had become very black. 
King Zahir Shah emanated from Afghanistan’s elite Mohammadzai 
clan of the Durrani Pashtun, rulers of Afghanistan since 1747. He 
had come to power in 1933 and presided over forty years of peace. 
It was only when his ambitious cousin, General Dauod, deposed 
him in 1973, while the King was in Italy for eye surgery, that things 
began to go wrong. Although Daoud had ‘modernising’ intentions, 
his was the first in a series of coups which would eventually plunge 
the country into war. I thought of what the old man must have 
seen in the years between Zahir Shah’s departure and now: several 
changes of government and ideology, the arrival of the Russians, a 
ten year jihad to eject them, then chaos as the various factions vied 
for power before the Taliban arrived. At our guesthouse, during 
breakfast table conversations between Nils and the journalists, it 
seemed there was still hope the King would be brought back and 
Nils said:
He would be a useful symbol, a banner beneath which opposing 
factions could unite, in memory of better days. Certainly the older 
generation are keen for this. Afghanistan is a very conservative society. 
The King could provide the glue that’s needed. Better than religion. 
Nils had explained that the problems would begin after the Loya 
Jirga. For it was doubtful the ‘Three Musketeers’ – Fahim the 
Defence Minister, Qanooni the Interior Minister and Dr Abdullah 
the Foreign Minister – could all stay in the key ministries. All three 
were originally from the Panjshir valley, so could not all feasibly 
stay in power. Fahim should step down but that would be difficult; 
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he was now the most powerful man in the country. 
‘The Panjshiris stepped into the corridors of power, taking over 
Kabul from its inhabitants, without the rest of the country getting 
a look in’, Nils explained to the journalists, adding that Fahim had 
ensured the ministries were staffed by Panjshiris loyal to him. Hence 
the chiefs of Intelligence and Security are both from Fahim’s village 
in the Panjshir. Fahim was also supported by Russia, Iran and the 
US, who needed to decide whether they preferred using him for 
their ‘war on terror’ or whether they preferred a truly democratic 
Loya Jirga. The latter would be better for Afghanistan’s stability. 
An American journalist commented that surely the shura-e-
Nazar ‘deserved’ to take Kabul, having routed the Taliban on behalf 
of the West? I should perhaps explain that Shura-e-Nazar was the 
name given by Massoud to his mainly Panjshiri-led ‘Council of the 
North’, a sub-set of the Northern Alliance and comprising members 
of Professor Rabbani’s Jamiat-e-islami Party. Throughout Kabul in 
the run-up to the Loya Jirga, the Shura-e-Nazar’ were buying off 
votes in some areas, intimidating in others and generally working 
to control the elections. In response to the journalist’s question, Nils 
sighed and asked them whether giving all the power to people from 
a valley representing less than five percent of the land area of the 
country was really sustainable? Afghanistan, he said, could easily 
end up like a federation, with the Panjshiris controlling Kabul. The 
problems would come when they tried to extend their influence into 
other areas. Then there would be fighting, and Pakistan, as well as 
neighbouring countries, would begin meddling again and things 
would get very bad.
***
The Newsweek journalist’s comments about Khalilzad’s bizarre 
behaviour at the press conference on the eve of the Loya Jirga, and its 
probable connection with the warlords’ subsequent violent arrival 
at the Loya Jirga site was now obvious. Most of these strongmen 
had returned rather haltingly from exile to Afghanistan, in the wake 
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of the Taliban’s recent departure. The view of the UN political staff, 
who had come into contact with warlords and strongmen in the 
spring of 2002 during elections for the Loya Jirga, was that many of 
those who had returned would be subject to some sort of accounting 
by the international community for the abuses they had committed 
during the civil war of the early 1990s.43 But this was not to be. 
The following day Amy told me that after my departure those 
women who had dared criticise the warlords ‘were intimidated to 
silence by Amniyat’.44 Amniyat was another name for the Afghan 
‘intelligence’ police, also known as KHAD45 (Khedamat-e-Ettela’at-
e-Dowlati) after the Soviet-style state security apparatus built up 
during the 1980s. Amniyat was made up of the sunglasses-wearing 
men who had attended the pre-Loya Jirga elections in Kabul with 
notepads, apparently to record potential troublemakers at the 
Loya Jirga. 
How these security / intelligence men had actually entered the 
Loya Jirga site, which was supposed to have been secured, was 
perplexing. Only when we saw Engineer Arif, the Panjshiri chief 
of Amniyat, who was standing at the top of the site, did it become 
obvious that their presence was ‘official’. Arif stood imperiously, 
with heavy-lidded eyes and radio in hand, directing his slick-suited 
minions around what was supposed to be a sealed meeting for the 
democratically elected delegates. 
These men were loyal to General Fahim, now the most powerful 
man in the country.46 Earlier in the year, he had awarded himself the 
title of ‘Marshall’ and today his intelligence police came to the Loya 
Jirga armed with Polaroid cameras, video cameras and the threat of 
later retribution for ‘troublesome’ delegates. 
The UN chief, Lakhdar Brahimi, responded to the disquiet of the 
election monitors by saying, ‘Tell them to go!’ This was transmitted 
– rather imperiously – via an aide. Those of us who wished to stay, 
so the message was relayed, could do so, but we must be content 
simply to monitor the intelligence police; however we were ‘on no 
account’ to interfere in their behaviour. 
Looking back at what has happened – and what flowed from 
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this event in June 2002 – it seems obvious that, as election monitors 
charged with protecting the integrity of the democratic process, we 
should, at that stage, have walked out. Although it was obvious 
that something was very wrong, I myself was not yet fully aware of 
the significance of what was going on. Perhaps, I thought naively, 
a larger and more purposeful plan for peace and stability was 
unfolding. But many of the monitors, particularly those who had 
spent more time in Afghanistan, as former aid workers, diplomats 
and writers during the anti-Soviet jihad, were very aware. One UN 
colleague had even quit prior to the Loya Jirga, telling Brahimi that 
he could not agree with the lack of representation of Pashtun elders 
from the south (for the UN had apparently deemed that they would 
be too closely associated with the Taliban).47 For the rest of us, it was 
only when the Loya Jirga had finished that we could assess what 
had happened in the cool light of day. 
This morning I was to check that Amniyat were not hassling the 
women in their dorms. There were reports they had even been into 
the rooms; a surprising contravention of Afghan culture. Outside 
the concrete building was a huddle of women, and amidst them 
a former Afghan colleague, Dr Massouda Jalal. She asked why 
Amniyat were present. Masouda was not just any woman. For 
several months, she had been preparing her campaign to stand 
against Karzai as Head of State. When she had first told me I hadn’t 
quite believed her. But it was her firm belief that if women played 
a greater role in politics, much of the fighting might be averted. She 
was nervous. An intelligence officer stood close to her robes, bent 
over taking notes in a scruffy notebook. She told me it was difficult 
for her to talk because he would report on her. 
Six months earlier, a meeting with the Women’s Minister, Dr 
Sima Samar, had foreshadowed how things were going to unfold 
for Afghan women. It was a day sharp with cold, in January 2002 
just eight weeks after the Taliban were routed from Kabul, and I had 
taken some Irish donors to meet some of the new Ministers. We had 
gone to Samar’s office which was then in a Kabul suburb, Wazir 
Akbar Khan. 
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Samar looked vulnerable, sitting on a 1950s sofa and huddled 
in a black overcoat. The chekhov style stove did little to assuage the 
blistering cold rising from a concrete floor in the women’s NGO. 
After six weeks as Minister, she complained that she still had no 
office. The son of Ismael Khan, Governor of Herat, had taken over 
the building reserved for her. The act was symbolic; for despite her 
being a Minister now he was a strongman and she did not matter. 
She said that she needed an independent place, so women could 
come without feeling harassed. Despite representing fifty-five 
percent of the population, women were still at risk, and in need of 
lawyers to take up their cases, as well as women’s shelters. 
A Hazara by origin, she had a reed-fine face, short dark hair 
and laughter lines around the eyes. She had just returned from 
Washington DC with the other new Ministers. She told me:
In Washington, George Bush put his arm around me and said, ‘Don’t 
worry Sima, we are watching to see that the women of Afghanistan 
will be okay’. But the other ministers were watching him. 
Behind her words was a degree of isolation, a plea for us to recognise 
that, despite the renewed interest in Afghanistan’s women following 
September 11, an automatic progression in women’s rights should 
not be taken for granted. 
Samar somehow resembled Audrey Hepburn: was it the oversized 
coat, the cropped hair, or her slightness? Yet there was an underlying 
determination in her tone. She said she had been threatened on 
the plane back from Washington by the other ministers, who were 
asking her why she was trying to Westernise Afghan women? Now, 
here with me, she slapped the table and said: 
But I’m not asking for abortion rights. If I say ‘access to education’, 
is it Western? The only way we can change society is via education. 
Illiterate women think they are the property of men. We need equality, 
not privilege. 
The Irishmen nodded sympathetically as she added that the big 
challenges in Afghanistan were education and employment. She 
wanted to give women skills so they were empowered. But it was 
important that the international donors act in a way that did not 
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make the situation worse. She related an example of what irritated 
her about the weakness of donors in the face of the plight of Afghan 
women. A year ago the Taliban had announced that women and men 
should have separate hospitals. She was infuriated by the response 
of international donors, because the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) had agreed with the Taliban to ‘build a separate hospital!’ 
Samar said she believed that this had happened because the head of 
WHO was a Muslim, and added that when the Taliban closed girls’ 
schools, UNICEF responded by closing boys’ schools. ‘It gave the 
Taliban the opportunity to make boys go to the madrassahs!’ 
Samar looked tensely into her teacup before going on: 
Even Karzai was scared to push women’s issues: ‘He’s concerned other 
leaders will not tolerate progress. So donors must make aid money 
conditional upon women’s rights being incorporated into projects’.48 
The Irish donors, who would have several million pounds to spend 
on Afghan reconstruction, leant towards her, transfixed. But then 
she was off the issue of ‘conditionality’ and onto the problem of 
appointing fundamentalists to senior positions. She had protested 
angrily to Karzai about his appointment of the new Chief Justice: ‘I 
had a big fight with Karzai about this; the man is almost Mullah Omar. 
How then could he protect women’s rights or make changes?’
The men nodded sagely as she moved onto her third major issue: 
appointing unindicted former mujahideen to senior positions. In 
particular Mohammad Fahim, the Defence Minister, was ‘also a 
problem’, she hissed. 
In the Defence Ministry, they have ten Generals but seven are Tajiks, 
two are Pashtuns and one is Uzbek. None are Hazara. Yet it was Fahim 
himself who gave the names to the British government. He chose 
his people. How could the British accept this? You know in Cabinet 
each day the leaders say they will appoint people on the basis of the 
Resistance rather than education. 
The Afghan ‘Resistance’ were those who had fought the Soviets 
during the 1980s. Many came from rural areas and were known as 
‘mujahideen’. Some Resistance leaders formed factional groups, 
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normally on the basis of ethnicity. Their leaders, men who oversaw 
many commanders and dealt with foreign donors to the war, were 
usually called warlords. Energised with anger, Samar went on, ‘But 
I was also part of the Resistance, only I did not kill anyone! And 
who bombed the West of Kabul? These men!’ 
One of the Irishmen finally spoke, asking for an explanation of 
the pictures of Massoud now pasted up on lamp posts across Kabul. 
The Iranians, she said, had printed seven metric tonnes of posters of 
Massoud and the Panjshiris were putting them up all over, ‘even at 
a womens’ conference!’ 
Today, at the Loya Jirga, some six months later, Sima Samar, who 
had initially been appointed as one of the three Joint Chairman found 
herself effectively sacked by Karzai. The warlords were apparently 
unhappy with her appointment.49 
Leaving the Loya Jirga site that day, I saw an ISAF soldier 
arguing with an officer of Amniyat. Perhaps the soldier might have 
been forgiven for assuming that the intelligence men, loyal as they 
were to Fahim, had no business being here. But evidently no one had 
briefed him that Mr Kar Sym Yar, now effectively Chairman of the 
Loya Jirga, had received a visit from the head of Amniyat and several 
Panjshiri gunmen on the eve of the meeting, the same evening the 
warlords had forced their way inside the site. Kar Sym Yar had then 
been forced to sign an ‘agreement’ stating that the ‘security’ of the 
Loya Jirga was no longer in the hands of the international community, 
but in the hands of the Panjshiri dominated intelligence police. 
***
When the Loya Jirga finally began the next day, it had been 
delayed by further private meetings between the US, the UN and 
the warlords or ‘mujahideen leaders’ as they now preferred to be 
called. The term was a reminder of their more glorious past, when 
they had dispatched the Russians, before turning on each other in 
bloody inter-ethnic conflict, laying waste to vast tracts of Kabul and 
to the civilian population.
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Today they arrived in their glory; in strings of black Landcruisers 
whistling through the site, laden with guards and ammunition. 
Taking their seats they were recognisable by their head-dress: the 
Tadjik ‘Lion of Herat’, Ismael Khan, wore his trademark keffiyah; the 
Pashtun Governor of Jalalabad, Haji Qadir, looked monarchical in a 
gold turban; Dostum, the Uzbek leader of the north, wore a sharp 
Soviet-style suit and was accompanied by a bodyguard with a crew 
cut. Finally, the Pashtun Abdur Rassul Sayyaf was crowned with a 
vast white turban. They sat together in the front row of the meeting, 
united in their audacity. Behind sat the democratically elected 
delegates, now hushed to silence by the presence of those who had 
terrorised them during the civil war years within the past decade. 
Most of the Loya Jirga Commission had wanted to disbar 
Sayyaf’s candidacy because of his human rights record, particularly 
his brutal campaign against the Shia in Kabul during the early 
1990s.50 But as he took his seat regally a colleague whispered, ‘After 
the first phase of the election he invited all the candidates for dinner 
and threatened to slit their throats if they didn’t vote for him in the 
final phase’. Quoting William Blake, he added, ‘The tigers of wrath 
are wiser than their horses of instruction’. 
But who were their masters? Ourselves? The Americans? The 
United Nations? Sayyaf wasn’t just any warlord with blood on his 
hands; he had opened the University of Dawal al-Jihad in the tribal 
areas of Pakistan using a large donation from bin Laden in 1980. It 
became a training school for extremists,51 men recruited from across 
the Islamic world. The terrorists Omar Sheikh and Khaled Sheikh 
Mohammad, responsible for the kidnap and killing of American 
journalist Danny Pearl and involvement in both World Trade 
Centre attacks respectively were reputed to have spent time there 
and one former student even set up Abu Sayyaf,52 taking Sayyaf’s 
name in honour. 
A week into the Loya Jirga, former King Zahir Shah was to make 
a speech. The delegates waited expectantly to hear the words they 
had missed when Zahir Shah’s microphone had so mysteriously 
cut as he had stepped off his plane from Rome. The great tent was 
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bathed in silence as the terrapin-like former King moved slowly 
towards the podium. At last on it, he gathered himself up to speak. 
His lips moved but his words were lost in the vast depths of the 
great tent. As the old King mouthed his words the delegates leant 
forward, straining to catch them. But oddly, the microphone which 
had worked perfectly just minutes before, had gone dead. It was the 
second time within a month. Again, King Zahir Shah’s moment had 
passed, silently. Afghanistan’s people were sorely disappointed. 
As the days dragged on and the candidates sat silently in the 
tent, the real business of the Loya Jirga – the horse-trading – was 
being conducted without their involvement in a small tent marked 
‘VIPs only’. There, Karzai, the warlords, the US Special envoy 
and the UN chief Lakhdar Brahimi remained for much of the two 
week meeting, returning only periodically to the main tent after 
agreements on (unknown) key issues had been made. At the back of 
the tent an American Embassy staffer whispered, ‘The Panjshiris are 
already handing out cards saying “Afghan Transitional Authority”. 
Like they already know they’ll be the new government’.
***
The die was cast for Afghanistan’s future a day later at the Loya 
Jirga. The Shiite Ayatollah Asif Muhseni53 called on delegates to re-
name the country the ‘Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan’. 
In unison with Muhseni’s suggestion Sayyaf swept to his feet, 
punching the air as his robes gathered around his legs. ‘Everyone 
must stand to signal his approval for the motion!’ Sayyaf shouted 
and the two front rows of mujahideen, including Karzai, rose quickly, 
eyes darting left and right, shouting ‘right!’ and ‘Allah e akbar’. To be 
seen with your bottom still on a seat when an issue with ‘religious’ 
connotations was being debated was to invite persecution. But 
behind the mujahideen, ordinary delegates rose reluctantly, many 
forced into doing so by the intelligence police who swept the tent 
from behind. Incredibly, there was a lone voice of opposition from 
the warlords: Kandahar’s jowly Governor Gul Agha Sherzai rose 
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from his seat, wiping a bead of perspiration from below his black 
and grey turban: ‘I think we’ve had enough war since twenty-five 
years ago in the name of Islam’. Undeterred by a collective gasp 
from the audience, he continued:
This government has enough of a basis in Islam and everybody knows 
this is an Islamic government. We admire Islam and … don’t need to 
put its name on the transitional government. 
But shouting broke out and men surged forwards, threatening 
chaos until the Governor of Nangarhar took to the podium, blue 
eyes flashing like headlamps beneath a gold turban. Grasping the 
microphone determinedly, Haji Abdul Qadir reminded the gathering 
that it was for ‘Islam’ that so many had sacrificed themselves during 
the jihad and the country would certainly be named an Islamic state. 
The motion was passed by a show of hands, few daring to dissent. 
Outside the womens’ dorms, Massouda was talking to another 
woman. She appeared unnerved and distracted. She was about to 
give a speech about her presidential candidacy but was scared of 
the reaction of the Mullahs to her candidacy: ‘It is not in Sharia law 
for a woman to be able to run for president’. 
She was hesitant as several black Landcruisers swept past. Dr 
Rabbani and General Dostum were leaving the site. But minutes 
later, Massouda, the first ever woman to run for President, gave her 
speech and said:
The women of Afghanistan are champions. And they have to tell the 
world that even though they have been forced inside the home for 
the last five or six years, they can free Afghanistan and the world can 
trust them. 
Afterwards, female and male delegates gathered around her. A male 
Professor of Medicine at Kabul University told her: ‘We see women in 
government positions as very patient and trustworthy, we think that 
if a woman was leader, Afghanistan would progress much faster’.54 
But the imam of Kabul’s main mosque, Qari Abdurrahman 
Qarizada threatened Massouda with his words: ‘Koranic law says 
women are too weak and unintelligent to run for president’. 
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The vote for president occurred by secret ballot, although in 
practice many factional leaders, having worked out deals in the 
side tent, forced the people from their fiefdoms to vote behind 
them. Haji Qadir managed to get most Pashtuns to vote for Karzai 
and so, despite visible support for Massouda (who got over one 170 
votes), the overwhelming majority of votes went to the handsome 
young man from Kandahar who was already interim President of 
Afghanistan’s Interim Authority.
In his first speech as Transitional President, Hamed Karzai said: 
The Afghan people want to get rid of warlordism. They want to get rid 
of the gun once and for all. And once again we have a strong mandate. 
But he then disappeared with the US Ambassador, Khalilzad and 
Lakdhar Brahimi. They apparently went to the Presidential Palace 
to make further deals about Cabinet positions with the warlords. 
Meanwhile, security was tightened with new checkpoints and an 
earlier curfew across the city. 
While the dealmakers were at the Palace, the delegates sat bored, 
impatient for the Loya Jirga to close and humiliated to have been 
excluded from the debate. One of them told journalists: 
I am really disappointed with the Loya Jirga. Governors and officials 
are telling people what to say in their speeches. I myself have been 
threatened into supporting Karzai and my first candidate was the 
former King Zahir Shah. This is just a Loya Jirga in name only. The 
main issues have not been discussed so far. If it goes on like this, 
fighting could restart because Karzai does not have the support of the 
majority of the people.55 
The choice of Cabinet seats was supposed to have been decided 
by the delegates but now that it was clear how the meeting was 
being conducted, the horse-trading had moved unashamedly from 
the VIP tent to the Presidential Palace. This went on for most of the 
ten day meeting. 
Finally, it seemed, there had been an agreement. So on the night 
before Karzai was finally due to announce the Cabinet, a British 
ISAF soldier explained about security arrangements for the next 
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day. ‘We’re gunned to fuck’, he declared nervously as a contingent 
of the Afghan National Guard marched past with Lee Enfield rifles 
swinging by their sides. Tomorrow, the tent would be filled with the 
more deadly armoury of the warlords’ bodyguards. 
***
Fahim’s black Landcruiser tore through the site like a dust devil 
minutes before Karzai arrived the next day. He was a stocky man 
and descended the vehicle onto a red carpet on which the National 
Guard were lined up awaiting inspection. With his chin stuck firmly 
in the air and his thickset nose like a pile of squashed rugs, Fahim 
began to walk along the line of soldiers who towered over him. 
The air inside the tent was thick with tension as everyone 
awaited Karzai. International diplomats and warlords alike had 
brought armed men. The whole event seemed like a superfluous 
show of testosterone as the bodyguards of opposing factions and 
international diplomats talked nervously into hand held radios, all 
the while eyes scanning the tent. 
The new President had already delayed announcing the make-up 
of his Cabinet once and today the mood was of nervous expectation. 
Ordinary delegates knew that deals about which factional leaders 
had been chosen as Cabinet members had gone on elsewhere, 
instead of with their vote as promised by the Bonn Agreement. Still, 
they were unsure just who would be given government positions. 
Finally Karzai swept in, cutting a fine figure in his long chapan 
silk coat, lambskin karakaul perched elegantly on his head. Taking 
his place on the podium, he began by making jokes to ease the 
tension. But he went on to announce his Cabinet haltingly. Those 
who had expected the Loya Jirga to rebalance the country’s ethnic 
power were disappointed.56 The hegemony of the Panjshiris was 
reinforced; of the three most powerful ministries – Defence, Foreign 
and Interior –the Panjshiris conceded one in name only. The only 
significant Pashtun to be offered a position was the Northern 
Alliance ally Haji Qadir, the powerful and charismatic Governor of 
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Jalalabad, who was made Minister of Public Works and one of the 
three Vice Presidents. 
With the meeting closed, Brahimi and Khalilzad announced that 
its outcome was a triumph of ‘peace versus justice’. When someone 
asked what this meant Brahimi explained, in a laboured way which 
rather implied the naivete of the journalist, that to maintain peace 
within Afghanistan, it had ‘of course’ been necessary to subvert 
the idea of justice. In later opinion columns, this was explained by 
adapting a Lyndon B. Johnson quote to refer to the warlords: ‘It’s 
better to have them inside the metaphorical ‘tent’ pissing outwards 
than outside the tent pissing in’. 
But others disagreed with the view that those who had hoped 
for justice were simply ‘naïve idealists’. One UN official admitted 
that the UN had ordered the Loya Jirga Commission (which was 
Afghan led) not to disallow Sayyaf’s election. Although delegates 
were, under the rules of the Bonn Agreement, supposed to have 
signed an affidavit saying they had never participated in ‘war 
crimes’, because none of these people had ever been tried in a court 
of law, this could not be proven in practice. I witnessed Sayyaf 
make this point in response to a Washington Post journalist when 
– at an election at a school near the old British cemetery in Kabul57 
- she had challenged him on his past. As a result of this ‘get out’, 
those who had previously terrorised Afghans were allowed to lie 
about their past. Then they were allowed to attend the Loya Jirga 
and – supported by the Amniyat who intimidated and threatened 
democratically elected delegates – the warlords were able to shape 
the meetings’ outcome and thus ultimately the outcome for the 
fledgling Afghan state. 
Back then, in June 2002, as the monitors and UN colleagues met 
to assess the likely outcome of the Loya Jirga, another UN colleague 
commented, ‘If I had been in Brahimi’s shoes, I would have made 
a ‘heavier’ footprint and been more engaged. The chance to control 
the warlords is now lost’. The warlords, he said, would now return to 
their fiefdoms emboldened. They had now been ‘legitimised’ before 
ordinary Afghans in the eyes of the international community. In the 
following weeks, reports dribbled back to the UN of revenge attacks 
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by these strongmen who, once back in their localities, singled out 
those democratically elected candidates who had dared speak out 
at the Loya Jirga. Sima Samar was forced into hiding. Brahimi and 
Khalilzad’s notion of ‘Peace versus Justice’ seemed dangerously 
like renting peace. But for how long this peace could be ‘rented’ 
nobody was sure. 
***
Within two weeks though an event occurred that set the stage for 
a further breakdown of stability. On a hot day in July, when the 
sun had reached its zenith on the far side of Kabul’s dry riverbed, 
Afghanistan’s Vice President was assassinated as he and his nephew 
left his Ministry building for lunch. Haji Abdul Qadir was also the 
Pashtun Governor of Jalalabad who had mobilised so many votes 
for Karzai only two weeks before. 
When my interpreter Omar and I arrived at the Ministry of Public 
Works, a small group of journalists were already gathered around 
Qadir’s bloodied Landcruiser. The site was not yet cordoned off and 
the vehicle had been driven into a wall, its bullet-ridden sides now 
resembled a cheesegrater. On the floor and front seats, where the 
bodies had been pulled from the car, the two men’s ruby-coloured 
blood glistened. Bystanders said the assassins had rounded on Qadir 
as he was driven out of his Ministry’s gates, not letting up their 
firing even as the car plunged into a wall. The killers then took their 
leave in one of Kabul’s many thousands of yellow taxis, blending 
instantaneously into the traffic. Someone had clearly wanted Qadir 
dead and was taking no chances. ‘Shame, he was a nice man’, said my 
Newsweek friend quietly. His fixer then reached into the car to pull out 
Qadir’s bloodied satellite phones and announced that in the last half 
hour before his death Qadir had tried, three times, to reach someone 
called ‘Haji Z’. This was probably Haji Zaman, an enemy and rival of 
Qadir’s from his home Province of Nangarhar, apparently driven out 
of the country by Qadir in the Spring. But the name which appeared 
on Qadir’s phone did not belong to Haji Zaman.
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Today had been Qadir’s first official day at work as Public Works 
Minister. Oddly, the bodyguards normally guarding the Ministry 
were not Qadir’s but belonged to the outgoing Minister. Someone 
said they had received instructions from the Interior Ministry 
yesterday to leave their weapons at home today. And several 
onlookers remarked that the assassins, who had been wearing the 
white salwar kameez of Nangarhar, Qadir’s province, had been hiding 
in the bushes outside the Ministry for several hours waiting. 
Three days after Qadir’s assassination, at a registration of 
journalists at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Panjshiri Press 
Officer, a small man with a splash of dark hair, a western suit and an 
east-coast American accent showed us into a minimalist 1970s-style 
office of leathered white chairs. His look was sullen, as though he 
really didn’t have time to deal with us. The door was closed and we 
were told to turn off recording equipment while he spoke: ‘I have 
just been to a Memorial Service, for a great man. For Haji Qadir’. He 
paused and looked around the room. The journalists sat in silence. 
The Press Officer continued, hissing to the group; ‘I’ve been reading 
some of your stories on his death over this weekend. Most of them 
are bullshit!’ He looked around, checking the effect of his words 
before going on:
This was not an ethnic killing. Do I make myself clear? It had nothing to 
do with ethnicity and let me tell you people, I’m watching the stories 
you write and I don’t want to see any more bullshit reporting, like 
saying this death had to do with ethnicity. 
Though some of the press had said the killing could be ethnically 
motivated, others assumed it to be the result of a drug feud. 
When leader of the Eastern Shura in pre-Taliban days, Haji Qadir 
had apparently made a lot of money. No one was quite sure how, 
but everyone knew that poppy was the major crop grown in his 
province. 
Haji Qadir had been the brother of another major Afghan 
commander: Abdul Haq. Ten months before, in the aftermath of 
September 11, the London Evening Standard had carried a story on 
5 October 2001 about Commander Abdul Haq.58 The headline read 
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‘Rebel chief begs; don’t bomb now, Taliban will be gone in a month’. 
A picture showed a large Afghan man named Abdul Haq. Another 
smaller photo showed him clasping Margaret Thatcher’s hand. It was 
1986 and she was lauding him for his role as a guerrilla commander 
in the Afghan-Soviet war. The reporter wrote that as well as being, 
‘one of the most respected mujahideen commanders in the guerrilla 
war against the Soviets’, Haq was now ‘a rebel commander at the 
forefront of a campaign to overthrow the Taliban’. 
The Taliban is collapsing from within, Haq explained, ‘The people are 
starving, they are already against them … but if the missiles strike, 
this will be delayed, even halted. Mr Blair has the influence to put the 
hand of restraint on America. I beg him to do it.59
But recent press articles had shown Blair leaving Moscow for 
Pakistan on the latest round of his diplomatic mission to shore 
up support for imminent US-led military action. He looked like a 
swotty schoolboy, frenetic and reactionary, desperate for approval. 
In contrast, Haq’s face appeared calm, cerebral even. His ‘strategy’, 
the piece said, was to persuade the Taliban’s own military forces to 
turn against their leaders in a secret war being waged against the 
hardline fundamentalist regime. 
Every time I meet commanders who cross the mountains in darkness 
to brief me, ‘they are part of the Taliban forces, but they no longer 
support them’. Haq explained, ‘These men will join us and there are 
many of them. When the time is right they and others will rise up 
and this Taliban government will be swept aside’. The only condition, 
he added, was that the struggle be one ‘in which Afghans take the 
leading role’.60 
With even the most liberal commentators in Britain subscribing to 
the idea of unleashing the full might of the West’s military hardware 
on Afghanistan, the quiet words of this open-faced commander 
struck me. 
That weekend the US-led bombing campaign began. It was 
Sunday 7 October 2001. A diplomat I’d known in Islamabad met me 
for supper. He now worked on the ‘Afghan desk’ in Charles Street, 
but like many Foreign Office officials, hadn’t visited the country. 
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The FCO Security policy was so tight that the Islamabad-based 
diplomats were not, back in 2000, even been allowed to take a tourist 
trip up the Khyber Pass. But he had been fascinated by my stories 
of Kandahar. Tonight he was excited the bombing had begun. On 
the question of whether the strategy was really to use the Northern 
Alliance to oust the Taliban, he indicated that this was not the plan, 
even though, with most of the journalists behind Northern Alliance 
lines, this seemed unlikely. But he would not say just what the plan 
was because of ‘security’ constraints. So what was the plan? 
‘Pashtun Commanders’, he sighed. ‘We’re going to use Pashtun 
Commanders. So you see we’re not relying on the Northern 
Alliance’. 
I asked if that meant they were going to use Abdul Haq, but he 
asked, ‘Whose that?’ I told him I had read about Haq in the papers 
the week before. He shrugged, ‘Not so far as I know’. 
‘But who else is there?’ I replied, ‘He’s the obvious one isn’t he?’ 
‘No, not as far as we’re concerned’. 
Haq’s brother, Haji Qadir’s strength had been as a pacifier, a 
bridge between the Northern Alliance and Pashtuns. During the 
jihad he had, unusually, been a Pashtun Commander representing 
the Northern Alliance in Kunar. This background had enabled 
him to push the Pashtun vote for Karzai during the Loya Jirga, 
while simultaneously keeping the Northern Alliance on board. 
As such he’d earned the sobriquet ‘Kingmaker’. This was deemed 
important during those days as the Americans were busy fighting 
the Pashtuns in the South. But Qadir was seen as the last man after 
Abdul Haq with significant cross-tribal following. Now both he 
and Haq were dead. 
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REIGNITING FUNDAMENTALISM
Nothing on earth can ever justify a crime …  
if you grant an amnesty to the past, you are corrupting the future.
Benjamin Constant, Des Effets de la Terreur (1797)
Kabul, July−October 2002
The soldiers directed us to some buildings on the far side of the 
compound, a short drive from the warlords’ office. When we found 
two women huddled together beneath a tree, one rocking on her bare 
haunches, it was obvious we had reached the women’s asylum. 
I was here two months after the Emergency Loya Jirga. But 
what I was about to learn here would illustrate how those who had 
gained most from the Loya Jirga – Afghanistan’s former mujahideen 
strongmen – were already imposing their stamp on society and the 
state-building project at large. 
Today, a middle-aged minder with a stern face and the black 
skirts of a Sicilian widow bustled towards us. ‘You must wait’, she 
explained to Omar. Many of the women were apparently in a state of 
undress. Muffled screams came from the solid Victorian building. 
Eventually the minder led us through a narrow corridor into the 
darkness and a vast hallway of stone, dank with the stench of urine. 
Gradually, the blur sharpened, revealing several ghostly figures: a 
cross-eyed dwarf woman and a girl wearing a shell necklace. They 
watched me intensely. The girl smiled faintly, showing fang-like 
incisors. Behind, in an opening between double doors secured by a 
chain, was an elderly woman whose lined face was suffused with 
deep furrows. Behind her, an upturned table and rags on the floor, 
clearly her sleeping arrangements in this vast and filthy grey space. 
She was naked. Suddenly the stillness was broken with ferocious 
intensity as the elderly woman battered the door with a club. Nothing 
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seemed normal here, where an ordinary-looking elderly woman 
was not only reduced to living in such demeaning conditions, yet 
was also capable of reacting with such violent strength. In the next 
room, a dormitory where light flooded through glass-less barred 
windows, a stream of urine trickled across the stone floor and a row 
of battered metal beds did nothing to soften the hardness. 
From beyond came the strangest cacophony of chatters and we 
moved through a door directly into a yard enclosed by a high wall. 
There, beneath a tree, sat a group of women. They were shaven and 
sat in the dust, each seemingly in a world of her own. Some rocked 
themselves, others sat still, legs folded, arms moving randomly. 
‘They cut and throw their chadors up there’, the minder indicated 
tatters of coloured rags hanging from dead branches above like 
odd Christmas decorations. Omar looked startled but I knew these 
women’s stories told of the brutality of Afghanistan. I wanted to 
understand what had brought them here. So Omar and I sat down 
with them on the dusty courtyard floor. 
One woman’s nose was bloodied and festering with flies. The 
minder, a black silhouette always hovering somewhere above us, 
explained how another inmate, a shaven thick-set woman called 
Nasreen, had sunk her teeth into it days before, tearing off the bulb 
of the nose. As we spoke, Nasreen sat alone against the yard wall, 
rocking. When I asked why, the minder explained that Nasreen had 
lost her family during the mujahidden infighting in Kabul. A rocket 
attack had occurred as the family ate supper and she had been 
spared because her father had sent her out to the kitchen to fetch 
a bowl of rice. All but her had been killed. Initially she had had 
eating disorders, but this developed into removing her garments, 
and more recently the aggression that led her to bite off the other 
woman’s nose. Nasreen, it seemed, was just one reject of war and 
a society unable to deal with her. An old lady in a torn green dress 
entreated me, ‘Write my name and take me out of the mental house 
to America’. The minder said the woman had been here twenty-five 
years and was unmarried because she could not walk. There was 
no wheelchair. 
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Another made an interjection which Omar translated. Six of her 
sons had died. After that, she had become ‘ill’. The minder murmured 
absently. She was sixty-five, her husband had been killed by a 
rocket twenty years ago and she had five children. She told me that 
the women needed blankets and medication, because winter was 
coming. With treatment many could improve, but she had worked 
here fourteen years and now things were worse than ever: ‘At least 
during Najibullah’s government61 we had water and electricity. The 
windows were broken during the fighting that followed’. 
Marastoon, as this forgotten institution on an arid hillside 
beyond Kabul was called, once had a car that drove through the 
streets collecting the insane, bringing them here. ‘The Taliban gave 
a bit more help than now’, she added. 
Walking back inside the shrouded corridor, there was a cell-like 
room with a small barred window high above the dirt floor. Within it 
was a ‘lump’ in the dirt; there followed a movement, and an old lady 
emerged. She gave a gratified smile, and pulled out a needle and 
thimble, which she held beneath her sacking cover. When I took her 
hand, she seemed pitifully grateful for human contact. She had been 
here twenty years, her name was Zainab and her smallest finger 
had gone, apparently bitten off by the same woman who had taken 
the others’ nose. The old lady wore a dirty pink dress with a bow 
and was from Maidan Shah, a Pashtun area to the South of Kabul. 
She had come to be at Marastoon after her husband took a second, 
younger woman. When the two fought, this lady was brought to 
Marastoon, the victim of a society where women are expendable. 
The shell necklace girl watched me sideways. She had been here 
for twenty years, having killed two men. ‘Her son and another’, 
said the minder casually. ‘Then last year she killed two women 
here at midnight’. It seemed unbelievable. Here she was, walking 
around ready to kill again, needing psychiatric treatment which 
was unavailable. Preparing to leave, I noticed a closed door and, 
feeling the minder hiding something, opened it. Inside, a pale-faced 
woman sat on a bunk. Against the black of her chador, her face was 
unexpectedly beautiful, and it seemed that she should not be here. 
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Despite her obvious shyness, Omar’s sensitivity enabled her to talk. 
She was called Raheela and she was twenty-five. Her parents were 
dead and she had been taken in by her uncle. But she didn’t want 
to live with his family. For fifteen years, they had beaten and fought 
with her, even though she cooked them good food. Omar explained 
that the girl had gone to the Women’s Ministry to ask for help. But 
they had sent her here. So, she had sought help and they had sent 
her to a dangerous mental asylum? Behind us, the shell necklace 
murderer stood watching, leaning against the doorway. Raheela 
commented that from night until morning it was impossible to sleep 
because everyone was shouting. 
 Having promised to help Raheela, I returned several days 
later with an Afghan-American doctor, a squat New Yorker who was 
a Mohammadzai Pashtun, one of the King’s tribe. We were obliged 
to seek permission to enter from the Director of the Afghan Red 
Crescent Society who ran Marastoon. Outside his office, soldiers 
in fatigues mooched. The soldiers were the Directors’ bodyguards. 
The doctor was shocked: ‘Dangerous for the women’, he remarked, 
‘a burqa is their only protection’. After a long wait we were shown 
in, and there sitting behind a large desk, was Qar a bec, the gold 
frames of his glasses catching shafts of light on the walls. He was 
a strongman who’d made no secret of his disdain for the election 
process in the Panjshir. 
It seemed odd for him to be here in the Director’s seat, as he was 
a warlord not a medical man. We drank tea and when I questioned 
him about the set-up, the lack of trained staff and equipment, he 
waved his arm beyond his head, saying there was no money for 
such things. He was vain and disinterested, only perking up when 
he heard of the huge response in the USA to the photographs of my 
colleague in this job, who worked for Getty Images. As a result of 
her pictures, American people wanted to send money to Marastoon. 
We suggested that maybe this could be used to buy the things the 
women needed. Taking a gold pen from his waistcoat pocket he 
wrote, presently pushing a scrap of paper towards me. It had his 
bank numbers on it. 
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Eventually, we were allowed to visit the women’s asylum and as 
walked into the yard where the women sat together. Here, the doctor 
said quietly that this was a terribly sad place. We reached Raheela’s 
room and the doctor spoke with Raheela in dari. Raheela sobbed 
that if no one could help, she would commit suicide. Eventually, the 
doctor said the Women’s Ministry had sent her here, and told her, 
‘There are Panjshiri women there who can look after you’. But her 
Raheel’s reply, as translated by him, was, ‘Her mother had a heart 
problem and her father was an officer in the Communist government, 
so was killed by the mujahideen’. Later, Raheela told the doctor that 
if she cleaned herself, the other women would accuse her of trying 
to make herself beautiful. She would prefer to be in the women’s 
prison where conditions were apparently better. The doctor told me 
that Raheel had said, ‘She says they should change the name from 
Ministry of Women to Ministry of Injustice to Women’. As we left 
the building, he said that Raheela had left home because her uncle 
was raping her. It was the secret shame of the family, something 
that in Afghanistan could never be acknowledged. 
We were obliged to leave the Marastoon compound close to Qar 
a bec’s office. He fixed me with a threatening glare and gripped my 
shoulder until it hurt. ‘You’ll be kind to us with your pen won’t 
you?’ he said menacingly. The doctor translated, his head hanging 
low, but as our car bumped down the track minutes later, he growled 
angrily that the warlord touching me was a transgression of Afghan 
culture. He added that the warlord and soldiers were bound to be 
abusing the women. He explained that a warlord was running the 
Afghan Red Cross62 because it was a lucrative post for him. ‘Tons of 
money comes into the Red Crescent from other Muslim countries 
and if he’s overseeing it, then well, you can guess the rest’. 
Qar a bec had stood out during our elections in the Panjshir as 
purposefully disinterested, as though the electoral process threatened 
to undermine the position he had carved out for himself. 
He tried to, three times. Fatima Gailani was appointed to the position 
but Qar a bec refuses to step down. And because Karzai has no power, 
he stays. 
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These were the words of Peter Jouvenal, a cameraman who had 
covered the anti-Soviet war in the early 1980s and has since stayed. 
As we drank tea in the garden of the guesthouse he had dubbed 
‘Gandomack Lodge’ in honour of the famous battle of the first 
Afghan war where British had been soundly defeated by the Ghilzai 
Pashtun during their retreat from Kabul he told me: 
The Panjshiris only accepted Karzai as he has no power base; neither 
tribe nor political party. So they know they can manipulate him. If I 
made you president of Afghanistan you’d have a problem. Karzai’s 
the same; he has no power so he has a problem. The Americans chose 
him as he was involved with pipelines, and so on. 
Even so, with all the international community’s Apache helicopters 
and F16s, it seemed odd that Karzai should not be able to get rid of 
a corrupt warlord at the Afghan Red Crescent. 
I set about looking for a women’s shelter for Raheela. This journey 
would enlighten me as to what had already begun to go so badly 
wrong with the West’s intentions for reshaping women’s rights in 
Afghanistan. The Deputy Women’s Minister, Tajwar Kakar, who had 
dealt with Raheela’s case personally, was not around. She had been in 
Australia for two months visiting relatives, her staff said. None were 
sure when she’d be back. UN staff were complaining that many of the 
new Ministers had simply taken off abroad on extended vacations, 
enjoying their new positions; instead of doing the important jobs 
they’d recently been appointed to at the Loya Jirga. 
Our meeting took place upon her return, three weeks later. She 
was a grey-haired, rather stern-faced woman who disturbingly 
reminded me of a headmistress. She sat as though perched on a 
throne, and remembered Raheela’s case immediately. ‘She is a 
prostitute, so she is mad. That’s why we sent her to the asylum!’ I 
tried a different tack. Surely, even if Raheela were a prostitute, she 
needed assistance? Didn’t the Women’s Ministry provide shelters 
for women? She raised her chin, and said with venomous disdain, 
‘A women’s shelter?’ She had seen one in the USA and considered 
it very dangerous. 
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We don’t want Afghanistan to become like that. In Afghanistan, our 
culture is different, every problem they [women] have they can discuss 
with the family. 
This woman obviously hadn’t come up against the dynamics of 
power relationships. Could Raheela really open up a conversation 
with her uncle about his raping her? Kakar was like Queen Victoria 
and – like the Queen who had denied the possibility of lesbianism 
– Kakar seemed to believe it unthinkable this girl was being raped 
by someone within her own family. If the family could resolve 
everything, why have a Women’s Ministry at all? Even if Raheela 
were a prostitute, did that not still entitle her to some form of 
protection? From a visit to a prostitutes’ day-care centre, a hidden 
place in the filthy backstreets of Kabul, it was clear the women had 
no other choice.63 
But the attitude of the Women’s Ministry reflected part of a 
trend that had been taking root since the Loya Jirga: the creeping 
re-establishment of fundamentalist Islam. It had begun with the 
reinstatement of the mujahideen warlords at the Loya Jirga and their 
demand that Afghanistan be named an Islamic state. The corollary? 
A return to Shariat as the basis of Afghanistan’s legal system; a 
retrograde step considering the 1964 constitution had been more 
progressive, a mixture of Shariat and Western jurisprudence. This 
was the first nail in the coffin of judicial reform, and how close this 
would be to the Shariat system used by the Taliban just depended 
on who was interpreting the law. 
The next nail in the coffin of judicial reform was the appointment 
at the Loya Jirga of the ultra-conservative Chief Justice, Fazel 
Hadi Shinwari.64 Within weeks65 he had reinstated the infamous 
Religious Police,66 ironically hitherto associated with the Taliban, 
but in fact modeled on the Saudi Arabian ‘Vice and Virtue’ police 
force.67 This move allowed the conservative elements associated 
with the mujahideen, men like Sayyaf, to crack down on the people, 
particularly women. They began issuing edicts to ban women from 
singing on television, to ban the showing of the weekly Bollywood 
film on Kabul TV, much to the annoyance of most Afghans. And in 
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the Western city of Herat, the mujahideen Governor Ismael Khan68 
told women working in UN offices they could not shake the hands 
of foreign men and must continue wearing the burqa. 
The words of the representative of the women’s rights NGO, the 
Revolutionary Afghan Women’s Association (RAWA), resonated. As 
long as the fundamentalists were in power, she said, the position of 
women would never change: ‘They are against women and against 
human rights’. She was angry. They had warned the West about the 
fundamentalists during the war against Russia. 
Now we warn the West not to help the fundamentalists again. These 
people – Fahim, Abdullah, Qanoooni and Rabbani – destroyed the 
city, raped thousands of women and abducted young girls when in 
power from 1992 to 1996.69 
Tense with emotion, she continued, ‘These men the West has put in 
government are common war criminals!’ But what about the proof 
needed to convict such men? For I had heard UN staff, perhaps 
parroting Brahimi, say the same when challenged about why the 
West had rehabilitated such men, instead of indicting them. I wanted 
to know how an Afghan woman would answer such a seemingly 
callous question. Frustrated, she shouted:
It’s like saying we don’t have proof of Hitler or Mussolini! Our people 
have the documents and what does the damage around Kabul say 
about their crimes? Go and interview women around Kabul: many 
were raped by these men and Sayyaf sold our women to the Arabs. 
Because of this people allowed the Taliban to come, to save us from 
these bloody hands. This shura nazar70 have no interest but their own 
power and as long as they have weapons the war won’t be finished. 
The people were hopeful for the Loya Jirga until they saw these 
bloody criminals sitting in the front row. When the USA supported 
Hikmatyar we said this is wrong and warned them. Now we warn 
them not to repeat the same mistake.
Unlike the Nuremburg trials in 1947, or the attempt to capture 
warlords Milosevic, Mladic and Karadzic in the Balkans, the West 
clearly had no interest in bringing justice to Afghanistan, or even 
initiating the ‘due process’ required to evince that. Instead, those 
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involved in such abuses were now its principal allies in the fight 
against the Taliban. She left, slipping the burqa over her clothes, 
blending in with the others in the white dust of the street. 
Karzai’s sacking of the former Minister, Dr Sima Samar at the 
Loya Jirga had set the ball rolling in favour of the fundamentalists. 
Samar was progressive and brave, and had highlighted the need for 
conditionality’ on aid money spent in Afghanistan. This would have 
guaranteed the protection of women not just in the form of shelters 
but also have given them some chance of participating more fully 
in society. Now she had been replaced with Kakar, a woman the 
mujahideen establishment believed ‘safe’. And the rights of Afghan 
women were effectively being washed down the drain. 
‘Khalilzad talked about a trade off between peace and justice 
at the Loya Jirga. Actually he’s lost both’, said a French-Iranian 
photographer I had worked with as an Election Monitor. No ‘Johnny-
come-lately’ to Afghanistan, this journalist had covered the 1980’s 
jihad as well as the Iran-Iraq war. He explained that Brahimi and 
Khalilzad had bowed to the warlords and now their factions would 
start fighting again. There was a real culture of fear here. And the 
recent deaths of those Ministers were not being investigated, he 
said. The ‘Ministers’ he spoke of were Haji Qadir but also Abdur 
Rahman, another Pashtun and former Aviation Minister. Rahman 
had been the keeper of General Massoud’s funds in Moscow, but 
was stabbed to death on an airplane in an apparent argument with 
disgruntled Hajis who were supposedly annoyed their plane was 
late leaving for Mecca. The real story was much murkier and many 
Afghans suspected it related to Rahman switching his support from 
Fahim to the former King prior to the Loya Jirga.71 
Samar, now Chair of the new Afghan Human Rights Commission,72 
had set up a Woman’s Shelter. Maybe Raheela could be taken there? 
Days later, one of her staff reinforced what others were saying when 
he commented: 
The problem with the Loya Jirga was that it legitimised the mujahideen 
leaders. Prior to it, they’d kept a low profile. Now they have a lot of 
power and they’ve been able to change the agenda. Their intimidation 
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of Sima Samar at the Loya Jirga sent an implicit message of threat to 
educated Afghan women.73 
This intimidation had resulted in Samar having to travel with armed 
guards, and live in hiding.74 ‘Something it was never necessary for 
her to do during all the years of Soviet oppression and war’, he 
added bitterly.75 It seemed that a huge opportunity had been lost 
at the Loya Jirga, an opportunity that, once squandered, could not 
be easily recovered. For it had set the direction of Afghanistan’s 
fortune on a new dynamic. When I asked what could be done for 
Raheela, he said: 
The problem is that Sima is facing a great deal of pressure from the 
mujahideen to close her shelter, so it is not possible to take more 
women.
As Sima Samar had said back in January, in her meeting with the Irish: 
‘Even Karzai is scared to push women’s issues too strongly, because 
he is concerned other leaders will not tolerate such progress’. 
 One late autumn afternoon, a member of the Afghan diaspora, 
who had returned to Afghanistan from Paris to serve on a panel 
charged with drawing up Afghanistan’s new constitution spoke 
with me. I was doing some research on transitional justice for the 
International Crisis Group. Understated and with graying hair, 
Dr Fasili was clearly a man of intellect and had become a junior 
Minister in France.76 But he was already dismayed by what he saw 
as interference in the democratic process. Referring to the warlords, 
he said: 
Now we’ll face the problem of conflict more strongly due to the 
development of fundamentalism over the past twenty years, 
and the renewal of it in the last six months. There are the old 
chiefs, the Tanzims. They’re the people holding power, the 
Islamic groups from the jihad period. All these factional chiefs 
were against the King during the Loya Jirga, because he is so 
widely loved here. The Religious Police were reinstated because 
of pressure from Rabbani and Sayyaf …77
Ironically, Abdurrab Rasoul Sayyaf (Head of Ittehad-e-Islami) and 
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former Prime Minister Berhanuddin Rabbani, retained power as 
conservative Islamist mujahideen. As such, both were against the 
modernising and ‘Westernising’ of Afghanistan. And their ideals 
were close to those of the Taliban. Fasilli continued, ‘The West must 
be firm on these issues and ensure that aid is withheld, otherwise 
Afghanistan will return to fundamentalism’. 
***
The Italian Ambassador was in the garden of his 1970s embassy. It 
was dusk and I was here because the Italians were leading on justice 
in the context of Security Sector Reform as mandated by the G878 
issues.79 He reminded me of a Lampedusa aristocrat when he said: 
Brahimi thinks legal reform is not possible in Afghanistan as the 
country is not ready for modern Western law. But it is one thing to be 
realistic and another to be so cautious that you don’t do things.80 
‘Do things?’ I asked. He paused, cupping long fingers around a 
cigarette and said, ‘The real pressure to give the ‘extra’ fifty seats to 
warlords at the Loya Jirga came at the ninth hour from Khalilzad’.81 
He spoke of the seats which had suddenly and inexplicably been 
issued to unelected strongmen on the eve of the Loya Jirga, the night 
the warlords had burst onto the site, which made a mockery of the 
work the election monitors had done to ensure that those charged with 
shaping Afghanistan’s future at this key event would be the people 
chosen by ordinary Afghans. The Ambassador gave a knowing grin 
and whispered, ‘You know it was Khalilzad who originally advised 
the Americans to back Hikmatyar during the jihad?’
Hikmatyar82 was the renegade warlord the USA had tried – and 
failed – to assassinate earlier in 2002 with a Hellfire missile. Now 
Hikmatyar was being blamed for everything from the gathering 
insurgency in the south to small bombs being set off daily around 
Kabul. Khalilzad, the Ambassador said, had previous connections 
with UNOCAL, the US oil company which for years had been 
inveigling to build a pipeline across Afghanistan. He went on, now 
holding his cigarette like a dart, 
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Khalilzad made a huge mistake by marginalising the King. The 
King could have kept the Pashtuns happy and Karzai or the King 
could have been Head of State and Qanooni83 Prime Minister. But 
… US policy is so short-term and has no respect for Afghan political 
evolution. By this I mean, why select Fahim or even Karzai as the 
men to fight al Qaeda for the war on terror, rather than concentrating 
on state building? The risk of a reversion to factional fighting within 
a few months is now very high. 
The next day a Senior European diplomat told me;
 ‘You know you cannot have stability without justice, or at least 
accountability’. And added, ‘ 
It was so cynical of Mr ‘B’ and the USA not to believe that an 
eighty-seven year-old man could have been a figurehead, one 
of the only people not seeking a position. It would have been 
so good for morale. It’s a shame when governments act as 
cowards.84
The eighty-seven year-old he referred to was the former King, 
Zahir Shah. 
***
A German lady had organised a meal with the Afghan Women 
Judges’ Association. Even their representative dismissed the 
idea of protection for women: ‘The situation is too difficult, such 
places cannot exist publicly because many men would not accept 
them’. Shelters’ would loosen the ties that still bound women to 
the household. So shelters were politically impossible as any 
independence for women was looked upon as a direct threat to 
society. Particularly a society now returned to the mujahideen. 
Women who did not fit into the ‘traditional family structure’ 
remained vulnerable. Clearly the attitude of the new Women’s 
Ministry was to see girls like Raheela as a threat. The easiest thing to 
do was thus to castigate her a prostitute, lock her up in Marastoon 
and throw away the metaphorical key. 
I was increasingly concerned about where we could find 
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protection for Raheela and contacted RAWA in Pakistan to see if she 
could be taken to one of their shelters. It was a protracted process 
waiting for their representative to find me in Kabul again, because 
I could not call her directly for her own protection. The lady on the 
phone in Pakistan offered to help but it would be difficult for them 
to get Raheela away from Marastoon, as she was under the eye of 
Qar a bec and his men. During the days I was waiting for the RAWA 
lady to arrive, I met Caroline, a feisty British girl from a German 
Women’s NGO, Medica Mondiale. She promised she would visit 
Marastoon and find Raheela, and two weeks later she arranged for 
Raheela to move into their house in Kabul. There, she took up a 
position of responsibility and seemed to gain some self-respect. 
A few months after that first visit to Marastoon, US Defence 
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz visited Kabul in a blaze of publicity. 
Wolfowitz visited a newly refurbished, shiny women’s clinic, hailed 
a triumph of progress for Afghan women. But maybe it would have 
been more appropriate if he had been photographed in the women’s 
asylum at Marastoon? 
News of Raheela came again in the spring. Raheela had been 
getting on very well and was helping out at the women’s NGO 
where Caroline worked. But within months her uncle turned up 
and demanded she be handed over. How did he know where she 
was? ‘The Women’s Ministry told him’, Caroline replied quietly. It 
was the last I ever heard of Raheela. 
***
During September 2002, I was invited to visit the Salang Pass, a route 
constructed by the Russians in the early 1960s, linking Kabul with the 
north. An invitation had been extended through a fellow journalist 
from Hayat Muslim, a prominent Panjshiri. Muslim was about to leave 
for London as Afghanistan’s Military Attache and was apparently a 
close friend of the Defence Minister Mohammad Fahim. 
A french radio journalist called Anna, a cameraman and two aid 
workers came with us. Anna had covered Afghanistan extensively 
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over the past decade and knew Muslim well, having often entered 
the country through the Panjshir. As we set out she seemed 
protective of her access to him, and their friendship, cultivated 
over several years. We drove through the Shamali Plains, stopped 
for tea in Jabal Seraj and continued up into the heights of the 
Hindu Kush, picnicking beneath the Salang pass at around three 
thousand metres. Behind us, an overhang in the road was held up 
by menacing concrete columns which shadowed the road for over 
twenty kilometres as it snaked its way into the Hindu Kush and 
towards the north. The pass had been built by the Russians in the 
1960s, a mammoth feat considering one of the series of columns 
was over two kilometres long. The building of Salang seemed to 
foreshadow a long held Russian ambition to invade Afghanistan. 
It was the Soviet’s principal supply and invasion route in; hence 
Massoud had concentrated his fire on Salang. When one stood 
below it, the whole Soviet plan seemed so obvious. 
‘So’, I asked Muslim, as we ate a picnic of chicken wrapped in 
Afghan bread, ‘why didn’t the King foresee a Russian invasion 
when they built this?’
‘The King?’ he said venomously. ‘He was just smoking pot and 
enjoying women!’ 
UN colleagues had explained why the US Special envoy Khalilzad 
had intervened to cut out the King before the Loya Jirga: because 
Fahim had threatened civil war, bringing his tanks to Kabul, if the 
King were made Head of State. The US response was apparently to 
say, ‘We won’t intervene if that happens’. And so the King was cut 
out, leaving many Afghans disappointed. 
It was precisely because so many Afghans saw the King as a 
unifier, someone able to bring morale to sections of the country 
disenfranchised by the Panjshiri monopoly on power, that Panjshiri 
strongmen like Muslim, who were benefitting from the status quo, 
professed to loathe him. But the jealousy went back centuries, and 
related to the dominance of the Pashtun majority over the rest of 
the country. 
Muslim appeared to be an easygoing sort of guy, always talking. 
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But he repeatedly told us how well the Northern Alliance had 
done to defeat the Taliban, and how the world owed the Northern 
Alliance a favour for this. 
On the way home, he pulled over to intervene in a road accident, 
having recognised the car of a commander he knew. We were back 
on the Shamali Plains, north of Kabul, on a link road between the 
old and new roads. Anna and I got out of the car. It was almost 
dark and American Chinooks were flying back to Bagram from 
Special Forces operations in the south, their twin rotors silhouetted 
elegantly against a full moon. She lit a cigarette and blew out the 
smoke with a long sigh, 
God I’ve had enough of all his talk about how the Panjshiris deserve 
to keep all these ministries. It’s disgusting and so transparent the way 
they’re gorging on power. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
‘FIRST YOU CALL US FREEDOM FIGHTERS,  
NOW WARLORDS’
In Kabul the rule of Shah Shujah proceeded smoothly against a 
backdrop of British bayonets.
Afghanistan, Highway of Conquest
Bagram, Herat and Jalalabad, April - May 2003
‘Today the “Coalition of the Willing” is at the Gates of Baghdad, 
bombing Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guard’, I wrote in my 
diary on 3 April 2003 on a plane flying back to Kabul, as beneath us 
Afghanistan’s snow-covered mountains sparkled.
I was returning to coproduce a documentary for a British 
television station, Channel IV.179 It was to be an update on progress, 
or the lack of it, in Afghanistan eighteen months after the invasion. 
My companions were the filmmaker Paul Yule and the presenter, 
British political journalist Peter Oborne. 
The atmosphere at Gandomack Lodge had changed and although 
the antique Lee Enfield rifles collected by Jouvenal still lined its walls, 
the journalists had left for Iraq during the Autumn. In their place had 
come consultants, engineers, ‘democracy experts’, diplomats, NGO 
workers and contractors. Over an ample Gandomack breakfast the 
next morning, we met a British engineer who had come to work on 
the new US Embassy. ‘A fuckin’ huge project’, he boasted, elbows 
outward as he cut into a sausage, ‘$300 million dollars worth’. 
It was more than the US had so far spent on Afghan reconstruction 
in the eighteen months since the fall of Kabul. Most money committed 
to Afghanistan was being soaked up by military operations. Paul 
was keen to make a triangular journey around Afghanistan, driving 
from Herat via Kandahar to Kabul. Peter and I were not so sure. 
Since our return I’d learnt that three foreigners had been killed on the 
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same road only a week before: two US soldiers in Helmand and an 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) delegate in Zabul 
Province. The ICRC delegate had apparently been dragged from 
his car. A translator relayed that those who captured the delegate 
had called to ask their chief, Mullah Dadullah in Pakistan, what 
to do with him as until now it had been taboo to kill aid workers, 
particularly those working for the ICRC which was considered a 
neutral party in the conflict. But today, with the Iraq war having just 
begun, Dadullah’s reply was, ‘Kill him’. 
The official UN advice was now not to travel by road. But in 
the Presidential Palace we found a markedly different response. ‘So 
would you say it is okay for us to do this trip?’ Peter asked Karzai. 
Smiling blithely in his elegant silken chapan, Karzai told us that it 
was ‘perfectly safe’ to make the trip. His preference for spin over 
safety in what was clearly a rapidly deteriorating security situation 
unnerved me. 
As late as early 2003, the insurgency had still been fairly minor, 
involving only small pockets of Taliban. However, an event I’d 
covered for the The Economist in January 2003 had surprised me. 
Coalition forces had brought in AC130 gunships to bomb caves 
following intelligence that as few as two or three Talibs were hiding 
out at Spin Boldak, the border crossing where I’d occasionally 
stopped for tea when making the drive from Quetta to Kandahar for 
my work with UN Habitat (UNCHS) during the Taliban period in 
2000. Bringing in gunships seemed nothing more than an expensive 
stunt, akin to using a sledgehammer to crack what at that stage was 
still a very small nut. Yet the effect would be to fan the insurgency. 
I remembered the sepia-coloured photographs of the young men 
pasted on the walls of a restaurant I had stopped at once during the 
Taliban period in Spin Boldak. Their motivation had been to oust the 
foreign infidel from their land. These photographs dated from the 
1980s and my Kandahari colleagues had fingered the faces in those 
frames lovingly, proud that their brothers had not died in vain. That 
fight had been to oust the Soviets, the next generation would deal 
with NATO and the Americans. I wasn’t even convinced that the 
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allegiance of many of these young men would be to the Taliban. 
It seemed more a commitment to honour their history of ousting 
every invader from Ghengis Khan to the British. 
We visited Bagram airbase, home to the 18,000 or so ‘coalition’, 
but mainly American, troops who were arriving in time for the daily 
eight am ‘pick up’ of journalists for the coalition press conference. 
We left our car at the gate and climbed into one driven by an African-
American soldier. He would clearly rather have been back home in 
the US. ‘People think the war in Afghanistan is over and look to Iraq’, 
the soldier explained wearily to Peter. ‘But this is still a full on combat 
zone’, he added despairingly, driving us into the base. We passed 
scores of soldiers jogging, M16 rifles slung over their shoulders. 
Despite media assertions throughout 2002 to the contrary, it was 
obvious to many of us based in Afghanistan that the war was far 
from over. Early in 2003, an American soldier was now affirming 
this. It would have been a revelation to hear a political officer or 
diplomat say as much at this stage.180 Close to where we had to 
register as press was a vast, sealed aircraft hanger. One of the Afghan 
journalists pointed to it and said, ‘That’s where they’re detaining 
people and two men even died there before Christmas’. There was 
something menacing about the building which was strictly a ‘no 
go’ area and the Afghan journalist turned out to have been correct. 
Two Afghans held in detention by coalition forces, one probably 
an innocent taxi driver, had indeed been murdered there. Carlotta 
Gall, of the New York Times was already onto the story, but it would 
be two years before it was fully in the public domain.181
Half-an-hour later, we stood in the glaring sun as coalition 
spokesman, Colonel King, wearing a peaked camouflage cap, 
presented his press conference. He paused to assure himself all eyes 
were on him, before his voice boomed out
Operation Valiant strike ended two days ago. And at Spin Boldak last 
night eight enemy were killed, fifteen others detained. 
An Afghan reporter whispered in my ear, ‘Mullah Omar has been 
distributing papers calling Afghans to react like the Iraqi people 
and defend their country’. Colonel King went on:
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As far as we know they were Taliban. Now eight killed, that’s relatively 
successful as they no longer have positions they can hold or access  
to supplies. 
Each day at the Bagram press conference, figures of ‘the dead’ were 
given out in relation to the previous nights’ engagement. The higher 
the toll, the greater the Americans’ deemed the operation to have 
been a ‘success’; it was the same routine employed apparently in 
Vietnam. It seemed a particularly myopic ‘metric’ of the military 
campaigns’ success, nothing to do with the battle of perception 
or the winning of peoples’ ‘hearts and minds’ to support the new 
government. It was also likely to inflame Afghan anger since every 
insurgent killed had relatives who would mourn him. Often the so-
called ‘Taliban’ cited by the US were simply locals carrying an old 
rifle182 for most Afghan households had one tucked away. Coming 
to the end of his spiel, Colonel King announced confidently, ‘We’ll 
be here till we beat the Taliban’. 
‘When’ll that be?’ I asked cheekily.
He laughed and said, ‘I don’t know’. As he turned away, I thought 
I heard him mutter quietly, ‘Somebody else’ll be making that 
decision’. 
***
We drove to Jalalabad to research the poppy story. Hanif Sherzad, 
our interpreter, was famous in Afghanistan because he read Kabul 
TV News. He and I drove in his Toyota Corolla while Peter and Paul 
went in a 4x4 with armed guards. On the edge of Kabul we reached 
the Pul-I-charkhi checkpoint. The posters of Haji Qadir and Abdul 
Haq had gone. When I had last passed through here, in the opposite 
direction, coming by minibus from Jalalabad back in January, some 
of the Panjshiri guards had confiscated Pashtun newspapers from 
the other travellers saying sharply, ‘It’s our city now’. This was only 
one example of how ill feeling was being incited by the Panjshiris, 
some of whom now thought they ‘ruled’ Kabul against the Pashtun 
majority who now felt completely unrepresented. 
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Hanif, a Pashtun, was originally from Jalalabad and was now 
expounding on US policy in the city. ‘It’s a big mistake you know. 
One day you’ll see the pay-back’, he said, frantically trying to keep 
control of the wheel as the Corolla bounced along the rutted road. 
‘They are a very small minority, the Dar-I-noor’. He pinched his 
thumb and forefinger together to emphasise. ‘Really, it’s a tiny valley 
on the way to Kunar’. He was talking about Hazerat Ali’s tribe, the 
people who had recently disarmed Haji Zahir’s soldiers. Kunar is 
the valley bordering Pakistan where Hikmatyar ’s followers were 
rumoured to be hiding out and where much of the fight against al 
Qaeda would focus from 2004 onwards. 
Hanif had recently been in Gardez working with ABC News. 
I saw one of our American journalists ask an ordinary citizen of 
Gardez, ‘What do you think will happen when US forces leave the 
country?’ 
Hanif banged his wrist against the wheel. 
You know, the man replied. ‘If today you leave the country, tomorrow 
the Taliban will return and I will first and foremost join them!’ And 
when the ABC reporter asked why, the man replied, ‘Because I studied 
in Peshawar and Kabul and what reconstruction have you done? You 
promised us jobs. Where are they!?’
Hanif also had his own opinion on the war in Iraq.
I have no doubt that the America will break up if this is their way. 
Even our communist PM, Taraqi, said, ‘The will of the people is the 
will of God’. If all these peoples around the world are against this war 
then the will of the people will prevail.
We were late arriving in Jalalabad. The Panjshiri guards Paul had 
hired to accompany us broke down and we had to wait for them 
on the road. So far they’d been more of a liability than an asset, and 
now we were in a Pashtun area they were nervous. The journey 
had taken five hours whereas normally it should take three with the 
new road. By the time we arrived at twelve thirty, Baryalai had tired 
of waiting and gone to a wedding in Surkh Rud. Spring was more 
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advanced here than in Kabul; the gardens in Jalalabad were greener 
and the aroma of orange blossom clung to the air. 
Peter and Paul installed themselves at the Spin Ghar hotel, which 
was dirty and still haunted by the menacing guards of Hazerat Ali. 
I stayed at Baryalai’s place, and later that evening Baryalai told 
me there had been a small demonstration against the Iraq war at 
Nangarhar University, but Hazerat Ali had arrested the Deans of 
various faculties and thrown them in jail. Baryalai shook his head, 
‘Hazerat Ali is just doing this to show loyalty with the Americans. 
How can he do such a thing without recourse to court, judge or legal 
system?’ The Shura Baryalai had set up in January and which was 
gaining significance. I asked what were its main activities and who 
it represented? He told me it was not supposed to ‘represent’ any 
one group. It was more a consultative council of locals interested 
in participating in decisions on issues ranging from reconstruction 
to security issues, dispute resolution or even to finding recruits for 
the new Afghan National Army. Even at this stage in 2003, there 
was concern that so far the ANA was recruiting a large proportion 
of its soldiers from Tajik areas. Again, the Pashtuns felt left out 
and voiceless. This was not surprising though, given that Fahim 
and the Panjshiri clique occupied the bulk of senior positions. The 
shura was trying to address this issue. Baryalai emphasised that 
those who participated in the shura were not people paid to do so. 
Baryalai rubbed his forehead as he spoke: 
They come because they’re interested to do something for our region. 
More and more people come to me now due to this type of problem 
with Hazerat Ali. And our shura is seen as a challenge to his people. 
So a report recently came from Kabul through the intelligence. It told 
them to investigate me. 
Flyers or ‘Night letters’, apparently from Pakistan, had also been 
distributed throughout Jalalabad city calling him an agent of the 
US’ because he had not publicly condemned the Americans. 
So we are being squeezed now by both sides; Pakistan and central 
government … 
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He looked tired, and explained that there were ‘invisible forces’ in 
Pakistan orchestrating pressure on him because he had spoken out 
in the Districts against rockets being sent into Jalalabad city. He had 
warned this could escalate, leading to the type of chaos that had 
made fertile ground for the Taliban’s arrival. ‘He and Zaman even 
helped the Taliban escape’, he said, speaking now of Karzai. When 
I commented that this must be a bit far fetched he said that Karzai 
and Zaman had to retain favour with the tribes, as the foreigners 
would not be there forever. Baryalai continued:
Karzai’s problem is that he has no support. Neither from his own tribe 
nor from the mujahideen either. Because he spent too much time in 
offices and not enough fighting the Russians!
The mujahideen had accepted Karzai as President precisely because 
with minimal tribal support and no political party, he could never 
threaten their hegemony. Now he was also losing popularity, not just 
because rural people were not seeing the promised ‘reconstruction’, 
but because Karzai’s many promises to tribal leaders from different 
parts of the country had not been unfulfilled. Now people were 
openly calling him ‘Shah Shujah’ after the nineteent-century Puppet 
King installed by the British. 
I asked about Jalalabad’s Buddhist remains at Hadda and the 
thousand minarets, and he told me sadly that it was all destroyed. 
I’ve not much hope in the war against opium. So much was lost 
during the past twenty-three years here but especially the culture. 
We’ve nothing left, we’ve destroyed everything. Just as the Iraqis have 
nothing left. 
In Baghdad, the National Museum and Iraq’s National Library had 
been looted the week before. Today, I’d found a message on my 
satellite phone from Jon Swain in Baghdad saying he was leaving, 
he’d had enough of it all. The incompetence of the Americans had 
left the city polluted and burning. I told Baryalai about the message 
and he said with a tone of defeat, 
To rebuild a country you have to work with the system that is 
compatible. You cannot just adapt the USAID system from Bosnia to 
Afghanistan. You have to work with the system here.
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Some acquaintances back in London were arguing that the 
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq were morally imperative 
‘humanitarian interventions’. The implication was that ‘morally 
imperative’ would equate to a successful outcome, whatever that 
meant. After all, hadn’t Bosnia been? In the face of the complexities 
and nuances of Afghan society, however, it was not at all clear 
that Afghanistan would follow in the steps of the international 
community’s forays in other places.183 
Baryalai’s attempts to revive the traditional shura system in 
Jalalabad had been met positively. The shura would be comprised 
of men recognised in the community for their wisdom rather than 
their political allegiance or force of arms. As such, there would be 
no remuneration attached. They would emulate the traditional 
system of consensus that had been partly destroyed during the 
Soviet occupation, by the targeted killing of village elders and 
intellectuals, and the support by outside powers of factional leaders. 
In the approach that Baryalai was attempting to re-formulate, local 
governance decisions were made after hours of tea drinking and 
debate by village elders. It even took many weeks of discussion with 
local elders for decisions to be made about the remit and scope of the 
shura. But the work paid off because eventually this shura was used 
as a blueprint by the Ministry of Rural Development for other shuras 
apparently intended to be set up around the country, particularly 
in relation to counter-narcotics efforts, in which Baryalai’s shura 
had been so successful.184 However, I heard that despite giving lip-
service, Karzai did very little to promote this concept and was often 
obstructive, possibly seeing this legitimate, traditional Afghan form 
of governance as a threat to his autonomy.
The filming of the documentary continued. One of the reasons 
Peter wanted to visit Herat was to deliver a missive to Ismael Khan, 
the city’s Governor and self-styled Amir, the mythic figure I had 
wondered about since hearing of his escape from the Taliban’s 
clutches and Kandahar jail. So having arrived in Herat by plane, 
Peter, Paul and I spent one hot dusty day following Khan’s convoys 
on a trail through villages whose streets were lined with children 
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singing songs from the Holy Q’ran, with little boys on one side of 
the road and girls on the other, all wearing bright white chadors. 
Finally, in the mosque at Ingil District, a place where five hundred 
had been killed by Soviet bombing, Khan made a long sermon of 
both memorial and encouragement. ‘A much greater orator than our 
politicians’, Peter whispered. 
***
When Peter and Paul left for London, I returned to Jalalabad. My 
interpreter and friend, Omar, offered to drive for he and his mother, 
who was from the Khoghiani tribe based near Jalalabad, were going 
there to visit her brothers’ family. 
To our left, the shining peaks of the Hindu Kush framed 
the Panjshir valley beyond us as we approached the descent 
to Sarobi. We were discussing the UN’s new scheme aimed at 
disarming Afghanistan’s militias, known as DDR (‘disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration’). It had been launched the week 
before by Lakhdar Brahimi in Kabul and I was telling Omar how an 
Afghan BBC journalist had asked a seemingly innocent question: 
‘Isn’t it paradoxical the UN is launching this ‘disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration’ programme while the Americans, 
just last week, were still arming warlord militias in the north?’ 
Brahimi had brushed the question off, but today Omar 
commented passionately: 
This is the problem. The US are dealing everywhere with Commanders. 
It brings the country down. It’s good to give dollars but give that to 
the Finance Ministry, to the government or the ANA, not to warlords. 
Who will care about the ANA when everyone has guns?
In 2003, the ANA was the still ‘new’ Afghan National Army. The 
international community was hoping it would become the main 
force in the country, enabling foreign troops to leave. 
***
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At Haji Zahir’s compound the next morning he said of my visit to 
Ismael Khan: ‘He is your new friend and my old friend’. He went on 
to relate how Karzai had recently called all the Governors together 
in an attempt to force them publicly to hand over customs money 
to the central government. But General Dostum and Ismael Khan 
had apparently come to Zahir’s house in Kabul to beg him not to 
agree to this.
‘And what did you say?’ I asked.
‘I say “in time of mujahideen I am mujahideen bu in time of 
democracy I am democratic man”, and so we must support this 
government’. 
I took a handful of kishmesh, not quite sure of his point.
Dostum is making $40,000 USD per day from customs duties not 
handed to the government, while Ismael Khan, with the Iran trade at 
Herat, gets $800,000 per day! In Jalalabad we only get $30,000 per day. 
But all this we give to central government!
He sounded angry, and flicked ash into a lapis bowl.
The Western powers will soon remove Ismael Khan from his post. You 
remember my words. First they will remove Khan and then others.
‘But isn’t it good if they get rid of the warlords?’ I asked. He scoffed. 
First you call us ‘freedom fighters’, now ‘warlords’. Yet in war against 
Soviets we were heroes, now we’re just villains!
Some members of the family – in particular Zahir and previously his 
father Qadir and also Haji Din Mohammad - maintained a national 
network of alliances with other ‘ex-mujahideen’ and warlords. Such 
men remained extremely unpopular with the more ‘progressive’ 
urban Afghans. It was disappointing to learn that this network 
of ‘friends’ included men like Sayyaf who, along with Massoud, 
had apparently been heard giving orders to his Commanders as 
the Hazara people at Afshar, a suburb of Kabul, were targeted in a 
massacre in February 1993. So I asked Zahir why he was so friendly 
with Sayyaf.185 Zahir boomed:
He was very good friend of my Father! He and my father was the only 
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Pashtuns who stayed in Northern Alliance area and continued fight 
against Taliban and did not relent! 
Sayyaf also represented another difference between Abdul Haq and 
Haji Qadir. For even as Qadir had fought alongside Sayyaf with 
the Northern Alliance, Haq had urged the West to beware of him, 
and emphasized his link to the training camps on the Pakistani 
border and the arrival of foreign fighters.186 From one camp the self 
styled ‘Sheikh al hadith’ (Sayyaf) had peddled fundamentalism 
among foreign fighters, whom he encouraged to visit the region 
through his Saudi contacts. Two of the most notorious terrorists, 
Omar Sheikh and Khaled Sheikh Mohammad, the former accused 
of killing American journalist Danny Pearl and the latter of being 
a mastermind behind both attacks on the World Trade Centre had 
spent time at Sayyaf’s vast camp.187
Zahir called Raz, his wiry and scruffy manservant and babbled 
something in Pashtun to him. Moments later Raz returned, placing 
two Polaroid photos in Zahir’s hands. ‘Look’, he said. The pictures 
showed men placing a golden turban on Zahir’s head. ‘They’re elders 
from the tribes of Khoghiani, Shinwar and Mohmand’. Perhaps this 
was a symbolic gesture, the mythical mark of leadership accorded 
him by ordinary people. So I wondered out loud how he was getting 
on these days with the Americans. Zahir told me:
I’m more friendly now with one of their commanders. One (of them) 
came to see me recently and said, ‘Why do you never come and visit 
us?’ So I replied, ‘I’m not needed anything from you’. 
Perhaps the subtext to this was that Hazerat Ali went to see the 
Americans a lot because they were his paymasters. Zahir continued, 
still fingering the photographs. ‘Now they want me more and more 
for their work’. They had, apparently, changed their opinion of 
him after travelling around the region, meeting with commanders 
in Kunar, Nuristan, Laghman and Nangarhar who said they were 
allied with Haji Zahir. 
Learning this, it was obvious how this place differed to Kabul. 
The West would never impose its ideal of ‘one man, one vote’ here in 
the east and south of Afghanistan where the web of alliances, deals, 
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paternalism and religion was not just complex but medieval. Where 
the tribes mostly looked to a leading family for leadership, trust and 
inspiration. The hopes I had held initially for a Western-style secret 
ballot democracy in Afghanistan, while I was monitoring elections 
in the run-up to the Emergency Loya Jirga back in Spring 2002, were 
now looking quite naïve. 
***
The following week evidence of the existence of Afghanistan’s 
nationalised ‘ex-mujahideen’ networks became more obvious. It 
was a late summer’s day; Zahir was visiting Kabul and had asked 
me to travel to Paghman with him for a picnic: ‘We’re going to see 
Mullah Izat. He’s invited me for lunch at his garden in Paghman’. 
Paghman was the valley outside Kabul where Sayyaf was based. 
Reading my thoughts Zahir said with a wry smile, ‘It’s okay, Izat is 
not like Sayyaf, more like me’. 
We drove out of Kabul with Zahir’s soldiers not riding postillion 
today, but tucked tidily inside two of his red Toyota pick-ups. ‘I’m 
not wanting to make big show here in Kabul’, Zahir answered. He 
still, I knew, saw Kabul as hostile territory after his father’s violent 
death. We headed towards the blue mountains of Paghman. Soon, 
we were overwhelmed by dust and the roar of a cavalcade of fifteen 
vehicles, led by four Landcruisers, passing us. 
‘That’s Rabbani’, Zahir sighed. ‘But where’s he going? He can’t 
be going where we’re going!’ 
‘But I thought he was a friend of yours?’ I said. ‘He paid for you 
to get out of jail didn’t he?’ 
Rabbani had just launched a political party called the National 
Party (Nowzat e mille) and Zahir told me that the week before he 
had asked Zahir to join. 
He wants support of the eastern region which he knows I can get. 
He is expecting mujahideen to band together. But if I should join his 
party, why not make my own? The people don’t have trust in him. 
He’s done nothing for them! 
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With all the uncertainty clouding Qadirs’ death, Zahir was steering 
a line independent of the Northern Alliance and particularly the 
Shura-e-Nazar. The mujahideen were already manouevering, as 
evidenced by the French Ambassador’s talk of Sayyaf and Rabanni 
kicking off the Presidential election campaign, to be held a year 
from now, in 2004, in Kandahar. 
Two days later I visited the office of an old Loya Jirga colleague, 
the head of one of Afghanistan’s ‘pro democracy’ Political Parties. 
I have changed his name and not mentioned that of his party to 
protect his identity. 
I arrived to find Musa reading Mr Brahimi’s latest report to the 
UN Security Council. He was not impressed. 
You know Mr Khalilzad and Mr Brahimi, they deal with Fahim. Now 
Mr Brahimi is saying that ISAF must be extended outside Kabul to 
deal with the security problems. But it was him who gave power to 
the warlords at the Loya Jirga last year. Yet now he is blaming the 
breakdown in security on the international community’s failure to 
extend ISAF!
He slapped the report down disdainfully. His alert face was clean-
shaven, except for a small handlebar moustache. 
It’s a good excuse for Brahimi to go on about extending ISAF to areas 
outside Kabul but it was his and Khalilzad’s actions that gave the 
warlords more power in their regions. 
He shook his head, before adding prophetically. 
Anyway if they extend ISAF to the areas outside Kabul it will make 
this into a guerrilla war. The Americans should be doing that job. 
‘But should people like Fahim have been completely excluded from 
the Loya Jirga?’ I asked, playing devil’s advocate. 
Maybe they should have participated – even though it was against the 
rules agreed at Bonn – but they should not have been given full voting 
rights and allowed to intimidate democratically elected candidates.
***
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Musa and I had worked together on district level elections for the 
Loya Jirga in April 2002. With his own political party and dedication 
to the cause of democracy, he was the type of Afghan many might 
have assumed the West would work with in bringing its vision 
of democracy to Afghanistan: a brave man soundly committed to 
following through on the democratic ideal articulated so loudly 
after September 11. At thirty-eight, he was also buoyantly youthful. 
He held steadfastly to the view that Afghanistan could make the 
transition from war, chaos and brutality, towards a peaceable 
democracy. As a police officer during the communist regime, he had 
also risked his life during the Taliban on reporting human rights 
abuses to the UN. Today was the first time I had seen him looking 
crumpled. 
I asked him about the issue of Ambassador Khalilzad’s 
pronouncement that the Loya Jirga had been a triumph of ‘peace 
versus justice’. He frowned and said: 
The effect was to show the people that the warlords were legitimate. 
This has been bad for the central government. 
He said that his own party were doing well, because people had been 
so disappointed by the fundamentalists’ decision at the Loya Jirga 
to make Afghanistan an Islamic state. Since then, membership of 
the Republican party had increased sharply. ‘If the country becomes 
an Islamic State, there is no chance for democracy’, he said. He was 
very disappointed though that the bill legalising the formation of 
political parties had yet to be passed. 
So until the party law is agreed we cannot operate freely and open 
offices across the country. That gives the jihadi parties an automatic 
lead in preparing for the elections as they are already formed. So all 
these new democratic parties cannot become legal? 
This meant that only the so called ‘parties’ of the mujahideen, in 
other words the ‘seven’ groups fostered by Pakistan as politico-
mililtary factions during the jihad period, were presently ‘allowed’ 
to operate in Afghanistan. Musa nodded, ‘They don’t need an 
election law to begin operating but anyone else who wishes to form 
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a political party does’. He then reiterated what we both knew: 
When the warlords came to the Loya Jirga they had less power and 
people protested against them. But after Mr Brahimi and Mr Khalilzad 
allowed them to participate, which was against the rules of the Bonn 
Agreement, and gave them full voting rights, they left with more power. 
Really, Khalilzad and Brahimi are just thinking of their benefits. They 
made a fundamentalist Loya Jirga for Afghanistan last year in which 
they shared government posts between the fundamentalists. This is 
leading to a fundamentalist constitution for Afghanistan and then 
next year, fundamentalist elections too.
His words reinforced the idea that it just didn’t make sense that 
President Karzai, the US, the UN and the international community, 
who had publicly legitimised the warlords at the Loya Jirga and 
effectively reinstated them in their fiefdoms, now stood back 
wondering what had gone wrong and why security was breaking 
down in the regions. It was just too simplistic to blame everything 
on the Taliban. The international community was beginning to 
wonder why the Afghan National Army was failing to become a 
unified force, the drugs trade was spiralling out of control and the 
insurgency in the south was gathering pace. But having effectively 
put them there, now the international community had no leverage. 
If the warlords and strongmen didn’t feel like handing over customs 
duties, didn’t feel like disarming their militias (re-armed by the 
Americans since 2001) and didn’t feel like renouncing their lucrative 
and opaque role in the drug trade, who could stop them?
The international community was glossing over what were, after 
all, rather fundamental problems, focusing instead on the larger 
imperative: US domestic policy. Hence the objective was to hold 
swiftly punctuated elections. This would give the American voter 
the impression that democracy had ‘arrived’ in Afghanistan. Never 
mind that there was no rule of law in the country to make such 
‘democracy’ viable. 
To illustrate the problem of holding elections in a country with 
no rule of law, I refer to an incident that occurred on my return 
from monitoring elections in the Panjshir valley in April 2002. We 
had left the mouth of the Panjshir, arriving at Jabal Saraj at dusk. 
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The village comprised ancient wooden houses and was formerly a 
Northern Alliance stronghold at the top of the Shamali Plains. The 
driver gesticulated towards his parents’ house across a wheat field, 
so I suggested we stop for tea. 
Minutes later, we sat with the drivers’ father on the floor of his 
house. He was unhappy about the elections here a week before. 
He told us that the people were not able to vote for their chosen 
Commander, because a neighbouring, more powerful one named 
Abdur Rahman Maulana, put forward his two candidates. So they 
were elected. The old man looked dissatisfied, pulling on his beard. 
But I was wondered impatiently what was the point of having 
elections if the Afghans weren’t even going to vote the way they 
wanted? It was a secret ballot after all. When I made a remark to 
this effect, the old man responded in dari, talking fast and furious, 
throwing impatient glances my way. When his response was 
translated, it was along the lines of what would these people do 
once the election teams leave? Who would protect them? For his 
security would be threatened if he did not vote with the powerful 
commander. The interpreter cast his eyes downward and it was 
obvious to me that this was not the West. There was no rule of law 
here. Of course those with power could dictate terms. 
Leaving the town at nightfall, our driver pointed out Maulana’s 
compound on the right, a large military base. I had seen Maulana 
at another election, at Saed Khalil, a few days before. He had 
lumbered nonchalantly into the mosque at the end of proceedings 
to claim his prize. He was a dark-haired man in his mid-thirties 
and I’d been surprised by his red toenails and henna-patterned feet. 
He looked like a pirate, someone who lived outside the rules. He 
waited complacently for the announcement of his name and then, 
making no acceptance speech, turned to leave. A heavy gold watch 
hung from his wrist. We streamed out behind to find a black Toyota 
Hilux waiting outside, its engine running, packed with bodyguards 
and ammunition. I’d been suspicious then, now I understood what 
had happened. Why there had been no vibrancy or debate in that 
election? Abdur Rahman Maulana, a man not even of the district, 
had it tied up with fear from the outset. 
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Despite the climate of fear and intimidation in many places 
beyond Kabul, diplomats still talked confidently of strengthening 
President Karzai’s remit in the regions and reconstructing the 
country. But Musa, like many Afghans and indeed like Abdul 
Haq, believed that the opportunity to do this had been lost forever 
once the decision had been taken to re-arm the Northern Alliance 
(and other mujahideen and militia groups). From then on, any 
chance for a democratic settlement in Afghanistan was lost. 
When, in 2001, the Taliban faced defeat, many warlords and their 
commanders had literally driven back across the border to reclaim 
former fiefdoms. Now they had reappointed themselves as police 
and army commanders, provincial governors and even Cabinet 
ministers.188 From these positions they could continue their often 
drug-related or corrupt money-making activities much more easily. 
Their integration into the Afghan state enabled them to operate 
with impunity, even though many had a history of war crimes. 
Outside Afghanistan there was intense international interest in the 
capture and indictment of Milosovic and Karadzic in the Balkans. 
Meanwhile inside Afghanistan, similar characters were being 
rewarded with government positions.189 
Thus it seemed that the British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, 
had things the wrong way around when in 2002 he commented on 
this flawed strategy:
The more we can get people in who have occupied positions of force 
and strength in the past but who now say ‘we’re committed to a 
political process’ and the more we can close off the options for people 
who resort to violence, the better the future of Afghanistan will be. 
In such a context the outlook for brave Afghans like Musa, people 
attempting to form small democratic parties, was lamentable. The 
international community had done nothing to protect them. There 
would only be increasing tension with the warlords and their 
politico-military factions, which rather oddly were named ‘parties’. 
Ironically, on the other hand, by the time of the 2005 parliamentary 
elections – on which I worked for the EU Election Observation 
Mission - the international community and Karzai would have 
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engineered a ‘single non-transferable vote’ (SNTV) voting system 
which – by its ‘divide and rule’ nature – would mitigate against 
political parties. Musa finished his phone conversation and said: 
The problem really began when the Americans allowed the Northern 
Alliance to take Kabul in November 2001. This broke the Bonn 
Agreement and signalled that international rules could be broken. 
Unfortunately we cannot cooperate with them [the jihadi parties] as 
they have not obeyed the laws and just want weapons. Until there are 
no weapons and no warlords the people will worry … Free elections 
without disarmament are impossible. The heads of [political] parties 
should not be involved in war crimes. Anyway, we are also mujahideen 
but not like them. 
The failure of the West to support people like Musa seemed a lost 
opportunity. Such people really believed –somewhat naively it now 
seems – that in the wake of September 11, Afghanistan was facing 
a rebirth with prospects of a democracy supported by the inter-
national community. On the issue of the Constitutional Commission, 
Musa said: 
It is headed by Shahrani, a fundamentalist and a mullah. How can 
he make a democratic constitution! … The UN has allowed Karzai to 
fill the Constitutional Commission with representatives of politico-
military factions, i.e. the warlords, while excluding the democrats.190 
They have even removed the word ‘democracy’ from the Constitution.191 
They inserted the word ‘Islamic’ so the country will be an Islamic 
republic. But it would be better to have a constitutional monarchy for 
Afghanistan. Basically, the constitution is private and controlled by 
the mujahideen. For them, Karzai is the perfect leader because, having 
no power of his own, he is forced to do what they want. 
His words echoed the warnings of Dr Fasilli, who had warned six 
months earlier that the drafting of Afghanistan’s new constitution 
had effectively been hijacked by the mujahiddeen. He stood up, 
clearly upset. 
The Shura-e-nazar parties have lots of money. The difference is those 
who want real democracy, no one gives them money. We pay for our 
offices and tea from our own pockets.
Abdul Haq and Jalaluddin Haqqani 
Top - Abdul Haq with Jalaluddin Haqqani at the Meeting of the Commanders, 
1991. Held in Shah Saleem, Badakhshan. The meeting was organised by Abdul 
Haq. Left to Right - Ibrahim Haqqani, Commander Amin Wardak (wearing 
black turban), Jagran Said Hamed (who was executed alongside Abdul Haq 
by the Taliban), Jalaluddin Haqqani, Khairullah (Haq’s Secretary), Nasrullah 
Arsala, Abdul Haq, a Hazara Commander from Ghazni Province, Belal Nairam 
(a Commander from Kabul Province). © Nasrullah Arsala
Bottom - Looking across Eastern Afghanistan from the top of the Lateband Pass.
Kandahar under the Taliban - Summer 2000
Top - The road from Quetta to Kandahar  crosss the Khojack Pass.
Bottom left - The author with UN Habitat engineers in office compound  
(hence no headscarf)!
Bottom right - Drilling deeper for water during the drought, close to  
Mullah Omar’s house.
RE-BIRTH OF A NATION? DISTRICT LEVEL ELECTIONS FOR 
THE EMERGENCY LOYA JIRGA - Spring 2002
Top - Breakfast with the 
Governor in Kjench, Panjshir.
Middle - The entrance to the 
Panjshir valley (from the South) 
is a natural garrison.
Bottom - Introductions to the 
electoral process.
September 2002
Top - Peter Jouvenal and ‘cook’ in 
our kitchen.
Middle left - Dubbed Gandomack 
Lodge by Jouvenal, our guesthouse 
had originally been the house of 
Osama bin Laden’s third wife.
Middle right - A poster of Ahmad 
Shah Massoud.
Bottom - At the One Year ‘Shahid’ 
remembrance held at Kabul Stad-
ium for Commander Massoud, 
Mujahideen leaders were out in 
full force including (left to right) 
Ustad Sayyaf, Professor Rabbani, 
Sibghatullah Mujadeddi and - on 
the right - Hedayat Amin Arsala.
The Way to Jalalabad
Top - The Kabul Pass just beyond the Pul-i-charkhi checkpoint, drops away steeply 
towards Sarobi and Eastern Afghanistan. 
Bottom - Amir Sher Ali, son of Dost Mohammad, sits in the middle and this is his cabinet 
in 1864 at the Ambullah Conference.  Haq’s great, great grandfather, Arsala Khan, stands 
to the right of Amir Sher Ali and was Foreign Minister. © National Army Museum
Nangarhar - Autumn 2002
Top - Haji Zahir Qadir, Chief of the Border Police, sits with his brother, Qader  
(to the right)  at a camp with his soldiers near Dacca.  
Bottom left  - Hazerat Ali, Corps Commander for Nangarhar Province, in his garden. 
Bottom right - Haji Nasrullah ‘Baryalai’ Arsala in his garden in Jalalabad.  
Autumn in Nangarhar
Top - Author with driver and guards on return from Tora Bora.
Middle - Gardeners at the Kasr Palace, Jalalabad, tending the lawn. 
Bottom - House of poppy farmer in Nangarhar Province.
One Year Shahid (Memorial) for Abdul Haq
Top - A girl with bike in her 
burnt out village following 
a dispute over land between 
Mohmand and Kutchi tribes. 
Middle - On the podium at 
the Shahid for Abdul Haq in 
Jalalabad, October 2002 are 
(left to right) James Ritchie, 
Haji Din Mohammad, Mullah 
Malang, Malem Ghani Hedayat 
(from the party of Ustad Sayyaf). 
Bottom - Din Mohammad 
gives an emotive speech 
commemorating the lives of his 
brother, Abdul Haq, and his son.
The Arsala Family
Top - Dubbed “Resistance 
Royalty” by foreign journalists 
during the 1980s jihad, the Arsala 
brothers provided some of the 
most formidable Commanders of 
the Afghan war.  Here, Haji Qadir 
wears a white fez and stands on 
Abdul Haq’s right side.  Haq 
wears a blue salwar.
Bottom - Abdul Haq as a young 
Mujahed.
both © Nasrullah Arsala
Jihad
Top left - Abdul Haq.
Top right - Nasrullah ‘Baryalai’ 
Arsala. 
Middle - Abdul Haq 
recuperating in Wardak 
Province after the loss of his 
foot to a landmine.  
Bottom - With his mujahideen 
on an operation. Haq stands on 
the left side holding a stick.
all © Nasrullah Arsala
Key figures were to defect under the ‘banner’ of the ex King
Top left - The ex King, Mohammad Zahir Shah.
Top right - Aga Jan, Haq’s famed Commander in the strategically important  
Sarobi area. 
Bottom - The Taliban Deputy Interior Minister, Mullah Khaksar. 
Haq’s US and British Supporters
Top left - ‘RAM’ Seeger after his period as Officer in Command of the UK’s Special 
Boat Service (1974-76), which ex marines have credited him with having re-shaped in 
the run-up to the Falkland’s War.  Seen here with the Sultan of Oman, whose Special 
Force he Commanded during 1977. © ‘RAM’ Seeger
Top right - Ken Guest, second from right, with Jalalludin Haqqani’s Jadran tribe 
Mujahidin during attack on hill top base at Taraghry, 7th March Afghanistan 1981. 
As it is early in the Soviet-Afghan War majority of Haqqani’s force were still armed 
with bolt action rifles from World Wars One and Two and mostly wearing traditional 
leather bandoliers with .303 ammunition. © Ken Guest 
Bottom - Joe Ritchie, who with his brother James tried to get serious support for Abdul 
Haq’s Plan in Washington DC in the run up to - and the aftermath of - September 11.  
© Touch Productions
Top left - Assadabad, Kunar in December 2002 with the Governor and Central Bank 
employees as we counted and then burnt old ‘afghani’ notes. 
Middle - Small child on Kabul to Jalalabad road near Sarobi. 
Bottom - Arrival in Khost by Soviet era Mi8 helicopter to undertake currency 
exchange operation - 2003.
Along the Durand Line
Top left - On the Durand Line at Yacoby, the Afghan border guard defend themselves 
against apparent Pakistani incursions.
Top right - The body guards of Haji Zahir. 
Bottom - On the way to Dur Baba smuggling district, in the Shinwar region. 
Top - Author with Haji Zahir on the Afghan side of Torkham border post.
Bottom left - Haji Zahir and elders in discussion in his garden in Jalalabad. 
Bottom right - Dacca, a guardpost of Haji Zahir’s border guard, was once a  
British outpost. 
Top left - Haji Zahir at the fortified compound 
Qadir had begun building during his first 
tenure as Governor of Jalalabad.
Top right - Afghan soldier with flower and 
kalashnikov. 
Bottom left - Haji Zahir and elders from Loya 
Paktia and Paktika. 
Bottom left - A picture of Haji Qadir looks 
down on the crowd at a ceremony of Shahid 
for Abdul Haq. 
All photographs unless otherwise marked, are 
© Author, with the exception of The ex King, 
Mohammad Zahir Shah.
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CHAPTER TEN 
PLAYING THE AL QAEDA CARD
Trust a snake before a Harlot
And a Harlot before a Pashtun
Tajik Proverb
Jalalabad, Lal Pura, Goste and Fatemena, August 2003
‘You have to come back to Afghanistan now’, said Zahir down a 
crackly line. ‘I can’t say why by phone, but there are problems. You 
must visit villages along the border, ask the people yourself and 
write about it’. I did not know it then, but fighting had broken out 
along the Durand line in summer 2003. Apparently the Pakistani 
Army were making incursions into Afghan territory, backed by the 
US who wanted Pakistan to seek out al Qaeda. 
Zahir told me that a thousand men had been in his house that day 
to celebrate the wedding of Abdul Haq’s eldest son, Majeed, to Haji 
din Mohammad’s daughter. I thought how sad it was for Haqs’ son 
that as both his parents had been murdered, neither would attend. 
London in high summer was unpleasant, even more so in the 
heat of the row between the BBC and Tony Blair’s cabal of officials 
about the ‘sexing up’ of the intelligence dossiers on Iraq. Now 
presided over by Blair’s spin doctor – an increasingly maniacal 
Alastair Campbell at Number 10 – it seemed no depths would be 
left unplumbed in the struggle to divert attention from the failure 
to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The previous weeks’ 
casualty had been Dr David Kelly, an honourable-looking weapons 
expert and civil servant mysteriously found dead on the edge of an 
Oxfordshire woodland. There was something deeply unpalatable 
about what was going on. 
Relieved to have an excuse to return to Afghanistan, I booked 
a flight and returned to Kabul where, in the shadows of the 1960s 
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airport building, one of Zahir’s cousins awaited me. During the 
long drive to Jalalabad he refused to be drawn on the reasons for 
my visit. But apparently a British junior minister192 was seeing Zahir 
that day to discuss drugs.
Today we sat beneath the mulberry trees in the damp, clinging 
July heat. It was Friday, the day of prayers and rest. Haji Zahir’s 
convoy had driven past the family’s village, into the flat land 
below the black mountains, towards Khoghiani district. ‘Visiting 
neighbours’, he had explained, as he parked the white Landcruiser 
close to some adobe houses, his soldiers trailing out behind us from 
a clutch of red SUVs. We were shown to charpoys in the shade and I 
sat opposite him, wilting quietly in the heat. 
This was once the house of a big Malek, he was so rich he had over one 
hundred cows just for milk, and he was a great friend of Zahir Shah 
who used to come here. 
Zahir smiled, clearly relaxed among his own people. Tea was 
brought by an elderly man. ‘Just imagine, King Zahir Shah sat on 
a charpoy here, thirty five years ago!’ he said. Groups of elders 
arrived, nodding respect silently, before seating themselves on 
cushions spread on the ground along the sidelines. 
They are elders of the village and also soldiers when we need them. 
Zahir explained as I wondered how long it took news to trickle through 
the adobe villages of his arrival? 
Abdul Haq’s remaining sons were there: the three youngest were 
round-faced boys aged ten, eleven and fifteen with a predilection 
for Diet Coke. They sat beside Zahir and gazed at him fondly, as 
though to a father. The oldest was the newly-married eighteen-
year-old, Majeed, who sat apart on a charpoy. Behind him, a white 
goat was tethered along the adobe wall of the maleks house. Cattle 
stood in the shade, flicking their tails and behind the wall was a 
group of cyprus trees. 
A red Toyota SUV arrived and out came bodyguards unloading 
steaming tin pots. Lunch. After some preparations behind a reed 
screen, the men filed out like medieval courtiers. They bore pewter 
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dishes of rice, stew and salad. We ate with the elders from the village 
on a long mat beneath the trees, some of the villagers looking on, 
quietly drinking tea. To my right, a row of small birdcages hung 
from the tree covered with cloths. Inside were nuristani doves. 
One of Zahir’s men came and whispered into his ear. A map 
was brought out and examined by the two with gravity. Zahir 
crossly gave me the latest update on Pakistani movments around 
the border: 
The central government told me to defend, not to fight the Pakistanis. 
But the people believe the Pakistanis have boats and may cross the 
Kunar river and make further incursions. They’ve already done so in 
Shinwar, Mohmand and Khoghiani [Tora Bora] tribal areas
‘So what do the Americans have to do with it? I asked. 
They came and told me, ‘We’re going to carry out an operation in 
Mohmand in three days’, and I offered them my bases. They didn’t use 
them. But when they left, they left the Pakistanis there; now Pakistan 
is in Kunar and all down the Durand line to Spin Boldak. 
He flicked his wrist in annoyance at the crumpled map which lay 
across his lap. ‘But Fazl Akbar, a ‘Karzai man’, has denied it three 
times. So I’ll have to go up to Kunar and Nuristan soon’. He was 
talking about the new Governor of Kunar. His pen skated back and 
forth over the map and its crosshatched border markings.
You know the problem is that the Americans are using British maps. 
But we’re using Russian maps. That has correct borders on! 
That Zahir was managing this situation with little support from 
Kabul was evident later that afternoon when we arrived at the kitsch 
fort Qadir had started building at Surkh Rud. Zahir’s bodyguards 
streamed out of the 4x4s, ran across the compound to the concrete 
shell and, moments later, returned ferrying boxes of ammunition. 
This was the ordinance the Taliban had stored in Qadir’s property, 
knowing it would not be bombed by the Northern Alliance. ‘They’re 
taking it to my checkpoints in the tribal areas’, said Zahir, a thumb 
in his jacket pocket. 
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I’ve spent $300,000 from my own pocket in these six weeks. The 
government has offered me one million Afghanis and they keep 
phoning to check if I’ve received it. But I tell them, I’ll send it back 
together with another million!
This was my first indication that summer of the Durand issue. 
The previous week, as news of skirmishes between the Pakistani 
government and Afghan forces filtered back to Kabul, a mob 
had ransacked the Pakistani Embassy protesting the violation of 
Afghan territory by Pakistan. That summer talk of Durand seeped 
into everything; from the Pakistani press (The Khyber News), to the 
intelligence reports which Zahir had brought by messenger each 
day from the frontier, to the talk amongst elders, UN staff or Zahir’s 
family. It seeped into our meals, our teas, the interviews I did along 
the mountainous areas of the Durand line, with the Governor, elders 
and tribal leaders in Jalalabad. They all believed Pakistan was here 
due to a tension between the two countries that went back over a 
hundred years. 
The genesis of the problematic ‘Durand Line’ was the ‘Gandamak 
Agreement’ which was signed in May 1879 between British Major 
Louis Cavagnari and the Afghan Amir Mohammad Ya’qub Khan 
during the Second Anglo Afghan War of 1879-80. Britain would 
maintain a diplomatic and military presence in Afghanistan and 
control its foreign policy, as well as being granted jurisdictional 
control of the three strategically important frontier districts of 
Kurram, Sibi and Pichin. 
When the Gandamak Plan failed to achieve peace, the British 
opted to leave Afghanistan, though not before ensuring it remained 
a buffer between their own Indian empire and that of Russia. To 
ensure this they decided to annex the unruly Pashtun tribe. Hence, 
Afghanistan’s eastern border would be moved inwards and 
westwards by about 150 kilometres at the narrowest point. The 
effect was to enlarge British India’s North-West Frontier Province 
and split the Pashtun tribe which had latterly been concentrated 
in Afghanistan. ‘Durand’ – as the 1893 agreement between Amir 
Abdul Rahman Khan193 and Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, Foreign 
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Secretary of British India, became known – formally adjusted ‘the 
eastern and southern frontier of His Highnesse’s dominions, from 
Wakhan (corridor) to the Persian border’. The problem was that 
Article 4 of the agreement, as follows, was never undertaken. This 
stipulated that the:
… frontier line will hereafter be laid down in detail and demarcated, 
wherever this may be practicable and desirable, by a Joint British 
and Afghan Commissioners whose object is to arrive by mutual 
understanding at a boundary which shall adhere with the greatest 
possible exactness to the agreed map, and have due regard to the 
existing local rights of villages adjoining the frontier.
So while the limits of Durand were set on paper, the border was not 
itself demarcated. And this would become the focus of a bleeding 
sore in relations between Afghanistan and, upon the partition of 
India in 1947, the country which was created as Pakistan. 
Haji Zahir, like many generations of Pathans, never recognised 
Durand, believing Abdul Rahman had made a personal agreement 
in return for money. While some Afghans believed it was only to last 
one hundred years, others believed the conditions so unfavourable 
that many had never recognised it. Today, although he was still 
only twenty-eight years old, the tribes along the Durand line were 
looking to Zahir to resolve the problem along the twelve hundred 
mile stretch of border which he managed. 
***
The town on the far bank was reminiscent of an Arabic trading post 
on the East African coast. As our wooden vessel took to the fast 
waters at a collection of wooden huts in a parched place known as 
Lal Pura, the soldiers regarded me blankly. They had wild kohl-
rimmed eyes and some leant against Russian-era rocket propelled 
grenades, red hair coiling vertically outwards beneath umbrella-
shaped woollen caps. The crazy scene was more ‘The Raft of the 
Medusa’ than Afghanistan. They were mostly Nuristani and the 
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boxes of ammunition and supplies they carried would be passed 
to comrades manning checkposts in the direction we were headed 
towards the heights of hostile border areas. I was visiting the 
mountains with Haji Zahir’s ‘Barder’ Police (Border Guard) and Lal 
Pura village was within kilometres of the Khyber Pass, one of many 
gateways to the unruly tribal areas belt of sun-bleached land lying 
sandwiched between Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
The Corps Commander, a solemn-faced man named Mustafa 
Khan was in charge of thirty-six checkpoints along this fifty kilometre 
stretch between the Shinwar and Mohmand districts. After a month 
of keeping the Pakistani government forces at bay I could see that 
he was tired; his eyes were like saucers. 
We descended the boat to sit on charpoys near the water’s edge 
while a car was found. A line of men stooped beneath heavy sacks, 
moving supplies from a rusting truck on the sandy riverbank to a 
wooden vessel. They moved determinedly beneath their load like 
an army of ants, white powder spilling from torn sackcloth. Heroin? 
I sat upright, thinking I had penetrated the smuggling district, but it 
was urea from Pakistan, shipped via this route to avoid tax.
‘Smuggling?’ I asked. 
‘No, not smuggling. Business!’ the cousin corrected me. ‘Because 
this is tribal area and they are not allied to any government’. 
About thirty barders (borders) soldiers now clambered on top of 
the ramshackle Toyota from which the urea had just been unloaded, 
reminding me of a Guatemalan taxi I’d once taken over the Mexican 
border in which people hung off every orifice. There were few 
vehicles this side of the river and this one, they explained, had been 
brought over by the Soviets and then captured by the tribal people. 
Now its sole use was to ferry goods across this ‘no mans land’. The 
cousin motioned for me to climb inside and we set off, driving into 
open desert past the occasional abandoned village, stumps of houses 
being all that remained after bombing by the Soviets, silent now 
except for remnants of tree cover. As we headed into the parched 
hills, I noticed a profusion of buffalo carcasses littering the route. 
‘They come from India, through Pakistan and to here and die from 
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the heat crossing the mountains’, explained the driver, a merry man 
named Liqat. After forty minutes of sweltering heat he dropped us 
where several charpoys were arranged beneath the shade of trees, 
explaining he was now driving to Pakistan. When he collected us 
later that day for the trip home, a buffalo was strapped to the truck 
floor. ‘So it won’t die of heat’, he said, as though this should have 
been obvious. The buffalo were raised in Pakistan before being 
smuggled into Afghanistan for eating. 
This was Fatemena village, Mustafa Khan’s base camp. In fact the 
‘village’ had been abandoned years ago after Russian bombardment. 
Today Khan’s soldiers lounged on charpoys away from the midday 
sun. Khan pointed solemnly to a parched mountain several kilometres 
distant from here. ‘During six weeks my poorly armed men have 
through good morale managed to push Pakistani government soldiers 
back 6 km from here’. As Mustafa Khan spoke, the soldiers clamoured 
to look through a set of Russian binoculars mounted on a tripod, 
scanning a peak which Khan said his men captured at three am the 
night before, having scrambled up it just as Pakistani government 
soldiers were being dropped by helicopter the other side. ‘Now’, he 
said, ‘the Pakistani’s are trying to cut off my supply route’. 
When I understood that the Afghan Border Police were up 
against Pakistani military spending which included a $3 billion 
USD ‘reward’ from the American government two months ago for 
its’ part in the war on terror, Mustafa Khan’s achievements seemed 
more remarkable. The US contribution to Pakistan was in marked 
contrast to the paltry $1.8 billion received by war-decimated 
Afghanistan for ‘reconstruction’ during 2002. 
We drove up the incline of a ravine towards the frontline, 
Mustafa Khan behind the wheel of a ramshackle anti-aircraft lorry 
captured from the Taliban. We descended and scrambled by foot 
through a cutting towards a checkpoint. Several soldiers, pleased to 
be diverted from the monotony of awaiting enemy fire, welcomed 
us. They had laid a row of mortars in a neat line, next to which 
was a rocket launcher from which they could fire to the end of the 
escarpment. Some fifteen kilometres away, they pointed out another 
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Pakistani position, the highest in the area. Under canvas in the dead 
ground, an elder with henna-coloured side-burns, a grey beard and 
white fez sat on a charpoy and prodded a knarled finger towards me. 
‘For a hundred years they are not here. This is our territory’, he said 
and jutted his chin dismissively towards the Pakistani position. 
They had vehicles and heavy artillery and told us to agree for this 
territory to become Pakistan, in return for electricity, roads and bribes 
to elders. 
The Pakistanis had been here weeks earlier, before Mustafa Khan 
pushed them back. The old man pushed back his white fez and said: 
The local people take weapons against Pakistan, but elders (three 
maleks and one maulavi) take money plots in Hyattabad to capture 
Afghan territory. Why, after fifty years? 
Hyatabad was the Peshawar suburb where Afghan resistance leaders 
had built villas. He looked into my face as though somewhere in 
it some he would find some meaning that might enlighten him, 
possibly relating to the legacy of British history on the North-West 
Frontier. 
But I am Afghan and we’ll never sell our soil to Pakistan. If the Afghan 
government was stable, we should say to Pakistan that our territory 
goes all the way to Attock. 
Smacking the lap of his salwar, he added, ‘That’s part of Afghanistan 
and they should give it back!’194 
I wondered about Afghanistan stretching all the way beyond 
Peshawar again, even to Attock where the rushing waters of the 
River Indus severed the two lands of India and Central Asia: a 
natural and historical boundary. Attock was also the location of a 
fort, where Benazir Bhutto’s husband, Asif Zadari, was rumoured 
to be in prison on corruption charges. If the Afghans still believed 
their border lay 150 kilometres to the East, it was understandable 
that men like the old man would be angered to see Pakistani 
government forces pressing westwards over the Durand Line. And 
simultaneously Pakistan’s anxiety was understandable, for if the 
Afghans desire were met, the territory of Pakistan would effectively 
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be halved. The old man went on: 
There were Americans here, eighty to a hundred of them and twenty 
vehicles, one week before. They came several times to patrol, coming 
alongside the Pakistanis, bringing twenty helicopters and fifty tanks. I 
asked what they were doing and their Commander said, ‘the Pakistan 
Government told us that Mullah Omar is here so we’ve come to capture 
him’. But I told them there is no al Qaeda here and after several days 
they left.
He picked up the fold of his kameez and stretched it neatly across 
his lap.
The Pakistanis said, ‘We are searching for al Qaeda. But al Qaeda 
is only a good name! Anything you can do using name of al Qaeda! 
When Pakistanis came they said Americans invite us here to capture 
al Qaeda. I don’t know about politics, just that this is my soil and I 
will protect it! I am Afghan and will never sell my soil in exchange for 
anything!195 
Before we left, the old man asked if I would like to visit his house for 
tea so he could show me the skull of a British soldier killed by his 
grandfather. I declined politely. But wondered if the skull was a last 
vestige of the third Anglo-Afghan war. It was always a revelation 
to see how much these simple people were so conscious of their 
history; certainly far more so than Prime Minister Blair, who was 
about to commit the British to a major escalation of our post-2001 
role in the south, in Helmand. 
Back in Jalalabad, others reaffirmed that Pakistan was simply 
using the excuse of capturing al Qaeda as reason to take more 
territory from the Afghans. People were also furious that President 
Karzai didn’t react more strongly to such audacity. When Kabuli 
men had mobbed Pakistan’s embassy that summer, Karzai made a 
public apology to President Mussharaf and promised the culprits 
would be jailed. People questioned whether it was his weak hold 
over the country and lack of military capacity that had engendered 
such a limited response? Or, whether as leader only of a ‘transitional’ 
administration, without a remit to renegotiate borders, maybe he 
wasn’t in a position to challenge Pakistan’s interpretation of where 
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Durand’s fuzzy limits lie. An elder at Jalalabad’s Loya Jirga shura 
office told me:
This is a transitional government which can’t decide borders so the 
USA should keep the integrity of Afghanistan as we don’t have an 
army or government. Pakistan is cheating the US, telling them al 
Qaeda is on its borders.
Unknown to US generals, the Afghans and Pakistan were fighting 
an old battle. Days later, a UN officer based in Jalalabad admitted: 
To be honest I haven’t heard of al Qaeda or terrorist activities in that 
area and they haven’t captured a single terrorist.
Pakistan and the US were apparently undertaking a joint 
operation called ‘Combined Resolve’, aimed at controlling the tribal 
areas and hunting down al Qaeda. But during a meeting in the Kasr 
Palace, Jalalabad’s Governor Haji din Mohammad confirmed:
It is a problem. Pakistan has crossed the zero line in several places, 
by several kilometres. But the real issue is the Durand Line. Pakistan 
wants to use it as a negotiating tool. There is no al Qaeda in Mohmand 
area. This is a good excuse for the Pakistanis to come inside. They want 
territory. Talk about al Qaeda is just propaganda.
I went up the hill and past a road which CIA staff had blocked off, 
renamed and signboarded ‘Chocolate Alley’, because, the Afghans 
said, the CIA liked to hand out ‘chocolate’ to local children from 
there. Today I was visiting the tribal areas chief, a whippet-thin man 
named Faraydoon Mohmand, head of the Mohmand tribe. ‘Pakistan 
is using the name of al Qaeda for its own benefit; to get control of 
the land and to have money from the USA’, he told me in a room 
surrounded by sepia photos of him as a young military officer. The 
people of his area, the Mohmand tribe, had always supported the 
family of Jalalabad’s Governor Haji din Mohammad. 
So why should we support al Qaeda or the Taliban? This situation 
is creating a problem between Afghanistan and the USA, as they are 
bringing our enemies to this country. This is an issue of sovereignty, a 
national issue, but if the central government does not react, the tribes 
will take it into their own hands.
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***
The border dispute illustrated the twisted chicanery of complex 
relations between Afghanistan and its southern neighbour. Although 
the Durand issue lay at the root of the problem, following Pakistan’s 
annexation from India in 1947, this had metamorphosed into the 
‘Pashtunistan issue’. Both mirrored Pakistan’s insecurity about her 
existence. As Haq recognised, both had contributed to the festering 
sore at the heart of Pakistan’s 1980s strategic and regional policy. 
A sore which continues to emit venom, yet whose existence often 
seems invisible to those advocating a regional policy to dealing with 
Afghanistan’s problems today. The following paragraphs explain 
why the issue remains as toxic today as it was during the 1970s and 
80s, when Pakistan preferred to back biddable Afghan mujahideen 
leaders (such as Gulbuddin Hikmatyar ) whom they knew they 
could rely on to support Pakistan’s strategic interests. 
As Baryalai had explained, Afghanistan’s relationship with the 
Soviet Union really began after the ejection of the British and the 
1919 Treaty of Rawalpindi. It deepened following Partition and the 
emergence of Pakistan. Afghanistan and Pakistani relations were 
soured from the outset after the Afghans did not immediately 
‘recognise’ Pakistan as a new nation at a meeting of the UN in the 
early 1950s. 
Then came the inevitable disagreements over the independence 
of the Pashtun belt. For the Pashtun tribal areas of the North-West 
Frontier Province had enjoyed quasi-independent status in relation 
to British India since 1901. After Partition, Afghanistan hoped they 
would gain independence but instead some areas were subsumed 
into the newly created Pakistan, which then had to deal with 
tribal uprisings. In 1949, after the Pakistani air force responded to 
one such uprising with an air strike, the Afghans reneged on all 
previous treaties creating a frontier with British India, and pushed 
for the idea of an independent Pashtunistan, on the Pakistan side 
of the Durand Line.196 Pakistan responded furiously, cutting off 
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Afghanistan’s access to the Indian Ocean and blockading petroleum. 
The Afghan government was forced to sign a free trade and barter 
agreement with Mosco; in exchange for petrol, Afghans would 
provide wool and raw cotton and the Soviets began oil exploration 
in Northern Afghanistan. Relations between Afghanistan and the 
USSR deepened further when diplomatic ties with Pakistan were 
cut once again and the Pakistan-Afghan border was closed for two 
years until 1963.197 
During his tenure both as Foreign Secretary in the 1960s and 
President following the 1973 coup which deposed the former King, 
Afghanistan’s President Daoud had brought Afghanistan closer to 
the Soviets than to Pakistan. This relationship was the culmination 
of a long post-WWII balance between the USA and the Soviets, 
both of which had competed for influence in the country, often by 
undertaking aid projects.198 
During the early 1970s, Pakistan’s generals knew that Daoud, an 
Afghan nationalist with a devotion to the cause of a ‘Pashtunistan’ 
state, hoped the lands taken by the Durand Agreement would 
revert to Afghanistan. Naturally the generals had no wish to reopen 
a debate over claims for land potentially reaching the old British 
fort at Attock. 
It was for this strategic reason that Pakistan and the ISI preferred 
to back Islamist leaders, such as Gulbuddin Hikmatyar , during the 
jihad. The intention was to make Afghanistan an Islamic state and 
find a leader to serve their cause in Kabul. This would also assist 
in creating a bulwark of ‘strategic depth’ against India, the constant 
threat to the south. Hence Afghan nationalists like President Daoud 
and later Abdul Haq, men with an ideological following were a threat 
to the Generals. The Generals preferred leaders they could control 
with the pursestrings, men like Hikmatyar and Sayyaf. Hence the 
Generals used US dollars during the jihad to buy off Hikmatyar - for 
he could then be counted on to form a pro-Pakistan government in 
Kabul – and later, Sayyaf.199 Crucially, this would also obviate any 
need to renegotiate Durand and risk losing Pakistani territory. It was 
for this reason that, of all the seven mujahideen leaders, Hikmatyar 
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received some eighty percent of the overall funding given by the CIA 
to Pakistan for the purpose of running the Soviet jihad. And probably 
why Abdul Haq, who could not be ‘bought’ but spoke out against the 
policy was ridiculed and dubbed ‘Hollywood Haq’ by the ISI. 
At this point it is important to note that Abdul Haq, although 
an Afghan ‘nationalist’ was not a ‘Pashtun nationalist’. He was not 
pushing for an independent state of ‘Pashtunistan’. This was ironic, 
given the way he was treated by the ISI, as he was not a threat to 
Pakistan.
Abdul Haq was one of the few Afghan Resistance leaders who 
recognised how the twin unresolved issues of ‘Pashtunistan’ and 
‘Durand’ lay at the heart of Pakistani politicking over Afghanistan. 
He understood how the two could have devastating consequences 
for Afghanistan and eventually global security. During the post-
September 11 American-backed hunt for bin Laden, both issues 
were being resurrected. However, President Mussharaff also now 
faced a growth in support for the Islamic fundamentalist coalition 
Islamist Mutahed-e-majlis-amal (MMA), which won elections in 
2003 in the NWFP. So not only was Mussharaf’s military regime 
having to balance his position as an ally of the US in its Afghan 
‘War on Terror’ with his pro-Islamist Generals and the ISI, but now 
he faced a resurgence of radicals in his midst. Some thought this a 
good reason for Mussharaf’s crackdown on Pakistan’s tribal areas. 
‘They’re not exactly his best friends’, said the UN spokeswoman, 
referring to the MMA.
Still, in the summer of 2003, Pashtuns like Haji Zahir felt Pakistan 
was not just using al Qaeda as an excuse (at least in Nangarhar 
Province) to take control over the unruly tribal areas and leveraging 
off the ignorance of the foreigners. No, Pashtuns like Haji Zahir knew 
in their blood that Pakistan was using al Qaeda here as an excuse to 
gain Afghan territory as a bargaining chip to press Kabul to close the 
debate on Durand. President Mussharaf, in a gibe at Karzai over his 
lack of control over outlying areas, called him ‘Governor of Kabul’.200 
Yet the irony was that, while fighting Zahir’s men over checkpoints 
in Afghanistan’s eastern territory, Pakistan was apparently turning 
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a blind eye to the regrouping and training of hundreds of Taliban 
on Afghanistan’s southern border in the Baluchistan triangle near 
Quetta. A regrouping that didn’t even have the excuse of being in 
tribal areas beyond the Pakistan government’s writ.201 
***
By late 2003, it was apparent that the ‘real’ war against al Qaeda as 
well as the search for bin Laden, now almost a mythical character, 
was happening further south along the border, in a hostile place 
closer to Quetta called Waziristan. By Spring this was known as 
a new ‘jihadi highway’ where Chechens, Arabs and Pakistanis 
flocked to fight jihad. After almost three years, the US didn’t seem 
to be making any headway in finding Osama, despite indication in 
spring 2004 from the US military that bin laden would ‘definitely 
be caught’ by that Autumn. US intelligence agencies still seemed 
so convinced that Pakistan really was their unalloyed ally that they 
were caught off guard in October 2003. Time magazine described an 
incident where the Pakistani military, supposedly fighting on the 
border in tandem with American troops, actually opened fire on the 
Americans.202 
If US Commanders had studied British history in the area they 
would have seen tremendous parallels between their own attempts 
post-September 11 to stem an insurgency and find bin Laden and 
the story of two other Holy Men who had caused trouble: Mullah 
Powindah in 1894, and then, during the 1930s, the Fakir of Ipi. 
Following the Durand Agreement of 1893, the Pashtun tribes east 
of the Durand became more turbulent in opposition to the British 
who were then ruling India. Increasingly, a feeling of nationalism 
began to replace ethnic and tribal loyalties. Waziristan was one of 
the most problematic areas, along the border, a place where ‘people 
were as unyielding as the rocks that covered the landscape’.203 
The story of ‘The Fakir of Ipi’ began on a summer day in 1936 
when a Waziri tribesman entered the district town of Bannu in the 
Province of Waziristan. There, he was captivated by the wife of a 
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Hindu merchant. Taking her with him, he brought her back across 
the administrative border and married her in a Muslim ceremony. 
When her original husband brought the case to court on a charge 
of kidnap, the case of Chand Bibi, as she had chosen to be called, 
took on the significance of ‘a pretty face that moved, not a thousand 
ships like Helen of Troy, but at least two British divisions’.204
The verdict came down in the Hindu’s favour and Muslim 
tribesmen smouldered over what they saw as an affront to their 
version of Muslim law. 
Several thousand Wazirs ambushed the Indian Army’s Bannu brigade, 
killing and mutilating 130 officers and men and making off with a 
bumper crop of rifles and ammunition. 
The whole episode may have quietened down but for the Fakir of 
Ipi, a priestly Wazir who for years had gone quietly about his holy 
duties without attracting much notice. It was only with the Chand 
Bibi case that the Fakir’s unassuming exterior was exposed to show 
how beneath there ‘bubbled a hatred for the unbeliever certifiable 
in its intensity’. Using the name ‘Islam Bibi’ as a rallying cry, the 
Fakir showed himself to ‘possess the skills of a Field Marshall and 
enough rabble rousing charisma to mobilise a tribal army’.205
The Fakir of Ipi, who was named Haji Mirza Ali Khan, headed 
up a group of Mullahs and managed to stir up rebellion amongst 
the Madda Khel and Tori Khel section of the Waziris. When British 
troops arrived they came: 
… festooned with automatic weapons, girdled with field guns and 
howitzers, chaperoned by flotillas of tanks and armoured cars, shaded 
by the umbrella of the Royal Air Force.206 
Nevertheless the British were forced to send three Divisions into 
action and, by the time an uneasy peace was made in 1937, had 
suffered over a thousand casualties. The debacle of the Fakir of Ipi 
had cost the British some £50 million (no small sum in 1937) and led 
to the deployment of fifty thousand British and Indian troops. 
Despite their superior firepower, the British found the tribesmen, 
who were now armed with long range rifles, more mobile and 
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tribal fighting very difficult. The Fakir of Ipi was never caught and 
remained safe near the Afghan border at Shawal. From there he 
remained a thorn in the side of the British, and later Pakistan, until 
his death in 1959.207 
In his book on the Fakir of Ipi, Warren said; ‘The attempt to 
pacify Waziristan had been the last of several major incursions into 
tribal territory during the hundred years of Britain’s presence in 
North West India. On each occasion the tribes and the mountains 
won a strategic victory. The Waziri Campaign was eventually called 
a ‘school for soldiering’ by Sir W Barton.
Like the incursions fought by the British in the 1930s, by 2003 
it was already apparent that the coalition too were caught up in a 
similar game in which the Pathans, with their superior knowledge 
of the mountains, hatred of the infidel and guerrilla skills, would 
ultimately win. And Pakistan, having already received some $3 
billion USD in military aid from the US, was benefiting too. 
There were other similarities between the Fakir of Ipi’s insurgency 
and that which began to put itself on the radar in 2004. As with al 
Qaeda and bin Laden, part of the strength lying behind the Fakir’s 
motivation was his faith in the ideal of a Muslim society: 
The extent to which Islamic fundamentalism lay at the core of the 
Fakir of Ipi’s motivations is only too apparent. He desired a status 
quo in which muslims lived beyond the interference of a western style 
administration directed by non muslims.208
And as with bin Laden:
It is commonly believed that anyone who gives information about 
him or about those who go to see him will be instantly struck blind. 
All illness and misfortune seem to be attributed to his displeasure. 
Not a single malik, tappa or lambarder has come forward voluntarily, 
with any information.
This was possibly due to the close-knit nature of Pashtun society, 
and in particular its emphasis on Pashtunwali, the Pashtun code 
which values hospitality and looking after ones guest. 
The insurgency along the border in Waziristan, as well as by 
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2004 throughout southern Afghanistan, was clearly a war furnished 
by a varying concoction of forces. Pakistan’s policy of apparently 
denying support to the Taliban while simultaneously allowing 
them to regroup on Pakistani territory outside Quetta and giving 
shelter to their fighters, increasingly caused people to accuse them 
of ‘implausible denial’.209 
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
A PERSPECTIVE ON BRITISH POST-SEPTEMBER 11  
STRATEGY AND INTELLIGENCE:  
THE UK HAQ EFFORT (PART I)
London, September 2003 
Back in London that September, I decided to find out about the 
ethereal Englishman Ritchie had tried to link me with at first: Sir 
John Wellesley Gunston. The Afghans had often asked me, ‘Do you 
know John Gunston? He was at Tora Bora …’ or ‘He’s working for 
MI6’. The irony was that, rather than working for MI6, I would 
find Gunston to be very critical, not simply of MI6 but of many 
of the most celebrated figures of the British military, intelligence 
and political establishment when it came to the post-September 11 
‘Afghan policy’.
I found him referred to in Kaplan’s book: 
The two were introduced to each other in the lobby at Greens hotel. 
Haq listened silently as Gunston related his experiences (with 
Hikmatyar and Massoud) giving names, dates and descriptions of 
various weapons and battle formations in the clipped, technical style 
of an army officer. He talked about how the Soviets used transport 
aircraft to provide battlefield illumination during night engagements. 
He went on to describe the actual configurations of the flares. Unlike the 
other journalists, Gunston was able to judge the fighting ability of the  
mujahidin as a military professional and was quite direct in his critic-
isms. ‘You have a very good memory’, Haq told him somewhat cryptically.  
‘Get in touch with me if you want to make more trips inside’.215 
Later Kaplan describes Haq organising a clandestine visit to Kabul 
for Gunston in 1988.
Something no other western journalist had done with the Mujahidin 
since 1985. Haq told Gunston not only that he could get him into 
Kabul but that he could also arrange meetings for him there with the 
regime’s army officers and KHAD agents who were secretly working 
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for the mujahidin. ‘I know you wont crack up and tell everything if 
you”re caught’, Haq told him. Gunston swore it was the first time in 
his life he was humbled.216 
For someone who had been accused of operating furtively, he wasn’t 
hard to find in the London phone directory. ‘Yes, I know who you 
are, I’ve been reading you in The Telegraph. Good stuff!’ a boyish 
voice said generously. 
When I said I was interested in writing about Abdul Haq, he said: 
You’re onto a good one! He was a great guy and the only hope for a 
decent solution post-September 11. He called me and asked me to meet 
him in Rome in Sept 2001 where he was working with the King. He had 
loads of resistance leaders who paid their own way to join him, from 
Farah and Hazarajat to Nangarhar. They looked for an Afghan solution 
and an ethical representation. It is quite exceptional for it to come from 
a Pashtun. Actually he was more of an Afghan than a Pashtun. 
He suggested I meet with him so that he could furnish me with 
news cuttings and maps. And soon I rang the doorbell of a Victorian 
house by the River Thames. There was a voice through the intercom, 
the door was buzzed open and I was alone in a library style room 
with polished parquet flooring. Each wall was lined with leather-
bound, gilt-embellished antiquarian books. At the far end, a TV 
and stainless steel kitchen area. Presently, the thump of feet could 
be heard coming down wooden steps. A man with floppy brown 
hair tumbled into the room. He was dressed in cords and a Viyella 
checked shirt in the English ‘country’ style. 
‘I was leaving for Dubai and then the east’, he smiled. ‘So you 
just caught me’. He was off to Kabul to try to ‘get the Pashtuns to 
work together’ in a Pashtun jirga initiative. It seemed a good idea, 
particularly as even now, in late 2003, there was still no Taliban 
reconciliation initiative. He gestured me towards a leather sofa as 
he made coffee, talking enthusiastically. 
They’re a great family but not all knights. Haji Qadir was a playboy. 
Well, he lived that element. Yet he was the old order, whereas Haq was 
the new order.
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‘Old order?’ I asked. ‘Well, Qadir liked to have his potentate around 
him. He was a great guy’. His view resembled the picture Kaplan 
had painted of Qadir: a sort of medieval knight upon whose arrival 
in a village during the jihad would prompt a huge feast with the local 
goat being slaughtered. Gunston told me he was Qadir’s advisor at 
Bonn, that he had advised him how to deal with the Brits and the 
US. Qadir had asked him to go to Tora Bora with his son Zahir. 
Haq was of course dead by the time the Bonn Conference took 
place. Gunston spoke about Tora Bora: 
At one stage we almost went to war with Hazerat Ali. Dear old Zahir 
is like Abdul in the early days but has his father’s temper. I see him 
as ‘the Hope’. 
As we spoke, he occasionally quoted from Afghan history books, 
asking if I had read this or that, pulling books from the shelves, 
fingering their pages. Gunston went on: 
A lot of people decried Abdul as they owed allegiance to other 
Commanders or groups. By this I mean Western journalists who went 
‘in’. But it depended who you were with. During the war it was easy 
to become partisan. 
‘So why was he so unpopular with the Americans?’ I asked.
Certainly people like Beardon would call him ‘Hollywood Haq’. It was 
clear that the guys they [the CIA] liked were the ones who would take 
orders from them or the Pakistanis. But Abdul had difficulties with the 
Pakistanis who’d ask him to carry out murderous operations. 
He waited for me to catch up. 
Look, Afghanistan today is teetering on a knife edge. The US has inher-
ently destabilised the natural order of power amongst the ethnic races. 
His voice was measured and as he spoke I glanced up at his shelves 
to see, rather auspiciously, a leather volume of Belous’ The Tribes 
of Afghanistan sitting adjacent to Ludwig Adamec’s History of 
Afghanistan. The leather-bound scarlet and gold volumes indicated 
an appreciation, at least, of books. The historical references he 
peppered into every anecdote demonstrated not only his voracious 
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appetite for reading, but also his interest in history. Unlike the 
British Ambassador I’d met in Kabul, a man who − despite enjoying 
the grandeur of life in Curzon’s Embassy with its huge retinue of 
staff − did not seem as interested in books about Afghan history as I 
felt he should have been. Gunston continued at full pelt, as though 
unburdening himself. 
OK, so initially they didn’t care. A CIA guy even said to me, ‘We’re 
here to kill ragheads and you’re trying to sell us a stable Afghanistan. 
We don’t care, we’re here for payback!’ And that was in October 2001! 
I recalled how, only months earlier during a late night discussion 
in Islamabad, an American diplomat who was friendly with a girl 
I’d known had commented savagely, ‘We’re not here for nation 
building. That’s bullshit. We’re here for revenge’. I repeated this to 
Gunston, who commented dryly.
So this guy understood. But the British, I’m afraid to say, compounded 
the error. They supported the US without a sense of our history and 
experience in Afghanistan. 
He put down his glass, ‘And do you want to know why?’ I struggled 
to pull out another notebook, nodding. 
Well, firstly, in September 2001, the guys dealing with Afghanistan − 
I was asked to brief an anti- terror branch of the MOD who briefed 
the PM – well these guys, they just quoted from the Ashdown article 
which, incidentally, was written by a mate of mine.217 
He broke off laughing. I’d read the article, the only piece of journalism 
written after September 11 that seemed to understand the nuances 
inherent to the Afghan problem. Gunston was now relaxed enough 
to be pretty direct.
So I went in to brief ‘Six’. It was amazing. Their knowledge was zero. 
They knew about the Falls Road,218 but that was about it! 
I leant forward. 
From ’95 or ’96 onwards, MI6 scaled down their interest. Our MI6 
people were basically ‘let go’. Just as the Taliban took power in ’96. 
So they were left with a twenty-three year old running the Islamabad 
office! And as you know that meant not just Pakistan but Afghanistan 
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too was run from there. It was outrageous!
I had known many of the embassy staff in Islamabad. Most were 
in their early twenties, some working as spies but masquerading 
as diplomats. Often in their first or second job abroad and with 
a penchant for meeting up with their British chums on Sunday 
afternoons for group DVD sessions or curries at the Marriott. 
Gunston continued:
 Since September 11, the US has gone in all guns blazing and 
created a government that has alienated forty-five percent of 
the Afghan population. It cannot work. Initially the US didn’t 
understand there were ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Pashtuns. It was like, 
they wear turbans so they’re all just ‘ragheads’!
He shook his head. 
The problem is the international community don’t understand 
that the Taliban is a stratified group, made of different supporters − 
hardliners, religious zealots and nutcases − but subordinated by al 
Qaeda and their money. Many decent Afghan nationalists supported 
the movement because the Taliban brought back law and order. The 
majority wanted stability, peace and prosperity. Not the Arabisation of 
the government.
‘Is that why did Haq opposed the bombing campaign?’ I asked.
Haq’s fear over the bombing was that they’d alienate forty-five 
percent − i.e. the single largest entity − of the population. The Brits 
should have known but were inherently foolish-minded in September 
2001. Instead, they and the Americans just identified Afghans they 
could do business with − Karzai and Zaman − dismissing Abdul as 
‘Hollywood Haq’ who spoke large but didn’t deliver. The reason? It’s 
a label that goes back to ISI and the 1980s when ISI considered Haq too 
‘independent’ to give weapons to. They preferred to work only with 
people who’d do their bidding. 
‘Did you witness Haq’s “independence” yourself?’ I asked.
I spent two years ‘inside’ on twenty-four trips between ’83 and ’89. 
And also spent time with Hikmatyar’s group, Massoud and NIFA and 
can tell you that Haq was the most significant commander in the Kabul 
area during the Soviet war. Despite not having the resources he needed 
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due to problems with the ISI. He was against the big show operations 
with no material benefit and possible collateral damage. So not ISI’s 
favourite. Plus of course they disliked the fact he was eloquent with 
the press and criticised the CIA’s unquestioning support for running 
the Afghan war through the ISI. That’s what came back to haunt him 
during September ’01.
He then suggested we go up to his office where he could copy me 
some of the news pieces relating to Haq from the time of the jihad 
and then September 11. He also gave me some photos taken by 
himself as a young freelancer during the jihad. As he pulled them 
out of drawers he annotated verbally the operations to which each 
picture related. There were many of Afghan mujahideen carrying 
RPGs and machine guns, stalking behind rocks. Also, news cuttings 
and photos, some of Abdul Haq, dating from the 1980s. When we 
returned to the ground floor he said: 
At time of his death, Private Eye published a small piece saying he was 
a ‘murderous terrorist’ and responsible for planting bombs in 1984 
killing eight or nine people . But I was with him then and no such 
operation took place. 
He pulled it out and I read. The piece began with a sarcastic take 
on some of the things journalists who had known Haq had written 
about him, and went on:
In a war where few have emerged in glory, Abdul Haq was one of the 
good guys’. 
And so said every leader writer, too: the death of this decent and 
civilised chap, they agreed, was a ‘severe blow’ to the war against 
terrorism.
But, as we pointed out in the last Eye, Abdul Haq was himself a 
terrorist. He took pride in having planted a bomb at Kabul airport 
in 1984 which killed 28 people – most of them schoolchildren. In an 
interview a couple of years later he was asked if he had any qualms 
about killing civilians and children, “I don’t care”, he replied, showing 
the charm which so enraptured hacks like Bruce Anderson. 
Like so many erstwhile terrorists, Haq managed to reinvent himself as 
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a “moderate” and a “peacemaker” – so successfully that his murderous 
exploits were entirely omitted from every single obituary.
Gunston interjected:
Of course the piece in the Eye was conveniently unattributed.  
A dirty tricks smear. Probably because I had pressure put on the 
intelligence services in October 2001 to support Abdul so when 
he died it was in their interest to diminish him. 
As I digested the enormity of this, he said: 
Look, you see the manner of his death spelt out his value. And that 
wasn’t all. In December 2001, the Daily Telegraph said MI6 were 
responsible for the fall of Kabul, Jalalabad and Ghazni. Nonsense! 
They were simply taking credit where it wasn’t due. In fact, din 
Mohammad asked me to get help from ‘Six’ to pay for buses to get 
their people to Jalalabad from Peshawar. He also asked for them to 
stop bombing the villages and killing their people. I told MI6, ‘You 
guys have a window of opportunity to support Haji din Mohammad 
and be part of it’. But they didn’t call him. 
Baryalai and Ritchie’s assertions about Gunston working for MI6 
now looked pretty weak. Even so there was an air of privacy, even 
secrecy around him. Over the following months I visited him several 
times and he was always very forthright about Haq, but clearly had 
‘other projects’ going on. 
He furnished me with documentation about Abdul Haq’s plan 
for toppling the Taliban. And told me that a former head of the 
Special Boat Service (SBS), Major ‘RAM’ Seeger,219 had accompanied 
Gunston to Haq’s Peshawar office during October 2001. Seeger’s 
job was to put the plan devised by Abdul Haq into an intelligible 
format, so that those in the UK220 with the potential to assist would 
understand the dynamics. 
The documents included situation reports (hereafter ‘sitrep’) from 
the period from September to October 2001. Some of these, Gunston 
told me, had been passed to the SIS. There was also a fax addressed 
to General Lord Guthrie (see Appendix III) briefing notes on Haq and 
the various Commanders (Taliban and otherwise) who had pledged 
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support, various summaries of the plan, notes on the requirements 
for money, arms, transport and so on, as well as updates. 
But it was a neatly typed-up sitrep marked 3 October 2001 (see 
Appendix IV) that first caught my attention. I later realised this 
had been typed by RAM Seeger, whom Gunston had been working 
alongside together with an ex-marine named Ken Guest, in an 
attempt to secure support for the Haq strategy in the immediate 
aftermath of September 11. I will come to Seeger and Guest’s 
perspective in a later chapter. 
The sitrep dated 3 October was numbered with points one to 
twenty-four it was an outline of the reasoning for the Haq option 
strategy. 3 October was of course still four days before the US-led 
coalition began its bombing campaign of Afghanistan. When the 
sitrep was typed up, Haq would not have known that the bombing 
would begin so imminently, hence perhaps the sitrep was more 
hopeful of success than it would have been had this information 
been known then. Nevertheless in the introduction, the sitrep 
said that the plan was dependent on the charisma, reputation and 
pledges of support from Taliban commanders and could unravel 
through lack of material support but that the critical effect would be 
the actions of the US and its allies. By this, I took the point to mean, 
a bombing campaign. 
The second point was about the ‘prizes to be gained from a 
successful outcome’ (i.e. of Haq’s strategy). This would include a 
‘relatively bloodless overthrow’ of the Taliban, the capture of Kabul 
by Pashtuns, isolation of al Qaeda, an ‘acceptable broad based-
government of all ethnic groups’, and, as a result of all the above, a 
‘terrorist-free’ Afghanistan. 
The sitrep explained how Haq’s plan was mostly dependent on 
large-scale Taliban defections, which they believed were possible, 
particularly because some ‘major players’ had apparently pledged 
support and the regime − as I had seen myself even in Kandahar 
− was unpopular, not least because the Pashtuns were fed up with 
hosting al Qaida’s Arabs. The fifth point explained the importance 
of not having a US-backed Northern Alliance capture Kabul and 
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impose a ‘Tajik dominated government on the country’ which 
would of course ‘not be acceptable to the Pashtun majority’ who 
were then likely to rally to the Taliban, thus prolonging the civil 
conflict and strengthening al Qaeda. This of course, is exactly what 
the US-led coalition had done! In recognition of the difficulty of 
having the Northern Alliance take Kabul, the sitrep thus proposed 
a Pashtun counterweight to the Northern Alliance to ensure a better 
distribution of ethnic power, and to increase the likelihood of the 
evolution of a more widely acceptable government. This point was 
underlined with reference to the civilian population’s memory of 
recent Northern Alliance atrocities committed in Kabul during 
the early 1990s. The sitrep floated the idea that al Qaeda (and by 
implication, the Taliban) was more likely to lose legitimacy in the 
longer term if the government was overthrown peacefully. 
Under the heading ‘Outline Plan’, the sitrep went on –in the 
sixth point – to say that Haq’s plan was to cross the border with 
two small hardcore groups of around two hundred ‘lightly armed 
mujahideen’ because:
… any larger initial group would arouse attention and provoke 
Pakistani interference. Once safely across the border, ‘these groups 
would be quickly increased by groups of volunteers travelling 
independently from Pakistan or areas inside Afghanistan. The first of 
Haq’s groups would start from the Mohmand tribal territories and 
after crossing into the Kunar valley converge on Jalalabad. The second 
group would start from Terrimangul and head for Teezine and Sorobi 
which are Haq’s tribal homelands and from which he is confident he 
could draw much popular support. Large scale defections would be 
expected as soon as the Taliban units were approached or confronted. 
Pledged defections by Jalalabad commanders would ensure the capture 
of this town and access to heavy weaponry (tanks and artillery) and 
uniformed soldiers. Areas of arab resistance would be bypassed. 
Reading this, I remembered the campaigns Haji Zahir had described, 
particularly his return to Jalalabad after exile in Iran post-September 
11. Then, he had described coming into Afghanistan with a small 
column of followers. As they had marched they had called up 
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previously forewarned commanders who had fought with the 
family during the jihad. These commanders would then mobilise 
foot soldiers, who would join Zahir and his men. By the time the 
column reached Jalalabad, it would be many thousands strong. The 
foot soldiers came from the tribes along the route, from Shinwar, 
Mohmand, Kunar and as far away as Nuristan, where the men wore 
pancake shaped pakhals. 
The seventh point of the sitrep added that simultaneous to 
the advances from the East would be: ‘two uprisings from within 
Afghanistan – the area north west of Ghazni (Wardak) and the area 
south of Ghazni but north of Kandahar’. Presumably these would 
have been orchestrated by commanders who still retained loyalty 
to Haq due to their history of fighting together during the jihad. 
Many of these commanders were apparently now embedded with 
the Taliban. 
The eighth point stressed that once begun, Haq estimated his 
plan could be over within three weeks. He would begin his plan 
on his home ground, at Tera Mangal/Teezin. Terrimangal lay to the 
north-west of Jalalabad and was where the family had originally 
come from, centuries before. The elders there retained loyalty due 
to this historical link. Haq must have followed this plan, because 
‘Terrimangal’ (also known as Tera Mangal’) was where he had been 
captured by the Arabs. 
The next section was titled ‘Afghan support for Haq’ and the 
ninth point:
It is not possible to gauge the actual and potential support for Haq 
with any certainty but the indications are that it is real. 
I reflected on my own experience of Jalalabad − with the number 
of elders and tribesmen I had seen coming to the compounds of the 
Arsala family, my visits to the Shinwar, the Mohmand and the borders, 
the weeping school girls at his shaheed and the reaction of people to 
the unpopular US-backed warlords − his support was real. 
The sitrep continued and the tenth point ten said: 
We have met and talked with two commanders from the areas around 
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Ghazni: Mullah Malang (renowned ex-DRA former mujahideen and 
more recently ex-Talib commander) and another commander from 
Wardak. We have also met and talked with two Talib commanders 
from Sorobi and Hisarak, the leader of the Mohmand border tribe and 
several other veteran mujahideen commanders. 
These areas mentioned were all critical crossroads and strategically 
important places in the Taliban/Pashtun heartland of the south.
I knew Mullah Malang from my visits with Baryalai and later, 
when I worked for the political side of the EU. Then my colleague 
− who was later expelled from Afghanistan in December 2006 
for apparently trying to ‘do deals’ with the Taliban - allegedly on 
behalf of MI6 − was already using Malang as his point of contact. 
During the anti-Soviet jihad, Malang had been renowned for his 
effective anti-Soviet operations around Kandahar.221 Critically to 
Haq’s plan though, one of Malang’s mujahideen during the jihad 
had included the young Mullah Omar. And with Malang’s other 
former commanders now apparently comprised Mullah Omar’s 
bodyguard. As Malang was a Talib who had recently defected, and 
was to have played a key role in Haq’s Solution, he was a pretty 
high value defection! 
Another possible ‘defector’ mentioned was a leader of the 
Mohmand tribe. He was also one of the people I visited whenever I 
travelled to Jalalabad. He was a true product of the frontier, yet bore 
an air of sophistication. Whenever I met with him we would discuss 
issues affecting his people and those in the region at large, e.g. the 
issue of Pakistani incursions over the Durand line, or whether the 
stories of the US spraying poppies were myth or fantasy. He always 
told me of the problems in a most measured and intelligent way. 
The tenth point said that Haq was ‘acutely anxious of the need 
to get things right’.
He realises he has only one chance and as a consequence most of his 
efforts have gone into building alliances and establishing support. He 
is confident that he will attract more than enough men and that the 
problem may in fact lie in attracting too many. He is planning on a 
basic force of about 5000 volunteers, this being the largest practical 
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number he can control and supply. Defecting units of course would 
be additional to this. 
The next heading was titled ‘Outside Influences’ and the four sub-
headings beneath it were: ISI, the USA, al Qaeda and the Ex-King. 
Firstly, it said, Haq had: 
… recently been visited by the ISI and is currently meeting with 
them again in Islamabad. He describes their mood as nervous and 
uncertain. They have expressed the desire to let bygones be bygone 
and the view that the Taliban has no future. They have not however 
(as yet) committed themselves to any sort of concrete support. 
As I write this I realise that this is where Haq made his greatest 
strategic miscalculation. He knew himself that his history with ISI 
was one of distrust. Many had told me that the ISI were suspected 
of being behind the murder of Haq’s wife and small son in their 
Peshawar house in 1998. The reason cited for that was Haq’s genesis 
of an anti-Taliban plan. So why, I wondered, had he allowed himself 
to trust them this time? It was possible that he thought that - with 
the weight of an angry USA about to bear down on the region - 
that he and the Pakistanis might have joint strategic interests for 
Afghanistan? Certainly with the US led bombing campaign about 
to begin - setting the scene for a Northern Alliance takeover of 
Afghanistan - this joint strategic interest ought to have been a 
consideration for Pakistan.
The third ‘external influence’ mentioned in the sitrep was thus 
the USA. Since Haq’s death the Pakistan’s have, as I saw myself 
when I questioned the Pakistani Ambassador to Geneva,222 been 
behind rumours that he was supported by the CIA. Prior to his 
death, Ritchie told me, the CIA themselves had spread rumours that 
they were supporting him. The sitrep said: 
American Embassy personnel have visited Haq several times but 
according to him have not come up with anything concrete. Haq 
is worried that a deployment of American troops would result in 
increased support for the Taliban as Afghans closed ranks against 
the foreign invader. From what we have seen and heard we would 
support this view. At present the main foreign invader is Al Qaida 
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but this situation could change quickly. On the other hand, the threat 
of American action against the Taliban and Afghanistan weakens 
the government and encourages all moderate factions who want a 
peaceful Afghanistan to oppose them’. 
The last heading under ‘outside influences’ was ‘Al Qaida’ and here 
it said − somewhat presciently given bin Laden’s subsequent escape 
and disappearance − that al Qaeda had:
Purchased 15,000 camels and a large number of kochi [nomad] tents. This 
suggests that they are preparing for a long march through inhospitable 
terrain. Bin Laden has been reported to havevisited Jalalabad and has 
subsequently moved to Kandahar and is now believed to be hiding in 
the mountainous area north of Kandahar and west of the Ghazni road. 
The same Taliban source also quoted al Qaida members as saying that 
they had struck but one of ten planned targets. 
As to ‘freezing out’ al Qaeda, the sitrep added that: 
Mullah Malang expressed the view that if Haq was successful and 
the Taliban were overthrown, the arabs in al Qaida (less the obvious 
terrorists who would be arrested) would be invited to return to their 
own countries. NB. This would be the easiest course of action for a new 
Government to adopt but might not suit the USA. A possible quid pro 
quo for material assistance might be an undertaking not to do this. 
Why, I wondered, might this not suit the USA? Surely they might still 
have been able to capture some of these operatives once the tribal 
people made clear they were no longer welcome in Afghanistan?
Under the last heading of ‘The ex-King’, the report said that 
although the ex-King was still ‘very acceptable as a figurehead for 
the creation of a new Afghanistan’, his family and followers, having 
no experience of the country, were not. I presumed this to mean that 
Haq wanted the ex-King for the purposes of putting in place his 
‘structure’ and the relevance of the ex-King was to secure this as the 
‘umbrella’ or glue for a multi-ethnic accord. This was reiterated by 
the next point which said:
Haq intends to run his operation in the King’s name for the cause of a 
united and peaceful Afghanistan. He does not wish to adopt a special 
name or cause specific to his efforts. 
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A heading entitled ‘Difficulties and Dangers’ indicated what the 
weak points might be and said:
Haq’s operation will be running on borrowed money and a shoestring 
and very dependent on the resources he captures and / or are handed 
over to him by defectors. The uncertainty of this reliance is aggravated 
by the needs of his plan for speed, momentum and co-ordination. 
The dangers are that lack of transport and radios will result in poor 
coordination and delay. His men will also expect to be fed and clothed. 
To a lesser extent they will also want to be paid and it is possible that 
much of his potential support will fall away when it is realised that he 
has no financial backing. 
As I re-read this point, I wonder how much coordination of 
knowledge there was between Gunston, Seeger and James Ritchie, 
who was, after all, apparently financing the operation. Could it be, 
I wondered, that the two groups trying to promote Abdul Haq and 
his plan had not been very coordinated in their commitment? It must 
be remembered though that both were private initiatives, although 
there is no indication that the British individuals were giving 
money themselves, but trying to secure political, and ultimately 
thus financial support. Time was also short. 
The next point recommended that in terms of civil administration 
in Jalalabad, Haq’s brother Haji Qadir would make a suitable 
provisional governor. As we know, he then was. But the British and 
Qadir had had their differences. It seems that their differences were 
so great that one has to wonder whether it was in their interests 
to have Qadir dead. Certainly the British ‘ally’ in Jalalabad, Haji 
Zaman, who was a long-term foe of the family, was thought by 
many Afghans to have been behind Qadir’s assassination. The 
sitrep finished with the following statement: 
Not to provide discrete support to Haq’s enterprise would seem to be 
needlessly risking the huge gains that could result from a successful 
outcome. The obvious needs are money, vehicles and radios and 
possibly some discrete specialist support (e.g. FACS and stand off fire 
support, signallers, advisers etc). 
Gunston told me that the Brits had offered to donate a grand total of 
‘four satellite phones’ to the Haq effort. 
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***
Gunston invited me for lunch at the Special Forces Club in 
Knightsbridge. Pictures of SOE agents lined the walls on the 
staircase. There was a desperately sad photograph of four-year-old 
Tania Szabo receiving the George Cross from the King on behalf of 
her dead mother, the renowned Violet Szabo. Some of the women 
whose pictures I was looking at had achieved extraordinary things 
during the Second World War, undertaking what was then called 
‘non-conventional warfare’. Yet an innocent-looking watercolour 
of a brick kiln had a particularly brutal resonance. Underneath a 
plaque explained how four SOE female agents had been burnt alive 
in it after their capture by the Gestapo. In the bar we ordered lunch.
Gunston told me that on a strategic level Haji din Mohammad 
had been coordinating the movement of people and tribes and 
dealing with Younus Khalis and his son.223 This had been important 
in ensuring a dissolution of the Taliban and the re-establishment 
of a new order. He was infuriated by the lack of support for din 
Mohammad by the British. ‘Yet they had the cheek to claim they 
were part of this’, he said, shaking his head. 
Kabul was a nonsense! The problem is that these so-called ‘spies’ 
report back to their political masters and therefore people say it must 
be true. It’s just like the politicisation of intelligence over the David 
Kelly affair. 
He asked the barman for ketchup and went on, telling me that 
General Guthrie had been used as emissary of Tony Blair. ‘But I 
told Guthrie to use Abdul, and said, “He has the ability to engineer 
the collapse of the Taliban”’. Guthrie had responded to Gunston’s 
request for help by saying that he was seeing Dearlove the following 
day and asking Gunston to send a fax. 
Dearlove was then Head of MI6. Gunston had sent him an 
outline of Haq’s plan, indicating who else had been briefed. When 
Dearlove wrote back to Guthrie he had apparently said, ‘I want to 
assure you that the PM is working hard for the good of Afghanistan 
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… We’re looking into it’. Gunston sighed.
It was a lost opportunity that should have been explained. But was 
denied as they’d already chosen Haji Zaman. Oh, and the Americans 
had chosen Karzai. 
I knew that was true. For I’d been staying at the Serena Hotel in 
Quetta in October 2001, while Karzai was still hiding out in the 
desert near Kandahar and the Newsweek correspondent asked if 
I wanted to accompany him to interview the Karzai brothers in 
Quetta. Gunston went on:
Plus of course there was an active element in the US who were 
denying Abdul. As for the British and MI6, well they chose Zaman 
and ignored Abdul, Haji Qadir and Haji Din Mohammad. 
The US ‘element’ which had ignored Abdul were, he told me, 
the CIA. 
A guy called Milt Beardon, CIA station chief in Islamabad from the  
mid 80s, leader of the group who ignored Abdul, calling him 
‘Hollywood Haq’. 
I’d seen Beardon being interviewed on the Haq documentary.224 
He’s still trying to undermine him. Yet Beardon basically ran his side 
of the war from Islamabad and a telephone connection to the ISI! 
Later, when I read parts of Beardon’s book,225 it seemed obvious 
to me he wanted to undermine Haq’s part in the Soviet war and 
particularly an operation which had turned the war in favour of the 
Afghans and the West: the blowing up of the Soviet army’s seven 
story underground munitions store at Qarga. 
Gunston said that Beardon ran Abdul Haq down ‘because of 
his outspoken criticism of CIA policy of working directly with 
the ISI’. He illustrated this with reference to ‘a very funny bit in 
Charlie Wilson’s War which showed ISI’s iron grip’. Abdul Haq, he 
said, had been intending to take Charlie Wilson − who was Chair 
of the US Government Appropriations Committee and responsible 
for having massively increased spending on the Soviet war − into 
Afghanistan. However, General Gul, ISI chief, himself cancelled the 
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visit, infuriating Wilson, who apparently shouted down the phone 
to Gul saying, ‘This is my war, I’m paying for it. And if I want to see 
it I damn well will!’226 
Changing the conversation, I asked Gunston if he knew who 
had killed Qadir? 
Fahim. But now the Panshiris say Zaman. Afghan history begins at 
the bazaar of the storytellers and then you have to wade through  
the conspiracy. 
I asked how he had become involved in the plan to support Haq 
and he said:
I briefed MOD and called Haq during the meeting. In August, my son 
and I had gone to meet Abdul Haq in Dubai and he said he’d be in 
Rome with his commanders on 19 September and asked me to come. 
He said, ‘I’ve been approached by Taliban elements and they want to 
work with me’. 
He paused, looking out of the window. 
Look, to know why Abdul’s plan was significant, one has to 
understand that the Taliban are not a homogenous force. They’re made 
up of a slim majority of Arabists and hardliners. But most are decent 
Afghan nationalists. The bulk wanted peace after the mayhem of the 
Najibullah and Mujahideen time. And although Abdul was a patriot, 
he wasn’t a nationalist who was about to start causing problems for 
Pakistan over the Durand line. In this respect they were short sighted 
not to support him. 
Abdul had been approached by the [Taliban] Eastern Corps 
Commander, a man called Rocketti. Now Rocketti had been one of 
Abdul’s commanders during the jihad. He’d earned the name ‘Rocketti’ 
for his skill then in launching rockets. Yes, he’d had a chequered past, 
but now he was earnest in what he wanted. Like other Pashtuns there 
was concern, after September 11, about the return of Jamiat. 
You know, Massoud came as the ‘Lion of Panjshir’ and left as the ‘Lion 
of Kabul’. These guys took Kabul to the cleaners. With that memory 
in mind, not just the Taliban but decent Pashtuns wanted a Pashtun 
who’d bring peace. They wanted to turn their forces over to use against 
the remnants of the Arabs. 
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So Rocketti was ready to call it a day with the Taliban and move 
over behind Abdul and what had formerly been the Rome Process. 
Behind the King. To work for a multi-ethnic new order in Afghanistan. 
In mid-September 2001, Rocketti and the ‘Eastern Command’ and 
‘Three Division’ commanders in Kabul, as well as the Divisional 
Commanders in Hezarac, Gardez and Ghazni, told Abdul they were 
with him. These were all Taliban commanders who after September 
11 went to Peshawar, or sent Abdul word there, that they would turn 
over their divisions to him at the designated time. 
My eyes widened as Gunston went on: ‘Do you understand? He’d 
broken the back of the Taliban. Just look at the map!’ It was true. 
The places he’d mentioned − Ghazni, Gardez and Hezarac − were 
all former Taliban strongholds, lying in an arc throughout the 
southern part of the country. If the commanders running the show 
down there had already met with Haq and promised to come over 
to his side, then clearly they’d been persuaded by his view of the 
future. Not just that it was a better alternative to a Tajik-dominated 
government: these were discussions Haq had already begun years 
before with the Rome process. Gunston continued; 
I went to Peshawar and while I was there a Taliban minister came to 
meet Abdul and stayed two days. I don’t know who it was. Everything 
was secretive and they came during the night to avoid detection by the 
ISI. Another commander came from Maiden Shah. I went to Rome and 
met guys from Farah and Hazarajat. They were all with Haq’s plan. 
So, as with the Hazaras I’d met at Haq’s one year Shaheed service, it 
was obvious to me that other ethnic groups and not just Pashtuns 
were clearly with Haq’s plan. Gunston went on;
Abdul wanted the King to be the unifier to avoid ethnic clashes. Abdul 
was one of very few Afghans who could achieve this. A national figure, 
his credibility was intact not just because of his record as an effective 
commander against the Soviets but because he walked away in 1992. 
Even though he was Head of the Police then, he didn’t want to be 
involved in the civil war that took place as other commanders divided 
the spoils of Kabul between themselves. 
I knew from talking to Baryalai that Haq had been training the 
mujahideen gendarmerie. He had trained up his men in the tribal 
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areas and Pakistan and then waited on the outskirts of Kabul for the 
communist government of Najibullah to fall. When Kabul finally 
fell Haq had tried at first to bring order. But when other mujahideen 
leaders took up ministerial positions for themselves, allowing 
their soldiers and factions to loot and destroy the city, Haq had 
withdrawn, going first to Pakistan and then to Dubai where he set 
up an unsuccessful oil business. At the time he’d said to his family, 
‘I didn’t fight jihad against the Russians in order to do this to my 
people’. Gunston continued: 
I went to Rome then London and spoke to [Paddy] Ashdown who 
bought into Haq’s plan and agreed to push it. I then got in touch with 
MI6 chums and briefed people. They used names like Havelock and 
Grenfell and were rather ‘grammar school’. 
Gunston was moving into his element now. 
They [the MI6] didn’t understand what the hell was going on and 
got their information from CNN! I went to the FCO and spoke to the 
anti-terror and Afghan desks. The former was fascinated but they’d 
already chosen Zaman. The problem was the US was in the driving 
seat and the Brits had just handed them the keys. 
I knew this to be true from the angered frustration of my diplomat 
friend in Islamabad. After September 11 she had complained about 
how everything was being decided by the US. When the British 
Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, flew into Islamabad he went straight 
to the American Embassy for a breakfast meeting, before even being 
debriefed by his own FCO staff. The Americans made the decisions 
and the British just ‘toed the line’, she sniffed. Gunston said: 
The CIA had denigrated Abdul. Although the Northern Alliance 
gave the US direct access to Bagram and were into the Panjshir by 
September, it got so bad that even though the Brits visited Haji Qadir 
in Jabl Siraj, by the time Tora Bora happened they’d decided to ignore 
him completely. It was due to the Zaman issue. 
‘And the British support for Zaman?’ I asked. Gunston sighed.
Yes, Qadir was absolutely despondent. In London, MI6 just said, ‘OK, 
give us his number and we’ll call him if we’re interested’. They had no 
idea of the importance of ‘face’ in Afghanistan. You can’t talk to a man 
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like Qadir in such a way. I tried to explain to them that they should tell 
him, ‘Look, we’re busy but we’ll get to you when we can’. God, these 
MI6 guys, they were in their mid-20s and knew nothing! 
He overbit his lip and shook his head, rolling his eyes. 
So I took ‘RAM’ Seeger with me and we went to see Abdul in Peshawar. 
He had a plan with the idea of turning the four main vertebrae of the 
Taliban military axis; Jalalabad, Gardez, Ghazni and Kabul. It would 
have decapitated the Taliban military command overnight. 
I must have looked confused.
Look, Pashtun battles are done with the ‘big flag’ and a ‘loud drum’. 
But the ‘deal’ is actually done two nights before over green tea and 
nuts. Abdul needed to field a force and he had forces. After September 
11, his office was full of defectors, former mujahideen commanders 
he’d known when fighting the Soviets and tribal leaders. And he 
was in touch daily. There were lots of Taliban and former mujahideen  
in Pakistan. 
I imagined Haq seated behind the antique colonial desk in his office 
in Peshawar receiving these clandestine visitors. 
We emailed this initiative to the Brits and they got it. An MI6 man 
called William turned up in Islamabad from the UK. ‘RAM’ and I kept 
out of the way as he didn’t want to meet us. Abdul said to him, ‘I need 
to trust you that you are not working with Zaman’. You see Zaman 
had bought an office and claimed to the Brits he had 200 commanders. 
It was bullshit, he’d just arrived from France.
So, this was what the diplomat I knew had inferred during our 
dinner in London after September 11 when he had said that the 
plan was to use ‘Pashtun commanders’. But had no idea who Abdul 
Haq was. Why had British diplomats (and possibly intelligence 
operatives) not known who they were dealing with? There was no 
excuse for them not to know who Haq was. It cannot simply have 
been that, even as the bombs began falling, the British had already 
chosen their man: Haji Zaman. 
When I put this ‘Zaman possibility’ to Gunston, he looked at me 
and said: 
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Yet Abdul had this whole string of Taliban commanders plus senior 
Taliban ministers ready to defect, to move over to his side with very 
little fight. In these key Taliban cities of the south. 
He’d been trying to say to the West, ‘don’t bomb, or you’ll turn people 
against you’. What he really meant was that a bombing campaign 
would result in the soldiers he needed − i.e. the Afghan Taliban 
defectors − running back to their homes leaving al Qaeda manning 
the guns.227 Because it wasn’t al Qaeda he’d done the deals with, it 
was the moderate Afghan Talibs, i.e. the very men he’d fought with 
against the Soviets. Many of whom he’d actually commanded back in 
those days. He wanted to destroy the Taliban from within as he knew 
they were ready to collapse. 
This was the nub of everything; the reason Haq had begged Blair 
and Bush not to bomb Afghanistan. Because, as a Talib colleague 
from my days in Kandahar had told me before September 11, even in 
Kandahar, the Taliban’s ideological base, people had begun breaking 
Taliban edicts like watching their TV sets. Why? Because many of the 
more fanatical Taliban were not even Afghan, but Pakistani. I myself 
had witnessed peoples’ contempt for the Arabs when, during my 
work there in Summer 2000, I had made a trip to Kandahar’s ‘Gen’ral 
Post Office’ to make a phone call to London. My driver, himself a 
former jihadi commander, had been asked who I was by one of these 
men. He then told me questions were being asked by ‘Arabs’ about 
the fair-haired foreigner (albeit I was wearing a chador). When I asked 
my driver how he knew the man was not Afghan he sneered, ‘By 
the way he spoke’. He added contemptuously, ‘We don’t want these 
people here, they’re not Afghan’. 
For these reasons I had guessed that the movement was brittle, 
waiting for the final strain that would cause it to snap. Abdul 
Haq had understood this and was trying to say so. Later on Haq’s 
Paghman based Commander, Khan Mir, who, after September 11, 
who was ‘embedded’ with the Taliban’s interior Ministry, himself 
in Command of some eight hundred men would reiterate to me 
the importance for Haq’s strategy of the West ‘not’ beginning a 
bombing campaign.228 
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Gunston continued, exasperated. 
Now, instead of a multi-ethnic democratic government, we 
have an ethnic imbalance and a return to warlords! Most of 
us working in Afghanistan knew the Taliban had overrun the 
country easily during the early 1990s, because people were fed 
up with the infighting and corruption of the warlords. 
It’s crazy you have this today, yet in Rome229 there were Pashtuns, 
Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazara leaders. They were all ready to buy 
into the process. All these guys were ready to work under the 
King’s banner for an ethnically balanced Afghanistan. Now you 
have the Panjshir nonsense in Kabul. 
He sighed. 
I saw Guthrie and the Tories but they were useless. I met Ancram, Hugo 
Swire, IDS [Ian Duncan Smith] etc, but the Tories were already giving 
uncritical support to the government and the US. The Americans had 
of course ‘bought them off’ by allowing IDS to meet Bush, which he 
was so chuffed about. So, when I briefed them, they weren’t interested 
as it would have been seen as being critical. IDS said to me, ‘What 
shall I do?’ I said, ‘Can you get this info out to the people who matter 
and can help?’ 
I briefed Guthrie, Sir Colin McColl, the Tories and Paddy Ashdown 
(who was dealing with both MI6 and the PM). Lord Cranborne was 
the first to come back. He said, ‘People don’t believe he’s got the ability 
and wherewithal’. 
Then Gunston said in a low voice: 
Cranborne, you have to remember was close to the Labour party as 
he did the ‘deal’ with Blair to keep some of the Lords when Blair was 
disbanding the House of Lords. 
Abdul wanted to go in [to Afghanistan] under the King’s flag, as the 
honest broker. Not as a Pashtun nationalist or as a Khalis commander,230 
but as an Afghan for the Afghans. He wrote up a plan; how much it 
would cost to field a force of 500-1000 men with radios and transport 
and guns and bullets.231 You could buy those and RPGs on the frontier. 
The cost was minimal; three to five million USD. That would have 
been enough to allow his former commander, Rocketti, to bring in the 
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Eastern Taliban forces and allow the collapse of Kabul and Ghazni. 
Gardez would have gone too. Because there was a real fear in Kabul 
of Tajik retaliation. Just look at the ’95 to ‘96 Panjshir excess and the 
killings of Hazaras. There was a real memory of this and a fear. The 
US finally understood this by October and told the Northern Alliance 
not to take Kabul. But it was too late. 
I remembered US and British Embassy staff complaining at meetings 
I’d attended in January 2002 how Sayyaff had all his guns pointed 
on Kabul from Paghman, even months after the City fell. Gunston 
continued: 
In August 2001, Abdul met Commander Massoud in Tajikistan. He 
wanted to get him on side with his plan and did. Yet later, when the 
Brits were given a copy of it they chose to ignore it. Ultimately they 
just offered four satellite phones! But the window of opportunity was 
closing as the bombing was about to start. That was the real issue. 
Afghanistan and the temper of the Taliban and those who’d defected 
to Abdul and the King’s side would change overnight. To understand 
why, one only has to remember Churchill’s quote from the Malakand 
Campaign, 1898: ‘Khan assails Khan, valley against valley, but all will 
unite against the foreigner’. 
So, if you start throwing bombs into a country everything will change 
overnight. Particularly in a place like Afghanistan, which is only a 
geographical space, not really a country! 
I remembered first reading about Haq in the London Evening 
Standard, when he was begging Blair and Bush not to begin bombing 
Afghanistan, to give him time first to put his plan in place first. 
Gunston had set out the reasoning for avoiding bombing in a fax 
(see Appendice III). He proffered it and I saw that it was addressed 
to ‘General Lord Guthrie’ and dated 13 October 2001. 
The first page detailed the names and dates of contacts he and 
Seeger had had with British MOD, SIS and FCO in London and 
Peshawar. The last contact was 11 October 2001 and Gunston noted, 
‘call Michael Havelock, SIS, to say that we have returned (from 
Peshawar). Call as yet unreturned’. This note seemed to sum up the 
brush offs Gunston and Seeger were met with and in an effort to 
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make light of this Gunston commented to Guthrie. 
This reluctance is probably for good operational reasons unknown to 
ourselves. Our concern is based on many years of experience working 
with the Mujahideen when fighting the Soviets, and the civil war that 
followed. This has led us to believe that there are no other credible 
Pashtun fighting commanders who can galvanise the many Pashtun 
tribes to rise up against the Taliban than Abdul Haq. Therefore we 
believe it is our duty to bring our concerns to your attention and those 
who may have a need to know.
He then proposed what he called ‘The Solution’: four major points 
aimed at ‘achieving a terrorist free Afghanistan’. Firstly, the solution 
must be ‘achieved from within by Afghans’. 
This would be the quickest, least damaging, least controversial and 
most long-lasting solution for achieving a terrorist free Afghanistan. 
Gunston’s note enlarged the reasons why: 
In contrast any attempt to impose a solution on Afghanistan from 
without – especially if by military force, carries a real risk of failure. 
Instead of widening the divisions amongst the different Afghan 
factions, it is likely to unite them against the foreigner and prolong 
the problem.
It is also important to keep Pakistan’s role in any solution to the 
minimum and /or strictly controlled. Her track record is not good. As a 
result she is distrusted and disliked by the majority of Afghan players. 
An inside solution should not be attempted by the mainly Tajik 
Northern Alliance alone. This would be resisted by the citizens of 
Kabul, surrounding Pashtun tribes and the Hazaras – all of whom 
have suffered at the hands of the Northern Alliance. But nor should 
it be attempted by such dubious Pashtun players as self-proclaimed 
‘General’ Rahim Wardak who can spin a tell tale that sadly has little 
foundation in reality. 
After making these three major points, Gunston’s memo proposed 
what Haq could offer: 
‘In contrast, if discrete and immediate support was given to Abdul 
Haq, a fast acceptable inside solution could be obtained. He is known 
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and accepted as a proven operational leader and a man of principle 
with a trans-ethnic outlook. He would welcome the return of the King 
– but not his supporting ‘Gilbert and Sullivan’ cast. He has the support 
of old Mujahideen commanders from all the 7 old parties, current 
Taliban commanders both political & military as well as tribal leaders. 
He has been consolidating this support over the last three weeks and 
has a workable plan for capturing Taliban key cities of Jalalabad, 
Kabul, Ghazni & Kandahar. These cities form the main vertebrae of 
the Taliban’s spinal cord. Their capture would render the Taliban 
paraplegic and allow the swift rounding up of the al Qaida network. 
Because he is his own man, Haq is not a favourite of the Pakistanis and 
probably for this same reason, of the Americans either. It is precisely 
because of this that he has widespread trust and pledges of support 
from within Afghanistan. However he is not a Pashtun nationalist 
and has never espoused a greater Pushtunistan, which the Pakistanis 
would have reason to fear. At the cost of a few million dollars Haq 
could put a Pushtun field force into the area very quickly. This would 
become a focal point for Taliban defections and a counterweight to the 
Northern Alliance – both essential prerequisites for a fast, acceptable 
and lasting solution. 
In the fax Gunston had finished off politely by writing: ‘I do hope 
this has been helpful. The best number to reach me on …’ 
Today it is obvious that the British and US intelligence services 
did not simply cave in on all these points. They pointedly did 
everything they were warned not to do by Gunston’s fax. Gunston 
continued: 
The majority wanted law and order, peace and prosperity. Not the 
Arabisation of the government. But what our people failed to appreciate 
was that a lot of Haq and Khalis’s former commanders had joined 
the Taliban so there was a closeness. For example, Din Mohammad’s 
relationship with the Taliban was initially well meaning and respectful; 
unlike the US who wanted to cut deals with them for the oil pipeline. 
When Abdul died, Haqqani actually phoned din Mohammad to 
apologise. Though Din Mohammad would not do deals with the 
command one has to understand that Nangarhar is in a very difficult 
position with Kunar and Nuristan so close.
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Gunston went on, ‘I went to Rome and didn’t speak to Abdul 
after. He went in on the Sunday’. Then, I asked what had been 
the threat to Western intelligence agencies of Abdul Haq. Gunston 
sighed heavily, 
In contrast to Washington DC, in Kabul Haq was seen as the greatest 
threat! Why? Because he was Pashtun. Because his vision was the 
antithesis to the way the Taliban had looked at Afghanistan. Because, 
despite that, he had a groundswell of support in their ranks. His vision 
was free of ethnic and religious hang ups. He was a true nationalist. 
He also had the ability to pull people together, I reflected. Following 
Haq’s death, Haji Qadir had asked Gunston to accompany him to 
the Bonn Peace Conference in November 2001 as ‘advisor to the 
Eastern Shura’ of elders. But, Gunston said, Qadir had ended up 
storming out of Bonn. Why? I asked. Gunston responded angrily.
Well, it was ridiculous. Qadir was in an extremely difficult position. 
You see, he was there as a representative of the Northern Alliance. Yet 
when he realised no significant Pashtuns had been invited he began 
to get agitated. What could he do? Apparently the visas promised 
by Brahimi to Pashtun leaders failed to turn up leaving them unable 
to attend. So people like Din Mohammad never went and the whole 
event was dominated by Tajiks and the Northern Alliance. What could 
Qadir do? He ended up storming out. So Bonn just set Afghanistan on 
an inherently unstable trajectory.
He had also attended the installation of the new Afghan Government 
with Qadir in December 2001. Gunston rubbed his face in his hands.
God! The whole thing was just like the second crowning of Shah 
Shujah. You even had men in CIA uniforms taking up the front ten 
rows. Supported by a Panjshiri chorus! 
He shook his head wearily. 
Now the problem is you’ve got an unrepresentative court, a leader 
installed by the US, a Shah Shujah.232 There’s no depth to the present 
Government but unfortunately it’s the only game in town. Forty-five 
percent of the population are not represented and the only single 
strong group is now the Taliban. It’s the direct result of the US ignoring 
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Abdul and supporting the Northern Alliance as they didn’t care what 
happened. One State Department person even admitted to me, ‘The 
reason we chose Karzai was because he wears a suit and tie and talks 
like you and I’. 
He sighed and stood up. 
When Abdul died I was in Rome asking the King to write and in 
support of Abdul. When he was captured I flew into Peshawar and 
Din Mohammad told me he thought Abdul had been killed and 
broke into tears. With his leonine face, it was like a cat hiccupping. I 
think he’s very straight. I was with Haji Qadir in ‘96 while Haji Din 
Mohammad was meeting the Taliban. That’s why I don’t believe he’ll 
cut deal with them.
He paused, eyes downcast, and said slowly.
Listen. This family. This family gave their lives, provided the option 
for a peaceful Afghanistan. Now you have a country teetering on the 
edge of a resurgent Taliban and al Qaeda. 
***
I went to Kenya to write. While there, I went to Lamu and found 
myself on a dow trip with an English couple. She a Blairite columist, 
her husband an ex-military man and, I later heard, possibly an ex-
member of MI6. We were discussing a piece another journalist had 
written about the willingness of the then head of MI6, John Scarlett, 
to ‘carry the can’ for Blair over the ‘sexing up’ of the dossiers on 
WMD in Iraq.233 I commented that the intelligence services seemed, 
as the author said, to have allowed themselves to become unduly 
politicised. As one of the chief cheerleaders in the press for the war in 
Iraq, she took fiercely against this view. Somehow the conversation 
got around to my interest in Abdul Haq. Her husband yawned 
lethargically, saying: ‘Well what did it matter; he was dead within a 
couple of weeks anyway?’ 
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‘HE WOULD HAVE BEGUN A REVOLUTION,  
THAT’S WHY THEY KILLED HIM SO FAST’
In contrast to Washington DC, in Kabul Haq was seen as the greatest 
threat! Why? Because he was Pashtun. Because his vision was the 
antithesis to the way the Taliban had looked at Afghanistan. Because, 
despite that, he had a groundswell of support in their ranks.
Sir John Gunston234
Kabul, January 2004
Towards the end of January 2004, I finally met the Taliban’s Deputy 
Interior Minister, Mullah Khaksar. It was his boss, the Taliban 
Interior Minister, Mullah Razzaq, who had apparently given the 
orders for Haq to be killed. 
The family told me that Khaksar had visited Haq in Peshawar 
after September 11 and helped him with his plan to overthrow the 
Taliban, intending to work with Haq in forming a broad-based 
government. The plan was for Khaksar to work with Khan Mir, 
another of Haq’s jihadi commanders, in Kabul as Haq went into 
Afghanistan on his mission. The two would work on turning over 
several divisions of the Interior Ministry. In the event though, Haq 
had been killed and captured before the fall of Kabul. 
I hooked up with Hanif. Khaksar had apparently turned himself 
over to the Karzai government following the routing of the Taliban 
and was now hiding out in a ‘safe house’. At this stage there was 
still no Taliban Reconciliation Programme.
We headed in the direction of Khair Khana on a cold January 
day, the air thick with a winter freeze. Eventually we arrived at a 
rundown suburban house, stepped into a concrete hallway and 
were shown into a curtained room. The Mullah sat there alone. He 
had a shaggy dark beard, a voluminous dark grey turban and dark, 
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spaniel-shaped eyes. I could see my breath in the cold air and was 
relieved when a young man arrived to stoke the bukhari235 and bring 
us green tea and nuts. 
Khaksar’s dark looks were utterly incongruous with his quiet, 
high-pitched voice and the phone which periodically jingled ‘happy 
birthday’ from inside his salwar kameez. After some explanations of 
who I was, I asked whether, given the current situation, it might 
have been better for many members of the Taliban if Haq had not 
been killed? Khaksar replied, ‘At the last days the friends of Haq in 
the Interior Ministry practically began a war. We were ready to act’. 
Haq had wanted a broad-based government, he said, even to the 
extent that he had met with the UN, the Arsala family and Massoud 
about this objective before September 11. Later, he had stayed at the 
Arsala house in Peshawar and spoken with Haji din Mohammad 
and Haji Qadir. He told me that he had known the regime would 
collapse two years before it did. I asked why Mullah Razzaq had 
wanted Haq dead and Khaksar said: 
He used his competence as it was an emergency situation. But he also 
said that, at this time, the Taliban still did not believe they would lose 
their power. They thought, rather naively, that Afghans would rise up 
against the foreign invaders in their support. They executed him as they 
thought the USA would rescue him and then he’d stand against the 
Taliban again. But the act [of killing Haq] was against human rights law 
and Shariat law. As he was killed without a fight and without a trial. 
As to why the Taliban had killed Haq so fast, he said;
If he was alive and his programme had been a success, then from my 
point of view he would now be President of Afghanistan … If they 
had put him in jail the people would have been rising up and pushing 
for a revolution. 
Again, his phone tinkled ‘happy birthday’ from somewhere deep 
within his salwar kameez. Fixing me with his bottomless dark eyes 
he added, ‘A lot of people supported his plan, even in Khost, Paktia, 
Gardez and throughout Afghanistan’. 
These were the same places Gunston had mentioned as being 
the backbone of the Taliban’s hold over the south: the places which 
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had fallen due to Haq’s commanders and the willingness of the 
people who were fed up with the regime. Not due to some ‘secret 
deals’ made by MI6 who had been nowhere to be seen when help 
was needed. 
His comments echoed Gunston’s assessment of the sad irony 
that, in Kabul, Abdul Haq had been deemed a threat to the Taliban, 
yet in Washington and London, those charged with knowing better 
were just blithely unaware. I asked Khaksar if it was too late to 
include moderate Taliban in the government. ‘Yes of course’, he 
snapped. ‘But if not 100% fruitful, it could be 20% at least’. It was a 
short interview. He had people to see, but he agreed to meet again 
the next day to talk more about the circumstances surrounding 
Haq’s death. 
The next day he told me that Razzaq had called him early one 
morning and told him to prepare to go to Hezarac. Khaksar had 
replied that he was sick. So Razzaq sent his personal bodyguards 
to kill Haq. Knowing the stature of Haq, I wondered if Razzaq had 
been too much of a coward to do it personally and asked why the 
Taliban inner core, those close to al Qaeda, had not thought it worth 
negotiating with Haq.
They were not ready to talk then with anyone. They were just thinking 
of their power. Even Hikmatyar and the ex-King and Haq people came 
but they did not agree with any one.
‘So they did not foresee the end? Did they not feel the US had power 
to get rid of them?’ I asked.
‘Not until the fall of Kabul did they think the regime would end. 
They thought people would fight with them’, he replied. 
Haq had realised it was hopeless trying to negotiate with the ‘top 
flight’ of the Taliban: Mullah Omar and those more closely allied 
with the Pakistani ISI. Instead he was targeting the moderates and, 
critically, the Afghan tribes and elders who were ready to throw in 
the towel with the Taliban. He understood that if the locals, and tribal 
elders, had agreed together to turn against the movement, it would 
be very difficult for the Taliban to stay. It was for this reason that he 
had likened the regime to a crystal that would crack finally once a 
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small fissure had appeared in it. That fissure would be opened by 
the broad-based support that Haq could supply for an alternative to 
the Taliban; it was why the ISI, who knew the threat he had posed, 
had killed his wife and small son. Yet Haq had continued to open 
up this fissure with his meetings in Rome with tribal leaders, later 
in Peshawar and then within Afghanistan just prior to his death. 
I had witnessed the fissure in support for the Taliban during 
the months I had worked in Kandahar in 2000. There were several 
incidents. Not only were Kandahari residents openly breaking 
Taliban edicts such as watching DVDs bought in Quetta, but kite 
flying had recently been reintroduced. I also remembered how – 
upon the capture of Taloqan in the North East – the staff in my office 
had celebrated. When I had asked them why and were not the Taliban 
a bad regime, they had said that they were happy the Taliban would 
soon win the war against the Northern Alliance, because then the 
Taliban would have to turn their attention to providing health and 
education services. There would be no excuse not to, once the war 
was finished. I remember too how my driver in Kandahar, himself 
an ex-mujahideen commander, had shown contempt for a group of 
Arabs who had quizzed him about who I was, particularly in terms 
of my nationality, during a trip to Kandahar’s ‘Gen’ral Post Office’.236 
I realised that the Arabs were regarded as − by ordinary Kandahari 
folk − not benefactors to the regime but as arrogant imposters. 
After the fall of Kandahar, Mullah Razzaq had apparently 
escaped to Chaman: a desolate place of abandoned containers and 
smuggling depots in the midst of dust storms whipped up by the 
Registan desert. Its position between Kandahar and Quetta − prime 
Taliban territory − indicated to me the hardline nature of Razzaq’s 
devotion to the Taliban cause. A point confirmed by Khaksar when 
he said, ‘Razzaq was powerful in the Taliban Emirate, very hardline. 
These Taliban did not like to compromise, because al Qaeda did not 
want them to. They were not Afghans’. 
What Khaksar said married up with what Gunston had stressed: 
that with the onset of the bombing, moderate Talibs had abandoned 
the fight, leaving the more fundamentalist al Qaeda237 strand in 
charge. The more moderate Afghan commanders of the Talib 
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battalions in the regions, the men Abdul Haq had once commanded 
during the jihad, were the fragile coalition he had needed to come 
over to his and the King’s side. It was this fragile coalition which had 
needed the West not to bomb Afghanistan. As Ken Guest, stressed 
to me later, ‘If the bombing hadn’t started, Haq would not have felt 
the need to go back “inside” Afghanistan so prematurely’. 
An interview given by Haq to Newsweek238 magazine from 
Peshawar within a week of his capture illustrates what he meant by 
this. Of Taliban commanders, he said: 
We won’t encourage them to defect. We say, ‘Just stay there so we can 
use you. If you defect you’re no use’. We plan to move in with our own 
commanders, with Taliban commanders, with tribal representatives. 
We’ll just take down the Taliban flag and put up our own flag. 
Then, Haq explained why the US bombing was so damaging to his 
plan and that of the Rome Process. 
Still soldiers and officials are already defecting to their homes, to their 
own camps; they’re leaving in the thousands. 
He had been talking to Taliban commanders by sattelite phone and 
they had come to see him at his home in Peshawar, where many of 
his relatives lived. Critically, he explained that, ‘forty to fifty percent 
of the Taliban forces were former mujahideen. They will be with us 
if they don’t have to worry about their own survival and security’. 
The background to all this, he told Newsweek, was that he had 
left Afghanistan in 1992 saying he didn’t want to take part in the 
destruction wrought on his country by civil war. Although the 
mujahideen had won the war militarily in 1992, they had lost it 
politically. Now, after September 11, he had returned to his country 
to finish a job he had begun when he had fought the Soviets. He 
argued that, as a military commander, he had a role to play, but he 
emphasized: 
No one can do it alone. We need teamwork. before September 11, there 
was a lack of united leadership to bring various tribes together. Now, 
after the former King has stated he’ll return home, that helps us solve 
this problem. We can begin a national process, not based on ethnic 
groupings.
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In terms of ‘defections’ he was aiming, he said: 
… to the second level, to the division commanders and corps comm-
anders. I’m saying to them, ‘okay, the leadership is crazy. Why don’t 
you and us and other tribes come together and work together?’ 
When asked if he could win over the Taliban leadership, Haq had 
replied;
More than 50% are willing to accept a new government if they can 
be part of the process and if the Northern Alliance is not allowed to 
take power. They want the security to live as normal human beings. 
Most of the former mujahidin commanders who are with the Taliban, 
plus many Taliban commanders, are not happy with the leadership 
but also fear the Northern Alliance. They fear revenge killings if the 
Northern Alliance takes over. So we’ll give them another option. 
Today, Khaksar continued: 
When they executed Abdul Haq, I was in Kabul with one of Haq’s 
commanders in the guesthouse [he was speaking of Khan Mir, Haq’s 
former Paghman-based commander]. I gave him a gun and then the 
bodyguards came and told us they had finished Abdul Haq. I said 
to them, ‘That is dreadful as he was a national figure in Afghanistan. 
And was famous Kabul commander during jihad’. 
He looked down and folded a flap of his kameez over a knee. 
They told me Haq was killed at Charasyab and that Isatullah was 
killed where they captured him.239
I asked, ‘Do you think Afghanistan would be better if Haq were still 
alive?’ His reply was matter of fact.
Undoubtedly! If his [Haq’s] plan had happened there would be no 
opposition nor an insurgency by the Taliban. It would be a broad-
based government with the support of the international community 
and UN. It would be a strong government with no opposition and the 
Taliban would be finished now.
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CHAPTER EIGHTEEN 
GOVERNANCE AND TRADITIONAL STRUCTURES
In Afghanistan we look for answers inside our forts (largely reliant 
upon kinetic energy) when the answers actually lie in the hills, reliant 
upon the tribes. This was the core of Abdul Haq’s message. The one 
we were incapable of listening to.278 
Jalalabad & Faizabad, 2004-5
As far back as 1973, the American anthropologist Louis Dupree had 
identified how, in Afghanistan, tensions were developing between 
the concept of ‘nation state’ and that of a traditional society based 
on ‘kinship’ (in other words, something more tribal). 
In his tome, Afghanistan, published in 1973,279 Dupree described 
the concept of ‘nation state’ as follows:
In the Western sense … more a set of attitudes, a reciprocal, functioning 
set of rights and obligations between the Government and the 
governed – with emphasis on the individual rather than the group. 
By contrast, he said, ‘tribalism’ tended to come in; 
In non-literate societies … when kinship replaces government and 
guarantees men and women born into a specific unit a functioning set 
of social, economic, and political rights and obligations.
In the 1960s and ‘70s, Dupree recognised that Afghanistan was 
attempting to create a ‘nation state’ out of what he called, ‘a hodge 
podge of ethnic and linguistic groups’. 
Yet, looking back at what happened from 1973 onwards after the 
King was ejected, this tension in Afghan society − between ‘centre 
and periphery’ and between ‘modernisers and traditionalists’ − 
set in motion the series of coups which turned Afghanistan from a 
monarchy into a republic and ended in the chaos of the jihad and 
the inter-factional fighting which followed. Since Dupree wrote this, 
almost thirty years of war has destroyed much of Afghanistan’s 
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former social fabric and undermined traditional governance 
systems. In particular, the Soviets and the mujahiddeen (particularly 
Hikmatyar) have systematically murdered many of the elders and 
intellectuals who provided the ‘glue’ for jirgas. 
The great irony, when one considers this history, is that since 2001, 
the international community has replicated this same tension by 
attempting to create a nation state in Afghanistan. Yet, writing in 
1998, Amin Saikhal depicts how local governance and political order 
still functions in Afghanistan:
In Afghanistan, political order and governance have always largely 
rested on a mixture of personalised, clientalistic politics, and 
elite alliance and elite settlement, legitimate through traditional 
mechanisms of consensus building and empowerment, such as the 
Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly).280 
In their excellent paper, ‘Integrating Tribal Structures into the State-
building Process; lessons from Loya Paktia’, Susanne Schmeidl and 
Massoud Karokhail assert that: 
… networks are less orientated around ethnicity (e.g. Pashtun) than 
along smaller entities such as tribes, sub-tribes or smaller communities 
or solidarity groups such as quams in Pashtun society.281
Tribal structures should best be understood as complex clientalistic 
networks where the importance of family and kinship overrules 
interest orientated associations. Such networks tend to be ‘non 
modern’ forms of authority (e.g. patriarchal and neo-patrimonial as 
described by Max Weber) where there is no ‘public sphere’.282 
Saikal’s quote depicts ‘how local governance and political order’ 
functions in Afghanistan; outlining clearly that ‘governance was 
never much centralised but depended heavily on local politics and 
elites’.283 In this way, neither the Safavid nor the Moghul empires of the 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-centuries, nor later the Durrani rulers of 
the eighteenth- and nineteenth-centuries ‘managed to preserve their 
rule permanently or extend state structures beyond the few urban 
centres’.284 Schmeidl and Karokhail’s paper goes on to explain how 
the lack of a state, ‘or even thinking in state terms’, has been further 
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intensified by the war because during conflict, the ‘accountability of 
local leaders towards the general population declines, focusing only 
on the needs and desires of very small groups’.285
Among other observations made during the introduction to their 
paper, Schmeidl and Karokhail emphasise how in a participatory 
approach to state building, ‘security at the district and provincial 
levels is guaranteed by agreements among tribes, and between the 
tribes and the government’. 
This was the core of what I’d learnt Haq had been working on when 
he was killed. It was also partly why Baryalai was driven to work on 
rebuilding traditional structures of consensus. The consultative shura 
which Baryalai had been working on since I had first known him in 
late 2002 was called the Council of Nangarhar Communities. In dari, 
this translates as ‘shura e Mashwarati e Nangarhar’ and in Pashtu, ‘da 
Nangarhar Mashwaraty shura’. The inception and background to this 
Council is outlined in the endnote.286 
I had seen how much care Baryalai had taken – since I had first 
known him in 2002 − over consulting on the evolution and eventual 
form of the Council of the Nangarhar Communities. There had been 
months of discussion as to the objectives for the shura and how best 
to attract members who wanted to serve their community, to work 
on the shura for no material gain, as was traditional amongst Afghan 
leaders. The stated objectives of the shura included discussing 
issues of unity between the tribes, security, economic development, 
women’s issues and rights, the selection of locals for the Afghan 
National Army (ANA) and the facilitation of better relations with 
Pakistan. Another issue that would later gain their – and Baryalai’s 
− attention was reconciliation with the Taliban. Because the issues 
were discussed in an Afghan forum, American generals increasingly 
saw the shura as a useful vehicle for bringing about the goals 
the West wished to pursue in Afghanistan. As Baryalai had said, 
however, the problem was who, despite the ‘cloak of shura’, was 
really making the decisions. 
By 2004, it seemed the foreigners were also keen to start shuras 
across Afghanistan. The National Solidarity Programme (NSP) was 
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taken up in 2001 by the World Bank, as an extension of Habitat’s 
‘Community Forum’ programme, which I had originally worked 
on in Kandahar during the Taliban. The programme would be 
rolled out from urban to rural areas and locally elected Community 
Development Councils (CDCs) would be set up. The PRTs which had 
extended their original remit – which was to provide security – into 
reconstruction and were now expanding further into governance. 
I visited the US Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Jalalabad 
in December 2004. Its commander was interested in and responsive 
to local dynamics but soon a female civilian advisor arrived with the 
intent of starting a shura. Apparently, she showed little interest in 
what Baryalai had been doing and when she bypassed his Council 
of Nangarhar Communities he commented: 
The problem is when foreigners come here to start shura − like the PRT 
starting shura to hand out money ‘via the shura’ − these shuras are 
not attracting people who want to do good for the community. They 
are attracting strongmen and those who want to use the shura to make 
money. So this is unbalancing the structure of the traditional shura. 
A German NGO had recently arrived in Jalalabad with the objective 
of working on counter-narcotics and shuras, and typified the view 
of the international community when they said, ‘We don’t like 
the traditional shuras as the old men make all the decisions’. So 
said one of the two grey-haired men who had come to set up the 
programmes. ‘We prefer to use the National Solidarity Programme 
[NSP] system as it has a secret ballot’. 
It seemed that the NSP, which had worked well in urban areas 
during the Taliban, was to be rolled out into rural areas and become 
a vehicle for bringing democracy into the villages of Afghanistan, 
bypassing traditional structures. I had worked on the precursor 
to the NSP project in Kandahar during the Taliban. Of course, the 
participatory aspect was very good, but the idea that use of a ‘secret 
ballot’ vote would automatically lead to democracy in this complex 
tribal society was naïve. 
When in late 2009, I wrote to Baryalai asking how things were 
progressing with the ‘parallel shuras’ being set up by the foreigners, 
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he said that the Americans wanted to work with shuras but so far 
did not have the right approach. The foreigners’ shuras would not 
work because they did not accept the traditional concept of shura, 
but wanted to do it in ‘so-called modern way, which was not 
compatible with the traditional way’. He was talking about the NSP 
which had been rolled out countrywide from 2003 onwards. The 
NSP shuras, he said, were now ‘everywhere’ in Afghanistan, but 
were ‘not the traditional shuras; members of these shuras are not 
leaders of their communities’. Indeed, he said, these members were 
only authorised by their communities to decide about the spending 
of the money allocated by the government for the projects in their 
areas and monitor and observe the implementation of these projects. 
By contrast, the traditional leaders were representatives of their 
communities in all issues related to their communities and were 
indispensible in interfacing between government and community 
- important in Afghanistan where rural areas remain so traditional, 
so distant from the centre. It was also important in solving disputes 
and conflicts. He added that the ‘members of NSP shuras don’t have 
that mandate’. Finally, he said, ‘the NSP exists only on the village 
level, not the district or province level. Our shura operates on all 
three levels’. 
Astri Suhrke,287 writing on the dialectic between ‘traditional’ 
and ‘modern’ government structures, assessed the limitations 
of the Bonn Agreement, with its focus on ‘modern government 
structures’. It was, she said, an approach which did not allow 
traditional elements a central role288 and meant that these elements 
have thus had to compete for space and power. In particular, the 
promulgation since September 11 of the NSP into rural areas was 
thus an attempt to replace traditional structures with modern ones 
(in this case, the village-based ‘democratically elected’ Community 
Development Councils or CDCs).289 
Baryalai’s assertions about the limitations of NSP as compared 
to other, more traditional structures, were backed up in other 
studies. In 2008, a nationwide assessment of the NSP project was 
published.290 It concluded that although the programme functioned 
very well, it often functioned either alongside traditional structures 
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or was infiltrated by more traditional elements. It had a limited role 
to play in dispute resolution, for example, as compared to the role 
played by traditional leaders. Nixon says: 
… mandating a single governance role for CDCs would produce 
mixed outcomes, due to the observed variation in how CDCs 
commonly function and in relation to customary structures. While 
there is evidence of fruitful governance improvements linked to CDCs 
this is often achieved through the implicit recognition of pre-existing 
governance patterns, not wholesale attempts to replace them.291
Schmeidl and Karokhail indicate: 
Even those shuras at the village level that are set up by NGOs  
or the councils of the government’s National Solidarity Programme 
are generally appointed by the major tribal shuras within a given 
province.292 
Unfortunately in the post Bonn state-building exercise there has 
been a fear that, ‘collaboration with tribal elites may strengthen a 
parallel power system that opposes or at minimum is an obstacle to, 
the creation of a strong modern state’. 
Suhrke, Schmeidl and Karokhail assert that such:
… zero-sum game approach to centre-periphery relations (with the 
centre being modern and desirable and the periphery (Provinces) 
traditional, backwards and undesirable), is ‘unconstructive’ in 
state-building exercises in countries where tradition and traditional 
structures still matter a great deal to the local population. 
Dupree wrote about this tension in 1973:293
Unfortunately, many of the national leaders in the non western world 
have been educated in the West and have the individualistic conceptions 
of nation-state. These leaders look on attempts to perpetuate tribal 
prerogatives as anarchistic, archaic and anti-unity.
Given the interest since 2004 in local governance, I wondered 
whether Baryalai’s alternative model − the Council for Nangarhar 
Communites − was now being asked to be a vehicle to assist in the 
implementation of government policy from the bottom-up. There 
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had been some initial interest by the Ministry for Reconstruction and 
Rural Development (MRRD), but he said that the effectiveness of the 
shuras and traditional structures of leadership in Afghanistan was 
being ‘systematically ignored’ by both the government, which felt 
challenged by what the shuras represented, and by the international 
community, which saw the NSP as a panacea in bringing democracy. 
Both, he said, had tried to eliminate or ‘go around’ the traditional 
structure, or ‘not to involve [it] in the decision making process’, or 
to ‘replace the traditional leadership in an artificial way that doesn’t 
work in Afghan society’. 
In a direct reference to NSP, with its secret ballot and more 
democratic emphasis, he went on to say: 
When government and international community try to impose new 
leaders on the communities, it doesn’t work. [The] Soviets tried this, 
[the] mujahideen tried this, [the] Arabs and our neighbours tried it. It 
didn’t bring a [good] result and Karzai and his allies tried it. They all 
could not see the result. 
One of the main problems for the Germans whom I had met 
in Jalalabad was that they had arrived, like the American PRT, 
with the goal of organising a parallel structure. They had spent 
several months doing up their compound and had now started 
work gathering data in the villages. The first time I had met them 
– when they had outlined their objectives to me − they had been 
confident and ebullient. Six months later, I found them frustrated 
and bitter. They were having implementation problems and were 
unable to get much of the community in the areas they had selected 
to participate. I asked if they had contacted the Governor. They 
sneered, presumably because they assumed that din Mohammad 
represented a certain limited franchise here. Maybe he did, but the 
comment about the secret ballot and their subsequent frustrations 
indicated that the Germans were trying to make a structure more 
in line with a Western democratic vision − with themselves as 
moderators – in a predominantly tribal society whose dynamics are 
necessarily fairly opaque to westerners more used to the concept of 
‘nation state’. 
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Since 2001, Afghans complained to me that relationships of trust 
between tribes had been further fragmented as the coalition had 
fostered hostility between groups. I had witnessed this myself in 
Jalalabad, as strongmen like Ali were favoured − with weapons, 
cash and the legitimacy conferred through working with the US 
and government − over tribal leaders with more historic legitimacy. 
Overnight, such actions had changed patterns of power and kinship 
and caused instability. 
The importance of working with the tribal system was something 
that Abdul Haq had understood and in a letter to Jimmy Carter, 
dated 6 January 1992, he wrote:
Today elections are impossible so I suggest we try and resuscitate 
the traditional system once again. Today the elements of power 
and tradition are Ulema; tribal leaders, resistance commanders; 
intellectuals and political party leaders and good muslims in Kabul. 
Each have shuras and committees.
Abdul Haq was talking of the Qawm, which is: 
Essentially … a community of interests, local and traditional, cemented 
by kinship, tribal or other ties … a solidarity group (encompassing 
family lineages, clans, tribes or sectarian, linguistic or ethnic groups) 
that is politically self governing and economically self sustaining. This 
traditional mode of community governance has proved remarkably 
resiliant. It has survived despite the efforts of successive rulers and 
bureaucracies in Kabul to bring it within the strait-jacket of a modern 
nation state, on the questionable assumption that the European 
construct of the nation-state was a summum bonum, a kind of political 
form of organisation that is self evident, a ‘natural’ culmination of  
all societies.294
Haq described how foreign interference had damaged such struc-
tures during the jihad;
In helping create the political parties, America and other foreign 
nations built up anti-democratic Afghan fundamentalist groups which 
are now almost out of control. But by building on our own traditions, 
Afghans may yet be able to overcome these dangerous ideologues and 
restore peace and security.
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In terms of how, in Afghanistan, ‘personalities’ rather than political 
parties in the Western sense of the word had more relevance, Baryalai 
explained that direction comes ultimately from the rural areas, from 
the people and from the tribes. For the Arsala family, this meant 
the tribes of Hezarac, Khoghiani and Shinwar, among other tribes 
of the Eastern Provinces: ‘They are the ones whose support we can 
count on. We can mobilise them as we have spent time with them’.295 
The Arsala family had, for the most part, produced the types of 
‘chief’ whom the British General Rawlinson had recognised as 
those who were able to hold together ‘tribes … of unequal power 
and divergent habits’.296
I had seen for myself how the people looked to the Arsala family 
as their representatives in Kabul and how they also came to ask the 
family for mediation of their problems. They came to discuss land 
and border disputes, issues with the American occupation or to plan 
how the tribes would mobilise themselves to ensure the re-election 
of Karzai, who was still seen as a Pashtun bolster against the Tajik-
dominated Northern Alliance power. To ensure that bolster, the 
family, and its quam had supported the concept of a more heavily 
Presidential, as opposed to a Parliamentary, system when the new 
Afghan Constitution was debated and agreed in 2003/4.297 
When Baryalai explained how the tribes organised themselves 
for the elections it indicated how little the West understood about 
Afghan-style democracy. For din Mohammad had discussed the 
presidential elections and its candidates with the tribespeople 
who told him that as they did not know the candidates personally 
they would look to him for advice. The result was hence a tribal 
‘block vote’ for Karzai. In other Pasthu areas, there were reports of 
a disproportionate number of ‘phantom’ women being registered to 
vote. Others would probably never see the ballot, which was decided 
along tribal lines or by bribery, or in many places intimidation by 
local commanders who had made deals, possibly with regional 
strongmen or warlords. Especially for those whose illicit incomes 
depended upon their maintaining powerful positions in the local 
hierarchy.298 
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***
Sometime in February I visited Faizabad, a traditional Northern 
Alliance stronghold in the north-east and from where former 
President Rabbani originated. Other NATO countries were 
complaining the Germans were not doing enough from their PRT. 
This was a major poppy growing and trafficking area. I wanted to 
assess the impact of their PRT on local development efforts. 
I flew in with our office interpreter, Najib. The plane headed into 
the vast confluence of the Hindu Kush and Pamir, finally making 
a dramatic landing on a tin runway installed by the Russians. We 
climbed into a scruffy yellow taxi organised by Najib and bumbled 
along the rutted road into town. The driver was clearly a poor local 
man. I asked what people thought of the PRT and he shouted:‘Why 
do the foreigners come here only to support Nazir Mohammad?!’ 
All Nazir Mohammad’s men are now working for the German 
PRT, even guarding its perimeter fence. He went on to explain that 
Nazir Mohammad was the most powerful strongman here, the 
leading drugs dealer, expropriator of property and even children. 
‘Everyone’, our driver said, was ‘scared of him’. So, as we arrived 
arrival at the outer perimeter of the German PRT, I asked the Afghan 
guards who they worked for. They chanted, ‘Nazir Mohammad’. 
Once inside the PRT (which had a set-up cost of around 15 million 
euros), comprising mainly of plastic cabins and vast steel containers 
sited on a flank of mud to the back of the airport, we met first with 
the civilian chief, an earnest German. He was amazed that the EU 
had allowed me to travel in a local taxi, concerned for my security. 
Ironically, it was the proximity to the locals conferred by travelling 
in a taxi – something diplomats, soldiers and intelligence officers 
who preferring convoys of armoured vehicles avoided – which had 
armed me with my first question for the PRT’s civilian chief. Was 
it true, I asked, they were using the guards of a warlord to guard 
their perimeter? He sighed, confirmed it were so and admitted it 
annoyed him. The decision had been taken by the joint ‘military 
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chief’ and had something to do with ‘force protection’.
Later, we visited the local head of the Afghan Independent 
Human Rights Commission who affirmed the stories about this same 
warlord, Nazir Mohammad, kidnapping small children as well as 
local fears about his possible paedophilia. Not only, he told us, did 
Nazir Mohammad have the PRT in his pocket, he also controlled 
the police department. In fact, as we visited the police department 
the next day, Mohammad’s cortege was arriving as we left. 
The PRT appeared to be spending far more on its set-up and 
running costs than it would ever spend on the development of 
Badakhshan. It brought to mind what Haji Zahir had recently said 
about the ‘running costs’ of foreign soldiers:They are importing 
bottles of mineral water at $2 a bottle from Dubai for these guys, 
when Afghan soldiers are only paid 25 cents a day. 
Still, the PRT was paying lip service to the idea of consulting 
with locals. The Danish Commander told me enthusiastically, 
‘Yesterday we got pictures of local elders’. He showed me the 
photos. ‘Tomorrow we’ll go back to dig the wells!’ Now, although 
well meaning, this all seemed absurdly simplistic when compared to 
the very impressive work already being done in Badakhshan by the 
Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN), who had been in region 
many years and among other detailed anthropological studies, had 
conducted income studies on the relative attractiveness for locals of 
working on the poppy harvest. 
When I distributed my report on the Faizabad visit to EU 
Embassies, the German Ambassador denied angrily the PRT had a 
warlord guarding its perimeter. Yet four months later, in summer 
2004, I returned and found Nazir Mohammad’s men still there. I 
heard from the Afghans that whenever NATO chiefs, including the 
then British commander, flew into Faizabad, their first stop was 
apparently, lunch with Nazir Mohammad!299 Unfortunately, this 
emphasis on putting the PRT’s interests above those of the locals 
made a mockery of the idea of NATO forces coming to Afghanistan 
to protect the locals and to manufacture ‘security’. In the same way 
that the 2001/2 Faustian ‘bargain’ made by the West with Afghan 
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warlords had allowed them to continue with their illicit and 
intimidating activities, this state of affairs had also inevitably brought 
insecurity in its wake. It also seemed contrary to the lofty ideals of 
‘human security’ and the ‘right to protect’ (R2P) under discussion 
as a UN objective. Because on the ground and despite their superior 
firepower, the prime concern of NATO chiefs was ‘force protection’. 
Other PRTs had made similar alliances in the south.300 
The same conciliation to strongmen had made the international 
community unwilling to engage301 in disarming illegal militias, most 
of which were associated with the strongmen who since September 
11 had become its allies. Around 1,700 illegally armed groups 
existed nationally in Afghanistan. They would continue to terrorise 
the local population, steal their children, their property, run the 
drugs trade and intimidate people into voting the way they wanted 
during the parliamentary elections due to be held in Autumn 2005. 
Yet I witnessed both NATO and coalition representatives squirm in 
meetings with the Afghan government and other stakeholders when 
asked about the possibility of disarming them in a programme to be 
called ‘Disarming Illegal Armed Groups’ (DIAG). 
There had also been the ‘Disarm, Demobilise and Reintegration’ 
(DDR) programme, whose meetings I attended each week in Kabul 
at the MOD. The DDR programme offered remuneration to soldiers 
in the so-called ‘official’ Afghan army in return for their handing 
in their more aged weapons. It was thus effectively a huge subsidy 
to those militias of the Northern Alliance − mostly General Fahim 
− who had taken over the Afghan National Army units from the 
departing Taliban in November 2001. Many of these scruffy, newly 
demobilised militias were now simply reintegrating into what 
were now dubbed ‘illegal armed groups’302 or, as a wry journalist 
observed, ‘reintegrating into the drug trade’. These groups, led by 
the strongmen the West had made stronger, would never be taken 
on by the coalition or NATO. Even as the first DDR programme 
was initiated in 2003, shipments of Western arms had continued to 
arrive in the north from the US, to be given to the strongmen who 
had become our ‘allies’.303 
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This was the precisely the state of affairs Haq had foreseen 
and desired to avoid through achieving a more equitable political 
settlement, avoiding the return of warlords to Afghanistan and not 
allowing the Northern Alliance to take Kabul. It was also why UN 
political officers such as my colleague, Nils, and some European 
ambassadors, had despaired of the ‘peace versus justice’ deal made 
with the warlords by Khalilzad and Brahimi on the eve of the 2002 
Emergency Loya Jirga. 
One of the ‘disappointed’ UN officers – who had worked in 
Afghanistan both pre- and post-September 11 − wrote to me in 2008.
Last year [2007] I accepted another assignment [in Afghanistan]. I was 
so disappointed that I quit the job this July. All the mistakes that we 
had warned Brahimi304 about have now grown to a fully dysfunctional 
state. Corruption, poverty, criminality, massive abuse of human 
rights, I felt very sorry for my Afghan friends, who had such high 
expectations after 9/11. Now many of them turned away from the 
international community and just expect them to leave. And frankly 
they might even be better off - much of the international assistance is 
barely more then window dressing.305
By 2005, the insurgency had strengthened and it was obvious that 
the international community was not delivering the building blocks 
required to stabilise the situation. There was a continued lack of 
coordination among different international actors and a failure of 
donors to respond to the requests by Afghans for conditionality 
on aid receipts (to ensure some delivery of services by this corrupt 
government to the people). The presumption by the military that 
− despite their lack of experience in state building, development 
or reconstruction − they should be the lead actors in the entire 
operation, often chiefly for the short-term benefit to themselves of 
‘force protection, seemed counter-productive. In late 2005, there 
had also been the bizarre decision of the European Union’s Chief 
Election Observer, Emma Bonino to toe the Bush-ite line of dubbing 
the 2005 parliamentary elections ‘free and fair’ in contravention to 
what our team’s election observers – and others − were saying from 
the field about intimidation of candidates, about security in the run 
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up to the election and vote rigging on the day of the election and 
about fraud in the counting of ballots.306 307 
With the 1,700 armed militia groups still roaming the country 
intimidating people into voting the way strongmen preferred, many 
more strongmen − or their proxies, some of whom were women − 
were thus elected to the parliament in 2005. They quickly pushed 
through an Amnesty Law against future prosecution for the mass 
human rights violations many had carried out in the past.308 The 
anger of Afghan women over this state of affairs was expressed 
by the brave Malalai Joya, who had risen to fame when she spoke 
out against the warlords at the Constitutional Loya Jirga. For her 
forthrightness, she had been expelled from that Loya Jirga and one 
strongman had recommended that she be raped. Elected during 
the parliamentary election as MP for her province of Farah, she 
continued to denounce the presence of the warlords in the new 
‘parliament’ and was again expelled by them soon after. Since then, 
under death threat, she has had to remain in hiding. 
The lack of a respected and decent Pashtun leader as an alternative 
to Karzai was becoming evident already in 2005. There were too 
many individuals wanting to be ‘King’ but failing to work together 
to form coalitions to topple Karzai’s deeply corrupt government. 
By 2004, the international community had burgeoned and Kabul 
was full of foreigners, aid workers, private security companies and 
diplomats. Behind them came alcohol, arms dealing, brothels and 
loud parties. Roads were closed off with concrete barriers and in the 
streets of the Kabul district of Shar-eh-Naw, where the US private 
security Dyncorp company had offices, even schoolkids had to put 
up with the humiliation of being ‘frisked’ on their way home. 
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THE UK HAQ EFFORT – PART II
Periodically the British forget that you can annex land but not people. 
Whilst military strategy is required to occupy territory, a political 
strategy not reliant upon explicit military force is invariably needed 
to pacify and appease the population.
Warren, The Fakir of Ipi
London and Geneva, 2009
Back in Europe, I followed up with others who had played a part 
in Haq’s last weeks. My aim was to ascertain the extent of the UK 
effort to promote Abdul Haq and his strategy in 2001, why it failed 
and the outcome of that failure. What I discovered has, I believe, 
major implications for our assessment of the competence of British 
intelligence agencies in the wake of September 11. 
I had met Ken Guest briefly in Jalalabad in 2002, when he was 
working on the documentary for the BBC about Abdul Haq.309 The 
next contact I had with Guest was in late 2008, by which time he was 
living in Kabul and had been involved with Afghanistan for twenty-
nine years. He was described to me by Seeger as someone who: 
… probably spent more time inside Afghanistan, living and 
working with the Mujahedin, than any other Western witness to that  
(Soviet) conflict.  A sizable part of this time was with Jalaludin 
Haqqani, who now runs the Taliban campaign on the South Eastern 
border.  He has also drunk tea and discussed religion with Osama bin 
Laden. As a result of that past, he has a first hand knowledge of not 
just how the ordinary Afghans thinks, but how the Taliban and Al 
Qaeda think and act.310 
Jere Van Dyk who spent time with Ken Guest in 1981, while the two 
travelled with Jalaluddin Haqqani’s front in Paktia, said of him in 
his excellent book about that period;
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Ken was an Englishman. He had been here for four months, wandering 
from one guerilla group to another, in the Panjshir valley, in Kunar, 
Nangarhar, Logar. He was skinny like a marathon runner, with long 
black hair to his shoulders, a beard, gaunt features; and he wore a 
Soviet winter army jacket under his blanket. He had three cameras, 
a small cassette player, a New Testament, and a thousand stories  
to tell. He had been a British Royal Marine. He had not had a bath  
in a month.311 
Ken Guest had served with 4 5 Commando Royal Marines, and 
during the 1980s he went on to make some forty-two trips into 
Afghanistan. After that he covered other wars in places varying 
from Liberia to Bosnia, Cambodia and Lebanon.
After 9/11 Guest became quickly disillusioned with what he 
was reading in the press. He wrote an email about Afghanistan in 
reply to a question by his older brother, who had served for sixteen 
years with the UK’s Special Boat Service (SBS). Soon after, Guest 
received a phone call from an old acquaintance, ‘RAM’ Seeger, who 
was similarly worried and had been discussing this on the phone 
with Paddy Ashdown. Guest sent Seeger a copy of the email he’d 
sent to his brother and Seeger sent it on to Ashdown, also putting 
him in touch with Ken. Ashdown liked the summary and asked 
Guest if he could use it as a basis for an article in The Times.312 
Seeger’s interest in and experience of Afghanistan stemmed 
from the early 1980s when he had made nine trips into occupied 
Afghanistan in order to give training and support to the mujahideen. 
Seeger had commanded the SBS in the 1970s, but had since left 
the corps and was working as a security consultant. It was Seeger, 
whom Gunston had mentioned to me as having travelled with him 
to Jalalabad in October 2001. 
Paddy Ashdown said to me of Seeger,313 ‘there should be a 
biography written on him’. He described Seeger as follows in his 
own book:  
In my first year as a senior boarder, I had been a fag for a senior boy 
who asked me to do none of the things normally expected of fags, 
such as making his bed or cleaning his shoes. Instead, I had to join 
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him doing PT in the backyard with a pack full of bricks on my back, 
or running along the banks of the River Ouse in large boots and the 
heaviest clothes we could find.
His name was “RAM” Seegar and he remains one of the most extra-
ordinary men I have met. He taught me the techniques of endurance 
and the importance of physical fitness and an active mind.
I followed him into the Royal Marines and ended up, like him, in 
Borneo during the confrontation with Indonesia in the 1960s. Ram 
won an MC. I also followed Ram into the SBS, the Special Boat Section 
(now Service)’.314
Having aroused Ashdown’s interest, Guest and Seeger decided to 
widen their lobbying. 
Initially our lobbying aim was to make available our considerable 
knowledge of the country and its peoples, warn against the 
consequences of a blunt and over heavy approach and point out the 
complexities of Afghanistan. Then as soon as we became aware of 
Abdul Haq’s intention315 and the opportunity that this offered for a 
quick and effective solution, we focussed on trying to obtain support 
for his cause.316
Ashdown assisted them with meetings and the first people they met 
with were at an MOD central staffs intelligence cell on 21 September 
2001. On the way into the first meeting, Guest says they passed 
a room in which there was a large wall map of Afghanistan and 
adjacent to it, a man standing on a ladder ‘sticking red arrows’ onto 
it. At this stage, Guest was concerned that a bombing campaign had 
already been decided upon. The meeting was with two staff officers, 
one of whom was a Marine. They had a file with some intelligence 
on Afghanistan. Guest nervously asked if he could know what that 
intelligence was. ‘Of course’, replied the officer and reached behind 
him to get it. 
Writing to me in 2009, some eight years later, Guest told me: 
When that file was opened and I was looking at what I was being told 
was the best intelligence they had at that point in time, the best insight 
from the furthest scout … it still shocks me.317
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For the ‘intelligence’ on Afghanistan produced at this meeting was 
little more than The Times article written by Guest himself! He added:
We were planning to go to war and people with nothing against 
us [who] would die in large numbers and our youth would follow 
commands given in our name and die there too. And the best we 
had was from some former General Duties318 Marine, who bought a 
camera and a one-way air ticket and went to Afghanistan and simply 
walked a lot and paid attention, and chance and fate led him to Haq, 
Haqqani, Massoud and bin Laden, and did it on invisible freelance 
budgets because he thought it mattered. And that source hadn’t been 
back since 1989 and there I was being told, 12 years since I was last 
in Afghanistan and lacking any resources but what I recalled off the 
cuff … I was being told (although they comfortably assumed it was 
Ashdown [who wrote the piece] as they appear to believe what they 
read in the press!) … [that] I was the best they had! 
Guest added:
It was in that meeting I first proposed Abdul Haq’s name … and 
proposed to RAM I bring in someone I knew who had all the right 
credentials in social entry to ensure a very wide and senior network 
of contacts.319 
That person was Sir John Wellesley Gunston and after a phone call 
from Guest, he came immediately to meet them in a Whitehall pub. 
Gunston then called Abdul Haq on his mobile, and they learnt that 
Haq was in Rome. And that he already had a plan.
A further meeting was arranged that evening in Knightsbrige, at 
the Special Forces club where Seeger, Guest and Gunston met with 
MOD staff officers to pass over the news about Haq’s plan with the 
King. The following day, 22 September, Gunston travelled to Rome 
to meet with Haq. Other meetings fielded by the three, and described 
already to me by Gunston, were with various Tory grandees, Ming 
Campbell and Paddy Ashdown. Gunston’s report from Rome was 
summarised by Seeger and sent to Ashdown, who passed it to No 
10 Downing Street on 26 September,  but to no avail.  
Ashdown informed them that the PM had said that ‘this is exactly 
the sort of thing that we are looking at’, but that British intelligence 
has ‘other resources’. 
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Guest reacted to this with disdain:
For any well informed source it was not a multiple choice puzzle. 
Nobody was close to Haq in value to West and Afghanistan.  
If we were seriously looking at the situation this was obvious. 
He added that either the PM was partially to blame: ‘I strongly 
suspect from his determination to back the US unconditionally’.320  
A few days later the news was worse. Guest recalls:
Paddy Ashdown called me and said, ‘Ken, you must accept there 
has to be a fireworks display, a significant fireworks display, the 
Americans are demanding it and not until after the firework display 
can we continue the debate’. 
Guest replied to Ashdown:
Paddy, if that is to be the strategy we are to set ourselves upon, there 
can only be one certain casualty of this path, the death of rational 
debate. No good can come out of it. After the bombing begins we will 
not be able to have debate in any rational sense. 
This was a certain fact to me, not based on hindsight but understanding 
the dyanamics.321
Our intelligence services were totally blind. En mass decamping to 
[the] USA [and] in the process … infected with the spirit … within 
the US intelligence services … through these channels we heard such 
things as the ‘Haq has baggage’ comment which was to me a haunting 
call from the past … as I knew who was speaking to me, Hamid Gul322 
…. For his voice to have carried through all the doors … in order to 
reach me meant that the corridors of our intelligence services were 
empty, leaving the voice of ISI free passage to echo through from the 
1980s. Christ, enemy were in our camps and welcomed there. It was 
chilling to know this.323 
Having seen the wall map in DIRA before the DIS meeting and the 
later one in the pub with DIRA I knew the absolute probability was 
we were going to war in Afghanistan, [with] at the very least a serious 
bombing campaign.
I left the meeting in a … state of shock … it clearly marked the path 
we were edging towards, kinetic force, the trap of the secondary arena 
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… I knew if we went to war [in Afghanistan] in a kinetic manner we 
would bury people we had no need to lose, barring the results of a 
marriage between ignorance and arrogance and the bastard child 
sired by those afflictions. That child is now eight years old.324
At this stage, Seeger was still a little more hopeful;
After the initial MOD meeting (which was only a start) we were still 
hopeful - excited even, that Abdul Haq offered the way ahead and 
that it would be quickly picked up. It was only after Paddy came back 
with the comments about ‘other resources’ and ‘Haq baggage’ and no 
one bothered to make contact with Abdul in Rome, that we realised 
there was going to be an uphill battle.
Days later, Gunston returned from Rome. Guest was already comm-
itted to filming part of a series from the trenches in northern France. 
So Gunston and Seeger visited Peshawar from 1 to 9 October 2001. 
Seeger wrote:
Where we assessed Abdul Haq’s plan for overthrowing the Taliban 
with a Pashtun field force. Before leaving (and the start of the bombing 
on 7 October) we submitted a modest list of requirements to the British 
Embassy (at their request).325 
In further summaries of their collective thinking, Seeger explained 
to Ashdown et al, what Haq was attempting to do:
AQ, estimated then to be a 10,000 man private army of Arabs and 
Pakistanis, of which 3-4000 of which were known to be the most 
aggressive troops in Afghanistan and had been used as the Taliban’s 
shock troops in their war against the northern alliance. Even if the 
Taliban had wanted to give up OBL, it is highly unlikely they could 
have done so whilst at the same time fighting the NA.326
It would be better, they said, for the Afghans to be the ones to defeat 
AQ, and if:
… Afghans were not involved at all (or only one faction used eg 
the Northern Alliance), an already difficult problem would be 
compounded as the Pashtuns (or worse still the Afghans as a whole) 
might close ranks against the western invader and fight with al Qaeda 
instead of against them.327 
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It would be a mistake, they stressed, to use the Northern Alliance to 
defeat the Taliban as:
… this would be resisted badly by the citizens of Kabul, surrounding 
Pashtun tribes and the Hazaras – all of whom have sufferred badly 
at the hands of the NA. The leaders of an inside solution must be 
pashtuns (the largest ethnic group – approx 44% of the population 
in contrast to the tajiks, the next largest group who are about 25%). 
While the Taliban could easily fragment (for reasons given earlier) 
they would be most unwilling to surrender or defect to the NA or 
western invaders. An adequately backed Pashtun field force would 
be a different matter. This could trigger large scale defections, build 
an alliance with the Northern tribes and facilitate the building of a 
widely accepted broad based government.328
Sadly this did not happen. In the report he made of that visit to 
Peshawar329 before Haq’s last entry to Afghanistan, he said of the 
bombing campaign:
We have probably lost our best chance of achieving a peaceful, lasting 
and relatively bloodless solution. This would have been for Abdul Haq 
to have marched on Kabul, destroyed (mainly through defections) the 
Taliban and then possibly in conjunction with the Northern Alliance 
defeated the al Qaida Arab army.  
Seeger and John Gunston left Peshawar on the 9 October, hoping to 
push this message in London. Seeger later wrote:
Meanwhile no support had been given to Haq although a derisory 
offer of four sattelite telephones had been made by the British (Haq 
had already bought a large number of these in Dubai and what he 
really needed - and as was made clear by us in our submission330 - 
was proper secure military radios). Realising that no serious help 
was forthcoming, Haq opted for a quixotic gesture and entered 
Afghanistan on October 21st from Parachinar to work with the tribal 
leaders and village headmen in the Azrow/Hisarak area331… when 
challenged by the Taliban border guards at Terimangul he told them 
who he was. The Taliban then put in large forces led by Arabs to 
converge on Azrow. Haq ran into these on the night of Thursday 25 
October. There was some confused firing and then Haq tried talking 
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to a small deputation.  This was joined by an arab who on hearing 
who Haq was, cocked his rifle and arrested him. Haq and his chief 
of staff Sayed Hamid were led away and shot the next day Friday 
26 October in Rischoor barracks Kabul by arabs and Pakistanis. His 
nephew Isatullah, a bright young man of 23 who had been a great 
help to us in Peshawar and who had recently married into the Chitral 
Royal Family, was captured and shot the following Tuesday in Azrow 
and had his body thrown into a well.332 
Guest, like Ritchie who had told me, ‘No one can hold a candle to 
him’, said of Haq’s death:
And then … the impossible blow that Haq was dead and with his 
passing went out the last flaming hope for a good result. The scale of 
the needless tragedy was clear and yet so far hidden from common 
understanding it was not appreciated then and is little understood 
now. For me it was a moment such as I have never heard so eloquently 
expressed elsewhere about the coming storm of war as Sir Edward 
Grey on 3 August 1914. The lamps are going out all over Europe; we 
shall not see them lit again in our lifetime.
Seeger later summarised what had happened between September 
and December 2001.333 Under the title, ‘Why no attention given to 
Haq?’, he writes,
Despite his offerring of a possible early solution, Haq never received 
any serious western attention. We lobbied hard on his behalf but to no 
avail. It seemed that Haq was distrusted or thought incapable of the 
task and / or other Pashtun leaders were preferred. Rumours were 
spread about his business interests, his involvement with Russian 
tarts and his penchant for insubstantial showmanship (Hollywood 
Haq). To anyone who knew him or had operated with him, these  
were absurd.334 
Guest, commenting on these allegations and what Ashdown had 
said about Haq ‘having baggage’ said;
ISI do not indulge [in] idle gossip. We did. Anything ISI said had an 
agenda … So what exactly was the ‘baggage’ in the views expressed 
by ISI chief Hamid Gul in the ‘80s and echoeing back in 2001? Haq’s 
independence of spirit and word? When Haq’s ‘baggage’ was put to 
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me by Ashdown as a hurdle to advancing Haq, I did not hesitate in 
my response. I asked him to return to source and find out what this 
‘baggage’ was and he would then find the charge would vanish like 
mist on a windy day … He called me back a couple of days later and 
said, ‘You were right, there is nothing specific attached to the baggage 
allegation’. I suggested ‘nothing specific’ meant ‘nothing at all’ as if 
there had been a shred of support, rest assured, there would have 
been no hesitation in presenting it. Nobody could as it didn’t exist.335 
Such allegations were intended to promote the view that Haq should 
not be supported because, as Seeger concluded:
He was his own man. As a consequence he was never a favourite of the 
Pakistanis and perhaps for the same reason therefore of the Americans 
also. Yet it is precisely because of this that he had such widespread 
trust and pledges of support from Afghans.336
Seeger says somewhat ironically,
His one real failing was that he did not like to ask for anything that 
he thought might be refused.337 Even worse than this disparaging of 
and reluctance to work with Haq was the possibility that an inside 
Pashtun solution was not wanted at all or thought to be unnecessary 
(i.e. a solution could/should be obtained by American arms and the 
Northern Alliance alone).338 Or perhaps it was just a failure of the 
Coalition leaders to understand the complexities of the situation and 
the need for speed. Early backing of Haq and/or a Pushtun field force 
could have overthrown the Taliban without recourse to bombing. 
Once the bombing started it became a race against time. A strong 
convincing anti-Taliban Pushtun field force had to be in place before 
Pushtun feelings inside Afghanistan had hardened irrevocably against 
the coalition and/or the arrival of Northern Alliance troops at Kabul 
and the inevitable hardening of tensions that this would bring.339
As to the ‘other resources’ mentioned to them by Ashdown it 
became clear:
… that the American and British favourite was Hamid Karzai, chief 
of the Popalzai tribe … Although essentially a good man (who Haq 
might also have wanted/backed as a Premier) he was not a proven 
field commander with the potential to act as a counterweight to the 
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Northern Alliance. This was subsequently shown by his failure to 
capture Kandahar (despite US SF support). 
Seeger’s note continued:
But even if he had been able to capture Kandahar, this was hardly 
enough to balance the Northern Alliance. The key was Kabul and a 
Pashtun leader had to take this. In this respect Karzai never stood a 
chance, while Haq of course did.
When I asked Seeger why in his opinion so little attention had 
been shown to Haq, he said that he thought it was because British 
Intelligence just wasn’t interested. 
Some attempt was made to talk to Abdul, but those tasked to do so 
always seemed to arrive too late: just after Abdul had moved on, from 
Rome to Dubai, then Dubai to Peshawer. Abdul was finally seen in 
Peshawer by someone from the British Embassy but nothing of note 
came of this, apart from the derisory offer of 4 satcom telephones. 
Yet significant amounts of money and support had been offered 
to other players whose names they seemed to have received very 
quickly.
Guest was more direct:
The truth is our systems were inadequate and utterly failed on 
intelligence. Why? How could they miss a collosus like Haq? What 
happened?340
***
I asked Guest, who explained to me that the problem in the West’s 
battle against the Taliban was one of perception, to clarify what he 
meant when he spoke of the various ‘generations’ of warfare. For 
this was the bedrock of why this war was one of perception. He 
wrote back:341 
1st Generation – we grapple hand to hand and batter each other  
with rocks.
2nd Generation – we wise up, use spears and bows to batter each other 
from a distance using some force delivery system.
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3rd Generation – we complicate the whole thing by adding manoeuvre. 
Manoeuvre warfare can mean cavalry, tanks, aircraft and the mobility 
compounds all the problems
4th Generation is where conventional force mass (mostly ‘state v state’ 
but inclusive of civil wars and guerrilla warfare) is not confronted by 
an opposing state or force of a similar nature and where conventional 
strategy is confounded by the abstract nature of the resistance.
In 4th Generation the prime arena is psychological and the application 
of conventional force mass out of sync with the combat arena. Where 
you attempt to resolve a physiological frontline with conventional 
force the more force you use the worse the result can be. 
This made sense, particularly when he added:
Taliban is a concept not a conventional force mass … Where we attempt 
to strike it with conventional means we flounder. Can this be proved? 
Yes. Look at the other side and reason how they achieve a better result 
with considerably less mass and resources. They primarily fight in 
[the] prime arena, mastery of the physiological front. It is a war of 
perception. This means our best weapon is being smart. Do you think 
we have been smart so far? Dis-regarding the distasteful nature of 
the opposing side, do you think they have fought a smart campaign? 
Based on results (they tend to lose tactically but win strategically, 
which is what matters) I would say they are very smart.
To win against an idea and a battle for perception you must have a 
smarter idea and the capacity to implant that as the best option. To 
do this effectively you must understand the local dynamics and the 
nature of the oppsing side. I would argue, based on how the West 
approaches the problem, the West do not understand the dynamics or 
the other side.
 We … [have fallen] into [the kinetic arena] as we had that capacity 
and it was our ‘comfort zone of understanding’. However the prime 
arena was not kinetic, it was psychological.342 
As Guest, Ritchie and Abdul Haq had understood only too well, 
the key of Abdul Haq’s message was the need to avoid resorting to 
kinetic warfare from the outset. For Haq knew that anything kinetic 
would immediately change the dynamics. 
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***
So what was the outcome of those decisions taken in September and 
October 2001? Guest remarked:
We have been warring in Afghanistan two years longer than it took 
to win world war two and we are nowhere near that point Churchill 
described after the ‘Victory at El Alamein in 1942 as ‘the end of the 
beginning’ where costly but marked achievements had been attained, 
the path was still rough but it was defined. [Today] we are still 
searching for our path and doing it without scouts. 
What does this have to do with Intelligence warfare and Afghanistan? 
Ponderous corporate mentality in a fast moving environment 
where your best arm is not kinetic, it is intelligence and flexibility. 
Probably because of that significant post cold war re-shuffling, where 
jealous bureaucrats, always the majority, ousted the field veterans. 
Result, slowly moving, safety seeking career seeking, career minded 
bureaucrats seize total control. Where the bureaucrats win we get spin 
…. it can be hard realising … we’ve lost because of all the smoke and 
mirrors involved. Does it begin to sound like where we are now?
So back tracking, British Intelligence were unable to take things on 
board as they were poorly informed, inflexible in motion, resistant to 
alternative views and comfortably corporate in mentality. Not at all 
the dashing image we like James Bond to be. 
If our leaders advise … that we bomb our way through rather than 
think our way through we must question the wisdom and the value 
of such leaders and suffer the pains … of their mistakes. Thucydides 
wrote, ‘The state that separates its scholars from its warriors will have 
its thinking done by cowards and its fighting by fools’.
In 2001 there was a far better option on the table that offered an honest 
and strong Afghan leader, the use of the tribes, sealing the border to 
prevent escapes and virtually no US footprint, other than discreet 
use of Special Forces as observers for report back needs. In effect an 
Islamic rejection of terrorism as un-islamic, exactly what we, in the 
West, should have been looking for and supporting.343
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In 2001 the West advanced without proper contextual understanding 
… We favoured wide bombing, often wide of the mark, ever expanding 
US / Allies ground force deployment, installing a weak leader, 
resulting in no government capacity and massive corruption. What 
we got, is what you see now. It isn’t pretty but it was all perfectly 
predictable, and it is the sort of thing that happens when we fail 
to properly consider all the options. Not ensuring we have sound 
strategy and full tactical support is a betrayal of trust our youth will 
pay for in blood.344 
… Tactically it may have felt like victory, with things being bombed 
and blown up. This was the fire works display demanded at the time 
and as such it worked fine, merely lacking any capacity to deliver the 
strategic objective. 
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CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE 
ABDUL HAQ AND CIA STRATEGY  
IN AFGHANISTAN
The State that separates its scholars from its Warriors  
will have its thinking done by cowards, and its fighting by fools. 
Thucydides
Abdul Haq’s story is important because it is symptomatic of a wider 
− and in many ways more important − story. This was hinted at in 
Whitney Azoy’s tribute piece in November 2001: 
Back to ‘maybe he was, maybe he wasn’t’. If Abdul Haq wasn’t actively 
supported by the United States, why wasn’t he? Because he was too 
independent? Because our Pakistani ‘allies’ didn’t trust him – as, with 
excellent reason, he didn’t trust them? Or perhaps because our own 
planners didn’t think of it first? Our Afghanistan planners haven’t 
been too good at their task for quite some time…353
The USA’s ‘Afghanistan planners’ were, of course, the CIA. 
Although there are numerous intelligence outfits that make up the 
US government − so many in fact that ‘they operate in an anarchy 
of chaos, competition and disunity’354 − it was primarily the CIA 
who were responsible for the failure to recognise the value of what 
Abdul Haq’s ‘Afghan Solution’ represented. 
In many ways the squandering of the opportunity that Haq 
could have provided, and the suppression of the warnings he had 
made reflects a continuation of the CIA’s policy in the region since 
the 1980s. 
For example when I had asked Guest to clarify whether Kaplan 
had been correct in asserting that Haq’s performance with Reagan 
had been instrumental in the procurement for the mujahiddeen of 
stinger missiles, his reply said much about what was wrong with 
CIA policy during the anti-Soviet jihad. Initially he referred to 
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Charlie Wilson’s War, which had recently enjoyed huge success as a 
book and film in the US. 
I really enjoyed Charlie Wilson’s War as entertainment, the relationship de- 
picted between Wilson and the CIA was priceless. Is it history? No … 
In the film, Charlie Wilson was pushing for Stingers for Massoud.  
And yet, at the time Massoud was not favoured by US/CIA and 
remained in that sad state of neglect by them through to the end of 1989. 
The same barrier to understanding his value applied to Haq and the 
barrier was a two bar gate, ISI agendas and CIA lack of understanding; 
a result of their bunkered down Fort Apache approach, in the rear 
with the beer and wholly reliant on secondary sources, the prime part 
of which was ISI.
Abdul certainly wanted Stingers, but not being favoured by CIA, 
he was not recognised as an outstanding commander and so not 
supplied with them…. as far as Milton ‘Milt’ Beardon, CIA Head 
of Station 1986−91, was concerned, Abdul Haq was not the finest 
Pashtun guerilla commander of the war, the only Pashtun commander 
to evolve into the secondary phase of guerilla warfare (mobility), the 
only one to have strategic reach to his planning, the commander of the 
most spectacular operations: destruction of the 40th Army Ammunition 
Dump at Karga, blowing up of the power lines to Kabul, attack on 
the Sarobi damn – every bit as daring as the Hollywood WWII film 
The Guns of Navarone. To Milt, Abdul Haq was nothing more than a 
simple, minor Commander. Less in fact; to Milt he was ‘Hollywood 
Haq’. It was long Milt’s proud boast that he coined that ignorant 
view, one he delighted in repeating ad nauseam to journalists. Having 
a grassroot view rather than a gin glass view of what was really going 
on inside Afghanistan, I have always felt the view expressed by Milt 
was not only inaccurate, it was profoundly distasteful and damaging 
to mujahideen needs. 
Milt and his like were so blind, they did not take what Haq had to say 
seriously. Abdul certainly wanted Stingers and had a good idea how 
best to use them as well. He argued he would not waste them in ones 
and twos all over the mountains, he wanted to deploy them where 
they could do the most harm, in and around Kabul airport, making 
every hit not only painful but highly visible. He was right.355 
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Guest was not the only journalist to have noticed that the CIA 
seemed to rely almost exclusively on the ISI for their intelligence. 
Robert Kaplan recalls a visit to Kandahar in 1988, when he discusses 
seeing Soviet aircraft − at that stage supposed to have taken hits 
from the mujahideen and departed − still flying in and out. He was 
confused because US intelligence reports from Islamabad continued 
to put out reports that,  ‘heavy mujahideen presence’ had deterred 
all enemy aircraft from landing or taking off from Kandahar airport 
during the entire period of my visit’.356 Kaplan asked whom the 
Americans were relying on for their information, and said, ‘I was 
stunned to learn it was their liaison in ISI’.
Possibly Kaplan was ‘stunned’ because he knew that the ISI’s 
strategic objectives for Afghanistan were not the same as those of 
the US. ISI was, he says:
… intent on creating a fundamentalist Afghanistan in Zia’s image, 
wanted Kandahar to fall only if the credit and the spoils could go to 
commanders like Hekmatayar and Rasul Sayyaf (the leader of another 
fundamentalist mujahideen party that, like Hekmatayars, depended 
on outside support and was thus easily manipulated by ISI).357 
Kaplan concludes: 
The awful truth seemed to be that the only sources of information 
the United States had about the fighting in Kandahar, and anywhere 
else in Afghanistan during the later stage of the war, were there own 
satellite photographs and what ISI chose to tell them.358 
Other journalists covering Afghanistan during the 1980s were also 
critical. Peter Jouvenal told me: 
The Americans did and still do favour Hikmatyar . Even as recently 
as last year [2008], the CIA tried to weedle Hikmatyar into the present 
government. During the 1980s, and until the election of Benazir’s 
widower, Asif Ali Zadari, the US listened too much to Pakistan. It 
was this blind obediance by the Americans to the ISI and support for 
Hizb-i-islami [Hikmatyar ] which in my view contributed to 9/11. 
The attitude [of the Americans] was very short-term in the 1980s, very 
much ‘let’s get even for Vietnam’. Because the US didn’t really care 
long-term, [they] encouraged the Arabs to come as thought it would 
give more legitimacy to the jihad. 
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In a book which has been as under-recognised as it was prescient, 
John Cooley359 discusses the ‘devastating consequences for world 
peace’ of CIA support for radical Islam. Cooley notes that by 1988, 
Sayyaf had built a huge Arab-funded development near Peshawar 
to house forty thousand360 people. He adds that this opulent lifestyle 
depended on the largesse of ISI and President Zia al-Haq (and 
ultimately the CIA, which, he says was unable to control the flow of 
its funds until after the death in a plane crash of ISI Chief General 
Akhtar and President Zia in 1988, in other words, as the jihad was 
ending and the Russians leaving.361 
So, given that the CIA had apparently ignored, undermined and 
even interfered with Abdul Haq’s plan, the question remains what 
was the strategy used by the CIA in Afghanistan after September 11? 
Afghan analyst Barnett Rubin throws some light on this when he 
says that in National Security Council (NSC) deliberations between 
Bush and the NSC on how to respond to September 11, the single 
focus was:
… the type of intelligence and military operations that would destroy 
al Qaeda and the Taliban regime. When the talk dealt with Afghan 
actors, the only questions were whether they would fight the Taliban 
and al Qaeda.362 
As with Iraq, Rubin says there was no mention of post-war 
scenarios.363 
Ironically, while Abdul Haq was meeting defecting Taliban 
commanders in Peshawar, the CIA were planning their own assault 
on Afghanistan. Rubin relates how on Saturday September 15, 
President Bush met with his war cabinet at Camp David. There, 
the CIA Director George Tenet presented the CIA’s plan for striking 
terrorist bases and overthrowing the Taliban with a combination of 
air power and Special Operations. A week later Tenet was: ‘planning 
the alliance of Afghan forces that would make this a US-assisted 
Afghan operation against foreign occupiers’.364 Within three days of 
September 11, the CIA were already planning a bombing campaign. 
This was still ten days before Guest would see the wall map with its 
red arrows at the MOD in London. 
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Further tactics – such as ‘buying off’ Northern Alliance warlords 
− are revealed in published accounts by veteran CIA operatives. For 
example, Gary Shroen365 recounts how in late September 2001, he 
carried $3 million USD in cash into the Panjshir valley, meeting with 
Engineer Arif, Massoud’s intelligence chief. Shroen informed Arif of 
the US intention to overthrow the Taliban, although ‘officially’ 
President Bush was awaiting a response to his ultimatum that they 
give up bin Laden. Shroen then explained to Arif that, in order to 
act as:
… an honest broker in a post-Taliban Afghanistan … the US would 
disburse money directly to commanders … The CIA would control 
funding and arming [of] commanders separately through small 
CIA teams to assure that Afghans followed a strategy made in 
Washington.366 
Yet CIA operatives like Schroen failed to foresee how their initial 
empowerment of these strongmen would soon become a runaway 
horse. For, as Rubin adds, ‘these were only a few of the figures 
whom these funds and arms empowered more effectively than any 
election’. 
Shroen gave Arif $500,000 USD cash and told him to stress to 
Fahim that much more money was available for purely military 
purposes. The following day Shroen met General Fahim and gave 
him $1 million. Schroen then travelled to Charikar where he gave 
$100,000 to Sayyaf. A few days later, the CIA’s Counter Terrorist 
Centre delivered a further $10 million. Shroen says he left the four 
cardboard boxes containing the cash in a corner of the office that 
Arif gave him and he and Arif later had a ‘good laugh’ when Shroen 
gave Arif $22,000 for two trucks of helicopter fuel that somehow 
never materialised.367 
Rubin says, ‘The amount of cash given to commanders by 
the CIA in this manner ultimately amounted to several hundred 
million dollars’. The commanders, Rubin adds, changed the 
dollars quickly into local currency because the value of the US 
dollar sank as the local Afghani currency was flooded with 
CIA cash. The dollars’ deflation became an incentive for these 
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commanders to turn it into profitable investment. With the price 
of opium so high after the Taliban’s recent ban, these Northern 
Alliance commanders quickly recycled the money into loans to 
farmers to finance the next spring’s poppy crop.368 Arif then built 
a four story house which looked like the kitsch marble mansion of 
a Pakistani drug dealer and which I had seen when undertaking 
election monitoring in the Panjshir. But this was small fry when 
compared to General Fahim’s investment in numerous properties 
and a $30 million gold market in Kabul. 
James Ritchie said to me of Fahim, ‘by 2004 the IRI369 told an 
Afghan friend of mine that he had accumulated $1 billion in wealth. 
$500 million in cash and another $500 million in business interests. 
Now he looks to be the next Vice President. I have personally seen 
him confiscate millions in real estate from our foundation.370 
Meanwhile Sayyaf was in a large villa in Paghman, just west of 
Kabul where he ruled the district with his private militia, seized 
land and sent raiders into western Kabul, as he had during the 
early 1990s when he had apparently played a key role in the Afshar 
massacre. Today, he was still terrorising both locals and rivals alike. 
He had also, I learnt from British Embassy staff in January 2001, 
broken through Taliban front lines against the wishes of the coalition 
in order to storm into Kabul. Later, he continued to have his rocket 
launchers aimed on the city. 
Ironically, back in September 2001 in Washington DC, the day 
before Schroen’s arrival in Afghanistan, the State Department were 
demanding receipts from the King’s group for a few thousand dollars. 
Yet, in the Panjshir, as described by Shroen himself, Afghanistan’s 
future was playing out on a very different and utterly unaccountable 
trajectory. The interesting thing though about Schroen’s account is 
how consistent the book is with previous accounts written by ex-CIA 
operatives, such as those of Beardon. This consistent misinformation 
− as Guest told me371 − indicates why the past thirty years of CIA 
policy in the region have ultimately failed. For example, Schroen 
recounts that Abdullah Abdullah was aware that Abdul Haq was in 
contact with people in Washington. Shroen says:
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Abdul Haq had always opposed Massood and the Tajiks. His 
popularity with key officials at the State Department and within the 
NSC was troubling, because he would certainly be pressing the same 
negative line about holding the Tajiks back from Kabul and focusing 
on the Pashtun south.372 
Either ignorance or plain mischief must account for what Shroen 
says next: 
Abdullah was convinced that if he could visit Washington to meet 
with senior policy makers, he would be able to clearly articulate the 
political policies of the Northern Alliance and, he hoped, reduce the 
distrust and fears of those who did not understand Afghanistan and 
its tortured history of these last twenty-plus years. I agreed that his 
visit to Washington was important. 
Here the CIA infer − rather bizarrely − that Abdul Haq ‘already’ 
had support in DC and that they had to ‘fight’ to get support for 
the Northern Alliance route. He also thoroughly discounts the 
unpopularity of the Northern Alliance given their role in the inter-
factional fighting of the early 1990s that laid waste to Kabul and 
made the countryside as insecure as it is today. His assertion that 
Haq already had support also conflicts with the many accounts 
given of US policy: from National Security Council reports, to the 
accounts of the Ritchies, to that of the former Reagan National 
Security Advisor, Bud McFarlane, who had been lobbying for Haq 
in Washington DC since well before September 11.
Critically, Shroen unwittingly shows that the CIA had failed to 
appreciate the need for a genuine Pashtun response to September 
11. Instead he parrots the taunts of his colleague, Milton Beardon, 
when describing Haq and the Ritchie effort:
Within the CIA he became known as ‘Hollywood Haq’ and from then 
on, he did all his fighting with his mouth. He played no role in the 
mujahideen interim government of 1992 to 1996, so I thought that the 
effort to try to build him into a political figure who could challenge 
the Taliban was a waste of time. Haq had no tribal base of support 
to which he could attach himself (unlike Hamid Karzai, whose roots 
in the Tarin Kowt area north of Kandahar were strong and deep).  
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I predicted that if Abdul Haq moved into the Jalalabad area without an 
established base, he would be killed by the Taliban. Now that scenario 
was being played out in deadly earnest. 
Here Schroen not only discounts Haq’s leadership as ‘the’ foremost 
Pashtun commander,373 he also twists the reason why Haq had 
honourably quit Kabul in 1992, as well as thoroughly discounting 
the role Haq had played in the Rome Process in the years leading 
up to September 11. It is bizarre that he makes so much of Hamid 
Karzai’s roots in Tirin Kot because – although Hamid Karzai’s 
father, Ahad, was well thought of – Hamid was not a well known 
figure during the jihad or nationally. 
Guest had this to say of CIA management of the Soviet-Afghan War:
The CIA was trusted with monitoring the Soviet Afghan War at close 
quarter, but was happy to … do nothing even marginally beyond the 
norm, accepting as gospel all that ISI told them. This betrayed the 
trust of the true heroes of the Afghan-Soviet War, among whom Abdul 
Haq, that they would rise to the needs of the hour, and do everything 
in their power to ensure the men doing the fighting and the dying 
were fully and properly supported … In my view, having spent time 
where the dying was done, that was a betrayal of trust not only to the 
men doing the dying, the Afghans, but also of the essential needs of 
the US to watch and learn, in order to increase their understanding of 
regional dynamics on the ground. This failure is where the root of all 
our present troubles are embedded. It mattered then and it matters 
now that we understand the dynamics. Incredibly, CIA contributed 
nothing to that understanding. In my view, that was a failure that 
set the path towards the future we now endure. If the lesson is not 
learned nothing changes.
… [Yet] the cure was so simple. Do not rely on single source intelligence, 
and the US did, they relied on ISI, fundamentalists with political 
agendas.374 
One of the prime examples of the CIA’s failure to accurately report 
the actuality of key events occurring inside Afghanistan at the height 
of the anti-Soviet war was the issue – which I have already recalled − 
of the Qarga operation. In the documentary on Haq, Afghan Warrior, 
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Malcolm Brinkworth, the presenter, asked Beardon about the attack 
on Qarga dam. Who was the commander? Guest, who was behind 
the camera filming, recalls: 
Milt had no idea at all. He blustered that it was important, that lots of 
people claimed credit, that it did not matter. Actually it did matter. He 
had described this event as the most important thing in his career, it 
had occurred soon after his arrival as CIA head of station in Islamabad 
and he said he was showered with congratulatory messages and 
lorded as the hero of the hour. He said it ‘made me’. And as the head 
of CIA station, charged with understanding the war and accurately 
reporting it and advising upon it, with all the funds and resources 
at his disposal (the largest ever American ‘covert’ operation) surely, 
who was the brilliant young Mujahead Commander in charge of the 
operation was worth knowing. A man to mark as one to support. 
People inside Afghanistan knew the name of the Commander, every 
Pashtun boasted about it as the Commander was Pashtun. That man 
was Abdul Haq. The man Milt beastly claimed credit for dubbing 
‘Hollywood Haq’. The man so denigrated, repeatedly by Beardon. 
The man ISI did not like.375 
Guest had written a book in 1996 naming Abdul as the commander376 
and told me: ‘Yet in 2002, Milt still had no idea’.377 This assertion is 
supported by Beardon’s own book,378 where he says dismissively of 
the Qarga operation: 
I never did find out who launched the attack – a dozen commanders 
insisted they were responsible – so I just decided to believe all or all or 
none of their claims. Kharga was smoking, and the mujahideen had a 
hundred new heroes. That was enough for me”.
Guest added; 
Later, the interview done and as the camera kit was being packed 
away, I casually asked Beardon, if he might have the telephone number 
of a man named Hamid Gul. Beardon rattled out the number off the 
top of his head. It confirmed to me what I expected it to, for there 
was nothing chance about the asking. It betrayed, that Beardon was, 
apparently, still in steady communication with Hamid Gul. It was 
exactly what I expected to hear and was useful to know.379 
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On this fact, Guest noted: 
Of interest to me was the suggestion that in 2001, with panic the order 
of the day … [the] CIA turned to their former ‘experts’ of the region, 
like Beardon, for advice. And having not paid much attention when 
they had the opportunity they had very little to contribute other than 
seeking the views of their prime source before: ISI. The could be cause 
enough to have Beardon calling Hamid Gul often enough between 
Sept 2001 and 2002 to be able to rattle out his phone number off the 
top of his head in 2002 despite not having been deployed to the region 
since early 1989. 
Guest, like most journalists covering the jihad, knew that Hamid 
Gul, despite no longer being ISI chief, in reality remained very 
influential on ‘policy’. 
Guest had met Gul during the course of filming the Haq docu-
mentary. He said of him:
Now, although I do not agree with his political view (dressed up as 
Islamic ideals), there was no doubt that Hamid was a very intelligent 
man. More than able to run rings around Milt whilst standing on one 
leg blindfolded and juggling hand grenades, and, of course he did 
that during the Soviet-Afghan War. 
During the Soviet-Afghan War, and repeated now, we allowed reliance 
on systems that lacked practical understandings to work through the 
Afghan puzzle. As a result, lacking sure foundations to set a viable 
strategy upon, we now largely rely on kinetic force to bomb our way 
out. That this is a strategy of desperation is not lost to the opposing 
force and affords them outstanding propaganda value. Result: where 
once there were clear paths through the maze, the way out is now 
far more complicated. To escape, we need less kinetic force and more 
scouts.
It was possibly this type of gullibility by the CIA which had led 
to the border problems I had witnessed at the Durand Line, when 
in 2003 Pakistan began making incursions onto Afghan territory, 
supported by the Americans.380 
Moreover, despite the assertions of Schroen and the CIA about 
the worthlessness of Haq, their opinion failed to appreciate the 
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wider dynamics of the USA’s post-September 11 engagement in 
Afghanistan. Yet others − not just the Ritchies, Guest, Seeger and 
Gunston − had foreseen the problems. In the November 2001 
tribute to Haq, veteran US diplomat and writer, Whitney Azoy had 
declared, and some might now admit, with tremendous prescience 
Only by such efforts as Abdul Haq’s – this much is increasingly, 
glaringly clear – can US objectives be achieved in the nexus of Afghan 
national power south of the Hindu Kush. Bombing can’t. US troops 
can’t. Northern Alliance troops (non-Pashtuns) can’t. Turkish troops 
(ethnically more akin to the hated Northern Alliance Uzbeks) can’t. 
Only the Pashtuns themselves – the groups from which the Taliban 
sprang and which now harbour Osama bin Laden – can get this job 
done.381 
***
Joe Ritchie was also interviewed for the documentary, Afghan 
Warrior, in 2003 and in this he says more about the Rome group, 
and what the Ritchies and Abdul Haq had been doing, as regards 
formulating an alternative plan to finish the Taliban, in the run up 
to September 11. It also shows Joe Ritchie’s view of the CIA and 
their role. 
Joe began by saying that he and his brother had wanted to do 
something to help Afghans get out of ‘the twenty-five years of hell’ 
they had suffered. The key was, as far as they were concerned, to 
find an alternative to the both the Taliban and the Northern Alliance 
warlords. 
The Taliban was bad but not necessarily worse than warlords. The 
Afghan people were capable of kicking the Taliban out given an 
alternative which hadn’t been given to them. The former King, 
because his name was gilt-edged, and because he was associated with 
a much better time, and was known to be a guy who was not power 
hungry and that actually kept the tribal balance … was the potential 
… alternative if he could be gotten into play.382 
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So the Ritchies worked on the King and on the concept of Loya Jirga. 
During the process Joe also got to know Haq and soon appreciated 
the need for a military component to the plan. Haq was, he said, 
‘The key guy there who was capable of … putting together the 
commanders that were needed to make this militarily playable’. He 
had ‘instantly connected’ with Haq. 
As I got to know him I realised the dimensions of this guy that he 
was extremely brilliant, sophisticated, liberal in a good kind of way 
… gentle, sensitive … and he had a leadership ability that he could 
bring Afghans together … Afghans are extremely fractious people, 
this was a man that could bring Afghan commanders together … 
because commanders are even more fractious and he just led by virtue 
of the fact that he was the man with the vision and everybody realised 
this, he never pushed himself forward, he just … was present and … 
would wind up leading whatever group he was in by virtue of … of 
his merits. 
Even before they had the King in play, Haq had taken a trip in 
early 2001 to Peshawar and realised that the Taliban had only weak 
support then in Afghanistan. He said to Joe, ‘This fruit is ready to be 
picked, the Taliban can be taken out now’. 
At this stage Joe said that because of Haq’s assets (in terms of 
commanders who knew and trusted him), there was the potential 
to go in with or without the King’s help. 
This was a man who – in a situation where it was virtually impossible 
not to have baggage − this was the man whose hands were clean. He 
said to me at one time, ‘I would favour a trial at the Hague of all the 
people involved in this, and I’ll be the first one to go stand trial. 
Joe talked of Haq’s integrity and how this had led to the murder 
of his wife and son in Peshawar ‘after it became known he was 
involved in the Loya Jirga concept’. 
In the years and months prior to September 11, the Ritchie 
brothers had − with Bud McFarlane − brought Haq’s plan to the 
attention of The White House, the State Department, the CIA and 
the Defence Department. 
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To lay out who Abdul Haq was, well they knew that pretty well 
already, but what his plan was, who the people, what the network 
was that he had available both inside and outside the Taliban, inside 
and outside Afghanistan, a lot of these people were in Peshawar, a lot 
were in Europe, a lot were in the US, a lot were inside Afghanistan … 
Thinking that … when they saw a network like this that they would 
be pretty eager to find a way to help out. … prior to 9/11 they just 
couldn’t seem to focus on that enough to actually want to do anything 
and then post 9/11, they wanted to do it another way. 
Jo Ritchie said of Haq’s ability: 
… this guy was a master at slipping into a place and setting up, er, 
contacts, sources, ah plants … at totally demoralising an enemy … 
he’d rather have a hundred guys up against ten thousand, but where 
the ten thousand knew that among them, there were some guys who 
were on the other side but they didn’t know who they were … he 
had a sense for that kind of warfare and … he would create a sense 
of momentum and inevitability that … would make an enemy feel 
defeated. Long before it was technically defeated …
But sadly:
There were some people who would, we’re talking pre 9/11 now, who 
recognised this to be a wonderful thing … but … it wasn’t their job to 
make it happen. The group that was in charge of making it happen, 
the CIA, had this problem with Abdul Haq … [they said] ‘This wasn’t 
a man you could count on to stay on message’ … There were times 
when he’d stood up and told the truth in spite of the fact that they 
didn’t want him to say those things. [So] they accused him of being 
‘Hollywood Haq’. I mean, this was the least Hollywood guy you ever 
met, I mean when he did get in the press incidentally, he did it at 
my insistence, for our people in Washington had finally said, I mean, 
he went to Peshawar and no press knew he was there, everything 
was totally under cover until finally the people in Washington said, 
‘Your’re never going to get any help from them unless he goes public’, 
and I called him and said, ‘Abdul you gotta go public’. Basically the 
problem was, he wasn’t a totally reliable puppet. 
Joe explained how he had persaded Haq to come to Rome in order 
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to persuade the King’s group to sign onto the Haq Plan. 
The King and the folks around him, his executive committee, 
recognised that nothing was happening, nothing had happened for 
years, there was nothing on the horizon that was going to happen, 
with one exception. Abdul Haq had a plan.
Haq went to Rome and went through his plans with the King’s 
Executive Committee, at the end of which, after they had grilled him 
with questions, he asked them whether ‘they’ had an alternative. 
They did not. 
So they unanimously voted to back what he was doing and … that’s 
when the King, after twenty, almost thirty years in exile, signed onto 
something that … were maybe some people were going to get hurt 
which I think he didn’t like at all, but, he recognised it was the only 
hope for his country, and so he, and the executive committee signed 
onto Abdul Haq’s plan.
With this two-pronged strategy − Haq and the King − now in hand, 
the Ritchie brothers assumed people in Washington would take an 
interest.
But it just didn’t happen, I mean there was still the same lack of 
willingness to actually step in and help out … and so by late July [2001] 
or early August, Abdul was saying to me, ‘Joe, save your time, save  
your energy, it’s not going to work … we’re just going to have to do it  
on our own’.
Within weeks the terrible thing, the ‘cataclysmic event for the 
West’ predicted by Haq back in 1991, happened. On the morning of 
September 11, Joe Ritchie and Bud McFarlane were due to meet the 
Secretary of State for South Asia. The meeting was cancelled and 
Joe Ritchie went to Rome, ‘to encourage the King to get into play, 
which he did’. Joe then returned to DC: 
… thinking that now we were in essence at war, it shouldn’t be a 
problem to get people to focus, on this [problem] of knocking off the 
Taliban … The problem then was that … they wanted to do it in their 
own way, without help from Abdul Haq.
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At this point, Joe Ritchie said, he felt like a guy walking down the 
street seeing some men trying to break into a safe:
… and I happen to have the key … and say, ‘here’s the key’ … how 
could you have a more golden opportunity to take something that’s 
been prepared for years and served up on a platter … people can’t 
possibly ignore it … But apparently the obvious fact is that the CIA 
didn’t work with the man who couldn’t be relied on to say exactly 
what they wanted, I mean … this guy was too courageous, this was a 
man who would stand up and, if things were being done too wrong 
… there’s a risk he would say it publicly … that one risk was just too 
great for them to deal with … 
Brinkworth asked Joe Ritchie just who in the US had recognised 
Haq’s potential.
I think people in the White House did recognise it … I think people 
at Central Command recognised it … but … It’s not their job to pick, I 
mean, it’s the CIA’s job to pick who we’re going to work with.
But after Haq’s death, the Ritchies had contact with Central Command. 
Because we explained that there were still a huge number of extremely 
courageous competent capable men in the field that weren’t being 
talked to at all, they … talked to us. And we found the uniform men 
terrific patriots, the right attitude, the right will, I thought they had 
it all correct, but again, they don’t make those choices, those choices 
are made somewhere else and … its basically CIA people making 
those choices and they’re the ones who, I think, stopped the train 
from going down that track … because the partners down that track 
weren’t necessarily totally buyable.
Like James, Joe Ritchie explained how the commanders had been 
due to gather in Rome for a meeting that had been scheduled prior 
to September 11. The call had gone out in August but many had visa 
problems getting there and so proceeded in dribs and drabs. 
They were overtaken by events and, so instead of being able to do this 
on a schedule that they had worked out, Haq felt he had to get back 
quickly, and he went to Peshawar in late September by himself. They 
couldn’t all follow because they had visa problems so they followed 
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piecemeal later on, and he headed to Peshawar and began collecting 
the … local folks there to go ahead with the … so he had to go ahead 
on a hurried basis. He didn’t really have the time to get everybody in 
place because he felt he needed to get there fairly quickly to prevent 
the Northern Alliance taking over Kabul and leaving Afghanistan 
with a long-term problem. 
Joe continued trying to get help from Washington: ‘but we kind of ran 
out of luck there’. Haq told Joe to give up saying they weren’t going 
to get help from there: 
… but I thought if we could get something so small as a helicopter ride 
across the border … we don’t need any weapons, don’t give us any 
money, no material supplies but if you can give Haq and a few guys a 
helicopter ride across the border, if you can take weapons that he has 
purchased in Peshawar and just drop them … at a given point … [That 
would] increase his chances of pulling this off, but it didn’t work out. 
At this stage Abdul Haq was in Peshawar and meeting with key 
members of the Taliban. 
His compound was ‘Grand Central Station’ in Peshawar. There 
were Afghan commanders from Peshawar, from Pakistan and from 
Afghanistan, but there were also these Taliban commanders who would 
sneak out of the country, come in and work out the arrangements and 
the understandings and … be given a satellite phone and they’d go 
back in and so they were in pace ready to defect at the appropriate 
moment … that‘s one of the reasons the East fell easily … I think 
without a shot being fired, when his network started barking the 
signals … after like the day the Northern Alliance moved in Kabul. 
He had to get in, with almost no one with him and virtually no arms, 
and first get a foothold, its like, you know, a beachhead, he had to get 
that done before he got snuffed out. 
Joe said that it was he who had encouraged Haq to do the interviews 
in Peshawar on his strategy. 
The strategy was simply that, it finally encouraged him to do that on 
the grounds that my advice … in Washington was … it was the only 
way we were going to get the Americans to focus on him … 
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Jo added that a couple of ‘agency’ guys in Peshawar were:
… amazed at … what he had built up as far as a following and  
a network and … they were totally bewildered at why he, why  
someone in Washington wasn’t reaching out a hand to help him.
When Brinkworth asked if there was a real level of ignorance in the 
CIA about who the players were, Joe said. 
You know, let me distinguish between inside and outside the CIA. 
Within the CIA its hard to imagine that they, they couldn’t have known 
who the players were … But I think it was that knowledge that kept 
them going the way they were going. They knew who could … who 
the … who the whores were and who … who the men of stature were 
and didn’t want the men of stature. Outside the CIA, I think there was 
the problem of not knowing enough about the players, because if they 
had known more, the … folks in the White House for example, and in 
some other places, I think they would have put some pressure on the 
CIA to use these guys. That was my sense of it, that when you got to 
the CIA guys, they … knew who the players were and they didn’t, and 
they wanted the guys they could buy, when you got outside the CIA 
they were less knowledgeable and then they would say, well the CIA 
guy tells us that Abdul Haq’s got baggage. Ah. And they, they didn’t 
want to pick a fight, you know, they didn’t want to go twist the arm of 
the CIA … whose responsibility it was to make these calls.
Regarding the final chat with ISI: 
We weren’t expecting any help from them … we figured that they 
were likely to try to betray him when he went in … we knew that they 
had been continuing to supply the Taliban with weapons.
At the end of the day the Brits ‘offered’ Abdul Haq four satellite 
phones. The Ritchies had given him sixty, which were being spread 
to Taliban commanders. He was offered four by the Americans, 
which Joe Ritchie said:
 … he respectfully declined, that was one thing he didn’t need, and he 
assumed that was probably offered so that they could track him more 
easily …
Abdul Haq is the symbol of giving Afghanistan back to the people. 
Massoud is the symbol of giving it back to the Tadjiks … to the Panjshiris. 
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He [Haq] said the bombing rallied people to supporting the Taliban, 
it meant people came in from outside [mostly Pakistanis] to fight on 
side of Taliban who had not been there. But once it was viewed as an 
American action it made it a lot tougher from the standpoint of real 
Afghans that wanted their country back … as now there was this split 
feeling about who were the good guys and the bad guys 
He thought it was a mistake … because the country could have been 
taken back by the Afghans and that was the real problem. Had they 
been allowed to do it, and it wouldn’t have taken long to find out 
whether they could or not, if they couldn’t, then then go back to the 
bombing plan but … if it could have been taken by this indigenous 
movement, then you had an Afghanistan in the hands of real Afghan 
patriots who believed in a broad-based multi-ethnic government. And 
if you weren’t willing to let that happen then you would up with, well, 
what we wound up with. And that’s why it was terribly important 
and that’s why he was in such a hurry to get in there and, ah, give the 
men a chance to do this. 
After Haq’s death, with his guys already inside Afghanistan armed 
with sattelite phones, Ritchie reiterated what I had heard from 
Gunston and Guest about Haq’s commanders in the South (which 
again demonstrated as ‘false’ the claims made in the British press 
that MI6 had somehow engineered the fall of the south).
They were in place, ready to go … he unfortunately got killed before the 
whole thing got rolling but they were still there, and they proceeded 
to take huge chunks of land, this wasn’t widely reported but it’s all 
there on the record … the whole east, which was his, the kind of core 
of his home territory, fell without a shot being fired … as far as I know, 
all the way from Sirobi clear to the border, which blocked the NA 
from coming further east, and then the first major town to the south, 
Ghazni, was taken by one of the men in his network, Ahrif Shah Jehan, 
a guy armed with a satellite phone and ten thousand dollars cash total 
to get the job done, but this was the guy that was the leader of the 
Hazaras … in Ghazni province, and so … these men, it was like he had 
said would happen. They stood up and took huge swathes of territory 
with very little fighting after his death. 
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Letter from Abdul Haq to former Ambassador 
Peter Tomsen (January 1993)
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ENDNOTES
1  There were three non fighting groups of Afghan exiles by 2000. The Rome group 
comprised the supporters of the ex King, Zahir Shah; the Bonn group was a 
splinter of the Rome group and the Cyprus group was made up of mostly Hazara 
and Pashtun Afghans who were against the re-instatement of the ex King and 
backed by Iran. Karzai was a member of the Rome Group (also known as the 
‘Rome Process’). 
2  For example in his book Descent into Chaos, (2008) Rashid says that – unlike his peers 
he argued in favour of an external military intervention in Afghanistan, seeing this 
as the ‘only’ way to ‘save’ the Afghan people from the Taliban …. and prevent the 
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as the driver was caught and killed by the regime. So with three friends, Haq set 
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  Haq’s tactical guerrilla fighting units around Kabul city operated in their own 
areas but united when necessary. From only four men Haq’s command grew to 
over 5000, with units completely surrounding the city. In the longer term, Haq’s 
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to speak only on condition of anonymity, said his unit had an extensive relationship 
with Mr. Matiullah. “Matiullah is the best there is here,” the officer said. This has 
irritated some local leaders who say that the line between Mr Matiullah’s business 
interest and the government has disappeared”.
  “Mr Matiullah’s operation, the officials said, is one of at least 23 private security 
companies working in the area without any governance license or oversight……” 
General Carter said that while he had no direct proof in Mr Matiullah’s case, he 
harboured more general worries that the legions of unregulated Afghan security 
companies had a financial interest in prolonging chaos”. (i.e in partaking in drug 
smuggling or enlisting Taliban or insurgents to attack those who did not use his 
security service). 
  Mr Matiullah was enlisted within a US intelligence report last spring as an associate 
of Ahmed Wali Karzai. 
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417  The prospect of large numbers of innocent civilians being killed has driven support 
lower, but still the majority in favor of military force has been quite strong. Asking 
four times since the attacks, CBS/New York Times consistently found two-thirds 
saying that military action ‘against whoever is responsible for the attacks’ should 
go forward ‘even if it means that innocent people are killed’. Likewise, ABC/
Washington Post found on 27 September that seventy percent supported military 
action even ‘if it meant innocent civilians in other countries might be hurt or killed’. 
Sixty-five percent favored ‘attacking terrorist bases and the countries that allow or 
support them even if there is a high likelihood of civilian casualties’ on September 
27-28 according to Newsweek. CBS/New York Times used the phrase: ‘What if … 
many thousands of innocent civilians may be killed?’ and still found sixty-eight 
percent support. On October 7th (while the US bombing was underway) NBC 
News found seventy-eight percent saying that ‘combating terrorism is worth 
risking civilian casualties in Afghanistan’. On October 17-18, Fox used strong 
language in a follow-on question (‘even if it cost the lives of thousands of civilians 
in the countries we attack?’) and still found sixty-two percent of the full sample in 
support.
418 Armed Forces Journal, April 2009
419 ibid
420 Written evidence passed to me by email from James Ritchie, July 2009.
421 al Shabab is thought to be hosting extremists from Pakistan and Afghanistan.
422  ‘Tora Bora Revisited: How We Failed to Get Bin Laden and Why It Matters Today’, a 
report to members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 
John F. Kerry Chairman, 111th Congress, first session 30 November 2009. 
423  In ‘The New American Foundation’ (December 2008), F. Berrigan and W.D. 
Hartung, write: ‘A new policy should not seek to reduce arms transfers as a goal 
in and of itself, but rather to strike a balance between short-term political and 
military considerations and long-term US interests in peace and stability. In many 
cases, seeking to enhance the role of human rights and conflict prevention in U.S. 
arms transfer policy will involve complex trade-offs, as in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
where massive ‘train and equip’ programs are central to the goal of reducing the 
direct U.S. military presence in those nations, although the new military and police 
forces in those nations have far to go in meeting basic human rights standards’.
424 Report by French MOD.
425  The problem of politicians who ‘fix’ the idea of going to war militarily yet who are 
subsequently offered Board seats with groups such as the Carlisle Group.
426 http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/zbig.html
427 www.warresisters.org/pages/piechart.htm (last checked March 2011)
428 eg The Times, 
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ACRONYMS
AIHRC – Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission
ANA – Afghan National Army 
ANP – Afghan National Police
CFC- ALPHA – Coalition Forces Command – ALPHA 
CENTCOM – US military’s Central Command 
DDR – Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-Integration
DEA – US Drug Enforcement Agency 
DIAG – Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups
DIS – Defence Intelligence Service
DFID – Britain’s Department for International Development
DOD – US Department of Defense 
ELJ – Emergency Loya Jirga 
EU – European Union 
FATA – Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
G-8 – Group of Countries with largest economies
GCHQ – General Central Head Quarters (Britain’s Intelligence Centre)
ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross
IOM - International Organisation for Migration
ISAF – International Security Assistance Force
ISI – Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (of Pakistan) 
MI6 – British Secret Service (International) 
MMA – Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal
MOD – Britain’s Ministry of Defence
NA – Northern Alliance
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NIFA – National Islamic Front for Afghanistan
NGO – Non Governmental Organisation 
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NSD –  National Directorate of Security (of Afghanistan). Also known as 
“Amniat”
NSP – National Solidarity Programme
NWFP – North West Frontier Province 
PDPA – People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PRT – Provincial Reconstruction Team
RAWA – Revolutionary Afghan Women’s Association
R2P - Right to Protect
RPG – Rocket Propelled Grenade
SIS – Secret Intelligence Service 
UNAMA – United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan 
UNCHS - United Nations Centre for Human Settlements 
UNODCCP – United Nations Office on Drug Control and Crime 
USAID – US Agency for International Development 
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GLOSSARY *
Fez - Prayer cap worn beneath turban 
Kishmesh – Nut and fruit mixture 
Pashtunwali (qaumi narkh) – the code of custom and honour governing 
pashtun tribes. This also functions as a body of laws for dispute resolution 
and a code of behaviour. The Pashtunwali may vary from tribe to tribe, each 
of which may retain distinct characteristics. Local elites and notables within 
and among tribes might use Pashtunwali as a means of providing a system 
of local governance. Pashtunwali is also a means to foster cohesions among 
major tribes. 
Pashtun – The largest tribal society in the world which is around 15 to 25 
million people who straddle the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
Most Pashtuns are Sunnite Muslims and their language is Pashtu. Some 
Pashtuns now speak dari (a dialect of farsi) meaning there are less Pashtu 
speakers than the number of Pashtu ethnic group members. The reference 
for all Pashtuns is the Pashtunwali code of honour and custom, as well as the 
belief in a common ancestor, Qais Abdur Rashid. As such, Pashtuns believe 
in the idea of a social structure segmented by lines of descent from this 
common ancestor. The two major lines are the Durrani and the Ghilzai and 
these two groups account for over two thirds of all Afghan Pathans. These 
groups are then further divided into tribes, sub tribes (as demonstrated by 
the use of suffixes ‘khel’ or ‘khail’, or ‘zai’), clans and extended families. 
Patou – Large scarf or rug worn around the shoulders 
Qaum – The word ‘qaum’ relates to the solidarity group that an individual 
feels they belong to. In pashtun society the word ‘qaum’ can be used to name 
tribal branches and sub-branches. Hence the word can be mixed up with the 
meaning of ‘tribe’ when in fact it relates more to a communal group, village, 
clan, extended family or professional network. 
Spin Giri – The word spin giri means ‘white beard’. Hence these are 
the most respected members of a community or within a tribe. A jirga 
is normally composed of spin giri and the influence of tribal elders is 
maintained by keeping the support of their constituency. Spin Giri can 
enhance their influence by having links with influential figures whether in 
government, or with important elders, khans or maliks of the region. 
Ulema – Religious Leaders 
Wakeel – a title which can be achieved by an influential khan or malik, eg by 
becoming a member of a Loya Jirga. 
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Jirga – This is the traditional decision making body in Pashtun Afghanistan. 
Jirgas are temporary bodies created for a special task, normally to solve 
disputes among tribes, sub tribes, clans, families, or individuals, as well 
as between government and tribes. The jirga is a means for negotiation 
and dialogue to take place so that stakeholders from different tribes and 
networks can engage with each other to solve disputes, gain resources, 
influence political processes or reach consensus on important issues. On a 
tribal level the jirga expresses the egalitarian ideals of Pashtun society. 
Loya Jirga – A Loya Jirga (or Greater Jirga) is an extremely rare occurrence, 
is countrywide and is initiated by the central authority. It normally includes 
representatives of all ethnic and tribal groups, and regions. Previously, 
the Loya Jirgas were initiated by Afghan Kings. However in the wake of 
September 11 the Emergency Loya Jirga, held in June 2002, decided upon 
the Transitional Administration while the Constitutional Loya Jirga held in 
December 2003 / 2004 approved the new Afghan Constitution. 
Shura – This term was once used for the gathering of Islamic dignitaries 
such as mullahs and ulema. But after the Soviet war the term began to be 
used for many types of gatherings, including those associated with the 
mujahideen. Hence the term began to compete with traditional Pashtun 
terms such as jirga. Today the term shura is used for all kinds of official 
gatherings and every tribe (both Pashtun and non Pashtun) has its own 
shura. Outside assistance is only then accepted when the tribal shura is 
unable to solve a dispute. Shuras are fairly stable structures which usually 
exist long term; more like a Council that has leadership and is comprised 
of influential people. More recently, shuras have adapted to government 
structures and can exist on village, district and province level. Often shuras 
are also set up externally (eg by NGOs) to assist in reconstrution projects. 
Like jirgas, shuras tend to be all male. Female shuras are newer and tend 
to be set up externally. Recently, groups we might in the west consider to 
be social or cultural organizations have also used the term shura. Eg Youth 
shura or Handicap shura. 
*  with apologies to Conrad Schetter and Susanne Schmeidl
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